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Abstract 
New Labour presented Nato's Kosovo campaign in 1999 as Britain's first war fought 
for purely humanitarian reasons, and this framing of the Nato campaign seemed to 
become the dominant image of the conflict in the British media. This study uses a 
framing conceptual framework to analyse the British media's coverage of the Kosovo 
Conflict, and tries to identify hegemonic influences on that media coverage; the 
analysis therefore works on a cultural and political level. The study uses framing as it 
has been used in previous social-political studies, as a tool for analysing whether 
Nato's framing of their campaign dominated the media discourse, in line with the 
hegemonic model. The objectives of the study are to analyse whether the media were 
sufficiently independent from the Nato perspective to provide the public with a 
balanced and informed view of Nato's Kosovo campaign; whether the humanitarian 
aspect of the Nato campaign brought a change in the traditional reporting of Britain at 
war in the UK media; whether the reorganisation of the Nato media operation brought 
an improved coverage for Nato in the second half of their campaign, and whether a 
newspaper being editorially anti-war affected the rest of its content to any noticeable 
degree. A triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research methods has led to the 
conclusion that the British media over-relied on Nato sources, and usually reported 
from a Nato perspective, in line with the hegemonic model, but provided a certain 
level of plurality in their opinions, and reporting of events, with Nato collateral 
damage receiving an especially prominent coverage. These findings seem to be in 
line with most recent research on the US and UK media when their nation is at war, 
although conclusions made by researchers with different expectations and 
interpretations, using different samples and methodologies, often lead to contrasting 
opinions on the performance of the media. 
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1. Introduction 
Introduction 
From March 24th to June loth, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) 
conducted a military air campaign which was presented by the Nato countries as a 
campaign to protect ethnic-Albanian civilians from the Serb military in Kosovo; in the 
United Kingdom (UK) New Labour portrayed it as a new kind of war, one fought for 
humanitarian reasons rather than strategic. The main focus of this thesis is to analyse 
how the British media framed Nato's Kosovo campaign. Although the media face 
several influences on their news reporting, this study will focus on how much the 
media professionals were influenced by the Nato political and military information, 
and whether there was evidence of ideology in their reporting; either a traditional 
ideology or one in transition. 
Nato was set up in 1949 to defend Western interests during the Cold War, and in 1999 
was an alliance of nineteen countries; the Kosovo Conflict was the first co-ordinated 
operation between all members in their fifty years history. Nato was led during the 
campaign by Secretary General, Javier Solana, although the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, was in charge of the 
military forces. The British military campaign was organised by the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD). The MoD was led by the Secretary of State for Defence, George 
Robertson. During the Kosovo Conflict, the MoD and Nato provided daily press 
briefings that tried to build and maintain support for the Nato air campaign. The 
conferences undertaken in April will be used in this study to try and identify the Nato 
framing of the conflict, and then to examine how those frames influenced the media 
coverage of the conflict. Framing refers to the way the conflict was defined and 
constructed by the competing factions, and then by the media. For the British media, 
2 
the MoD and Nato conferences offered both opportunities and dilemmas; the 
opportunity was that the quick and easy information was provided by reputable people, 
while the dilemma was that it was often uncorroborated and repetitive. 
Some work has already been done on the Kosovo Conflict using a similar framework 
to this study, but it has not been on the scale of this study, or focused on the British 
media. Some of these studies will be discussed later in the theory section, but Denis 
McQuail offered a brief summary of how he saw the Nato framing of Kosovo when 
he wrote that Nato aimed from the start of the air attack on Yugoslavia to define the 
event as a necessary and `humanitarian' war against Serbian `genocide' of the ethnic- 
Albanians, with the Serbian leadership and military identified as serial aggressors, and 
compared to the Nazis in World War Two. McQuail wrote that the purpose was to 
raise and keep support in public opinion, and to combat alternative frames that 
suggested the Nato campaign was illegal, excessively brutal or an inappropriate way 
to deal with an internal ethnic conflict. McQuail thought the Nato media operation 
was generally successful. ' 
1.2. The American and British governments 
During the Kosovo conflict there were centre-left governments in power in the UK 
and United States (US), and as a major part of this study involves the UK and US 
media's use of government information, this section contains brief outlines of the 
governments in power during the Kosovo conflict. As the US's Democrat 
government was in power before the UK's New Labour government, and the 
Democrat style and strategy influenced New Labour, the Democrats are featured first. 
1 D. McQuail., Mass Communication Theory (4`h edition), (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 2000), p. 344. 
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1.2.1. The US government 
In the US, the Democrats were in power, under the leadership of Bill Clinton, after 
they had ended twelve years of Republican administrations in the 1992 election, and 
then been re-elected with a relatively small majority in 1996. Clinton and his vice- 
president, Albert Gore, were both in their forties when first elected, and represented a 
new generation in American political leadership. They had taken the Democrats to 
the political centre with their `third-way' politics, and had invested large amounts of 
time and money in their communications strategy. 
Clinton was reluctant to send US ground troops into action for peace-keeping 
missions after significant losses in Somalia in 1993,2 but he did help bring the 
Bosnian war to a close in 1995 by sanctioning bombing missions by US planes 
against the Serbs. In 1998, Clinton's presidency was damaged as a result of sexual 
relations with a female White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, and he became only 
the second US president to be impeached by the House of Representatives. He was 
tried in the Senate in January and February, 1999, but was found not guilty of the 
charges brought against him. He apologised to the nation for his actions, and 
continued to enjoy good approval ratings for his job as president. Clinton was going 
to have to stand down at the next election in 2000, after his two terms in office, but 
wanted to provide a foundation for Al Gore to win the presidency, and retain 
Democrat hegemony. 
1.2.2. The UK government 
In the UK, New Labour was elected in 1997 with a huge House of Commons majority 
of 180 seats, in what has been described as Labour's greatest ever electoral victory; it 
2 J. Rentoul., Tony Blair: Prime Minister (London: Time Warner, 2001), p. 514. 
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also ended eighteen years of Conservative government. The New Labour victory was 
largely attributed to the policy changes that had revolutionised the party after their 
1992 election defeat, and brought the party more towards the centre. Tony Blair, the 
New Labour prime minister, and Alistair Campbell, his press secretary since 1994, 
were leading figures in the transformation of Labour to `New Labour', and they also 
became integral to Nato's campaign in Kosovo. Andrew Rawnsley considers the 
major upheaval in the party philosophy was not only undertaken to win the next 
election, but to change the whole British cultural and political structure, and make the 
Conservative party and their ideology redundant; the New Labour strategy to acquire 
hegemony was to re-educate the country `into a nation which would embrace 
progressive values in the twenty-first [century], ' and that Blair had publicly revealed 
his desire to be remembered as having destroyed the Conservative Party. 3 
With regard to foreign policy, `Old Labour' had been isolationist in Bosnia during the 
early 1990s, but New Labour was more interventionist, and this was one of the 
reasons why foreign secretary, Jack Cunningham, a pragmatist, was replaced by 
Robin Cook, an international idealist. 4 However, when Cook announced he intended 
following an `ethical foreign policy', after the election victory, it was quickly 
criticised from within the party. This was mainly because Jonathan Powell, a former 
diplomat and then Blair's Chief of Staff, who was regarded as the most influential 
voice on foreign affairs, was infuriated at what he saw as Cook's `naive and 
simplistic' approach. Powell argued the best way to deal with big powers who abused 
human rights was to speak softly and carry not a large stick, but a carrot. The 
3 A. Rawnsley., Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New Labour, (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 
xiii-xiv. 
4 Ibid., p. 509. 
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pressures from Powell and his allies meant that after just six months in office `Ethics 
man [Cook] had joined the realpolitikers. ' 5 
In place of the ethical foreign policy, Cook declared they would ensure there was a 
moral contribution to foreign policy, and Blair stated New Labour was pursuing a 
`third way' in foreign affairs, a course that was distinct from those taken by Labour 
and Conservative governments in the past. 6 In 1998, Blair formed the Foreign Policy 
Centre, an independent think-tank designed to help construct foreign policy from 
outside the formal mechanisms and control of the Foreign Office. This provided 
senior figures in government with an alternative source of policy to that from the 
Foreign Office researchers. Blair was patron of the new centre, while Cook was its 
president. 7 When the Kosovo conflict developed, the third way strategy saw New 
Labour reluctant to send British military forces into action at first, but once the 
campaign had started Blair became the Nato `hawk'. In the middle of the Nato 
campaign he proposed a new international doctrine, supporting intervention by the 
international community when a sovereign nation was inflicting a humanitarian crisis 
on its people. 
The UK and US governments therefore had very similar ideologies during Nato's 
campaign in Kosovo, with the Democrat party having influenced New Labour's 
election strategy and media operation, and its policies in government. However, their 
situations were very different: New Labour was less than half way through its term of 
office, and had a very large parliamentary majority, while the Democrats were 
5Ibid., p. 169-73. 
6 M. Wickham-Jones., `Labour's trajectory in Foreign Affairs: The Moral Crusade of a Pivotal Power? ', 
in R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones., New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 3-13, p. 3-4. 
7 Ibid., p. 12-13. 
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defending a slender majority, had Clinton emerging from a scandal, and an election 
due in the following year. These differences in situation might have been the reason 
why Blair emerged as the resolute Nato hawk during the Kosovo conflict, to applause 
by most of the British and American media, while Clinton appeared weak and 
indecisive, and was criticised by many in the media. 
1.3. A profile of the UK press, and comparison with the US press 
1.3.1. The UK press 
As the government of the UK moved to the centre, there was a similar occurrence in 
the UK media, with a press that was historically partisan along political lines moving 
toward a more apolitical reporting. James Curran wrote that the character of the 
British press changed through the twentieth century, as the papers became more 
loosely connected to the political parties they traditionally supported. 8 This decline in 
newspaper partisanship increased in the 1990s, as many Conservative papers grew 
disillusioned with the Conservative government under John Major. Colin Seymour- 
Ure wrote that for most of the twentieth century the Conservative press had been 
disproportionately strong, both in number of titles and size of circulation, but in 1997 
there was a massive shift to support for the Labour party, and six papers turned away 
from the Conservatives. 9 Brian McNair also referred to this change in political 
allegiance by the press, and wrote that in 1997 the Guardian, Independent, Financial 
Times (FT), Sun, Mirror and Star supported Labour in the election; the Mail, Express 
and Telegraph supported the Tories; while The Times was neutral. 10 Seymour-Ure 
8 J. Curran, Media and Power, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 67. 
9 C. Seymour-Ure., Are the Broadsheets becoming Unhinged?, in J. Seaton, (ed)., Politics and the 
Media. Harlots and Prerogatives at the Turn of the Millennium, (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 
1998), pp. 43-52, p. 48. 
10 B. McNair., The Sociology of Journalism, (London: Arnold, 1998), p. 107. The source of the 
information was the Audit Bureau of Circulation. 
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wrote that what made the shift in support for Labour look so extraordinary was that in 
the fourteen general elections from 1945 to 1992 they had only once had the support 
of three national dailies. Moreover, during that time there had only been one 
unqualified U-turn by a paper in support of one of the major parties, when the Sun 
switched from Labour to Conservative in 1974. If every paper had changed at every 
election, there could in theory have been 150 changes. ' l 
As well as the newspapers becoming less politically partisan, David Walker believes 
that journalistic loyalty to papers based on their political leanings has also diminished, 
and they are more likely to take jobs for the amount of money on offer than the 
political views of the paper, leading to `a growing sameness' in British journalism. 12 
Moreover, this trend towards less partisanship has also been reflected in the 
readership, and by 1979 over a third of national daily newspaper readers bought 
papers with political allegiances different from their own. 13 
Another change in the British newspaper industry from the 1980s was the 
convergence of newspaper ownership into a small group of large organisations, and 
during Nato's Kosovo campaign, the British press had just five groups controlling 
over four-fifths of national newspaper circulation. 14 Although this private ownership 
included two transnational corporations based in Australia and Canada, Curran and 
Leys believe `The British press routinely makes the assumption that its readers are 
British; that they are mainly interested in what happens in Britain; and that they 
identify with other British people; global media ownership should not be equated with 
'1 C. Seymour-Ure., op. cit, p. 48. 
12 D. Walker., Newspaper Power: A Practitioner's Account, in H. Tumber., Media Power, 
Professionals and Policies, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 236-246, p. 244-5. 
13 J. Curran, Media and Power, op. cit, p. 67. 
14 Ibid., p. 231. 
internationalism. ' 15 The details of ownership at the time of the Nato campaign are 
dealt with in more depth in the table below, which is based on audited circulation 
figures for April 1999,16 and in the sample section of the methodology chapter. 
Newspaper Parent 
company 
Circulation % of total 
circulation 
Prominent 
shareholder 
The Sun News 
International (NI) 
3,746,376 Rupert Murdoch 
Times NI 744,490 
Sunday Times NI 1,402,210 
News of the 
World 
NI 4,176,409 
Total 10,069,485 37.53% 
Daily Mirror Trinity Mirror 2,331,101 Sir Victor Blank 
Sunday Mirror Trinity Mirror 1,964,659 
The People Trinity Mirror 1,645,822 
Daily Record Trinity Mirror 654,556 
Total 6,596,138 24.58% 
Daily Mail Associated 
Newspapers 
2,336,587 Harmsworth 
Family 
Mail on Sunday Associated 
Newspapers 
2,336,587 
Total 4,555,812 16.98% 
The Express United News 
and Media/MAI 
1,099,830 Lord Hollick 
Express on 
Sunday 
United News 
and Media/MAI 
988,720 
Total 2,088,550 7.79% 
Daily Telegraph Hollinger 1,046,813 Conrad Black 
Sunday 
Telegraph 
Hollinger 825,678 
Total 1,872,491 6.96% 
The Guardian Guardian Media 
Group (GMG) 
402,182 
The Observer GMG 402,484 
Total 804,666 3.00% 
Independent 224,494 Tony O'Reill 
Independent on 
Sunday 
251,409 
Total 
, 
475,903 , 1.78% 
15J. Curran, and C. Leys., Media and the decline of liberal corporatism in Britain, in J. Curran, and P. 
Myung-Jin., De-Westernising Media Studies, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 221-236, 
p. 233. 
16 Table from P. Manning., News and News Sources: a Critical Introduction, (London: Sage, 2001), p. 
91. Roy Greenslade updated the competititve situation in the British press in the Media Guardian 
article Murdoch versus Murdoch, on Monday, February 7th, 2005, 
http-. //media. guardian. co. uk/mediaguardian/story/0,7558,140711 1,00. html. 
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Financial Times Pearson 368,384 1.38% 
Total daily and Sunday circulation 26,831,429 
Figure 1.1. Circulation figures for UK newspapers in April, 1999. 
1.3.2. The UK press compared with the American press 
John Lloyd, an FT journalist, considers the American media to be unique in the world, 
in relation to the amount of significance they apportion to fulfilling a democratic role 
in their society. 17 However, some studies have found the British press to be more 
critical of the establishment than the American press, despite the American media 
traditionally priding itself on being a balancing counterweight for the public against 
elite power. For example, Thomas Patterson's comparative study of journalism in 
five nations, including the US and UK, found that American journalists had the most 
freedoms but they also made the `narrowest range of choices about how they would 
cover various hypothetical news situations. ' 18 This narrow objectivism is widely 
acknowledged as a trademark of American reporting, and differentiates it from most 
European countries, which have a tradition of more partisan reporting in line with 
political parties. Research by Weaver and Wilhout also seems to back up this view of 
the American media, as their research found that only seventeen percent of the 
American journalists they interviewed felt their role should be an adversarial one. '9 
Dorman and Farhang consider the modern American media do not live up to the 
watchdog ethic because of the difference in society between when it was articulated, 
in the 1700s, and the modern business orientated US: `The framers of the First 
Amendment could not guess or imagine that the press would someday become 
17 J. Lloyd., What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics, (London: Constable, 2004), p. 141. 
18 W. L. Bennett., News: The Politics of Illusion (5`h edition), (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 30 and 
163. Patterson's study was published in 1993, and the other countries in the study were Germany, Italy 
and Sweden. 
19 Ibid., p. 51. 
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profitable. The mythos surrounding the press, in short, was born before the media 
became big business.... The result is that the journalistic watchdog, which was to be a 
check on the excesses of government, rarely leaves the kennel on matters of foreign 
affairs. '20 
Jeremy Tunstall considers the American reliance on objectivity as a guiding principle 
has hindered their watchdog ethic, and this has meant the British newspaper industry 
is more intrusive and polemical than their American counterparts. 21 Quoting Tunstall, 
Gaunt argues that the British media is freer from legislation than almost any other 
country, and that a voluntary restraint dependent on consensus has been far more 
effective than legislation and compulsion in ensuring good journalistic practise. 22 
This `voluntary restraint dependent on consensus' sounds hegemonic, and in line with 
indexing, but the British media seemed to have become increasingly critical of 
politicians during the 1990s. John Lloyd believes the British press has become too 
critical of politicians, and puts it down to competition from their close proximity to 
each other: `British press and TV news are at least as cynical as their US equivalents. 
They trash politicians at least as much. More so, for the structure of the British press 
is much more competitive than that of the US - indeed, it is more competitive than 
anywhere else in the world'23 
20 W. A. Dorman, and M. Farhang., The U. S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of 
Deference, (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1987), p. 223. 
2' J. Tunstall., Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
352. 
P. Gaunt., Choosing the News: The Profit Factor in News Selection, (New York, Westport and 
London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 22-5. 
23 J. Lloyd., op. cit, p. 101. 
1.3.3. The UK and US press reporting conflicts involving their military 
Michael Nicholson, who has reported sixteen wars for Independent Television News 
(ITN), considers the media to be `one of the four cornerstones of democracy. It 
stands to reason. If we weren't here making public some of the misdemeanours of 
government... and all the other rottennesses in society, who would know about 
it.... but underlying all that is a belief that your pen, camera. . . your writing can 
help 
change the way the world is. By making it public, by showing suffering, by showing 
war... you're going to help change it... ' 24 However, most media researchers have 
found that the bright idealism journalists set out with is dimmed when they cover their 
own country's military at war, by a combination of censorship and a national 
perspective; this view was emphasised by Zaller and Chiu: `It is a truism that 
journalists find it difficult to report critically on government activity during foreign 
policy crises. They must contend not only with officials who strain to control the 
news but also with the fear that tough reporting will undermine the government's 
ability to deal with the crisis. As a result, journalists often simply `rally "round the 
flag" and whatever policy the government favours. '25 This section offers evidence to 
show how the initial enthusiasm of journalists to report the facts about conflicts 
involving their military is often compromised by military controls, their own feelings 
as they bond with the military, and editors at home that do not think their reports 
would be welcomed by their readers and viewers. 
24 G. McLaughlin., The War Correspondent, (London and Sterling Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 14 
25 J. Zaller, and D. Chiu., Government's Little Helper: U. S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 
1946-1999, in B. L. Nacos, R. Y. Shapiro, and P. Isernia., Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass 
Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21" Century, (Boulder, 
New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 61-84, p. 61. 
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Daniel Hallin considers the style of war reporting developed by the US and UK media 
combines strategic reporting heavily dependent on official sources, viewing the world 
from the centralised perspective of those who managed the global war apparatus, with 
a populist perspective which concentrated on and often glorified the `GI' or the 
`Tommy' and the ordinary family on the `home front. ' Hallin considers the present 
age of US and UK `limited war' reporting is still influenced by the `total wars' seen 
earlier in the century, with the initial stages presented to the public as replays of the 
Second World War: `many of the conflicts over wartime communication arise from 
the clash between expectations based in the culture of total war and the political 
reality of limited war. '26 Like Hallin, Stephen Badsey also believes that 
disagreements between the military and the media during conflicts usually revolve 
around how much censorship the military should be able to invoke in limited military 
operations that do not pose a threat to national security. 27 
In the Korean war (1950-3), the World War Two total war influence still seems to 
have been strong, as American journalists did not want to be left to censor themselves, 
as they believed competition between themselves might lead them to disclose 
information that could compromise their military. McLaughlin explained that in 
Korea `journalists expressed uneasiness with the trust General MacArthur was 
prepared to invest in them to report `responsibly', and to censor and regulate 
themselves... ' 28 Just a few years later, the biggest break-down in the British 
government/military-media relationship during a twentieth century British military 
operation occurred, when several papers opposed British involvement in a military 
26 D. C. Hallin., The Media and War, in J. Corner., P. Schlesinger., and R. Silverstone., International 
Media Research: A Critical Survey, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 206-23 1, p. 209. 
27 S. Badsey., The Media, the Military and Public Opinion, in S. Badsey., (ed)., The Media and 
International Security, (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 23 8-252, p. 241. 
28 G. McLaughlin., op. cit, p. 68-72. 
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operation against General Nasser of Egypt in the Suez canal during 1956. Tony Shaw 
considered the `damage which papers like the Manchester Guardian, Observer, Daily 
Mirror and Daily Herald inflicted on the government's claim of acting in the national 
and free world's interest was considerable. ' 29 However, Shaw did also point out that 
the British media were excluded from the war zone during the military operation 
(Musketeer Revise), 30 and the overall media coverage was consistently more 
supportive of the government policy than public opinion. Shaw therefore did not 
think the media coverage had influenced the premature ending of the operation, and 
Suez was `as much an illustration of the innate weakness of the British press, its 
structure and modus operandi, as it is a celebration of its in-built strength. ' 31 
The US's next major overseas conflict after Korea was in Vietnam, and their defeat in 
that war was blamed by members of the American government and military on the 
negative media coverage they believed their military campaign had received in the US, 
after there was little control or censorship on journalistic movement and reporting, 
and some journalists had used their relative freedom to question the administration's 
version of their campaign. However, like Shaw's analysis of the media coverage of 
Suez, most research on the media coverage of Vietnam has found that it was not as 
critical or unpatriotic as made out by those who accused the media of losing the US 
the war, and most critical reports sent by journalists from Vietnam never even made it 
into the news, let alone the front pages. McLaughlin considers the inquest into the 
American media's coverage of Vietnam, and the negative verdict, influenced the 
military's relationship with the media in future US and UK conflicts, starting with the 
29 T. Shaw., Eden, Suer and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis, 
(London and New York: Taurus, 1996), p. 94. 
30 Ibid., p. 78-9. 
31 Ibid., p. 92-4. 
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UK's Falklands campaign. 32 However, as Shaw emphasised on Suez, and Howard 
Tumber has pointed out on World War Two, 33 the British government and military 
had imposed similar restrictions on the media in its conflicts prior to the American 
war in Vietnam. 
The British media was generally more supportive of the Falklands campaign than they 
had been of Suez, and only the Morning Star newspaper opposed the war, while 
others gave broad support to the government, albeit with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm. 34 However, this did not prevent the British government and military 
introducing strict controls on the access of journalists to the war zone, and as the 
journalists also faced delays in despatching their copy, this meant their ability to 
report the war was severely impeded. Moreover, David Morrison and Howard 
Tumber wrote that journalists who had sailed and gone to battle with the British 
military in the Falklands felt their balance and impartiality went out the window 
because they were with the troops, and were more a part of the operation than 
observers; the writers considered that values `which serve an occupation well in 
peacetime or amid the pain of someone else's wars do not necessarily serve the 
individual journalist well in the midst of his war. '35 Max Hastings, who was with the 
first wave of British troops to enter the Falklands capital, Port Stanley, seemed to 
confirm Morrison and Tumber's view when he later said that being at war with troops 
from your own country meant `the bond is like nothing else. ' 36 
32 G. McLaughlin., op. cit, p. 71-2. 
33 H. Tumber., Prisoners of News Values? Journalists, professionalism, and identification in times of 
war, in S. Allan., and B. Zelizer., Reporting War: Journalism in wartime, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 190-205, p. 190. 
34 D. Mercer., The Media on the Battlefield, in D. Mercer., G. Mungham, and K. Williams., The Fog of 
War: the Media on the Battlefield, (London: Heinemann, 1987), pp. 1-16, p. 7. 
35 D. E. Morrison and H. Tumber., Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the 
Falklands Conflict, (London, Newbury Park, Beverly Hills and New Delhi: Sage, 1988), p. 99-104. 
3' Max Hastings., BBC I breakfast news, 5/4/02. 
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The American government and military seem to have concluded from the experiences 
and outcomes of the Vietnam and Falklands wars that they needed to control the 
media more rigidly than they had done in previous conflicts, as they brought in much 
tougher restrictions on media access to the war zone for their campaigns in Grenada 
and Panama during the 1980s, with much tighter restrictions on the media than had 
been imposed during Vietnam. In the American military's Urgent Fury invasion of 
Grenada in 1983, the media were kept out of the war zone completely until hostilities 
had finished, while in Panama in 1989 the American military used a pooling system 
for journalists similar to that introduced by the British military for their Falklands 
campaign. However, A. T. Thrall has vigorously countered the `conventional wisdom' 
that the American military introduced more restrictions on the media in response to 
Vietnam, as he argued that Vietnam `did not prompt innovation or change in military 
public affairs policies, ' and the military did not have a pre-conceived media policy for 
their Grenada operation. Thrall argued that changes, such as the pool system that was 
used in Panama, were brought in after the Grenada `media-lockout' angered the 
American media, and led to them using information from critical sources. 37 
The pool system was again used in the Gulf War, which Thrall considers `was both 
the most widely covered war in history and the one in which the US government 
imposed the greatest restrictions on the press short of outright censorship. '38 John 
Fialka, who reported on the ground during the war for the Wall Street Journal, agreed 
with Thrall's verdict on the media's freedom: `We were not just going to write history; 
we were about to make history. . Was this a rosy moment 
in military-media relations? 
Hardly. We were an indigestible lump being fed into a military press-handling system 
37 A. T. Thrall., War in the Media Age, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc, 2000), pages 77- 
161, summarised on pages 232-236. 
38 Ibid., p. 163. 
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that was woefully short of resources and teetering on the verge of collapse. The 
Pentagon had insisted that in this war reporters must be accompanied by military 
escorts, but it had not provided enough seasoned public affairs escorts and vehicles to 
do the job. '39 Peter Braestrup thought American journalists in the Gulf War wanted 
the same kind of freedoms as in Vietnam, which represented a golden age to them, but 
this was denied them by the military pool system, which had been initiated by the 
British military during the Falklands War. Braestrup also explained that the Gulf was 
a very different conflict to Vietnam, which had been a low-intensity conflict against a 
foe who could not easily exploit inadvertent breaches of security, and there had 
seldom been more than forty American journalists out in the field on a given day. 40 In 
contrast, as noted by John Fialka, the Gulf War was a `Big League buildup', the foe 
seemed equipped to exploit any revelations, the distances were vast compared to 
Vietnam, the strain on communications and logistics across the desert was 
considerable, and there were hundreds of journalist who wanted to cover the conflict. 
Fialka noted that the number of journalists who see `action' in American wars has 
always been small anyway, and most report the conflict from a safe distance. 41 
Braestrup also considered that as many journalists were victims of their ignorance of 
military affairs as manipulation by the military, as many journalists who had no 
experience of covering wars were sent to report from the battle zone, and military 
language was like a foreign language to them. 42 
David Morrison concluded the UK had just a little more censorship and reporting 
restrictions than the US during the Gulf War, but American journalists were angrier 
39 JT Fialka., Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War, (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 
1992), p. 4-5. 
40 Peter Braestrup, foreword in Ibid., pp. ix-xiv, p. xii. 
41 J. J, Fialka., op. cil, p. 55-6. 
42 Peter Braestrup., op. cit, p. xii. 
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about the restrictions than the British journalists. 43 Sean McKnight believed the 
British media was less critical than the American media about the Gulf War 
restrictions, partly because the MoD provided the British journalists with better 
communications facilities to relay their reports to their editors, and partly because of 
the `greater cynicism of British journalists, who expect governments to be secretive 
and manipulative and do not believe - in contrast to their American colleagues - that 
they have a special constitutional status. '44 
During the Kosovo Conflict, the Serbs largely did the job of keeping journalists out of 
the war-zone for Nato, when they expelled all but a few, who were allowed to stay in 
Belgrade, and were only allowed out under Serb escort. This situation, with the Serbs 
controlling access to the war zone, even brought Alistair Campbell to ask journalists 
why they were not entering Kosovo to get the real story, as news of Nato `collateral 
damage' incidents threatened to lose Nato the media war. However, at the same time, 
Campbell was also working to control the journalists' perceptions of the Nato military 
campaign, so they reported Nato's version of events. Philip Knightley wrote that 
there were over 2500 correspondents present at the end of the Kosovo Conflict, 
compared to a peak of 500 in the Vietnam War, and although correspondents never 
had so many sources as in the Kosovo conflict, in the end the public `drowned in 
wave after wave of images that added up to nothing. '45 Writing after Nato's Kosovo 
campaign, Mirjana Skoco and William Woodger also considered Nato to have 
controlled the Western media coverage, concluding that the `military have been 
learning the lessons of how to deal with the media, and the media have been coming 
43 D. E. Morrison., Television and the Gulf War, (London, Paris, and Rome: John Libbey, 1992), p. 72-3. 
as S. McKnight., Media Perceptions of Other Forces: Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War, in S. Badsey., The 
Media and International Security, (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 91-113, p. 93. 
J. J. Fialka also wrote how the British journalists had better access to communications in the Gulf War 
than American journalists. J. J. Fialka., op. cit, p. 63. 
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to terms with selling the `positive' side of military exploits. In tacit acknowledgement 
of past mistakes, military personnel are now under orders to provide information, and 
not to lie or grandstand. The new `openness' has been widely welcomed by the media, 
though ultimately, for all the rhetoric, it is the same as usual, with restrictions, 
misinformation and manipulation. This should come as no surprise, since the aim of 
the military is to present the case for prosecuting war effectively, not to question 
whether war is the solution. '46 Changes in the military's attitude to media relations 
were confirmed by a military source, Lieutenant Colonel Angus Tanner, who wrote: 
`It is therefore understood that it is better to break adverse news early than to try and 
cover things up. When information is not forthcoming, speculation will often take its 
place. This can be just as damaging, if not more so. The military has recognised that 
the media, like nature, abhors a vacuum. It is better that stories should be released as 
fully and swiftly as the situation allows than to stay silent and hope that events will 
move on.... Truth is the most important of these principles. The temptation to deceive, 
evade or even lie is, on occasions, very powerful. This has to be resisted. Any short- 
term gain will be swiftly overtaken by the longer term disadvantage of loss of 
integrity, damaged relationships and, as likely as not, hostile media coverage. '47 
To conclude this look at the British and American media-military relationship 
between World War Two and Nato's Kosovo campaign, it should be stressed that the 
general consensus amongst media researchers is that advances in communications 
technology have not allowed the media to become more independent of the military 
as P. Knightley., The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the 
Crimea to Kosovo, (London: Prion, 2000), (2nd ed), p. 502-4. 
46 M. Skoco., and W. Woodger., The Military and the Media, in P. Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds): 
Degraded Capability. The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 
2000), pp. 79-87, p. 86. 
47 Lt. Col. Angus Tanner., Learning the Lessons of the 20`x' Century: The Evolution in British Military 
Attitude to the Media on Operations and in War, in M. Connolly and D. Welch., War and the Media: 
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during conflicts since the American military campaign in Vietnam. Although the 
evidence suggests there have usually been tight controls on media access to war zones, 
with Vietnam being an exception to the twentieth century norm, to counter better 
communications equipment available to journalists, the military have brought in even 
tougher restrictions on media access to the war-zone. On the evidence of recent 
conflicts, it is therefore a victory for military restrictions on free movement over 
advances in communications technology. 48 However, as well as bringing in greater 
restrictions on the movement of the media, the military have also recognised a need to 
react to the changing media situation, and that it is now necessary for the military to 
provide the media with fast and accurate information in a way that may not have been 
so important before the dawn of the twenty-four hour news age. This is because the 
media have shown they will look to the enemy for information, or criticise the 
military operation themselves, if there is a lack of credible information being 
presented by their military. So, far from the UK and US media being compliant 
members of the national military effort when their nations go to war, the military have 
learnt from previous conflicts that if they do not provide the media with fast and 
accurate information they face the prospect of the enemy gaining more media time for 
their information and frames. 
Therefore, as stated in the introduction, and supported by the above evidence, UK and 
US journalists face several obstacles when they file news reports from war-zones 
where their country's military is involved. This begins with the military's attitude to 
Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003, (London and New York: I. B. Taurus, 2005), pp. 264-274, p. 
271-2. 
48 For a recent article on the media-state relations during military conflicts, which agrees with this view 
of the media-military relationship, and also draws on Hallin's spheres of media dialogue theory, see 
Piers Robinson., Researching US media-state relations and twenty-first century wars, in S. Allan and B. 
Zelizer., op. cit, pp. 96-112. 
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the media, and how much freedom of movement they allow the journalists; then the 
emotions of the journalists, as they have to report on men they have probably bonded 
with, and who are fighting for their country; and finally the decisions of the owners 
and editors of their media organisation, who may not think that their readers want to 
hear critical news about their nation's military. The following model shows how this 
system is likely to function, with influences that might cause informative and 
unbiased reporting on the top, and influences that may result in a relaying of the 
official line or biased reporting on the bottom. The table works left to right, from the 
military, who are the subjects of the news, through the journalists and media 
organisations who report the news, to the audience that reads and analyses the news; 
as it was thought this was the usual direction for information from the war zone to 
reach the public at home, via the news media. 
Try to show the Try to show the 
reality of war. reality of war. 
Pride in work. Pride in work. 
Public service spirit. Public service spirit. 
Antagonism towards Antagonism towards 
government/military. government/military. 
Belief in Belief in democracy Belief in democracy 
democracy and and freedom of and freedom of 
freedom of speech. speech. speech. 
MILITARY--+ JOURNALISTS--+ ORGANISATION--> 
Protecting Protecting soldiers. Protecting soldiers. 
themselves. 
Protecting Protecting Protecting operations. 
operations. operations. 
Belief that war Belief that war goals Belief that war goals 
goals override override press override press 
press freedom. freedom. freedom. 
Distrust of Patriotism Patriotism 
journalists 
Believe journalists Bonding with Concerns over 
are a hindrance military. sales/advertisers. 
Receive an 
informed and 
balanced 
covera 
AUDIENCE 
Receive a 
limited and 
biased cove 
Figure 1.2. Influences on journalistic reporting of military operations involving their 
nation. 
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1.4. The Kosovo Conflict 
Although Nato's military campaign in Kosovo started in 1999, its origins can be 
traced back to the earlier wars in the Balkans between 1991-95. The Serbo-Croat War 
(1991-2) and Bosnian War (1992-95) were initially framed in most Western countries 
as conflicts between equally aggrieved ethnic groups, but as the Serbs used their 
superior armoury to gain ascendancy, and were involved in major humanitarian 
abuses, such as the Srebrenica massacre, they were blamed more for the continuing 
violence by the British and American media. The status of Kosovo was left out of the 
Dayton peace deal that ended those wars, and internal unrest developed through the 
1990s, after the Serbian government led by Slobodan Milosevic took autonomy away 
from Kosovo, whose population was predominately Muslim. This erupted into civil 
war in 1998, and although the international community tried to negotiate a peace 
settlement during 1998 and early 1999, by March 1999 the Nato countries agreed that 
military intervention was necessary. This section provides an overview of the 
sequence of events that led to the Nato campaign, and then what happened during and 
after it. 
1.4.1. The build up to the Nato air campaign 
In February 1998, Robert Geldard, the US special envoy to the Balkans, praised 
Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic's adherence to the Dayton accords that ended 
the previous Balkans wars, and denounced the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) as 
`without any question a terrorist organisation. ' Within days, the Serbs attacked two 
suspected KLA villages, Cirez and Likosane, killing twenty-six villagers. 
49 Two days 
later, Serb police killed fifty-eight ethnic-Albanian members of one family, the 
49 W. Shawcross., Deliver us from Evil. Warlords and Peace-keepers in a World of Endless Conflict, 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2000), p. 327. 
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Jasharis; some of whom were suspected of being KLA members. When Robin Cook 
went to visit Milosevic, in an attempt to broker a cease-fire, Milosevic upset Cook by 
not keeping their appointment, and then denied his forces had over-reacted in their 
response to the KLA attacks. 50 These events can be seen as the beginning of the cycle 
of violence and failed diplomacy that culminated in the start of the Nato air campaign. 
The KLA ranks grew as a result of the Serb crackdown, and this led to an escalation 
in the conflict, with the Serbs increasing their military activity over the summer of 
1998. In September, the Nato countries, led by the US, threatened the Serbs with 
military action unless they stopped their offensive against the KLA. Milosevic agreed 
to the Nato demands in October, and pulled his forces back to avert the threat of 
military action by Nato. 51 The Kosovo conflict all but disappeared from the British 
media for three months, despite the fact that the cease-fire the West had hoped for 
never really took place; Wesley Clark wrote that the KLA ignored `entreaties by the 
international observers, ' while the Serbs `hadn't followed through with the 
withdrawal of heavy weapons from the police, as they had promised. '52 
It was only after Serb forces killed forty-five ethnic-Albanians in the village of Racak 
on January 15th, 1999, that the British news organisations again considered Kosovo to 
be headline news. Following the Racak killings, the international community set up 
peace talks to be held in Rambouillet, France, and warned the Serbs and ethnic- 
Albanians that it was their last chance to find a peaceful solution. Despite this, both 
parties refused to comply with Western demands. A second meeting then took place 
50 T. Judah., Kosovo: War and Revenge, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 140. 
51 W. Bartlett., `Simply the right thing to do': Labour goes to war, in R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones., 
op. cit, pp. 131-46, p. 133-5. 
52 W. Clark., Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, (Oxford: Public Affairs, 
2001), 'p. 158. 
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in Paris, and after persuasion from Madelaine Albright and James Rubin of the US 
state department, Hasim Thaci signed the Rambouillet Accords for the ethnic- 
Albanians. However, the Serbs still refused, claiming a late appendix allowing Nato 
forces free access to all of Yugoslavia made signing impossible for them; although 
some analysts believe the Serbs did not have any inclination to sign, as they thought 
that agreeing to let the ethnic-Albanians have autonomy in Kosovo would eventually 
lead to Kosovo becoming independent from Serbia. 53 The ethnic-Albanians' signing 
of the accord, and the Serb refusal, meant that Nato was given a clear mandate to use 
military force against the Serbs. 
1.4.2. Nato's air campaign 
The Nato air campaign began at 1900 Greenwich Mean Time on March 24th, 1999, 
and continued for seventy-eight days; 38,004 sorties were flown, with 1,618 of these 
undertaken by British planes. Out of the above sorties, 10,484 were strike sorties, 
with 1,008 by British planes. 829 aircraft from fourteen countries were used. 54 Peter 
Gowan wrote that `The Nato air war was overwhelmingly a US effort. The US flew 
over 80 per cent of the strike sorties, over 90 per cent of the electronic warfare 
missions, fired over 80 per cent of the guided air weapons and launched over 95 per 
cent of the Cruise missiles. '55 
Nato were frustrated at the start of their campaign, as weather limited the 
effectiveness of their aircraft, and Milosevic refused to capitulate. Daalder and 0' 
Hanlon, who believe Nato did the right thing, but in the wrong way, wrote that 
53 For example, J. Eyal., Kosovo: killing the myths after the killing has subsided, in 
Rusi Journal, Volume 145, Part 1,2000, pp. 20-7, p. 21. 
sa G. Robertson., Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis, (MoD: 1999), p. 10. 
ss P. Gowan., The War and its Aftermath, in P. Hammond., and E. S. Herman., Degraded Capability: 
The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 39-55, p. 39. 
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`Operation Allied Force was in its early weeks a textbook case of how not to wage a 
war. The blindness of NATO's major members to the possibility that the war might 
not end quickly was astounding. '56 Evidence of Nato's lack of preparation for a long 
campaign has also come from a number of other sources, including high ranking Nato 
officers. For example, General Wesley Clark became one of the biggest critics of the 
early Nato campaign; Clark asserted: `Any first-year military student could point to 
the more obvious inconsistencies between our efforts and the requirements posed by 
the Principles of War. The air campaign began with one objective - drive the Serbs 
back to the negotiations at Rambouillet - and quickly moved toward other aims, such 
as halting the ethnic cleansing, and then, after the NATO summit, the five conditions 
endorsed by the G-8 foreign ministers -a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all Serb forces, 
the return of all refugees and displaced persons, the presence of a NATO-led 
international force, and subsequent participation in a political settlement. '57 Admiral 
James Ellis, Commander of Nato's southern forces during the war, also admitted they 
had got it wrong at the start, with no coherent campaign plan, target set or even the 
staff to formulate a detailed plan when Milosevic failed to capitulate. General Klaus 
Naumann, who was head of Nato's Military Committee for part of the Nato campaign, 
also criticised the Nato political leaders for only being prepared for an operation, not a 
war. 58 
To add to Nato's disarray at the start of their campaign, the air bombardment was the 
catalyst for a massive offensive by Serb forces on the ground in Kosovo. The Serb 
offensive and Nato air campaign led to thousands of civilians fleeing their homes, and 
56 I. H. Daalder., and M. E. 0' Hanlon., Winning Ugly: Nato's War to Save Kosovo, (Washington D. C.: 
Brookings, 2000), p. 19. 
57 W. Clark., op. cit, p. 427. 
58 I. H. Daalder and M. E. 0' Hanlon., op. cit, p. 104-5. 
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ethnic-Albanian refugees citing Serb atrocities became the main focus for the British 
media in the first weeks of Nato's air campaign. The refugee exodus led to 
allegations of Serb `ethnic cleansing' by New Labour and Nato, while the Serbs 
claimed the refugees were fleeing the Nato air campaign. Wesley Clark considered 
the `Serb ethnic cleansing of Pristina in the early days of April... [to have been] ... one 
of Milosevic's greatest strategic blunders. It fully engaged Western opinion, and 
while it continued, made a strong impression. It was a key factor in sustaining the air 
campaign during the early weeks before the NATO summit. '59 
The Nato attack on an ethnic-Albanian refugee convoy on April 14th exacerbated the 
early difficulties Nato faced, as the pictures of dead and injured refugees, together 
with Nato's contradictory explanations to the media, led to widespread criticism of 
Nato's strategy of only flying above 15,000 feet when over Yugoslavian air space. 
There was also a growing disquiet in the UK government about Nato's refusal to send 
in ground troops; and in this regard the UK government seemed to have followed the 
majority of UK newspaper opinion. However, the Nato leadership did not change its 
strategy, and instead intensified the air attack with more aircraft, sorties and a wider 
range of targets. Rawnsley believes that after the Washington summit in late April, 
Blair felt he was isolated in his calls for ground troops, and by May, `The British 
politicians had surrendered virtually all control over the air campaign .... The conflict 
had switched to American auto-pilot. '60 In early May, there were several Nato 
collateral damage incidents, including the bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade; but Blair reacted to the resulting media coverage by accusing the British 
59 W. Clark., op. cit, p. 447. 
60 A, Rawnsley., op. cit, p. 277-8. 
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media of showing `refugee fatigue, '61 while his personal assistant, Anji Hunter, called 
on journalists to show some patriotism. 
Although the intensified Nato campaign was causing more `collateral damage' 
incidents, it was also starting to enjoy greater success in its campaign, and a large 
force of Nato ground troops were also being assembled on the borders of Kosovo 
towards the end of May, after Wesley Clark had convinced Clinton a credible ground 
force should be deployed for a possible invasion. This escalation in the Nato 
campaign increased the pressure on Milosevic; as did his indictment for war crimes 
by the Hague in the same period, and diplomatic efforts were increased by the G8 
nations. 62 Milosevic was given an ultimatum after some initial negotiations, and in 
early June he agreed to most of the Nato demands, including a Serb military 
withdrawal from Kosovo; the Nato air campaign then ended on June 1 Oth. The 
increasing ferocity of the Nato air campaign, the threat of Nato ground troops, Serb 
anti-war protests, his indictment, and the loss of Russian support 63 are thought to be 
the main factors in Milosevic's decision to sign the peace deal, although Nato also 
gave some concessions to the Serbs. 64 
1.4.3. After the Nato campaign 
Nato had come through a difficult campaign, and as the Serb military left Kosovo, and 
the ethnic-Albanian refugees returned, the Nato leaders declared their campaign a 
6 Ibid., J. 280. Blair accused the media of `refugee fatigue' at a speech to the Newspaper Society on 
May10. 
62 W. Clark., op. cit, p. 295. 
63 It is thought that Milosevic had hoped the Russians would support him more, and at first they did, 
with Yeltsin threatening to deploy several war-fighting vessels to the Mediterranean, and warning that 
the West risked starting World War Three. 
6' These were the United Nations (UN) being given a central role in the administration of Kosovo, 
Russia being given a role in the peace-keeping force, and Nato forces not having free access throughout 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). A. Roberts., Nato's `Humanitarian War' over Kosovo, in 
Survival, 41 (3), Autumn, 1999, pp. 102-23., p. 117. 
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success. However, the conflict was not over for those on the ground in Kosovo, 
because as the Nato troops went in to Kosovo, the Serb military left, along with many 
Serb civilians who had lived there. They feared revenge from the ethnic-Albanians, 
and those fears were realised in the first year after the war, with `revenge' attacks on 
Serbs leading to the Serb population in Kosovo dropping from at least 200,000 to no 
more than 100,000. Most of the Serbs who stayed in Kosovo moved up to the north, 
between the town of Mitroviza and the Serb border. This meant that Kosovo was 
largely ethnically divided between a small pocket of Serbs in the north, and the rest of 
Kosovo in the hands of the ethnic-Albanian majority. 65 
During the Nato campaign, about 3,000 ethnic-Albanians are thought to have been 
killed, and 600 Serbs, although the exact number is still not known. Nato had claimed 
they had destroyed 120 tanks, 220 armoured personnel carriers (APCS), and 450 
artillery and mortar weapons during the campaign, but the real figures turned out to be 
fourteen tanks, nineteen APCS and twenty artillery and mortar pieces. 66 A House of 
Commons Defence Committee report after the war criticised Nato for not being ready 
for the humanitarian catastrophe, and not starting the campaign with greater force: `all 
the evidence suggests that the air campaign accelerated the pace of the disaster. So by 
the end of the campaign, its central purpose was said to be that of dissuading 
Milosevic and his henchmen from directing this brutality and coercing them to 
negotiate a settlement. This aim required quite different tactics, and that confusion of 
purpose dogged the campaign. ' However, paradoxically, it did acknowledge that `an 
65 I. H. Daalder and M. E. 0' Hanlon., op. cit, p. 177. 
66 J Kampfner., Blair's wars, (London: Free, 2003), p. 58. 
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all-out air attack against Serbia on 24 March would have destroyed the cohesion of 
the Alliance. ' 67 
George Robertson conceded there had been tragic incidents caused by Nato in the 
conflict, where civilians were killed, but he also claimed that by keeping collateral 
damage to a minimum the campaign had been successful in an unprecedented way. 68 
Daalder and 0' Hanlon agreed with Robertson, stating the Kosovo death toll was ten 
times less than that from the Bosnian civil war, and so it must be considered a limited 
success. 69 Nicholas Jones believed the clarity of Blair and New Labour's message 
was instrumental in maintaining support for the Nato campaign in the UK, and also 
for convincing the British public the campaign was a success, 70 while Rawnsley 
believed Clinton had shown himself to be too obsessed with opinion polls and focus 
groups. 71 
1.5. The MoD, Nato and Serb information 
This section looks at the organisation and strategy of the British and Nato information 
providers during the Nato campaign, before also detailing some of the content of the 
Serb information that was used in response. This contest for positive media coverage 
was vital to the Nato campaign, as Alistair Campbell pointed out after the conflict: 
`Our enemy, as spokesmen, was Milosevic's media machine, but our judge and jury 
was the Western media. Their editorial decisions over which pictures to run, whether 
67 B. George., The House of Commons Defence Committee Report, Lessons of Kosovo, in Rusi 
Journal, December 2000, Volume 145, Number 6, pp. 12-14, p. 12-13. 
68 G. Robertson., op. cit, p. 11. 
69 I. H. Daalder and M. E. 0' Hanlon; op. cit, p. 195. 
70 N. Jones., The Control Freaks: How New Labour Gets Its Own Way, (London: Politicos, 2002), p. 
210-11. 
71 A. Rawnsley., op. cit, p. 278-89. 
29 
to run them, and how prominently, were of considerable influence. ' 72 Peter Goff 
wrote that journalists were disappointed with the Nato information during the conflict, 
as they `felt the briefings over-simplified the situation to present a "`Good Nato; Bad 
Serbia" picture, '73 although Mark Laity, a BBC journalist at the Nato conferences 
thought that the `challenge for journalists is not to get all worked up because 
somebody has spun you; the challenge is to spot the spin and take it out. '74 Laity's 
opinion was reflected by those journalists interviewed for this study, as they also 
expected Nato to spin their campaign positively. 
1.5.1. The Nato conferences 
During the campaign in Kosovo, Nato conducted a similar media operation to the 
allied forces' media operation during the Gulf War. During the Kosovo campaign, 
the main Nato conferences were held in Brussels, and journalists received a 
communique at 9.30 in the morning, with an update on the military operation, before 
a 10.30 off-camera briefing with Nato spokesperson, Jamie Shea, which was quotable 
by correspondents. There was then the main briefing at 1500, usually with Shea and a 
military spokesperson presenting it. 75 For the first few weeks, Wesley Clark's 
representative, British air commander David Wilby, presented with Shea, but Clark 
wrote that Solana demanded Wilby was replaced after Nato had bombed the Serb 
television studios, because Clark and Wilby had not succeeded in a `public 
explanation of the military value of the [Serb television] transmitters... ' Clark 
thought it was the most `intense and determined' he had seen Solana, and this was an 
'Z A. Campbell., Communications lessons for NATO, the military and media, in Rusi Journal, August 
1999, pp. 31-6, p. 36. 
73 P. Goff., The Kosovo News and Propaganda War, (Vienna: The International Press Institute, 1999), 
17. 
G. McLaughlin., op. cit, p. 120. 
75 E. Brivio., Soundbites and Irony: Nato information is made in London, in P. Goff., op. cit, pp. 514-22, 
p. 517-8. 
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indication of `just how critical the public information operation was. '76 Wilby was 
followed for two weeks by Italian general Giuseppe Marani, and then, in May, 
German general Walter Jertz accompanied Shea. Italian commander, Fabrizio 
Maltinti, was also sent on now and again, to report on Nato's humanitarian mission. 77 
During the muddled Nato explanation for the Djakovica convoy bombing, it became 
apparent there was not enough personnel involved with the Nato media operation, and 
this led to Alistair Campbell being sent out to restructure the Nato media operation. 78 
Rawnsley wrote that under Campbell's authority, a clone of New Labour's 1997 
election machine room was created by knocking through the wall between two rooms, 
so that there would be faster and more coordinated information provided to the 
spokespeople. 79 The Media Operations Centre (MOC) was staffed by 
communications experts from America and Europe, but the biggest contingent was 
British. Civil servants were drafted in from Downing Street, the Foreign Office, the 
Ministry of Defence, and even the Scottish office. 80 Brivio thought the conferences 
were dominated by a strong Anglo-American model of communications policy, and 
they changed after Campbell was sent out to Brussels to re-organise the strategy and 
presentation, with a more coordinated one message a day released from harmonised 
press conferences in London, Brussels and Washington. 
8' Brivio thought it worked 
well in the UK and US, but was questioned in countries such as Italy, Greece, 
Germany and Belgium. 82 
76 W. Clark., op. cit, p. 252. 
" E. Brivio., op. cit, p. 521. 
78 P. Goff., op. cit, p. 543. 
79 P. Knightley., op. cit, p, 512-3. 
80 A. Rawnsley., op. cit, p. 266. 
81 E. Brivio., op. cit, p. 515. 
82 ibid. 
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Robin Brown believes New Labour's media operation became vital for Nato during 
the campaign, because although they had at first studied the Democrat public relations 
system, they had produced a model that in some ways exceeded the US model, and 
this was what Nato relied on during their Kosovo campaign. Brown wrote that the 
`successful prosecution of the war was partly dependent on the orchestrated 
presentation of the war. Indeed the political opposition to the war was deflected via 
presentation and successful presentation sustained the coalition.... The organisation to 
execute this was the imposition of a centralised organisation in which the only 
permitted communication was that in line with the approved line - that was "on 
message. "'ß3 
Shea later described how the MOC was organised in the television documentary, 
Correspondent: How the War was Spun. Shea said that a team of twenty-five worked 
to Campbell's blueprint under Solana: there was a strategy team who directed overall 
policy under the Secretary General, with representatives that spoke on conference 
calls every day; a team working on Grid (planning conferences and speeches around 
important dates or events, and responding to Tanjug); Drafters of articles (for leaders 
to use/opinion pieces in newspapers); Talking heads (monitoring what experts had 
been saying about Nato); Media monitoring (what and how things were said); 
Drafting of lines/messages (Shea said that sometimes he used them, sometimes he 
didn't); and someone analysing Milosevic and the Yugoslav media. 
84 Philip 
Knightley observed that in the `comparatively short history of media management in 
83 R. Brown., Campbell over Kosovo: Mobilization and Media Management in British Foreign Policy, 
(British International Studies Association conference paper, Manchester, December 1999), p. 6-10. 
84 Correspondent., How the War was Spun, (BBC2: 16/10/1999). 
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wartime there can have been no system so skilfully designed to win the propaganda 
war. Nothing was left to chance. ' 85 
Campbell thought the Nato media operation improved in the second half of the 
campaign, writing that Nato had made the mistake of thinking aloud before the facts 
were known after the Djakovica convoy attack, but after his arrival they `demanded 
the facts from the military, got them and stuck to them. ' Campbell believed the 
coordination had improved by the time Nato bombed the Chinese embassy on May 5th, 
and that event therefore reverberated for several days less as a news story than the 
convoy incident. 86 
Shea also thought Campbell's arrival had made the difference, as they had been 
struggling before that, with no coordinated message. 87 Shea explained that by the 
time Nato had their thirteenth `blunder' at the end of May, hitting a block of flats in a 
little town on the Montenegran border, he did not wait for journalists to ask him a 
question because he had all the information to hand, and afterwards he was not asked 
a single question about it; this was in contrast to the overwhelming journalistic 
interest in the earlier Djakovia convoy attack, which had become `the single dominant 
issue. ' McLaughlin thought journalists that covered the Nato campaign will not be 
pleased to hear Shea gloating about how the Nato media operation had tamed them 
during the second half of the conflict; 88 while Patrick Bishop of the Telegraph also 
wrote that Nato's `parsimony with the truth' meant that if it `goes to war again, the 
media will examine its claims from an initial standpoint of disbelief. '89 
85 P. Knightley., op. cit, p. 512-3. 
86 A. Campbell., op. cit, p. 33. 
87 N. Jones., Sultans of Spin, (London: Orion, 1999), p. 306. 
88 G. McLaughlin., op. cit, p. 121. 
89 P Bishop., untitled article, in P. Goff., op. cit, pp. 431-3, p. 433. 
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1.5.2. The MoD conferences 
The centrepiece of the UK communications effort during the Nato campaign was an 
11.30 morning press conference held at the MoD; but before that the UK war cabinet 
would meet at 0900, and then Campbell would brief lobby journalists at 1100.90 The 
usual format for the MoD conference was for a minister (on twenty-six occasions 
George Robertson and on sixteen Robin Cook) and either the Chief of Defence Staff 
or one of his deputies to brief the media. Robin Brown thought the content of the 
press conferences was highly repetitive, although there were some attempts to vary 
the presentation. 91 
Jonathan Eyal wrote that the MoD decided their press conferences should be at 11.30 
so that its information would be useful to as many media sources as possible, and act 
as a `centrepiece' of the day; at 11.30 the conferences would be at the right time to 
provide news for lunchtime broadcast media at home, and the breakfast television 
news in the US. Eyal explained that: `The aim of the MoD's media operation was to 
grind down Milosevic's determination by persuading him that the British government, 
as part of a coalition, was determined to pursue the offensive until NATO's objectives 
were met, and to maintain Alliance cohesion. ' The conferences had to address 
friendly, neutral and enemy audiences, and also had to be co-ordinated with other 
government departments, with Nato's own media operation and with Alliance 
governments. Eyal wrote that at times when there was little news, the MoD 
sometimes had doubts about the value of the daily conferences, but it was thought that 
Milosevic could have taken advantage of a lack of MoD information if conferences 
were cancelled, and that he might then have started `dictating the public debate in the 
West. ' Eyal believes the journalists were happy with the division between the 
90 J. Rentoul., op. cit, p. 522-3. 
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military and political presentations at the MoD's daily press conferences, and that the 
MoD conferences usually compared favourably with those of Nato. 92 
George Robertson thought the media operation had been a `considerable challenge, ' 
as `throughout the campaign, NATO's actions were subject to intense and real-time 
media scrutiny, ' but the UK had `played a leading role in informing and supporting 
the Alliance media operations. ' 93 Oona Muirhead, who was the MoD Director of 
Information Strategy and News during the war, thought it had been vital during the 
conflict to play down collateral damage incidents, and to get the media to focus on the 
humanitarian catastrophe that Nato was trying to stop and reverse. Muirhead 
explained that when the media focused on Nato blunders they tried to get them back 
focusing on the important issue, the refugees, and when they were successful they 
knew they were making a contribution to winning the campaign. Like the New 
Labour leadership, Muirhead thought the UK media should have been more pro-Nato 
during the campaign, and not helped Milosevic with reports that dwelt on Nato 
collateral damage incidents. 94 
1.5.3. The Serbian information 
As Nato tried to build and maintain support for their campaign around the world, the 
Serbs had the advantage of controlling access to the battlefield, and could therefore 
take journalists to events they thought would provide good publicity for themselves, 
while keeping the media away from areas they wanted to hide from the world. 
Wesley Clark referred to this when he wrote that Nato knew from the outset the Serbs 
would do all they could to portray the Nato strikes as targeting civilians, rather than 
91 R. Brown., op. cit, p. 10. 
92 J. Eyal., The Media and the Military, op. cit, p. 3 8-9. 
93 G. Robertson., op. cit, p. 25. 
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the Serb military and police, and that the Serbs had the advantage of controlling the 
war zone. 95 The difficulty Nato faced in the propaganda war was also referred to by 
Nicholas Jones, who wrote that: `In taking on President Milosevic, NATO was up 
against a master propagandist, whose state-run television service had long fostered 
and strengthened Serbian nationalsism. '96 The Serb media operation revolved around 
three issues: their sovereignty and Nato's imperialism; the war on the ground being a 
reaction to Nato financed KLA terrorism, and that the Nato bombing was responsible 
for the civilian casualties and refugees seen in the media. 
Some examples of the Serb rhetoric came on the first day of the attacks, when 
Vladislav Jovanovic, in a speech at the UN, said talks should be talks, not threats; that 
all the Serb wars had been defensive; that they were a sovereign country and therefore 
should not be attacked, and that their strength was moral and political, rather than 
military. Moreover, on Yugoslav television, Milosevic said they could not let Nato 
put troops on their soil, as the land was for the people, and it was a question of 
freedom; while Miloslav Paic denied the Nato campaign was a reaction to a 
humanitarian catastrophe, and that Nato were just claiming that to justify their 
actions. 97 A few days later, Paic said their ground war was a reaction to large scale 
attacks by terrorists financed by the Nato countries, and that they would probably stop 
their operations if Nato told the KLA to stop their atrocities. Paic compared the 
situation to that in Bosnia Srpska, where he claimed Muslims and Croats were used as 
94 O. Muirhead., `My job: At the Sharp End of the Media Operation', in Rusi Journal, (Volume 144, 
No 4, August 1999), pp. 37-43, p. 39-41. 
95 W. Clark., op. cit, p. 447. 
96 N. Jones., op. cit, p. 302. 
97 BBC World., 24/3/1999. 
36 
a ground force by Nato to remove the Serbs; and also accused the KLA of setting fire 
to their own houses, so that Nato would send in ground troops. 98 
The Serbs also claimed the Nato bombing had caused the humanitarian catastrophe 
that was developing, and tried to convince the media of this. For example, Jovanavic 
claimed they were only acting against terrorists, and that reports of Serb atrocities 
were Nato black propaganda. 99 Similarly, Marko Gasic blamed the refugees on the 
Nato `murder machine', and said reports of Serb atrocities were uncorroborated, and 
that maybe one in a thousand were true. Gasic criticised Western journalists for 
believing stories from people who gained an advantage from lying to them. 10° 
When Nato planes caused civilian damage or deaths it played into the hands of the 
Serbian Ministry of Information, and they used them as evidence to back up their 
claims, and also to make new ones. For example, Paic blamed Nato for causing an 
ecological disaster after they hit a pharmaceutical factory, and also claimed they had 
purposely targeted schools, hospitals and private houses. 101 The Serbs also claimed to 
have shot down eighty Nato planes, 102 but they only offered evidence of a few 
downed planes, and this suggested the other claims were false. The eagerness of 
some Western analysts to believe the Serb claims also called into question their 
credibility as experts. 
1.6. The importance of the study 
The study of the relationship between the government, military and media seems 
especially important in times when the country is at war; as war can lead to the 
98 Ibid., 27/3/1999- 
99 Ibid., 26/3/1999. 
10° Ibid., 28/3/1999- 
101 Ibid., 27/3/1999- 
102 P. Goff., op. cit, p. 534-6. 
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unnecessary loss of life, damage to infrastructure and wasted money. This study aims 
to show how the British government and Nato military set about persuading the media 
and public that their Kosovo campaign was justified, and evaluate how the media 
responded to the Nato media operation. Ideally, the government and military ought to 
present the media with accurate and comprehensive information, as long as it does not 
inhibit their operations, and the media should act as a watchdog for the public by 
making sure there are no inaccuracies in that information. 
Although it has been found in previous research that most British people do not want 
to know any news that may compromise the British military when they go to war, 103 it 
is still important for people to receive enough information to form an opinion on such 
issues as whether we should enter the conflict, whether the cause is just, and whether 
the government and military are acting in a correct manner. To enable the public to 
make informed judgements on the above issues, it is important that the military 
provide the public with information on why the British military are being sent to war, 
what risks they face, what are the objectives, and what is the exit strategy; and this 
information is usually relayed to the public through the media. The media therefore 
play a crucial role in the democratic process when their military is at war, and 
analysing their independence from the government and military, while evaluating 
their ability to inform the public, is vital for democracy, as Brian McNair emphasised: 
`journalism is a key resource in supporting our role as citizens in societies which 
claim to value the democratic process. If that is true we clearly have an interest in 
103 See D. E. Morrison., Television and the Gulf War, op. cit. Entman also refers to evidence suggesting 
`members of the public seek to avoid dissonance by refusing to confront the implications of journalists' 
criticism' of military censorship during conflicts involving their nation's military, and that `polls 
suggest, time after time, public hostility to complaints from news organisations about restrictions on 
their ability to cover the military action. ' R. Entman., Projections of Power: Framing News, Public 
Opinion, and U. S, Foreign Policy, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 71. 
Entman cites J. R. MacArthur., Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1992). 
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understanding how it works, in being able to read it intelligently and to criticise it 
when necessary.... but I and many others would not study and write about journalism 
if we did not believe it to be an important and powerful cultural force. ' 104 McNair 
considers that the processes of journalistic production can be empirically observed 
and analysed, and are then rendered visible, and open to democratic scrutiny. 105 The 
empirical results and conclusions contained in this study will therefore be an addition 
to the current knowledge on the relationship between the country's leaders and the 
media, and will be a resource for those interested in studying how the relationship 
worked during Nato's Kosovo campaign. 
The comparative methodology is also hopefully in line with the trend in research 
interests, as two of the biggest theoretical influences on this study have recently called 
for more comparative studies: in 2004, Todd Gitlin wrote: 'comparative studies are 
long overdue. Why do we have so few? '; 106 while Hallin (and Mancini) wrote that 
comparative analysis was essential if we want to move beyond the limitations of only 
analysing media systems we are familiar with, and there `is a need, finally, for more 
case studies of the interaction of the media with other social actors in the coverage of 
particular kinds of events or issues.... This kind of study is particularly important for 
exploring issues of power that, we have argued, are very much underexplored given 
their significance to many of the normative questions that communication researchers 
often return to in the end: This kind of study would make it possible to explore which 
points of view are able to enter the public sphere, which actors and institutions are 
104 B. McNair., The Sociology ofJourrnalism, op. cit, p. 16-7. 
105 Ibid., p. 33. 
106 T. Gitlin., Reply to Rodney Benson, in Political Communication, (Volume 21, Number 3/ July- 
September 2004), pp. 309-10, p. 309. 
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able to shape the process of debate, and how these processes are affected by the 
structural characteristics of media systems. ' 107 With further relevance to this study, 
and its image variable, another important influence on the study, Robert Entman, 
wrote in 2004 that `Research on framing and on news of foreign policy has paid scant 
attention to the visual dimension of media coverage, even though many scholars 
suspect it has substantial influence.... the danger of somehow misleading readers or 
distorting the "real" messages or impacts of the visuals seems outweighed by the 
potential insights generated in plunging ahead - with due caution. ' 
108 
1.7. Limitations of the study 
The main focus of this study was to analyse how the British media framed the Kosovo 
Conflict, and identify what sources they used. The study investigated the influences 
on the media coverage within a hegemonic framework, but recognises that ideology is 
just one factor that may influence the way the media frames conflicts. As this was a 
macro-analysis rather than a micro-analysis; looking at media frames across the whole 
of the conflict rather than a detailed micro-analysis of the way each sentence was 
phrased, this meant that many interesting aspects of the war may have been missed or 
marginalised, but the coding system was designed to provide as comprehensive and 
accurate a picture of the media coverage as possible. There was also no research 
undertaken on the effects of the media coverage on the public, or the Nato campaign. 
Some models, theories and concepts also had to be left out or marginalised, although 
many seemed relevant and deserving of inclusion. 
107 D. C. Hall in and P. Mancini., Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics, 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2004), p. 302-4. 
108 R. Entman., Projections of Power, op. cit, p. 56. 
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The results are also only particularly relevant to Nato's Kosovo campaign, as the 
conflict can only be considered in its time and context. Nato's Kosovo campaign was 
a conflict against a Serb enemy that the UK and US media had generally framed 
negatively even when the UK and US militaries were not involved in a conflict 
against them. Nato's Kosovo campaign also came at the end of a decade of ethnic 
conflicts that took over the media agenda for international conflicts after the Cold 
War, and before it all changed again a couple of years later, when the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the US brought a return to more conventional wars; with the UK and the 
US fighting for themselves instead of for ethnic groups. This brought a different UK 
media coverage for the Iraq war in 2003. Nato's Kosovo campaign was also the last 
major conflict fought mainly from the air, at the time of writing. 
The study will only use nineteen days of MoD and Nato speeches from their press 
conferences, and government rhetoric, to determine how Nato wanted to frame their 
Kosovo campaign. Although there were other ways the government and Nato sources 
could have influenced the media, such as the lobby system and personal conversations, 
the conferences and political rhetoric should provide the study with sufficient 
evidence of how the government and Nato framed their campaign, so that the media's 
coverage can be analysed in comparison to them. Also, only the coverage of eight 
media sources will be analysed, due both to the time available for the study, and the 
availability of sources. The omission of television news coverage does mean that it is 
a limited research project, but newspapers and the Internet are still very important 
media sources. Moreover, there is likely to be a greater difference in the framing 
between the eight media sources analysed than there would be between national 
television and radio sources. If more time had been available, including all the 
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available days of media coverage of the Nato campaign would have given a more 
comprehensive analysis; but hopefully enough days were coded to get an adequate 
view of the particularities of each media source's reporting of the conflict. An 
analysis of the House of Commons debates, which was going to be used to test the 
indexing hypothesis, was also given less prominence than at first envisaged, as there 
was a front-bench consensus in support of Nato for almost all their campaign, and this 
meant there was little relevant evidence available to judge political influence on the 
media coverage, as the media had few prominent political challenges to the 
government policy to index their coverage to. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Introduction 
Having introduced the Kosovo Conflict and this study in the previous chapter, the first 
section of this chapter will explain some of the theories and concepts that will be used 
in the analysis of the Kosovo media coverage, and also the views of some analysts on 
what influences the media to report the news in the way they do. Although this study 
is on the media coverage of a conflict, it is thought important to also include theories 
and evidence from peace time, because some aspects of media coverage that may 
seem to be for propagandistic reasons in war are also commonplace in peace time. As 
Robert Harris, who was working as a journalist for BBC's Newsnight programme 
during the Falklands War concluded on its media coverage: `The episodes which 
caused the most disquiet, and which have been described in this book, were not 
necessarily unique to the Falklands crisis. The instinctive secrecy of the military and 
the Civil Service; the prostitution and hysteria of sections of the press; the lies, the 
misinformation, the manipulation of public opinion by the authorities; the political 
intimidation of broadcasters; the ready connivance of the media at their own 
distortion.. . all these occur as much 
in peace time Britain as in war. ' 109 
This study will focus on the theories of framing and hegemony as they have been used 
widely in studies on the relationship between the government, military and media 
during times of conflict. These two theoretical concepts of hegemony and framing are 
inter related in their media terms, through both being concerned with the production 
of news content, and what influences the decisions of the media professionals to 
report the news the way they do; the hegemonic influence is usually evident in the use 
109 R. Harris., Gotcha! : the media the government and the Falklands crisis (London : Faber, 1983), p. 
151. Also quoted in the introduction to Glasgow University Media Group., War and Peace News, 
(Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985), p. x. 
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of national government or military sources that control the framing of how an event is 
reported in the media. If the media concentrate too much on the above official 
sources for their news, and relay their frames to the public virtually uncontested, they 
are considered hegemonic. 
This section elaborates on some of the above points, and presents some of the 
evidence that has been gathered on what influences the way news is reported. The 
picture that emerges from the hegemonic research tradition is one of journalists being 
constrained by the demands of their profession to keep to news largely provided by 
official sources; that will be culturally understood by the audience, and be in line with 
the political outlook of their media organisation. Other relevant theories involved 
with the politics-media relationship, such as indexing; and metaphorical concepts, 
such as watch-dog, lap-dog, and attack-dog are also featured in this chapter, as 
research conducted using those theories and concepts have provided valuable insights 
for this study; indexing theory is explained in depth in the sources section, while 
watch-dog refers to an independent media; lap-dog to a subservient media, and attack- 
dog to a hostile media. The section begins with some of research that has already 
been done on the Kosovo media coverage. 
2.2. Research on the media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict 
There have been several articles written about the media coverage of the Kosovo 
Conflict since the end of the war, and a few of the articles most relevant to this study 
are discussed here. The book, Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo 
Crisis, which was edited by Edward Herman, along with Philip Hammond, contains 
several articles critical of Nato's war in Kosovo and the UK and US media coverage 
of the Nato campaign; for example, in the qualitative article, Third Way War: New 
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Labour, the British Media and Kosovo, Hammond concluded: `Although every 
British newspaper except the Independent on Sunday took a pro-war line in its 
editorial column, there were, broadly speaking, two types of press support for the 
Nato attack. Politically conservative newspapers, such as The Times, Telegraph, 
Express and Mail, voiced their customary stout support for the British military. At 
the same time, however, these papers expressed a certain caution about the wisdom 
and goals of Nato action, particularly in the early days of the war.... By contrast, for 
the more liberal section of the press, particularly the Guardian and Independent, to 
whom a pro-military stance is not such a traditional reflex response, it was Nato's 
proclaimed moral mission which captured the imagination. ' Hammond believed the 
Nato campaign was viewed by some of these liberals as `a fulfilment of hopes that 
had remained frustrated during most of the Bosnian conflict. ' l 10 In Peter Goff s book, 
The Kosovo News and Propaganda War, Hammond also asserted in his article, 
Reporting Kosovo: Journalism vs. Propaganda, `that one casualty of the Kosovo war 
was British journalism, although some sources maintain it was already long dead. In 
its place we have propaganda. ' 111 
In a qualitative analysis of the German media, Thomas Deichmann came to a similar 
conclusion to Hammond's: `The new closing of ranks between "modernisers" in 
politics and the media demonstrated more clearly than ever that those who were the 
loudest in their demands for the defence of human rights and democracy were the 
most absolute in their support of a total Nato war and their denunciation of criticism 
as Serbian propaganda.... While in the post-war era German history urged political 
and military restraint, this was now turned on its head under Red-Green auspices. A 
110 P. Hammond., Third Way War: New Labour, the British Media and Kosovo, in P. Hammond., and 
E. S. Herman., Degraded Capability, op. cit, pp. 123-131, p. 123-26. 
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paradigm shift, apparent in Germany since the end of the Cold War, was thus sealed 
in the course of the Nato war against Yugoslavia. ' Deichmann believed that this 
change in the left/liberal publications undermined German democracy, as the `process 
of forming opinions in a democratic society depends on the multiplicity and reliability 
of the information made available. ' 112 
However, several writers have defended the media's coverage of the Kosovo Conflict. 
For example, Greg McLaughlin argued that there is not enough evidence to support 
Hammond's propaganda theory, and instead the evidence `suggests that in the case of 
the British news media, at any rate, there was real media counterweight to NATO 
spin... ' 113 Donald Trelford, who was formerly the editor of the Observer, also 
considered that Campbell was more `right than wrong' about the British media 
allowing `Nato blunders' to dominate the news agenda for too long, and quoted 
Michael Williams from BBC Radio and John Sweeney of the Observer as being in 
agreement. 114 Richard Keeble found that thirty-three out of ninety-nine prominent 
columnists opposed military action against Serbia in a survey he conducted, but he 
also noted that `virtually all of Fleet Street backed the action, even calling for the 
deployment of ground troops (which not even the generals dared adopt as policy). ' 115 
The European Journal of Communication's September, 2000 issue was a special 
Kosovo edition, featuring several articles that analysed the media coverage of the 
conflict. Like Deichmann, Eilders and Luter also analysed the German media 
coverage of Kosovo, but by using a frame analysis that used both qualitative and 
111P. Hammond., Reporting Kosovo: Journalism vs. Propaganda, in P. Goff., The Kosovo News and 
Propaganda War, op. cit, pp. 62-67, p. 67. 
112 T. Deichmann., From `Never again War' to `Never again Aushwitz': Dilemmas of German Media 
Policy in the War against Yugoslavia, in Ibid, pp. 153-63, p. 159-60. 
113 G. McLaughlin., op. cit, p. 122-3. 
114 D. Trelford., Britain's Media War, in P. Goff., op. cit, pp. 57-60. 
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quantitative methods. They looked at five newspapers from across the political 
spectrum to identify a variety of competing diagnostic, prognostic and identity-related 
interpretations. Their content analysis found the legitimacy of the war was hardly 
contested, and they considered this supported the basic assumptions of the indexing 
thesis, as the high degree of consent in the media system reflected the lack of 
substantial conflict in the German party system. "6 However, they did find 
considerable criticism of the Nato campaign in their analysis, as Nato collateral 
damage increased during the conflict, and the chances of a successful outcome for the 
alliance looked less likely. The main difference they found between the right and left 
wing papers was that the conservative papers were more likely to emphasise the 
military options, while the liberal papers directed attention to humanitarian and 
diplomatic efforts. They found that `approval of a ground war' and the `unhindered 
continuation of the war' were almost exclusively expressed at the right end of the 
political spectrum. They also found that it was mainly the right-wing papers that 
concentrated their diagnostic emphasis on `human rights violations, ' while the left- 
wing papers diagnosed the war as `uncontrollable dynamics' or the `consequence of 
diplomatic failure. ' Eilders and Luter also found that although the liberal papers' 
editorials were more cautious about supporting the war, they did not question the 
legitimacy of the war. 117 
Also using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis, Reiner Grundmann, 
Dennis Smith and Sue Wright surveyed an establishment newspaper from Germany, 
115 R. Keeble., Information Warfare in an Age of Hyper-Militarism, in S. Allan and B. Zelizer., op. cit, 
pp. 43-58, p. 51. 
116 C. Eilders., and A. Luter., Competing Framing Strategies in German Public Discourse, in European 
Journal of Communication, (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage), 15 (3), 2000, pp. 
415-428, p. 415. 
117 Ibid., p. 424-6. 
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France and the UK to analyse `what their reportage reveals about the political agenda 
of the various elite readerships and their perceptions of the international order. ' They 
found the British newspaper they analysed, the FT, `did not comment in any depth on 
the possibility that there might be "spin" in the press releases from NATO and its 
heavily British press team. Like other parts of the British media, the FT was content 
to relay the message that this was a fight against evil. ' 118 The analysts also concluded 
that the FT tended to `take the straight NATO [and British government] line of 
treating the Milosevic regime as an enemy that needs to be defeated, and while LM 
[Le Monde] displays much more sympathy and some support for the Serbian position, 
FAZ [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung] is more sensitive to the complexities of 
Serbian culture and politics. ' They also found the French were incensed with the spin 
put on events after Campbell re-organised the Nato media operation. 119 
In Infosuasion in European Newspapers; A Case Study on the War in Kosovo, Rosella 
Savarese examined the orientation of the European press during Kosovo by means of 
the `infosuasion' (persuasive information) and media logic hypotheses; analysing a 
selection of ten European newspapers to see how the conflict's participants were 
presented. A conservative and liberal newspaper was analysed from the UK, France, 
Italy, Spain and Germany, with the Times and Guardian chosen from the UK. 
Savarese found the Guardian was similar to the Times, in that they were 
`characterised by a balancing of opinions, ' particularly in comparison to the Spanish 
newspapers, El Pais and ABC, who Savarese found to be extremely partisan in their 
support for the Nato campaign. Savarese found there was a strong narrative scheme 
"8 R. Grundmann., D. Smith., and S. Wright., National Elites and Transnational Discourses in the 
Balkan War, in Ibid., pp. 299-320, p. 315-6. 
'19 Ibid., p. 310-2. 
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in the British papers, and that Nato were seen as heroes and the Serbs as anti-heroes, 
with Nato's main value objects being democracy, equality, liberty, independence and 
cultural independence, while the latter's were authoritarianism, justice, peace and 
nationalism. Savarese found that in the non-Spanish newspapers: `Half the authors of 
the articles, although not necessarily journalists, declared themselves to be against 
intervention in as much as they believe that the operation is not (in this order) 
successful, or rapid, or effective, or necessary, or indispensable, ' with the other half in 
favour of action for the opposite reasons. Savarese thought that those against the 
action either believed the Serbs were legitimately defending their rights in Kosovo; 
were worried that Russia and China might enter the war on the Serbs' side, or 
believed that diplomacy should have been used. Those in favour of the Nato 
campaign emphasised the fact that human rights had been violated; Milosevic was 
authoritarian, and that the UN had been blocked from taking action by vetoes. 
Savarese did not find any distinct differences between the coverage of liberal and 
conservative newspapers across the different countries, 120 and there was more 
difference found between the different countries' coverage. 
Stig A. Nohrsetedt, Sophia Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Rene Ottosen and Kristina Riegert 
looked at the coverage of the first three days of the Nato air strikes in newspapers 
from four countries: The Daily Telegraph from the UK, Ta Nea from Greece, 
Aftenposten from Norway, and Dagens Nyheter from Sweden. The analysts found the 
Telegraph differed from the other papers because it depicted Tony Blair as the 
dominant Nato leader, rather than Bill Clinton. The Telegraph was also found to have 
followed Clinton and Blair in personalising the war around Milosevic more than the 
120 R. Savarese., Infosuasion in European Newspapers; A Case Study on the War in Kosovo, in Ibid., 
pp. 3 63 -8 1, p. 3 69-3 79. 
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other papers, and blamed him for all the troubles in the Balkans over the previous ten 
years. The analysts concluded that only Ta Nea consistently questioned the Nato 
discourse. Their research also found that the Telegraph did not question the legality 
of the Nato air strikes as much as the other papers; criticised the bombing most for its 
lack of efficiency, and discussed whether ground troops were the answer much more 
than the other three papers. 121 
2.3. Frame theory 
Frame analysis provides the main conceptual framework for this study; in media 
analysis, framing is a modern term for the conscious or unconscious way that media 
workers decide what to include or omit from a news story, and also how to construct 
that story. Media professionals usually have to work to rigid deadlines, and this limits 
the amount of time they have to construct a news story around the day's events. This 
means they have to analyse and process the information they receive in a very short 
time, and frames offer a quick and convenient way to package news information that 
will be understandable to the audience. Stephen D. Reese recently suggested a 
working definition of framing, influenced by definitions from those who have used 
framing in their research; most of whom are also included in this study. Reese 
considered that: `Frames are organising principles that are socially shared and 
persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social 
world. ' 122 
121 S. A. Nohrsetedt., S. Kaitatzi-Whitlock., Rene Ottosen., and Kristina Riegert., From the Persian 
Gulf to Kosovo: War Journalism and Propaganda, in Ibid., pp. 383-404, p. 391-401. 
122 S. D. Reese., Prologue - Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model for Media Research, in S. D. 
Reese., O. H. Gandy., and A. E. Grant., Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our 
Understanding of the Social World, (Mahwah, New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
2001), pp. 7-31, p. 11. 
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2.3.1. The origins and development of frame analysis in media research 
Reese wrote that Erving Goffman is often credited with introducing the framing 
approach, along with the anthropologist-psychologist Gregory Bateson, whom 
Goffman credited with originating the metaphor. 123 Goffman used frame analysis in 
his examination `of the organisation of experience, ' and with regard to the question of 
what influences the journalism process, Goffman considered that reporters' 
understanding of the world precedes the stories they write about, `determining which 
ones reporters will select and how the ones that are selected will be told. ' 124 Goffman 
later wrote that: `When the individual in our Western society recognises a particular 
event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) 
one or more frameworks or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called 
primary... a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise 
be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful. ' 125 
William A. Gamson wrote of Goffman's legacy, and considered that although 
Goffman never cited Gramsci in his work, his work on frames is very similar to 
Gramsci's hegemony theory. Gamson quoted Goffman's aim in the use of framing as 
being `to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our 
society for making sense of events and to analyse the special vulnerabilities to which 
these frames of reference are subject'; a frame `allows its user to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its 
terms. ' 126 Gamson stated that political, economic and organisational factors do not 
entirely explain media content, and that part of it must be explained at the cultural 
123 Ibid., p. 7. 
124 E. Goffman., Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience, (Middlesex, Victoria 
and Auckland: Penguin, 1974), p. 14. 
125 Ibid., p. 21. 
126 W. A. Gamson., Goffman's legacy to political sociology, in Theory and Society, 14 (5), 1985, pp. 
645-622, p. 615. 
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level: `The frames for a given story are frequently drawn from shared cultural 
narratives and myths. Some stories resonate with larger cultural themes; this tunes the 
ears of journalists to their symbolism. ' 127 
Todd Gitlin was one of the first to use frame analysis in the study of news coverage, 
and described frames thus: `What makes the world beyond direct experience look 
natural is a media frame.... Frames are principles of selection, emphasis, and 
presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and 
what matters. Media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organise the 
world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely 
on their reports. Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers 
routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or visual .... Any analytic approach to 
journalism - indeed, to the production of any mass-mediated content - must ask: What 
is the frame here? Why this frame and not another? What patterns are shared by the 
frames clamped over this event and the frames clamped over that one, by frames in 
different media in different places at different moments? And how does the news- 
reporting institution regulate these regularities? And then: What difference do the 
frames make for the larger world? ' 128 
Gadi Wolfsfeld considers Gitlin's to be a `cogent summary' of framing, and sums up 
the process of media framing as one in which the news media construct frames for 
conflicts by attempting to fit the information they are receiving into a package that is 
professionally useful and culturally familiar; journalists attempt to find a narrative fit 
127 W. A. Garrison., News as Framing: Comments on Graber. American Behavioral Scientist, 33 (2), 
November/December 1989, pp. 157-166, p. 161. 
128 T. Gitlin., The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the making and unmaking of the new Left, 
(Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1980), p. 6-7. 
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between incoming information and existing media frames. Wolfsfeld therefore thinks 
that news is not information driven or frame driven, but is a combination of the two, 
and there are always alternative frames that can be used. 129 Wolfsfeld suggested that 
`those who hope to understand variations in the role of the news media must look at 
the competition among antagonists along two dimensions: one structural and the other 
cultural. ' 130 Wolfsfeld explained that many political conflicts centre on disputes over 
frames as each antagonist attempts to market its own package of ideas to the mass 
media and the public. It is therefore important to examine the level of correspondence 
between the frames adopted by the media and those offered by each of the political 
antagonists in order to understand better this competition. Wolfsfeld considers that 
transactions between antagonists and the news media are more than a business deal, 
they are a set of cultural interactions in which antagonists promote their own frames 
of the conflict while the news media attempt to construct a story that can be 
understood by their audience. Therefore, Wolfsfeld considered that the most useful 
way for researchers to deal with this aspect of the relationship is to focus on the 
interpretive frames constructed by the news media about political conflicts, 131 and 
imagine editors and reporters asking three questions when they first get news of a 
conflict: How did we cover this conflict in the past? What is the most newsworthy 
part of the conflict? Who are the good guys? 132 
According to Robert Entman, who set out to clarify frame theory, framing `essentially 
involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
129 G. Wolfsfeld., Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 33-34. 
130 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
131 Ibid., p. 31. 
112 Ibid., p. 49. 
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promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'. Echoing Goffman's 
original definition of framing, Entman argues that culture is the stock of commonly 
invoked frames, and communicators make conscious or unconscious framing 
judgements, guided by their belief system, and that the decisions are then manifested 
in the text by the presence or absence of keywords, phrases, stereotyped images, 
sources and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or 
judgements; Entman also considers that what is omitted from the news is as important 
as what is included. 133 Six years after Entman's article, Dietram Scheufele argued 
that the fractured framing paradigm Entman had referred to was still fractured, as the 
numerous approaches to framing developed since Entman's work had meant there 
was little comparability of empirical results. Scheufele classified previous approaches 
to framing research along two dimensions: the type of frame examined (media frames 
or audience frames) and the way frames are operationalised (independent variable or 
dependent variable). 134 In the theoretical framework of this study, it is the media 
frames that are studied rather than the audience frames, and the government and 
military frames are considered the independent variables, and the media frames are 
the dependent variables. 
Reflecting the still open-ended status of the framing concept, Michael Schudson 
argued that `framing' has largely replaced the idea of `bias' in the social sciences, and 
this has moved the analysis of news away from the idea of intentional bias: `That is, 
to acknowledge that news stories frame reality is also to acknowledge that it would be 
133 R. Entman; Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, in Journal of Communication, 
Volume 43 (4), Winter, 1993, pp. 51-8, P. 52. 
134 D. A. Scheufele., Framing as a Theory of Media Effects, in Journal of Communication, 49 (2), 
Spring 1999, pp. 103-22, p. 115-8. 
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humanly impossible to avoid framing. Every narrative account of reality necessarily 
presents some things and not others; consciously or unconsciously, every narrative 
makes assumptions about how the world works, what is important, what makes sense, 
and what should be. ' 135 James Tankard considers framing `differs from bias in 
several important ways. First, it is a more sophisticated concept. It goes beyond 
notions of pro or con, favourable or unfavourable, negative or positive. Framing adds 
the possibilities of additional, more complex emotional responses and also adds a 
cognitive dimension (beliefs about objects as well as attitudes). Second, framing 
recognises the ability of a text - or a media presentation - to define a situation, to 
define the issues, and to set the terms of a debate.... Framing also reflects the richness 
of media discourse and the subtle differences that are possible when a specific topic is 
presented in different ways. These fine points are often lost in a crude pro-or-con bias 
approach. ' 
136 
Nelson, Clawson and Oxley argue that framing can unlock the process of meaning 
making in the news process: `evidence is steadily accumulating that framing is a 
powerful concept for explicating the activities of journalists and news organisations. 
It also provides leverage for understanding the behaviours of public relations 
specialists, "spin doctors, " and other elites and professionals whose job it is to 
produce congenial concepts, beliefs, and opinions among the broader public. ' 
137 
Sanghee Kweon, who used framing in a study on business mergers and acquisitions, 
agreed, writing that frame theory `provides an answer for the question of how news 
135 M. Schudson., The Sociology of News, (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 
p. 35-6. 
136 J. W. Tankard, Jr., The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing, in S. D. Reese., O. H. 
Gandy., and A. E. Grant, op. cit, pp. 95-106, p. 96-97 
137 T. E. Nelson., R. A. Clawson., and Z. M. Oxley., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its 
Effect on Tolerance, from American Political Science Review, 91 (3), September 1997, pp. 567-83, p. 
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texts are framed by media style.... Furthermore, how does government policy affect 
news coverage? When news media focus on their own story, how do they cover the 
news? What kind of news selection value do they have in news media? ' Kweon 
considered frame theory a useful theoretical model to distinguish a news text's 
various dimensions, and thought that through content analysis it is possible to identify 
the framing style, format, timing, and nature of news stories. Moreover, Kweon later 
explained that `By identifying the dominant frames and, more importantly, the unused 
or oppositional frames, in coverage of the reality, we can also determine the extent to 
which journalists succeeded or failed in attempts at objectivity and fairness. Though 
the information delivered is very often factual, and still fairly unbiased, framing 
research would question how complete a picture of reality is being conveyed. 038 
2.3.2. Previous work on framing concepts used in this study 
There is a special section on sources after the hegemony section, so they are not 
included in this review of previous work on the framing concepts used in this study. 
The other framing concepts are set out in the order they appear in the hypotheses. 
Main People 
Propagandists have been demonising enemy leaders and militaries for centuries, but 
the emergence of the practise in the context of the modern mass media can be traced 
back to World War One, where British propagandists and the media framed the 
Germans as `worse than ogres; ' Cate Haste wrote that the intention was to create an 
image which acted as a repository for all the hatred and fear inspired by war. It meant 
building up the image of national and allied leaders as the embodiment of courage, 
138 S. Kweon., A Framing Analysis: How Did Three U. S. News Magazines Frame about Mergers or 
Acquisitions, in Journal of Media Management, 2 (3/4), 2000, pp. 165-77, p. 167. Read online at: 
www. mediajournal. org 
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heroism, and resolution, while the enemy leaders became the embodiment of evil, and 
the scapegoats for the war. 139 Doris Graber provided a social scientific explanation of 
how the media also demonise enemy leaders, when she wrote that the media use 
culturally and socially appropriate cues to evoke the audience's schemata to 
supplement information supplied by the story. As an example, she used the 
characterisation of a brutal dictator as `another Hitler', which she believed 
`immediately evokes images of persecution, racial discrimination, and genocide in 
many audiences who need no further reminder about these deeds. ' 140 
This kind of demonisation of an enemy leader was identified in the British media's 
reporting of the Gulf War. David Morrison wrote that ninety-three per cent of the 
military acts shown were directly attributed to Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and 
twenty-four per cent of items which included Saddam inferred or stated he had the 
ability to end the war by withdrawing from Kuwait; moreover, Saddam's personal 
views were contrasted with the moral righteousness of the collective decisions of the 
nations making up the UN. Morrison thought this helped to personalise the war 
around Saddam, and make his claims sound unreasonable, as the idea of 
unreasonableness or madness is usually restricted to an individual and not a state. 
'4' 
Indirectly agreeing with Morrison, Liebes wrote that the Iraqi people were excised out 
of the frame during the Gulf War, leaving only a demonised Saddam to represent 
them all. 142 Robert Lichter, president of the Centre for Media and Public Affairs in 
Washington, admitted they had demonised Milosevic during the Kosovo conflict in a 
139 C. Haste., Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War (London: Allen Lane, 
1977), p. 3. 
'ao D. Graber., Content and Meaning: What's it all About?, American Behavioral Scientist, 33 (2), 
November/December 1989, pp. 144-153, p. 148. 
14' D. E. Morrison., Television and the Gulf War, op. cit, p. 83-7. 
142 T. Liebes., Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Hegemony Works, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 70-3. 
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similar manner to how Saddam had been demonised in the Gulf War: `To sell a war in 
a democracy when you're not attacked, you have to demonise the leader or show that 
there are humanitarian reasons for going in.... George Bush demonised Saddam 
Hussein. We did something of the same with Milosevic. ' 
143 
Position 
The position variable was included because previous research has found that readers 
usually take more notice of news at the front of the paper, with their attention fading 
as they read the less prominent stories. For example, Doris Graber found this pattern 
of behaviour when she researched how Americans processed the news: `Everything 
else being equal, the panelists were more likely to say that a story had caught their 
attention because it appeared on prominent pages of the paper, because it was 
characterised by prominent headlines or pictures, or because it was given lengthy and 
often repeated exposure. ' 144 
The relevance of coding the story's position in a study using a hegemonic framework 
was emphasised by Cohen and Young, who reasoned that a hegemonic media does 
not want to report some events, but they are too big to ignore, as to do so would lose 
the audience's credibility, so the media try to minimise their effect on the audience by 
placing them on inside pages. 145 Daniel Hallin considered this kind of reporting was 
evident in the NYT during the later stages of the Vietnam War, as although `the 
editorials and columns diverged increasingly from the official line, the news columns 
and especially the front page continued to reflect it - in all its ambiguity - more or 
143 P. Knightley., op. cit, p. 502. 
144 D. A. Graber., Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide, (New York and 
London: Longman, 1984), p. 82-3. 
145 S. Cohen., and J. Young., The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass 
Media, (London: Constable, 1973), p. 103. 
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less at face value. ' 146 A similar editorial practise was found by Robert Entman and 
Benjamin Page in their research on the American media's coverage of the Gulf War; 
their results suggested that over the whole of the newspaper, the NYT and Washington 
Post had more critical stories than supportive, but on `the more-noticed pages it was 
equalled by support. More importantly, much of the most relevant, substantive 
criticism was obscured by its placement in the news. ' 147 
Focus: diagnosis or prognosis 
Media articles often contain judgements on what caused events, and offer opinions on 
how the issue can be resolved if it is a continuing story: the diagnosis and prognosis. 
As explained previously, these are two of the main framing elements referred to by 
Robert Entman. Nelson, Clawson and Oxley agreed with Entman, and asserted that 
news frames `declare the underlying causes and likely consequences of a problem and 
establish criteria for evaluating potential remedies for the problem. ' 148 
Some media analysts, such as Timothy Cook, believe that in times of war the liberal 
media often consider it reasonable to criticise the way a war is being fought through 
their prognoses, even if they support the reasons for going to war through their 
diagnoses. Cook wrote this allows journalists to include tension and conflict that 
would otherwise be absent from their stories, and provides a way for reporters to 
`perform a political ritual that distances them from their sources. ' 49 In other words, 
146 D. Hallin., The Uncensored War, op. cit, p. 83. 
147 R. M. Entman and B. I. Page., The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to 
Media Independence, in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, (eds), Taken by Storm: the Media, 
Public Opinion and U. S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
Fý. 82-101, p. 87. 
T. E. Nelson, R. A. Clawson and Z. M. Oxley., op. cit, p. 567-8. 
149 T. E. Cook., Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution, (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 105-6. 
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they can consider themselves to be independent of the government and military, and 
playing the watchdog role, while still supporting their nation's military campaign. 
Several of the researchers involved in the hegemonic/indexing tradition have found 
similar journalistic practices, including Jonathan Mermin in his study of post-Vietnam 
American military interventions: `The debate journalists do conduct on their own 
initiative, although it presents conflicting possibilities vis-ä-vis the execution and 
outcome of U. S. policy and the political fate of the president, creates a powerful sense 
of inevitability about the policy itself. It frames government policy as if it had been 
stipulated at the outset, finding conflicting possibilities in its outcome, as opposed to 
framing government policy as open to critical analysis and debate, the product of 
choices among conflicting possibilities. ' 150 Mermin believed that what this critical 
angle encourages, in other words, is spectatorship, not deliberative citizenship. ' 151 
Format: episodic or thematic 
The most prevalent distinction between formats of news frames is that between 
episodic and thematic frames. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon described episodic 
news coverage as focusing `on specific events, ' while `thematic coverage is broader 
in scope and refers to the policy debate, historical background, or possible political 
consequences... ' 152 Iyengar had explained in a previous book that: `the dominant 
episodic news frame illustrates what some media scholars and critics have termed the 
"hegemonic" model of public communication. In this model, the dissemination of 
information is considered part of an elaborate "code control" process through which 
existing power structures are maintained. That is, news organisations in general and 
150 J Mermin., Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U. S. Intervention in the Post- Vietnam 
Era, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 10. 
151 Ibid., p. 56. 
152 S. Iyengar., and A. Simon., News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion, in 
Communication Research, 20 (3), June 1993, pp. 365-383, p. 371. 
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television in particular tend to be spokesmen for dominant groups and their 
ideology. ' 53 
Citing Iyengar's work, W. Lance Bennett has called for more thematic reporting: `In 
an ideal world, the present information system could be replaced with perspectives 
that were more institutional, analytical, historical and reflectively critical in 
orientation. ' Bennett sees the main problem with episodic news as being how it 
fragments events into discrete episodes that confuse larger patterns and trends. 
Bennett considered this to have happened in the American media coverage of the Gulf 
War, with the underlying causes of situations remaining outside the news frame; 
leading to the coverage being driven by personalised, highly emotional fragments. ' 54 
Indirectly agreeing with Bennett's views on the Gulf War media coverage, David 
Morrison found that `the event itself - war - appears to swamp the news and did so at 
the expense of discussion about either the initial invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, 
or the presentation of a historical perspective on the war. ' 155 
James Curran also considers that the current media environment undermines 
intelligent and rational debate, as it tends to generate information that is `simplified, 
personalised, decontextualised, with a stress on action rather than process, 
visualisation rather than abstraction, stereotypicality rather than human complexity. ' 
Curran considers this `is a by-product of processing information as a commodity. ' 156 
However, Eve-Ann Prentice of The Times suggests it is unrealistic to expect the press 
to provide more background information on main stories, as to survive a paper has to 
153 S. Iyengar., Is Anyone Responsible?: how television frames political issues, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 137. 
iM L. Bennett., News: The Politics of Illusion, op. cit, p. 53-6. 
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serve up fresh news; she wrote that they had `tried to change the nature of news' with 
more thematic content at the The Sunday Correspondent, but it had led to a serious 
decline in sales. 
Historical References 
With similarities to how journalists have been described as using frames in previous 
sections, G. H. Jamieson wrote that historical factors `bear down upon people, they 
provide forms or frames of reference which could be termed their ideology. They 
provide reference points for interpretation; just as in map-making, co-ordinates are 
necessary for position finding, so ideological co-ordinates provide reference points for 
social life, the accuracy or otherwise of the co-ordinates is another question. ' 157 In 
line with Jamieson's idea of historical references providing ideological co-ordinates, 
Martin Woolacott wrote in the Guardian during Nato's Kosovo campaign: `Whenever 
wars come, the ghosts of other wars are called up and history stands at the elbow of 
the leaders making the decisions. War is perhaps the most historical thing that nations 
do... ' 158 Peter Arnett, who reported from the front-line during the Vietnam War, also 
considered that `ideological coordinates' from previous conflicts were important to 
the military, as he wrote that: `... American commanders still analyse Vietnam in 
terms of World War Two, and the communists analyze the war in terms of the fight to 
oust the French in the 1950s. ' 159 During Nato's Kosovo campaign, an NYT editorial 
made a similar observation, but this time drew analogies with World War Two and 
Vietnam: `Every war is conducted in the shadow of its predecessors, and the conflict 
in Kosovo is no exception. The nation is haunted by memories of the Second World 
157 G. H. Jamieson., Communication and Persuasion, (London, Sydney, and New Hampshire: Croorn 
Helm, 1985), p. 138. 
158 Martin Woollacott., The not so old alliance, in Guardian, 21/05/1999. 
159 P. Arnett., Live From the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in the World's War 
Zones, (London: Corgi, 1995), p. 244. 
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War and Vietnam as it considers how intensely to prosecute the war in the 
Balkans.... For every American generation of this century, the power of war analogies 
has been undeniable, and they have framed debate about every recent American 
military venture abroad. ' 160 
The use of historical references by politicians and the military has also been noticed 
by media theorists; for example, Murray Edelman explained that `The meanings of 
current events, actions, and policies are similarly changed by knowledge of history or 
by illusions respecting history. Advocates of conflicting positions routinely draw on 
historical references to buttress their positions, so that history becomes manipulable 
for political purposes. ' 161 Capella and Jamieson cite the work of Thomas Gilovich as 
an example of how propagandists can use historical references to prime mental 
associations; in an experiment he conducted, Gilovich found that out of a study group 
given texts with either reminders of World War Two or Vietnam inside (phrases like 
Blitzkrieg invasion and briefings in Winston Churchill Hall for World War Two, and 
Chinook helicopters and briefings in Dean Rusk Hall for Vietnam), those that had 
reminders of World War Two favoured intervention in another war more. 162 
Wolfsfeld has also referred to the importance of historical references in journalism, 
and believes that journalists, like generals, are often fighting the last war; 163 having 
established the mode of reporting, journalists then attempt to find historical examples 
to fit the story, and questions of which historical example offers the most appropriate 
frame often becomes a matter for public debate. 164 James Sadkovich refers to the use 
160 NYT editorial., 18/4/1999- 
161 M. Edelman., The Politics of Misinformation, (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), p. 58. 
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of historical references by journalists as news pegs: `When journalists translate reality 
for the rest of us, they hang their stories on news pegs - familiar facts and symbols. 
Linking new news to old (a. k. a., history) makes it comprehensible, whether the links 
are events, symbols, individuals, or story clusters. News pegs simplify the story, but 
give the illusion of complexity. They assure familiarity by using analogy to make the 
alien and the exotic comprehensible, and they guarantee an emotional response based 
on the pegs used. They can also determine a story. News pegs operate within news 
frames that organise and determine which data will be included and which 
excluded. ' 165 
Images 
It was also thought important to include an image variable in the coding system, as a 
dominant image can be important for influencing the audience into perceiving a story 
in a certain way. G. H. Jamieson considers that photographs are excellent persuasive 
devices because they look like they have not been manipulated, and are a true 
representation of the event. 166 Doris Graber also thinks images are powerful, because 
much more information is processed and retained by the public from images than 
words, as a `greater portion of the verbal information is waste, in part because it 
represents an overload of information that cannot be processed in the available time 
and part because the audience is not interested. ' Graber reported that the audience in 
her research `believed that the visuals allowed them to form more complete and 
accurate impressions of people and events; ' such as being able to see and assess `how 
physically debilitated a group of refugees looked. ' 167 Although writing about 
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television news research, Graber's views on the importance of including images in 
frame analysis seem just as relevant to the content analysis of newspapers. Graber 
explained that although television news is an audiovisual medium, most content 
research has focused on only the verbal portions of messages; this means that not only 
do they miss the information contained in the pictures, but also that neglecting the 
pictures can lead to a failure to interpret the rest of the story properly, as it is modified 
by its combination with the pictures. 168 
The importance of images was also referred to by journalist and writer, Neil Minow, 
who recollected a talk by a TV journalist who said she had become frustrated with the 
Hollywoodized `pretty pictures' approach of the former American President, Ronald 
Reagan's White House. So she did a story contrasting the images of the president 
playing with puppies or looking genial with a voice-over describing what she thought 
the story should have been about. She expected complaints from the White House 
press office, but they loved it. They pointed out, correctly, that the power of the 
images was so mesmerizing that it really didn't matter what her voice-over said. ' 
169 
In her study on media images during the Kosovo Conflict, Kimberly L. Bissell 
supported the above views on the importance of images in the news, when she wrote 
that media photographs `play a role in (1) representing the media agenda as an 
accompaniment to stories and (2) helping with the transferral of salience of particular 
issues to the public. A single front page could have anywhere from five-to-ten 
stories. -This same 
front page could also have anywhere from one-to-three images. 
If the still images represent issues also mentioned in the front-page stories, those 
168 D. Graber., Content and Meaning, op. cit, p. 145. 
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particular issues are receiving even more prominent treatment by the newspaper. 
Thereby, the reinforcement of these issues in photographs may help shape viewers' 
impressions of the most important issue. ' 170 Her conclusion on the photographs used 
during the Kosovo conflict was that the images `acted in conjunction with newspaper 
stories to prime audiences to think about certain aspects of the conflict. ' 171 
In her post-Iraq War article, When War is Reduced to a Photograph, Barbie Zelizer 
considers that images featured in the media during wartime often draw connotations 
with images from previous wars; images that are iconic and culturally significant, and 
act as `a visual bridge by which the more recent article could be understood. ' 172 
While acknowledging that journalism's images of war can often be disturbingly 
graphic in their depictions of shattered bodies and broken spirits, Zelizer considers 
that images are generally used by journalists as `pegs not to specific events but to 
stories larger than can be told in a simple news item, journalism's images become a 
key tool for interpreting the war in ways consonant with long-standing understandings 
about how war is supposed to be waged - notions about patriotism, sacrifice, 
humanity, the nation-state, and fairness that come as much from outside journalism as 
from within. War is presented as often heroic and reflective of broader aims 
associated with nationhood, clean and at times antiseptic, and involving human 
sacrifice for a greater good. ' 173 
170 K. L. Bissell., The Crisis in Kosovo: Photographic News of the Conflict and Public Opinion, in E. 
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2.3.3. Examples of military conflict frames 
Gadi Wolfsfeld considers that two competing meta-frames appear regularly in 
insurgencies and unequal wars: the first is the law and order frame, which is usually 
used by the most powerful, and promotes the need to maintain social, national or 
international order, while the second is the injustice/victims frame, which the weaker 
side usually invokes to oppose the law and order frame. 174 This is quite a good 
description of the frame contest that took place in the Kosovo Conflict, with Nato 
invoking the law and order frame and the Serbs the injustice/victims frame. 
Wolfsfeld described how the same frame contest evolved in the Gulf War: `Once the 
war broke out, the only genuine frame competition concerned whether the United 
States and its allies were using excessive force against Iraq. Again the major question 
for analysis is whether the challenger becomes framed as a victim. The success of the 
law and order frame depends on the ability of the authorities to keep the moral 
spotlight squarely focused on the challenger. An alternative story line about the 
brutality of the powerful is always available from the news shelf and can be quickly 
taken down and applied when circumstances warrant. ' 175 Wolfsfeld considers that the 
Allies had a good information war during the Gulf War, and this led to the authorities 
completely dominating the press. 176 This meant the Western news media 
enthusiastically adopted the law and order frame, and virtually ignored the injustice 
and defiance frames being promoted by Hussein. '77 
According to hegemony theory, the US and UK medias used a Cold War frame to 
categorise post-World War Two foreign conflicts that affected the West's interests up 
to the collapse of the old Soviet bloc in 1991. This meant that when two nations went 
174 G. Wolfsfeld., op. cit, p. 141-2. 
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to war, the nation or people who were more in line with democratic capitalism were 
likely to receive the better media coverage, while those who followed a communist 
political agenda were more likely to receive a more negative coverage. Influenced by 
the work of Gamson on frame `depth, ' 178 Wolfsfeld proposed that the Cold War 
frame was on the next level down from the deepest level of framing in the American 
media's coverage of the Vietnam War, with the deepest being the notion of peace 
through strength, a longstanding principle that suggests that aggression must be met 
with force. Wolfsfeld also considered that a more specific frame in Vietnam could be 
labelled the falling-domino frame: this suggested that American involvement in 
Southeast Asia was to prevent the spread of communism in that part of the world, and 
that if Vietnam was lost to Communism it would quickly be followed by other 
countries in a domino effect. Wolfsfeld suggested the smallest level of framing was 
that of particular events, such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was framed as an 
unprovoked Communist attack on American forces. 179 
Elihu Katz wrote that by the time of the Gulf War, the Cold War frame was no longer 
available, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc; Katz argued that President Bush 
therefore proposed the World War Two frame for the confrontation with Iraq, and the 
media followed his lead: `Iraq had swallowed up a neighbouring country, defying its 
legitimacy and independence. Iraq was fascist Germany committing genocide against 
its own minorities.... This was not just a confrontation of ideologies; it was a moral 
crusade of good against evil. ' Katz considers the media love contests, especially 
when it is `us' versus `them', and on the whole they rallied to the president. 
178 S. D. Reese, op. cit, p. 13. 
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Katz also pointed out that the framing of Iraq as a fascist aggressor for its invasion of 
Kuwait was very different to its framing by the majority of American politicians and 
media during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). As there was no intervention likely by the 
US in that war, the American media set it within a feuding neighbours frame, and it 
therefore received little interest from the American public; feuding neighbours are 
only `them' and `them', which is not as interesting as `us' versus `them'. Katz 
thought that if it had not been for Bush's World War Two rhetoric, followed by the 
American media, then the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would have been seen by the 
public in a similar way to the Iran-Iraq war, and it would not have captured the 
public's interest. 180 
An example of the British government using elements of three conflict frames 
relevant to this study; Cold War, World War Two and Law and Order; in an attempt 
to win a positive media coverage, was highlighted by Tony Shaw. Shaw wrote that in 
the months preceding their military intervention in Suez during 1956, `the British 
government launched an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at capturing the moral 
high ground in advance of any conflict against Egypt. "Colonel Nasser", as he would 
always be referred to by official spokesmen, was presented as a fanatic nationalist, 
and the autocratic nature of his regime was emphasised. He was a second Hitler 
whose "plunder" put the world "at his mercy" and who therefore could not be 
"appeased. " The Suez Canal Company employees, forbidden to leave their 
employment, were, it was claimed, being treated as virtual hostages.... For Arab 
consumption, great play was made of Nasser's avowed intention to dominate the 
Middle East, clearly outlined in his own version of Mein Kampf, The Philosophy of 
180 E. Katz., The End of Journalism? Notes on Watching the War, in M. Scammell and H. Semetko 
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the Revolution. His unwillingness to consult fellow Arab leaders prior to the 
nationalisation coup was evidence of his lack of respect and regard, especially for 
those countries whose healthy development relied upon their oil trade. With the 
American public particularly in mind, Nasser was portrayed as a Soviet "stooge" 
whose dangerous antics could threaten US interests in the Middle East and ultimately 
lead to war in this most unstable, but strategically and economically vital, region. 
Finally, in addition to all this, Britain and France had to depict themselves as the 
policemen of the Middle East, as the only powers physically capable of enforcing 
"international law" in that region. ' 181 
Philip Hammond considered that the UK and US again drew on the law and order 
frame during the Kosovo Conflict, as part of the moral intervention in ethnic wars 
frame that developed during the 1990s, as a replacement to the Cold War frame. 
Hammond wrote that the `discourse of humanitarianism and human rights was 
promoted throughout the 1990s by journalists and commentators as an organising 
principle for a post-Cold War world order, nowhere more conspicuously than in 
media coverage of the former Yugoslavia. As they sought to encourage Western 
intervention in Bosnia, reporters and intellectuals developed the "moral vocabulary" 
which was later given an official stamp of approval by NATO during the 1999 
Kosovo conflict... ' Hammond thought that the `moral' wars promoted in the 1990s 
allowed the West to override established principles of international law, and that they 
were driven by the need of Western societies to discover some new moral purpose in 
the post-Cold War world. 182 After detailing how the Kosovo War could have been 
181 T. Shaw., Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis, 
(London and New York: Taurus, 1996), p. 12. 
182 P. Hammond., Humanizing War: The Balkans and beyond, in S. Allen., and B. Zelizer, op. cit, pp. 
174-189, p. 175. 
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framed differently, from the KLA's part in the failure of the 1998 peace treaty, 
through the thousands of civilian casualties from Nato bombs, to the ethnic-cleansing 
of Serbs by the ethnic-Albanians after the war, Hammond wrote that despite `all the 
evidence to the contrary, the belief persists that Kosovo was a successful and "moral" 
war, ' and many of those politicians and journalists who opposed the war with Iraq in 
2003 were at pains to emphasise that they supported the Nato bombing in Kosovo. 
Hammond pointed out that the reasons for this were cultural rather than political: 
`while the propaganda for war with Iraq was undoubtedly clumsy, it was no more 
inept than in Kosovo, which also featured bogus diplomacy and dodgy documents. In 
1999 the propaganda tended to be taken at face value because many journalists and 
commentators were predisposed to welcome war. It fitted the "moral" worldview 
which developed in the 1990s, epitomised by Western perceptions of the former 
Yugoslavia. ' 183 Hammond thought this view was epitomised by Robin Cook's 
framing of the Kosovo conflict as a battle between `two Europes competing for the 
soul of our continent, ' with Yugoslavia representing `the race ideology that blighted 
our continent under the fascists, ' while Nato's vision of the future Europe was of `a 
continent in which the rights of all its citizens are respected, regardless of their ethnic 
identity. ' 184 
2.4. Critical theory, hegemony and other media models 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Frame theory will be used in this study to analyse whether the media coverage of 
Kosovo was more in line with the hegemonie or plural models of media and power in 
society. This use of frame analysis for identifying hegemonic influences and content 
183 Ibid., p. 179-80. 
184 Ibid., p. 184. Robin Cook quoted from the Guardian, May 5"', 1999. 
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responds to requests for studies combining the two concepts over a long period of 
time. In 1991, James Tankard, proposed that `framing might give quantitative 
researchers a way to approach ideology.... Framing may even give quantitative 
researchers a means to examine the hypothesis of media hegemony, one that has been 
difficult to validate empirically. Media hegemony can be viewed as a situation in 
which one frame is so dominant that people accept it without notice or question. ' 185 
Then, in 2004, Carragee and Roefs made a similar request, considering that studies 
integrating framing and hegemony have `produced multiple benefits ... the media 
hegemony thesis directly connects the framing process to considerations of power and 
to examinations of the relationship between the news media and political change. 
Studying the framing process within the context of the production, distribution, and 
interpretation of hegemonic meanings enables researchers to chart the relationship 
between news and the distribution of power in American society .... the 
framing 
concept, including arguments about the influence of power asymmetries on frame 
sponsorship and framing contests, has enriched some scholarship on hegemony. It 
has done so by providing a specific means to examine how the news media construct 
ideological meanings largely consistent with the interests of powerful elites. ' 186 They 
also suggest that: `further integration of framing scholarship with research on 
hegemony would benefit both traditions. Framing processes are central to both the 
production of hegemonic meanings and to the development of counterhegemonic 
ways of seeing. ' 187 
In studies on the media and power in society, hegemony provides a model of media 
185 J. W. Tankard, Jr., op. cit, p. 97. 
186 M. Carragee., and W. Roefs., The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research, in Journal of 
Communication, 54 (2), June 2004, pp. 214-233, p. 222. 
187 Ibid., p. 227-8. 
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performance to compare with the traditional plural media model that the UK media 
aspires to, with the hegemony model depicting a media that is biased towards the 
ruling elite in society, such as the politicians, military and business leaders; this bias is 
evident in source access, opinion and news content. This section will not go into the 
plural research tradition in great detail, and Gillian Doyle's brief description should 
suffice for this study: `Pluralism is generally associated with diversity in the media; 
the presence of a number of different and independent voices, and of differing 
political opinions and representations of culture within the media. Citizens expect 
and need a diversity and plurality of media content and media sources. ' 188 Hegemony 
theory is also distinct from political economy theory, which considers the media to be 
working in conjunction with the ruling elite to manipulate the masses in a more purely 
Marxist view of society, and the differences between the two theories are discussed in 
detail later in this section. 
2.4.2. Gramsci, Hegemony and Mass Communications 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines hegemony as `dominance, especially by one 
state or social group over others, ' and writes that it is derived from the Greek word 
hegemonia. Its adaptation to late twentieth century critical analysis was influenced by 
the work of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian communist, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, 
developed the work of Marx into a new political theory based on the concept of 
hegemony. 189 In the Italy of his lifetime, Gramsci thought the possibility of self- 
elevation had `been blocked by the confinement of the hegemonic culture to a caste of 
'88 G. Doyle., Media Ownership: The economics and politics of convergence and concentration in the 
UK and European media, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 2002), p. 11-12. 
189 L. Pellicani., Gramsci: An Alternative Communism?, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 
1981), p. 30-32. 
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intellectuals, the "people-nation" having been left to contend with fossilized customs 
and dialects of restricted communication. ' 190 
Gramsci's theory of hegemony preceded his reading of Marx, and Dante Germino 
wrote that `Gramsci's vision of a new politics cannot be described fully with any 
simplistic label, including that of "Marxist".... In Marx, the lower class, the proletariat, 
will rise up(ward) to knock over the bourgeoisie. In Gramsci, the dominant emphasis 
and the original insight is that of the periphery moving in on the centre and dissolving 
it into itself.... I do not want to suggest that they are mutually exclusive. The two 
models overlap. Both of them aim to destroy the reign of privilege (see figure. 2.1). 
Gramsci's model is the philosophically richer and more interesting of the two, 
however, because it is not so tied to merely economic categories. Because the 
periphery/centre model is not confined to the economic situation, it is possible for 
Gramsci to make room for the world of culture - of the mind and spirit - in a way that 
Marx does not.... One could use the centre/periphany model in an unrevolutionary 
way - to prick the consciences of those at the centre and to call for their gradual 
inclusion of marginalised individuals and groups in the centre.... What makes 
Gramsci's model revolutionary is its marrying of his centre/periphery design to 
Marx's class struggle symbolism. Just as the lower class must rise up and overthrow 
the upper one, so the marginalised sectors of society must move in on the centre. By 
virtue of their having included themselves through their own struggle for recognition, 
they themselves - the formerly peripheral ones - erase the boundary surrounding the 
centre. ' 
191 
190 D. Germino., Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics, (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1990), p. 30. 
191 Ibid., p. 56-8. 
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Periphery 
ra rL(ci 
Upper (Bourgcoisie) 
Lower (Proletariat) 
Marv 
Fig. 2.1. Dante Germino's representation of the differences between the Gramscian 
and Marxist models of politics and society. 
James Martin wrote that `In the 1960s, Gramsci's ideas were employed to support 
arguments within the European Left against liberal political scientists who equated the 
apparent absence of widespread conflict and social division with a general satisfaction 
amongst the populations of western capitalist states with the social and political 
arrangements as they stood.... The absence of popular resistance testified not to the 
recognised validity of capitalist states but to the generation of passive consent 
achieved through the control of public institutions such as the media and education 
system by groups inclined to support the status quo. ' 192 In the emerging British 
Cultural Studies field, 'Gramsci's texts were a useful source for the growing interest 
in ideology throughout the 1970s because of his explicit focus on consciousness and 
the process of subjective leadership. Whilst traditional Marxist texts had little 
positive to say on popular culture and forms of consciousness, Gramsci's interest in 
"common sense" and "folklore" revealed a rare depth of sympathy for the lived 
experience by subordinate classes of their conditions of domination .... Gramsci 
recognised the diversity of practical experiences and hence forms of belief to which 
people subscribed: hegemony implied the bringing together of a variety of beliefs and 
192 J. Martin., Gramsci's Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, (Basingstoke and New York: 
1998), p. 119. 
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values that did not by necessity reflect any class interest.... The Gramsci of Cultural 
Studies, in contrast to that of the earlier state analyses, was a theorist of the dynamics 
of civil society, of the way in which different ideological- currents were combined and 
contested to promote an ongoing response to economic and social change. ' 193 
Raymond Williams was one of the British writers who wrote about Gramsci during 
the 1970s. Williams considered that although much is still uncertain about how 
Gramsci conceptualised hegemony, his work is one of the major turning-points in 
Marxist cultural theory. Williams wrote that the concept of hegemony often 
resembles Marxist definitions of how ideology functions within society, `but it is 
distinct in its refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system which 
can be and ordinarily is abstracted as "ideology".... it sees the relations of domination 
and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation 
of the whole process of living - not only of political and economic activity, nor only 
of manifest social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities and 
relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be 
seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the 
pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. Hegemony is then not 
only the articulate upper level of "ideology", nor are its forms of control only those 
ordinarily seen as "manipulation" or "indoctrination"... . It is, that is to say, in the 
strongest sense a "culture", but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived 
dominance and subordination of particular classes. ' Williams considered there are 
two immediate advantages in the use of Gramsci's hegemony instead of pure Marxist 
theory. Firstly, it allows analysis beyond the supposition of a ruling class controlling 
the masses, which is based on much earlier and simpler historical phases, and so can 
1931bid., p. 123-4. 
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be used to study modem electoral democracy; 194 secondly, Williams explained that 
cultural tradition and practise can be seen as they are, without reduction to other 
categories of content, and without the characteristic straining to fit them to other and 
determining manifest economic and political relationships. Therefore, culture is seen 
as much more than a superstructural expression of its political/economic base. '95 
2.4.3. Early Critical Theory in Mass Communications Research 
Denis McQuail wrote that early critical theory in mass communications research 
focused on the relation between media and the power structure of society, and 
influenced by Marx and Engel's views of a dominant elite controlling the masses, the 
theorists largely interpreted the media as `weapons in the hands of the ruling 
(capitalist) class, employed either to control and guide the masses by propaganda or to 
narcotise and divert them from effective opposition by escapist fantasies and 
consumerist dreams. ' The most prolific work in this regard was that undertaken by 
the Frankfurt school theorists, such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse; who, 
having observed the use of mass communications by totalitarian regimes in Germany, 
Italy and Russia in the 1930s to persuade and control the masses, considered that the 
modern media, as part of the culture industry in capitalist societies such as the US, 
could also be used by the powerful to disempower the citizen, and reduce `him or her 
to a cog in the machine run by and for the new "power-elite" of the military-industrial 
complex. ' 
196 
194 Ivor Crewe recently used hegemony in such a way, asking if New Labour was a new political 
hegemony after their 1997 and 2001 election victories, and with no sign of a significant threat in the 
near future. Crewe considered that Blair and New Labour had not only planned to win the 1997 
election, but create a new party hegemony. I. Crewe., A New Political Hegemony?, in A. King., 
Britain at the Polls, 2001, (New York and London: Chatham House, 2002), pp. 207-232, p. 212. 
195 R. Williams., Marxism and Literature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 109-111. 
196 D. McQuail., Mc Quail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory, (London, Thousand Oaks and 
New Delhi: Sage, 2002), p. 8. 
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Their views were mirrored in the work of C. W. Mills (see figure 2.2. ), who wrote in 
the 1950s that `the media, as now organised and operated, are even more than a major 
cause of the transformation of America into a mass society. They are also among the 
most important of those increased means of power now at the disposal of elites of 
wealth and power; moreover, some of the higher agents of these media are themselves 
either among the elites or very important among their servants. ' 197 
2.4.4. The emergence of the hegemonic model in critical theory 
Although critical theorists invigorated media research with new theories and methods, 
their initial claims of a media allied with the establishment, and complicit in the 
manipulation of the masses, did not survive arduous research, as the media was found 
to be more independent of the establishment than claimed under the manipulative 
model, and both the media and establishment were also divided themselves. 198 
Reviewing the relevance of the original critical theorists, and their manipulative 
model of the media, James Curran considers they were largely correct about strong 
elite pressures on the media, and that the media are powerful ideological agents, but 
they are not puppets of the establishment. 199 As many critical researchers accepted 
the establishment did not control the media in the way they had initially envisaged, 
the Marxist manipulative model was considered out-dated, 20° and the critical school 
197 Ibid., p. 78. 
198 J. Curran; Media and Power, op. cit, p. 143. 
199 Ibid., p. 165. This was highlighted in the 1990s, when the mostly Conservative supporting 
upmarket newspapers campaigned against the sleaze and corruption of some Conservative members of 
parliament. Although the press had focused on scandals before, Jeremy Tunstall considered that what 
`was perhaps different in the 1990s was the vigour of the newspaper anti-government campaign, ' and 
their common urge to sustain their definition of the government as in a state of continuing crisis. 
Tunstall also argues that far from showing the royal family too much respect, the British media have 
redefined and reinvented the monarchy as `super soap [opera]' characters. Tunstall considers that these 
attacks on elite British members of society were evidence of a change in the British media from the 
1960s to the 1990s, declaring there `are not only fewer lapdogs, but there are also many more 
watchdogs and fighting dogs. ' J. Tunstall., Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 312,338 and 280. 
200 J Curran., Media and Power, op. cit, p. 141. 
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divided into different research interests. One of these was the cultural, which had the 
notion of hegemony at the centre of its theoretical framework. McQuail wrote that 
Gramsci's notion of a contest for `hegemony' was helpful in bridging the gap between 
the two very different forms of mass communications societies that had been put 
forward by the pluralist and critical theorists. 20' 
Figure 2.2.202 shows how the hegemony model combines aspects of both the pluralist 
and power-elite (manipulative/propaganda) models: whereas the pluralist model 
depicts a society with unrestricted access to power, and the power-elite model has the 
elite closed off from the mass, the hegemonic model has the elite differentiated from 
the mass but with the mass having the possibility of becoming elite. Eric Louw 
considered plural theorists were naive in failing to address the fact that elites can and 
do intentionally work to manipulate and control non-elites, but the power-elite notion 
that non-elites are necessarily powerless and perpetually manipulated is equally 
dubious, and so the view of an uneven competition for hegemony is a more accurate 
explanation for the way society works. 203 In media theory, the hegemonic model is 
similarly situated between the plural and the manipulative/propaganda media models. 
While the pluralist media model features fair access to the media for all, and the 
manipulative/propaganda model has the media consciously manufacturing consent for 
the power elite, the hegemonic media model considers there is access to the media for 
all, but due to journalistic routines and ideology, elites are given privileged treatment, 
and the media therefore usually frames issues in line with elite opinion. 
201 D. McQuail., McQuail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory, op. cit, p. 8. 
202 Diagram scanned from E. P. Louw., The Media and Cultural Production, (London: Sage, 2001), p. 7. 
203 Ibid., p. 8. 
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(a) Dahl's pluralist model 
(b) Mills's power-elite model 
EGEMONIC 
ELITE 
(RULERS) 
(RULED) 
(c) Hegemonic-dominance model 
Figure 2.2. Plural, Power-Elite and Hegemonic models. 204 
For cultural theorists, hegemony theory placed society and the media in a broader 
cultural context than the manipulative model had, and Paul Manning considered that 
hegemony theory offered a step forward from the old theory, because it avoided 
economic reductionism, and while claiming the powerful had an advantage, accepted 
that competing perspectives were also included in the media. 205 McQuail described 
204 Dahl's model taken from R. A. Dahl., Who Governs?, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1961). Mills' model taken from C. W. Mills., The Power Elite, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1959). 
205 P Manning., op. cit, p. 39-42. 
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media hegemony theory as a `culturalist' correlate of the political-economy theory of 
control; hegemony refers to `a loosely interrelated set of ruling ideas permeating a 
society, but in such a way as to make the established order of power and values 
appear natural, taken-for-granted and commonsensical. A ruling ideology is not 
imposed but appears to exist by virtue of an unquestioned consensus. Hegemony 
tends to define unacceptable opposition to the status quo as dissident and 
deviant .... The mass media do not define reality on their own but give preferential 
access to the definitions of those in authority. '206 Stuart Allen defined hegemony as a 
site of ideological struggle over common sense, with subordinate groups encouraged 
by the ruling group to negotiate reality within what are ostensibly the limits of 
common sense, when the common sense is consistent with dominant norms, values 
and belief. Allen considers that the hegemonic approach to media analysis `enables 
the researcher to denaturalise the very naturalness of the ideological rules governing 
news discourse's representation of "what can and should be said" about any aspect of 
social life. '207 
Unlike the manipulative model, which considers journalists are consciously biased in 
favour of the establishment, hegemony theory locates `the source of "bias" in the 
environment external to the journalistic organisations, the culture, so that content is 
not simply a function of ownership, or of journalistic practices and rituals, but of the 
interaction between news organisations, the sources of their output, and other social 
institutions. ' Hegemony theorists also propose that journalists are socialised into their 
own particular newsroom culture, `where many judgements are taken as "common 
sense" and rarely questioned, ' meaning `institutional voices tend to enjoy advantaged 
206 D. McQuail., Mass Communication Theory, op. cit, p. 96-7. 
207 S. Allen., News Culture, (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999), p. 84-5. 
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access to the media. '208 This means elite sources have an advantage over the rest of 
the public in shaping the interpretative frameworks journalists use to construct their 
stories, 209 but other social groups are not excluded, and news organisations are 
thought to `play a strategic role in hegemonic struggle, functioning as "a site of 
contest between competing social forces rather than as a conduit for ruling class 
ideas. "'210 Anders Hansen et al consider that: `Studies working broadly within a 
hegemony framework have successfully used content analysis techniques to show that 
public issues are defined in the mass media and for public consumption 
overwhelmingly by representatives for powerful institutions, agencies and interests in 
society, and that "alternative" voices critical of the status quo are much less likely to 
gain a platform in the mainstream media. '211 
2.4.5. Early hegemonic theory media research 
Stuart Hall et al's Policing the Crisis, published in 1978, was one of the first Marxist 
influenced books to propose the Gramscian hegemonic model as a preferential 
explanation for the media-state relationship to the previously popular manipulative 
model, which drew on the more conventionally Marxist base-superstructure model. 
In the book, Hall et al analysed how the crime of mugging was constructed and 
defined by the media in 1970s Britain, and argued that its elevation to the top of the 
media agenda allowed the state to introduce a wave of new criminal measures. 
However, the writers distanced themselves from the manipulative model by stressing 
they did not think this was due to a state conspiracy involving the media as willing 
208 A. Anderson., Media, Culture and the Environment, (London: UCL, 1997), p. 18-23. 
209 B. McNair., News and Journalism in the UK, op. cit, p. 66-7. 
210 J. Curran., The new revisionism in mass communication research: a reappraisal, originally in 
European Journal of Communication, 5 (2/3), June, 1990, pp. 135-64, cited in B. McNair., News and 
Journalism in the UK, Ibid, p. 25. 
211 A. Hansen., S. Cottle., R. Negrine., and C. Newbold., Mass Communication Research Methods, 
(London: MacMillan, 1988), p. 108. 
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accomplices; on the relationship between the media owners, journalists and the public, 
the writers made clear they did not think the `fit' between dominant ideas and 
professional media ideologies and practices was due to the fact that the media are in 
large part capitalist owned, since that would ignore the day-to-day `relative 
autonomy' of the news producers from direct economic control. Instead, Mall et al 
considered the preferential biases shown by the media towards the establishment were 
because of professional practises, or structural imperatives, such as objectivity and the 
use of establishment figures as the main sources on news stories that involved them; 
Hall et all therefore considered establishment figures to be primary definers, while 
those with alternative opinions were usually secondary definers. Hall et al wrote that 
although the different media sources do not use the same language of address, and 
have different stories to each other, it `is not the vast pluralistic range of voices which 
the media are sometimes held to represent, but a range within certain distinct 
ideological limits; ' within a `consensus of values. '212 
Todd Gitlin, whose work was previously cited in the framing section, was one of the 
first American media analysts to do a similar study to Hall's; bringing Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony into the study of the media's role in American society. Gitlin 
worked from `the assumption that the mass media are, to say the least, a significant 
social force in the forming and delimiting of public assumptions, attitudes, and moods 
- of ideology in short. ' Gitlin considered that such ideological force was central to 
the established order, and that it was ideology and not the power of the economic and 
political capitalist establishment that explained the continuation of society's 
persistence through the system's deep and enduring conflicts. Gitlin presented 
212 S. Hall., C. Critcher., T. Jefferson., J. Clarke., and B. Roberts., Policing the Crisis, (London: 
Macmillan, 1978), p. 57-61. 
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Gramsci's hegemony theory as an explanation of the ruling class's domination 
through ideology; through the shaping of popular consent. Gitlin considered 
Raymond Williams' recent work utilising hegemony theory had transcended the 
classic Marxist base-superstructure dichotomy, and also enthusiastically discussed 
Hall et al's use of hegemony. 
With regard to his own views on the media, Gitlin thought that hegemonic influence 
does not mean that media networks being capitalist corporations will necessarily 
mean they will frame socialism negatively, but it does `preclude continuing, emphatic 
reports that would embrace socialism as the most reasonable framework for the 
solution of social problems. ' Gitlin did not think it was even necessary to accept the 
Marxist premise that the material base precedes culture, but he agreed with, and 
retained, Gramsci's core conception that hegemony, which actively works through a 
complex web of social activities, is secured by those who rule the dominant 
institutions `by impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule and, 
if not usurping the whole of ideological space, still significantly limiting what is 
thought throughout society. ' Gitlin thought the main way ideology entered the news 
was through journalists' routines, which are `structured in the ways journalists are 
socialised from childhood, and then trained, recruited, assigned, edited, rewarded, and 
promoted on the job; they decisively shape the ways in which news is defined, events 
are considered newsworthy, and "objectivity" is secured. News is managed routinely, 
automatically, as reporters import definitions of newsworthiness from editors and 
institutional beats, as they accept the analytical frameworks of officials even while 
taking up adversary positions. When reporters make decisions about what to cover 
and how, rarely do they deliberate about ideological assumptions or political 
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consequences. Simply by doing their jobs, journalists tend to serve the political and 
economic elite definitions of reality. '213 
In his analysis of the New Left movement's media coverage during the Vietnam War, 
Gitlin found the NYrs framing of them became more negative as the New Left 
became more radicalised, and rejected the core hegemonic principles of the American 
system, while finding allies in every class and race layer of the society. Gitlin 
therefore thought the NYT took issue with the New Left movement when they became 
`a profound challenge to the core principles which the dominant institutions 
sustain. '214 Gitlin considered this led to the movement being `surrounded by a 
firebreak of discrediting images, images partly but only partly of its own making. The 
spectre of violence hovered over media representations before it became popular in 
the movement itself. '215 The movement was also depicted as being outside the norms 
of society, and the leaders caricatured, although Gitlin admits the movement was 
fragmenting under competing egos and ideologies at the time anyway. After his 
analysis, Gitlin concluded there were hegemonic constraints on the media coverage of 
the New Left: `But even when there are conflicts of policy between reporters and 
sources, or reporters and editors, or editors and publishers, these conflicts are played 
out within a field of terms and premises which does not overstep the hegennonic 
boundary. Several assumptions about news value serve, for the most part, to secure 
that boundary: that news involves the novel event, not the underlying, enduring 
condition; the person, not the group; the visible conflict, not the deep consensus; the 
fact that "advances the story, " not the one that explains or enlarges it. '216 
213 T. Gitlin., The Whole World is Watching, op. cit, p. 9-12. 
214 Ibid., p. 77. 
215 Ibid., p. 183. 
216 Ibid., p. 263. 
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2.4.6. Daniel Hallin's "Uncensored War" study on the Vietnam media coverage 
In the US, much of the work on the media's use of sources in military conflicts has 
been influenced by Daniel Hallin's The "Uncensored War; " Hallin was tutored by 
Gitlin at the dissertation stage of the book, and his theory of media-state relations 
during the Vietnam War could be described as an international-military version of that 
proposed by Gitlin, in his hegemonic analysis of the media coverage of the domestic 
American anti-war protest movement. 217 Hallin's Uncensored War developed a line 
of argument he had first espoused in an article on a critical theory perspective of the 
American media. Reflecting Gitlin's views in The Whole World is Watching, Hallin 
criticised objective reporting for restricting the boundaries of journalistic criticism of 
the establishment, but also distanced his views from the Marxist base and 
superstructure model and political economy theory; Hallin wrote: `Corporate control 
of the mass media does not guarantee that the media's cultural products will 
consistently serve the interests of the capitalist system as a whole, any more than 
corporate control of energy guarantees against an energy crisis. Certainly no major 
news organisation is ever likely to become an open critic of capitalism, but the 
purpose of a news organisation is to make profit, not politics, and there is no reason to 
211 In the preface to `The Uncensored War, ' Hallin acknowledges Gitlin was on his dissertation 
committee at the University of California, Berkeley, and that Gitlin's work on the media was 
`extremely important' to him. Michael Schudson was also acknowledged as having read and 
commented on the manuscript. D. Hallin., The "Uncensored War": the media and Vietnam, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. vii. Hallin's Vietnam War findings also have similarities 
with George Orwell's views on the British media coverage of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. In 
his essay `Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War, ' Orwell wrote of how the British press had followed 
Spanish newspapers in reporting battles and victories that had never happened. Also, in line with what 
would become the Cold War frame, Orwell believed the Western press `significantly overplayed the 
extent of Russian involvement on the side of the republican forces, thereby suggesting that the struggle 
in Spain was not a struggle waged by the toiling masses for their own interests but one in which the 
Spanish people were being used to further the global political objectives of the USSR. This 
interpretation, Orwell argued, significantly limited support for the republican forces... ' T. Bennett., 
Media, `reality', signification, in J. Curran., M. Gurevitch., T. Bennett., J. Curran., and J. Woollacott., 
Culture, Society and the Media, (London and New York: Routledge, 1982), pp. 287-308, p. 289-90. 
Orwell's thoughts on the British media coverage of the Spanish War are also discussed in J. Eldridge., 
News, truth and power, in Glasgow University Media Group., Getting the Message, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993), p. 6-7. 
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assume that the narrow economic interest of the corporation will always coincide with 
the political interest of the system. If the anarchy of production leaves the capitalist 
system vulnerable to economic crisis, why should the anarchy of ideological 
"production" not leave it similarly vulnerable to cultural crisis?. .. the U. S. journalist is 
also traditionally cynical about the holders and seekers of power, and that tradition 
has been reawakened and perhaps deepened by the political conflicts of the 1960s and 
the drift and ineffectiveness of the 1970s.... at the same time she or he clings to an 
ideology of traditional individualism that predates the corporate era and coexists with 
it somewhat awkwardly. '218 
Hallin's research on the American media coverage of the Vietnam War covered the 
period from 1960 to 1965 in the NYT, and from 1965 to 1973 for three main American 
television networks. The study was acknowledged by many media analysts as 
changing the common belief at the time, which was that the liberal media had been 
strong opponents of the American military in Vietnam, and this had caused the failure 
of the American campaign. In the book, Hallin proposed a model of the objective 
journalism he was highly critical of, and Hallin's use of spheres denoting insiders and 
outsiders in the model is reminiscent of that used by Germino to depict Gramsci's 
view of hegemonic society (see figure 2.1. ), with the hegemonic elite in the centre, 
and the masses on the periphery. Explaining his Spheres of consensus, controversy, 
and deviance model, Hallin wrote that the sphere of consensus (the centre) denoted 
times when there was broad agreement within elite circles and the public about what 
should be done about certain issues, such as in popular military campaigns by their 
country; at those times, the journalists consider their role is to serve as an advocate or 
218 D. Hallin., The American News Media: A Critical Theory Perspective, in J. Forester., Critical 
Theory and Public Life, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 121- 
146, p. 137-8. 
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celebrant of consensus values, and do not think they need to balance sources. The 
sphere of legitimate controversy's limits are defined primarily by the decision-making 
process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch, with objectivity and balance 
reigning as the supreme journalistic virtues. The sphere of deviance (the periphery) is 
the `realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political 
mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard, ' such as Communists or 
others who wanted to challenge the political consensus. Hallin explained that the 
boundaries were not rigid, and which of the various models prevailed depended on the 
political climate in the country as a whole. 219 In the Vietnam War, Hallin found that 
as the war was not as solidly planted in the Sphere of Consensus as World War Two, 
more negative stories for the American military were included than in World War 
Two, although the motives for the military campaign were never really challenged. 220 
In line with the frame theory explained in the last section, Hallin wrote the language 
of law and order was common in the American television coverage of the Vietnam 
War, and whereas the American military were never presumed to have a policy of 
targeting civilians, attacks on civilians by the North Vietnamese military were 
routinely assumed to result from a calculated policy of terror. Hallin considered that a 
wide range of events was bent to fit this view, and this dehumanised the North 
Vietnamese military and banished them not only from the political sphere, but from 
human society; 221 the media thus considered their opinion unworthy of inclusion in 
the confict discourse, and they were banished to the sphere of deviance. 222 
219 D. Hallin., Uncensored War, op. cit, p. 116-118. 
220 Ibid., p. 131. 
221 Ibid., p. 156-8. 
222 Ibid., p. 148. 
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Sphere of Consensus 
Sphere of 
Legitimate Controversy 
Sphere of Deviance 
Fig. 2.3. Hallin's model of the boundaries of American objective journalism. 
Hallin found that `in the early years the media strongly supported American 
involvement in Vietnam, which they interpreted in a Cold War framework similar to 
the geopolitical framework of the Second World War. ' Hallin thought the most 
important element in the ideological framing of Vietnam was that it was consistently 
described as a conflict between a `Western-backed' regime and `Communist guerillas', 
which was essentially true, but it was also a war of peasant revolutionaries against a 
feudal social order, and a conflict born out of a nationalist struggle against colonial 
rule. Hallin thought that although all three were relevant, the ideology of the Cold 
War directed attention almost exclusively to the first of these three factors. Hallin 
later explained that an ideology defines not only what people see, but also what they 
do not see, and in the Vietnam coverage they did not see revolution, only aggression. 
The political dimension was played down, and the war in Vietnam was understood as 
a `new kind of aggression, ' carried on by `subversion'; with subversion being the 
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bridging concept that linked the phenomenon of revolution to the Cold War 
framework. 223 
Hallin did not argue there was no significant criticism of the American military 
campaign in the early years, but he contended that it `was a conflict over tactics, not 
principles. It threatened neither the Cold War consensus itself nor the premise that 
American intervention in Vietnam was a "legitimate part of the global 
commitment. " '224 In this respect, Hallin is in line with the view that the media are 
willing to criticise the policy of their country's military campaigns through their 
prognoses, but are reluctant to criticise the premises of the conflict in their diagnoses. 
In the American media coverage of Vietnam, Hallin seems to consider this was 
because of Cold-War ideological influences on the journalists, as in Gramsci's view 
that there is a constant battle for hegemonic commonsense in society: `But the 
journalists themselves were as deeply steeped in the ideology of the Cold War as 
those they wrote about. Its images pervaded their language; its assumptions guided 
their news judgements. Its power can be seen both in the "framing" of the events that 
were covered and, equally important, in the things that were not covered, that fell 
through the conceptual gaps of the world view the journalists accepted as common 
sense. ' 
Hallin considered that later in the war, after the Tet offensive shook American 
confidence of a military victory in 1968, the establishment and the nation as a whole 
were so divided over the continuation of the war that the media followed the political 
debate in taking a more sceptical and critical view of administration policy. The war 
therefore entered the sphere of legitimate controversy, as there was a political debate 
223 Ibid., p. 52-4. 
224 Ibid., p. 28. 
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about conduct of the war amongst prominent American politicians, and this meant the 
administration could no longer benefit from consensus journalism. 225 Hallin wrote 
that he did not encounter a television story that mentioned World War Two in this 
period, as the Vietnam military campaign `was now cut off from that legitimising 
connection with tradition. ' Hallin concluded from his research: `the media became 
more critical, though they were at least as much followers as leaders in the process of 
political change, responding to changes in elite and mass opinion and to the decline of 
morale among troops in the field after withdrawal began. ' 
Therefore, Hallin considered the media were failing to fulfil their role as watchdogs of 
elite policy for the people, because they were mostly following the elite debate and 
policies, rather than criticising the American strategy independently; instead of 
initiating independent critical frames, they became a forum for airing differences of 
opinion amongst politicians: `the basic structure of relations between the media and 
government were not radically different in later years of Vietnam. Early in the war, 
for example, the journalists relied primarily on two kinds of sources: government 
officials, particularly in the executive branch, and American soldiers in the field-the 
latter being particularly important in the case of television. They continued to rely on 
these same sources throughout the war; but later on these sources became much more 
divided, and many more of them were critical or unenthusiastic about American 
policy. The news "reflected" these divisions, to use the mirror analogy.... But they 
also limited that change. The Nixon administration retained a good deal of power to 
"manage" the news; the journalists continued to be patriots in the sense that they 
portrayed the Americans as the "good guys". News coverage in the later years of the 
225 Ibid., p. 162. 
91 
war was considerably less positive than in the early years, but not nearly so 
consistently negative as the conventional wisdom now seems to hold. '226 
Hallin considers that the most remarkable feature of the media coverage was that the 
media went as far with American policy as they did, 227 and as much as the media 
coverage helped persuade the public to want an end to the war, it also helped the 
Nixon administration maintain majority support through the last four years of war. 228 
However, Hallin considered that a delayed effect of Vietnam was that the American 
reporting of the Central American wars questioned the Cold War perspective, and 
there had been discussion of whether the American role in the region was a 
benevolent or imperialist one. 229 
2.4.7. Differences between the hegemonic model and the propaganda model 
Although there are many similarities between Hallin's theories in The Uncensored 
War, and Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model in Manufacturing Consent, and 
they are often cited together, the propaganda model is more in line with the base- 
superstructure model than the hegemonic, as it was formulated under the assumption 
that the media are a part of the power elite, and act as propagandists in consciously 
manufacturing consent for the continuation of the capitalist system in the US, and 
drumming up support for the US's foreign policy. 
One of the biggest differences between the work of Hallin and Herman and Chomsky 
is their views on how and whether the American media have changed over time, and 
especially since the Vietnam War. While Herman and Chomsky were still declaring 
226 Ibid., p. 175. 
227 Ibid., p. 213-4. 
228 Ibid., p. 10-11. 
229 Ibid., p. 208. 
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in 1988 that `Some propaganda campaigns are jointly initiated by government and 
media; all of them require the collaboration of the mass media, 230 Hallin considered 
that reporters were questioning official information much more during the civil wars 
in Central America in the 1980s, and the `contrast between Vietnam and El Salvador 
coverage is dramatic. ' Hallin thought an example of the change was how journalists 
in the 1980s portrayed the information they received from the Americans and their 
enemies as a two sided `propaganda war', instead of only talking about enemy 
propaganda as they had done in Vietnam. 231 Michael Schudson also considers 
Herman and Chomsky have been ahistorical in not taking into account the fact that the 
American media have been more independent of the government since the Vietnam 
War and Watergate, and that they are now more negative and cynical in their political 
reporting than they were prior to those events. 232 The above view of a changing 
American media that is independent from the power-elite, but often has to endure its 
control and restrictions when the US is at war, is supported by leading American 
journalist, H. D. S. Greenaway, who was a foreign correspondent for Time magazine, 
and is today the editorial page editor in The Boston Globe: `Well, the real legacy of 
Vietnam is that for the first time reporters and editors began to question the American 
authorities as they never had before. If you look back, from the Spanish American 
War through World War I, through World War II, through Korea, people may have 
complained about censorship and access to the front, but as Jimmy Greenfield, who 
was foreign editor of the New York Times, once said, few expended any ink in Korea 
debating whether or not we should be there at all. In Vietnam, all these things were 
230 E. S. Herman., and N. Chomsky., Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media, (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 32-3. 
231 D. Hallin., Hegemony: The American News Media from Vietnam to El Salvador, A Study of 
Ideological Change and Its Limits, in D. L. Paletz., Political Communication Research: Approaches, 
Studies, Assessments, (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1987), pp. 3-25, p. 7-10. 
232 Ibid., p. 89-92. 
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questioned and as never before, and that's a lasting legacy -- we don't take things for 
granted; we don't take things as face value; we don't believe officials, as we did before 
Vietnam. When you think about it, Vietnam was unique. The same problems that 
Christiane [Amanpour; the problems related to media independence during American 
military campaigns] is talking of now were true in previous wars, in World War II and 
in World War I. Only in Vietnam were the two bugbears of journalism overcome - 
censorship and access to the action - that the military can impose. Vietnam is really 
the only war where there was no censorship and you could go anywhere you wanted. 
That wasn't true in World War II or World War I, and it's never been true since. So 
Vietnam was really unique in that - to that extent. Oh, they're very much shaped 
because there were basically three generations of war reporters in Vietnam. The first 
generation - like David Halberstan - came criticizing perhaps the tactics, but feeling 
that we were in the right war at the right time in the right place. There came another 
generation like you and me, Terry [Terence Smith, the television host], that felt, well, 
maybe this isn't so great, but neither are the Communists, and then there came - the 
kind of radicalized reporters in the late - in the early 70's - who really felt that the Viet 
Cong deserved to win. So when we got to El Salvador and Nicaragua, I would try to 
tell reporters, take everything with a grain of salt, you know, don't trust the briefings 
that you get from the Americans or the Salvadorians, but don't fall for everything the 
rebels are telling you either. So, you know, try to be very judicious. 
'233 
McNair has also emphasised that we should distinguish between the work of 
Chomsky and others `who stress the "propagandistic" nature (if not necessarily 
always intent) of the media, ' and others such as Hallin, who prefer to emphasise the 
233 Jim Lehrer's Online News Hour., Covering the War transcript, available at 
http: //www. pbs. org/newshoLir/bb/inedia/ian-*uneoO/vietnam 4-20. html, 20/04/2000. 
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media's flexibility and adaptability in the context of a fluid, dynamic system, 
governed not by a single ruling class but by rotating elites drawn from different 
parties and factions within parties. In the latter perspective, the adaptability of the 
media to shifting lines of debate is essential to the retention of their legitimacy as 
facilitators of political discourse in the public sphere and hence, ultimately, to their 
"hegemonic" role. '234 Similarly, Phillip Schlesinger wrote that in `the propaganda 
model internal contention amongst elites is regarded as trivial given the assumption of 
an "elite consensus" that can be imposed upon the public as a whole. ' Schlesinger 
also thought that when Herman and Chomsky acknowledged public opinion was not 
controlled by the state-media manipulation it contradicted the deterministic picture 
they painted in the propaganda model, and `formal adherence to a powerful effects 
model. '235 Manning also believes the propaganda model is too reductivist, as it does 
not account for times when journalists helped bring discrepancies by elites to the 
public's awareness, and because it reduces 'US foreign news coverage simply to the 
economic and political objectives of corporate capitalism and US imperialism. ' 236 
Gitlin also criticised the propaganda model for depicting the media as 'not so much 
social institutions as an unchanging (and singular) black megaphone. Garbage 
cascades in, garbage cascades out. '237 
The Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG) have carried out several studies on 
the British media from within a hegemonic framework; John Eldridge, a leading 
member of the group involved in an analysis of the British media's coverage of the 
234 B. McNair., An Introduction to Political Communication, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 
p. 57-60. 
235 p. Schlesinger., From production to propaganda?, in P. Scannell., P. Schlesinger., and C. Sparks., 
Culture and Power: A Media, Culture and Society Reader, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: 
Sage, 1992), pp. 293-316, p. 311. 
236 p. Manning., op. cit, p. 39. 
237 T. Gitlin., Reply to Rodney Benson, Political Communication, Volume 21, Number 3,2004, pp. 
309-10, p. 309. 
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Falklands War, stated they had not found any conspiracy theories between the 
government, military and media in their research, `but a set of professional [media] 
practices, which while valuing the principle of independence, relies heavily on official 
sources for its news .... it does result in tight limits on the amount of dissent that can 
take place outside those parameters especially in a time of crisis... '238 Eldridge 
distanced their findings from Herman and Chomsky's `deterministic' propaganda 
model, and instead supported the hegemonic `contested' model: `What we learn to 
recognise here is that power over the media, and in the media, is something which is 
contested. The very process of negotiation can teach us something about changing 
power balances. It is not a unidimensional or one-way matter. '239 Tamar Liebes, who 
conducted a hegemonic study on the Israeli media coverage of the Arab-Israeli war, 
considers that news reporting shows `hegemonic overtones much more subtle than 
those involved in accepting or resisting censorship. It is obvious by now that any 
telling involves making choices, adopting perspectives, and constructing narratives, ' 
and that the aim of researchers therefore was `to point out some of the mechanisms of 
hegemonic reporting in the framing of news of the conflict' by interpretation, after 
remembering what democracy requires of journalists, and how the enactment of this 
role is `particularly problematic (technically and psychologically) in times of war or 
in a security crisis. ' 
240 
The above sections have hopefully defined why and how hegemonic theory will be 
used in this thesis. Hegemony theory in this study does not refer to the media as 
being a servant of the state; rather, the media are seen as being made up of people 
238 J. Eldridge., News, Truth and Power, in Glasgow University Media., Getting the Message, op. cit, p. 
10. 
239 Ibid., p. 29-30. 
240 T. Liebes., Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Hegemony Works, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 50. 
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who are generally supportive of the liberal-capitalist democratic system, but who have 
different political outlooks within that higher ideology, and need convincing of the 
merits of government policy before they support it. In the Kosovo media analysis, a 
hegemonic UK media will be one that uses Nato sources the vast majority of the time, 
and lets the Nato perspective dominate the framing of the conflict. This thesis will 
look for evidence of support and criticism in the British media as New Labour 
attempted to introduce a new dimension to the use of the British military in 
international conflicts, by sending forces into action for purely humanitarian reasons; 
it will therefore analyse how successful New Labour were in convincing the British 
media of the wisdom in this `hegemonic shift' in foreign policy. 
2.5. Right-wing critics of the media 
Although the left-wing critical tradition has been the basis for most critical media 
research in the UK, in the US, conservative politicians and analysts have protested 
alleged media bias much longer than liberal politicians and analysts. The main 
criticism the right-wing levels at the media is that there is a much higher percentage 
of liberal journalists than conservative, although left-wing media analysts respond that 
the journalists' political leanings are nullified by the conservative, business orientated 
media organisations. 241 
Ironically, most of the right-wing criticism in the US is aimed at the most criticised 
media source in the hegemonic tradition, the NYT; along with the Washington Post. 
Kellner wrote that the conservative critics emerged in the late 1970s, accusing the 
4 new class' of liberal journalists of being mouthpieces for `Third World and socialist 
`41 For example see Michael Nelson foreword, in B. H. Sparrow., Uncertain Guardians: The News 
Media As A Political Institution, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 
ix-x, p. ix-x, and M. Schudson, op. cit, p. 42-3. 
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tyrannies, ' and `exhibiting hostility toward US business, US labour, the US military 
and US technology. ' 242 An example of this right-wing criticism of the media was 
evident in the work of William V. Kennedy, who took the opposite view to Hallin on 
the media coverage of the Vietnam War; Kennedy argued the media were pressured 
into opposing it by the powerful NYT, and that if the other media resisted `the ultimate 
anti-war message' they faced being `professionally smothered. '243 As well as 
attacking the same media sources as the left-wing theorists during the Vietnam War, 
the right-wing also attacked the media's objective journalism; while Hallin believed 
the media's objectivity allowed the war to proceed and continue, the right-wing 
believed the media should have been more partisan and patriotic. For example, 
Carruthers wrote that American President, Richard Nixon, and the US Government 
information officer, Barry Zorthian, thought that `the missing context was an 
optimistic spin on events, which would encourage readers or viewers to recognise that, 
even if the pictures looked grim, the war itself was not going badly, as the nature of 
the task was inevitably protracted. ' 244 
In the UK, there were examples of right-wing criticism of the media during and after 
the Falklands War, when the government attacked the sections of the media they did 
not feel were patriotic enough; Morrison and Tumber wrote that during the war, 
government `attacks fell on the liberally educated, associated in the minds of the 
assailants with broadcasting personnel and the readers of the Guardian. '245 Bernard 
242 D. Kellner., Television and the Crisis of Democracy, (Colorado: Westview, 1990), p. 4. A survey of 
national journalists in the US during 2004 found that 54% thought of themselves as moderates; 34% 
liberal (up from 22% in 1995), and 7% Conservative (much lower than the amount of citizens that saw 
themselves as conservative, which was 33%), on Journalism. org., Annual Journalism Survey, 2004. 
http: //www. stateofthenewsmedia. org/iournalist survey prc. asp 
243 W. V. Kennedy., The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War, 
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1993), p. 102. 
244 S. L. Carruthers., The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, 
(Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 116. 
245 Ibid., p. 351. 
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Ingham, Conservative Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher's press secretary during the 
war, was still criticising the media a year after the war ended; while addressing the 
Guild of British Newspaper Editors in May 1983, he declared: `Too often these days 
the assumption seems to be that Government is either automatically wrong, naturally 
perverse, chronically up to no good or just plain inept .... 
I can understand and 
sympathise with the suspicion with which the media regards Government and all its 
works. It must never cease to be vigilant. But it should not assume, as it so often 
seems to do, that Government is by definition up to no good... ' Ingham reinforced 
this theme in a speech to the International Press Institute in March, 1985: `Some 
journalists, at least, believe passionately that another Watergate is lying around just 
waiting to be uncovered .... I believe that the Watergate syndrome.... seems to require 
that any self-respecting reporter should knock seven bells out of symbols of authority, 
and especially Government. This goes beyond the normal and expected tension 
between Government and press. Its effect on our democracy is, in my view, 
corrosive. ' Leapman believes Thatcher and Ingham pursued the case so doggedly 
because they were convinced that the national interest was best served by a press that 
saw itself as a cheer-leader for democratic governments rather than an inquisitor of 
them. 246 
The New Labour government criticised the media in a similar manner to Ingham 
during Nato's campaign in Kosovo, and then again in the later Iraq war; whether this 
suggests New Labour are as hostile to an independent media during British military 
operations as the Tories were during the Falklands War, or that the media have 
become more antagonistic towards the government since the 1980s, is open to debate. 
246 M. Leapman., Treacherous Estate: The Press after Fleet Street, (London, Sydney, and Auckland: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), p. 245. 
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Evidence for the latter of the two above options was cited by John Lloyd and Alistair 
Campbell, in Lloyd's recent book. Lloyd stated he believes the media have now 
become more powerful than their unelected role justifies, and politicians are now on 
the defensive in their relationship; Lloyd believes this means politicians are 
`constantly ceding ground to the media in what the latter can ask and how they can 
ask it... '247 Campbell was quoted as being in agreement: `The scene is one of 
increasing and ferocious competition. Media are insatiable when there's a frenzy 
on.... We came to power as a number of trends were becoming more obvious. One 
was an almost total fusion between reporting and comment - not just in the tabloids, 
not just in the broadsheets, but even among some of the broadcasters. ' 248 
2.6. W. Lance Bennett's indexing hypothesis 
In 1990, W. Lance Bennett set out to provide a guideline for press-government 
relations that drew on previous left and right wing theories, which Bennett considered 
had left the field divided. Whereas Hallin and Gitlin had focused their attention on 
the adversarial history of the American press, Bennett also drew attention to the 
Federalist Papers, particularly Federalist 10, which had originated the `strong and 
enduring belief that government ought to be buffered from direct popular 
accountability in order to protect the political process from the whims and passions of 
an often ignorant (and unpropertied) mass public. ' Bennett approached his study 
from a political rather than a cultural angle, and warned it would be a `norm that 
theorists on the Left may find too conservative and theorists on the Right may find too 
liberal - reactions that would reflect the enduring tensions between two traditions 
comprising the guideline. ' However, Bennett was essentially defending the media 
247 J. Lloyd., op. cit, p. 16-17. 
248 Ibid., p. 92-93. 
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against right-wing theories that their content is liberally biased, while also agreeing 
with Hallin and Gitlin that the media use too many elite sources, but do not usually 
consciously manipulate the news. Bennett also agreed with Hallin that the media had 
been too soft on the government and system after Watergate, and left the public to 
conclude the system works, when millions of people had lost faith in the system. 
While observing the media coverage of the El Salvador conflict, Bennett thought the 
media had largely fallen silent in line with the political debate, when the right-wing 
government and military's war crimes became the main story in the conflict, as this 
was negative for American foreign policy. Bennett therefore thought the media had 
not fulfilled their `watchdog' role, and foreign policy reporting might be particularly 
susceptible to the press settling for being a `keeper of the official record. ' Bennett 
therefore proposed an indexing hypothesis to test the conduct of the press, and wrote 
that if it was found to be true it would mean the media have embraced `the first 
element of our aforementioned cultural ideal (i. e., emphasis on institutions, 
deemphasis of direct popular expression) while abandoning the important companion 
principle calling for publicising popular opposition in the face of unrepresentative or 
irresponsible institutions; evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis would suggest 
that the news industry had ceded to government the tasks of policing itself and 
striking the democratic balance. '249 
Bennett proposed that an acceptable norm for the news media's use of sources should 
be that journalists can be expected to give government officials a privileged voice in 
the news, unless they exclude or marginalise stable majority opinion in society, and 
unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety; when the news media 
249 W. Lance Bennett., Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States, in Journal of 
Communication, 40 (2), Spring, 1990, pp. 103-25, p. 103-111. 
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have serious suspicions about political behaviour, they should `foreground other 
social voices (polls, opposition groups, academics, political analysts) in news stories 
and editorials as checks against unrepresentative or otherwise irresponsible 
governments. ' Bennett considered that as long as an effective opposition bloc 
operated in government, the mass media were justified in indexing news content to 
the range of institutional debate, but when the political opposition collapsed the media 
should abandon the indexing norm in favour of restoring the democratic balance, and 
a `watchdog press' would look to interest groups, opponents in Congress, or opinion 
polls. 
Bennett's consequent study on the American media coverage of the Nicaraguan 
conflict found that the media's opposition to the American government's position on 
the war collapsed in line with the political opposition, and therefore the journalistic 
patterns both before and after the shift in congressional policy on Nicaragua are best 
explained by continued application of the indexing norm, at the expense of the 
democratic ideal. ' Bennett's analysis showed that out of 889 voiced opinions in the 
news story on Nicaragua, 604 came from members of US governmental institutions. 
Bennett was also concerned about the NYT undermining the legitimacy of public 
opinion, by omitting several polls showing negative results for the government policy; 
such as a majority opposing the use of American troops against a sovereign country, 
in a conflict they thought could turn into another `Vietnam'. Bennett thought his most 
dramatic finding was that the NYT reflected Congress silence during the funding for 
Contras votes; an ideal time for the NYT to show its watchdog function. Bennett 
therefore concluded that media liberalism is indexed, and it `tends to disappear at 
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precisely those moments when it would be most useful for maintaining the democratic 
balance in the culture. '250 
2.7. Research supporting the indexing hypothesis 
Jonathan Mermin considered that Bennett's indexing hypothesis `offered a general 
formulation of what Hallin described in the Vietnam case, '251 and Mermin's study on 
American media coverage of post-Vietnam military conflicts involving US forces 
found evidence supporting Hallin and Bennett's theories on the state-media 
relationship. Mermin concluded that despite its critical-liberal outlook, the NYT still 
largely relied on official sources for any criticism of American foreign policy, as 
Hallin had found in the Vietnam War, and Bennett in the Nicaraguan War. In the 
eight foreign policy cases Mermin analysed, he found that in the news section of the 
NYT an average of 10.1 % of the paragraphs were coded as critical when there was 
conflict in Washington, while when there was consensus in Washington the figure 
dropped to just 2%. On the opinion pages, 46% of editorials and columns were 
critical when there was criticism in Washington, while the figure was 14% for the 
consensus cases. 252 With relevance to the focus section in this thesis, Mermin argued 
that if there is a consensus in Washington, journalists concentrate not on the wisdom 
of US policy itself, but in the execution and outcome of US policy, and the possibility 
of political triumph or disaster for the president. Mermin considers this critical angle, 
while limited to practice, should dispel the view that evidence supporting the indexing 
hypothesis means that American journalists are `mere propagandists for the state. ' 
250 Ibid., p. 115-24. Bennett also found there was little difference between source access for the 
Sandanistas and Contras, the two groups fighting each other in Nicaragua; there was little access for 
either, and this finding concurs with the results of this study on the use of Serb and ethnic-Albanian 
sources. 
251 J. Mermin., op. cit, p. 4-5. 
252 Ibid., p. 100. 
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Yet Mermin argued this is still a narrow parameter for critical reporting, and that there 
should be more analysis of the `ends and means' of the government policy during 
times of foreign conflict, so that the public can make an informed decision about 
whether the use of military force is the best course of action. 253 
Entman and Page considered the pre-Gulf War coverage in the NYT, The Washington 
Post, and ABC news was also in line with indexing theory, as they wrote that it 
`varied with the parameters of elite debate, ' but `even in this period of intense elite 
divisions, administration views got a privileged hearing. ' They believed this 
suggested that `even at the highest level, all elite sources are not equal. ' In line with 
Mermin's views, they also considered that `a significant part of the criticism reported 
was procedural rather than substantive, ' and warned that they could not expect the 
same amount of debate if the elites agreed on a policy. The writers considered that 
journalists relied on elite sources in this way because `of the ease of regular access to 
officials, the dependable supply of news the officials provide, the need to cultivate 
such sources over time, and the usefulness of citing legitimate, authoritative sources, 
all of which serve important commercial needs to these for-profit businesses. ' 254 
Using `watch-dog', `lap-dog' and `attack-dog' theories to analyse the American 
media coverage of the Gulf War, A. T. Thrall's research found qualified support for 
the lap-dog theory, which is basically in line with hegemony and indexing. He found 
`the press did little analysis that raised questions about the need for moving to a 
military option, ' and once fighting began the `majority of news stories and columns 
accepted the president's assertions that such action was necessary. ' Moreover, `what 
253 Ibid., p. 9-10. 
254 R. M. Entman and B. I. Paige., The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the limits to 
Media Independence, in W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz, op. cit, pp. 82-104, p. 96-7. 
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criticism there was focused almost entirely on the best means to achieve victory, 
rather than on the need to go to war in the first place. '255 Thrall also found the media 
had an obsession with the use of information from their president, 256 and that a 
compliant media for the administration depends on a political consensus. 257 Thrall 
qualified his critical findings for the media by explaining that during war, the media's 
options for newsgathering are severely constrained, and they have to go to 
government officials for information more than at any other time. Thrall therefore 
concluded that the media were not acting as a subservient `lap-dog', and more `an 
imperfect watch-dog on a very short leash. '258 
2.8. Research questioning the indexing hypothesis 
While the results in the above section make a good case for the hegemonic and 
indexing theories, some recent research has called into question how limited the 
media are in their criticisms of the American military when they go to war. For 
example, in a study inspired by Bennett's indexing theory, which they considered to 
be, both theoretically and empirically, one of the most important studies of press 
dependence on sources; because it had systematically tested and made explicit a 
theoretical deduction that had long been implicit in the scholarly literature on the 
press and foreign policy, John Zaller and Dennis Chiu analysed the coverage of forty- 
two American foreign policy crises from between 1945 and 1999 in Time and 
Newsweek magazines. However, unlike Bennett's indexing study, which relied on the 
NYT abstracts for evidence of congressional opinion, they measured congressional 
opinion independently of media coverage of it. They still found strong evidence that 
255 A. T. Thrall., War in the Media Age, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton, 2000), p. 250-1. 
256 Ibid., p. 246. 
257 Ibid., p. 62. 
258 Ibid., p. 252. 
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reporters do appear to `wax hawkish and wane dovish as official sources lead them to 
do, ' but did not find much evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis after the end 
of the Cold War, and concluded the media now `tend to be more independent of 
Congress and the president, though not necessarily more independent of government 
officials generally. '259 They also found that the media reported from extremes when 
the enemy was communist, either in a hawkish or dovish manner, while they were 
more balanced when the enemy was not communist. 260 Zaller and Chiu's results were 
not as supportive for the indexing hypothesis as Mermin's study, and they put this 
down to differences in their coding schemes. While Mermin's study followed 
Hallin's view that only negative media coverage `that fairly directly challenges the 
premise of a policy' was in line with the watchdog role the media should fulfil as a 
balance to the powers of the administration, Zaller and Chiu included any negative 
coverage that was likely to lower public support for the government policy in their 
conclusions, arguing `how meaningful is it to say that the media have not challenged a 
policy if they challenge everything about it except its explicit premises? '26' 
Entman also considers that since the Cold War ended, and the first Gulf War had a 
problematic ending, the media have shown more cynicism towards leaders than 
respectful deference. Entman first made this proposition in the article Declarations of 
Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War, and included the 
media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict as an example of this, as he found Clinton was 
heavily criticised by the American media during the Nato campaign. 262 Like Zaller 
259 J Zaller and D. Chiu., Government's Little Helper: U. S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 
1946-1999, in B. L. Nacos., R. Y. Shapiro., and P. Isernia., Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass 
Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21" Century, (Lanham, 
Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 61-84, p. 61-64. 
260 Ibid., p. 77. 
261 Ibid., p. 80-1. 
262 R. M. Entman., Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War, in 
B. L. Nacos., R. Y. Shapiro., and P. Isernia., Ibid., pp. 11-26, p. 16-17. 
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and Chiu, Entman also focused his study on analysing Time and Newsweek coverage. 
In 2004, Entman followed up that article with a book that proposed a new media 
model (see fig. 2.4). Entman suggested a new media model was needed as the 
American media was now more independent of elite power and influence, and this 
meant the hegemonic and indexing theories were not as relevant as they had been. In 
contrast to this study, Entman included Herman and Chomsky's work as an example 
of the hegemonic model, and Hallin's work as an example of indexing. Entman 
proposed the new model should be called the Cascading Network Activation Model. 
Entman wrote that the `cascade model suggests that the media should provide enough 
information independent of the executive branch that citizens can construct their own 
counterframes of issues and events .... what citizens need 
is a counterframe 
constructed of culturally resonant words and images, one that attains sufficient 
magnitude to gain wide understanding as a sensible alternative to the White House's 
interpretation. ' 263 
Entman looked at controversial American foreign policy incidents and conflicts, and 
concluded that the 1990s foreign conflicts he had studied `suggest that news of 
foreign affairs does not fall into the iron grip of hegemonic elite control, nor does it 
always provide a straightforward index of elite discussion. Ever since the Cold War 
began to fade, the news has become messier than either of these approaches lead us to 
expect - less predictable, less easily categorised and regulated. ' Entman argued that 
elite control over frames in foreign conflicts depends on the administration and the 
conflict; although the media can look hegemonic in some cases, in others, when the 
administration does not have a clear ideological frame that suppresses criticism of 
their policy, `journalists and other elites who oppose the president can use shared 
263 R. Entman., Projections of Power, op. cit, p. 17. 
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cultural schemas not merely to contest the White House frame but actually to 
dominate it. ' 
Administration 
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Figure 2.4. Entman's Cascading Network Activation Model . 
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Entman considers that the Clinton administration's weakness and vulnerability to 
attack during the Kosovo Conflict was one such occasion, and that it `illustrates the 
applicablility of the cascading network activation model to a post-Cold War 
environment where the administration, Congress, other elites, journalists, and even 
264 Ibid., p. 10. 
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indicators of public opinion all jostle for space on the same discursive stage. ' Entman 
considered the lack of media celebration after the Nato campaign to be another sign of 
how they were now more independent of the government. 265 Entman later wrote that 
although American journalists might support their country's military conflicts, they 
`remained vigilant for signs of quagmire even during the massively popular post-9/11 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and questioned administration officials aggressively 
when they thought such signs were present... ' 266 However, Entman considers that the 
media usually needs elite support to continue calling for a policy that counters the 
government strategy: `By itself, media enterprise may bring useful new information 
before the public... but without the push from continued, strategically adroit 
opposition by anti-administration leaders, potential counter-frames receive 
insufficient magnitude and resonance to yield much learning or questioning by the 
public. '267 
In the last volume of the Political Communication journal in 2003, Scott L. Althaus 
also challenged the indexing hypothesis, through a study on the American television 
coverage of the Gulf War and its build-up, where he found more media independence 
of elite influence than the indexing hypothesis predicts. 268 Althaus considers the 
question of press independence from officials is vitally important, as it is the only way 
the `people at large can exercise popular sovereignty over their institutions of 
government. ' Althaus thought that previous studies had focused too much on 
`overturning the presumption of independence than at providing consistent answers 
about the extent of the problem, ' and had also been `frustrated by inconsistent 
265 Ibid., p. 99. 
266 Ibid., p. 147-56. 
267 Ibid., p. 73-4. 
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methods for analysing news content, conflicting ideas of what "independent" news 
coverage might look like, and the tendency to study press-state relationships using 
stand-alone case studies ... that obscure common patterns. ' Althaus stated he found 
more media criticism than most previous studies because he examined `the process of 
news construction at a finer level of detail than previous studies have been able to do. 
Using full-text content analysis data from every... evening broadcast aired during the 
1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis. ' 269 
Althaus observed that previous studies, such as Hallin and Bennett's, have found a 
large amount of critical framing of government policy, but because it did not attack 
the substantive policy, they did not think it was enough to satisfy the expectations of 
what an independent media should provide. Althaus also drew attention to the fact 
that many studies had used proxy data in place of the full-text news content, and 
studies that use full-text stories usually find more media criticism of the government; 
also, because of the time-consuming work involved in coding full-text content, many 
studies only cover a short period of time, rather than the whole conflict. Althaus also 
thought it was important to include foreign sources in the study, as Bennett and 
Mermin's studies had only included American voices, and this cut out a large amount 
of potential sources. Althaus thought this meant there was still no clear picture about 
how independent news discourse is from the parameters of official debate, as different 
studies have touched different dimensions of press criticism. 
270 
268 Althaus and Entman have been working on revising the indexing thesis together since 1994 (see S. 
Asthaus., J. Edy., R. Entman and P. Phalen., Revising the Indexing Hypothesis: Officials, Media and 
the Libya Crisis, Political Communication 13 (4), 1996). 
269 S. L. Althaus., When News Norms Collide, Follow the Lead: New Evidence for Press Independence, 
in Political Communication, 20 (4), Oct/Dec, 2003, pp. 381-414, p. 382. 
270 Ibid., p. 386-8. 
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Althaus did not find that media criticism rose or fell in line with American official's 
opinions, as predicted under indexing theory, and that most of the criticisms of the 
administration's strategy were not initiated from within government circles. Althaus 
found the criticisms were limited, and did not question the premises of the war, but 
also found that journalists were independently generating critical perspectives about 
issues. Althaus concluded that although the media were `on balance, still fairly 
supportive of the government's designs, ' and `would have appeared even more 
permissive if this study had followed the conventions of previous research, ' the press 
may be more independent of government sources than previously thought: `The 1990- 
1991 Persian Gulf crisis had all of the elements that should have undermined press 
independence: a unified executive, a deferential Congress, a military build-up 
signalling American intentions for war, and an easy villain in Saddam Hussein. 
Yet.... These findings suggest that the press was much more independent in reporting 
the Persian Gulf crisis than scholars of political communication usually presume it to 
be. '271 
On indexing, Althaus concluded `Criticism of government in evening news discourse 
during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis was not triggered by or closely tied to patterns 
of gatekeeping among elected officials. Instead, the evidence from this case suggests 
that journalists exercised considerable discretion in locating and airing oppositional 
voices. This discretion did not tend to produce many bold statements of fundamental 
criticism within ends discourse, but it would be a mistake to infer from this that 
strategic criticism was thereby marginalised. ' Althaus' findings are therefore similar 
to Entman's, but he accepted that the likelihood of the media indexing to elite sources 
depended on the conflict they were covering, and the Nicaraguan conflict where 
271 Ibid., p. 392-402. 
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Bennett first formulated the indexing hypothesis was a conflict where indexing was 
more likely, as it was more localised than the Gulf War. 272 
2.9. Hegemony, Indexing and Cascade compared 
As Althaus has observed, the above findings from the disparate research on American 
media coverage of international conflicts involving their government are probably 
quite similar, with an over-reliance on official sources combined with a certain level 
of critical reporting, but there were differences of opinion about what constitutes 
media independence from government, and so the resulting conclusions on whether 
the media were independent watchdogs, or hegemonic, indexing lapdogs varied. This 
was evident in the different research perspectives of Mermin, who found in favour of 
indexing but admitted there was a narrow parameter of critical reporting, and Zaller 
and Chiu, who also found the media were still reliant on politicians, but did not 
consider indexing to be relevant after the Cold War because they found a certain level 
of media independence from Congress and the president. Another difficulty in 
comparing the 1980s studies with recent ones is that while Hallin and Bennett focused 
on newspapers (and television in Hallin's case), Zaller and Chui, and Entman 
analysed Time and Newsweek magazines in their recent studies. 
Moreover, while Entman's cascade model differs to Hallin's hegemony and Bennett's 
indexing in that he believes journalists offer criticisms that precede breakdowns in 
elite consensus, all believe journalists offer criticisms of elite policymaking, but need 
elite support to sustain coverage of their alternative agendas in the media. However, 
there seems little difference between media coverage in the `post-Cold War' conflicts 
Entman found evidence to support his cascade model in, and Hallin's findings on the 
Vietnam War in Uncensored War, as Hallin also found evidence of journalists 
272 Ibid., p. 404-5. 
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vigorously criticising the American military campaign early in the war, and 
occasionally favouring the North Vietnamese version of events to the US 
administration, but without support from elites or other media they could not prevent 
the escalation in the American campaign. Hallin's main criticism of the American 
media was that they did not criticise the premises of the American military campaign, 
and there were similar criticisms of the American media over the `post-Cold War' 
Gulf, Kosovo and Iraq conflicts. 
Therefore, there seems to be a consistency in the results between all the above 
hegemony/indexing/cascade studies, with the media relying too much on official 
sources, but covering events relatively plurally; with the positivity of the media 
coverage for the US government and military dependent on the progress of the 
military campaign, political opinion, and restrictions on journalistic movement and 
freedom of information. The main difference between the various studies seems to be, 
not in a particular transformation in the media profession since the Cold War, but in 
the theory, samples, methodologies and interpretations of the researchers. So it does 
not really seem to be fair to proclaim old models or theories redundant when using 
different media sources. As Althaus pointed out, it seems that more consistency is 
needed, and these differences in accounts suggest that to declare a model relevant or 
irrelevant needs a detailed and comprehensive analysis of all available media sources, 
from all available conflicts, across a wide spectrum of consistent variables and 
categories, and with common definitions on what constitutes political consensus, and 
media independence. 
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2.10. British studies on the media's use of sources 
The modern debate about the British media's use of sources owes much to the work 
of Stuart Hall et al, Philip Schlesinger and Howard Tumber, and although their work 
at the time did not concern source use in conflicts, their theories were similar to those 
proposed in the American studies discussed above, and their work is therefore 
relevant both for continuity from the above sections, and as context for this section on 
the British media's use of sources. In a critique of the aforementioned Policing the 
Crisis, where Hall et al argued that elite sources could expect to dominate news 
discourses, because they were used by the media as primary definers for issues that 
involved them, Schlesinger and Tumber argued that although the `primary definers' 
do have an advantage in getting their information into the news, Hall et al 
underestimated the ability of less powerful groups to get their views into the media. 
In line with Hallin's hegemony, Schlesinger and Tumber also stressed there is often 
disagreement between elites, and this can lead to journalists opening up the `gate' to a 
more varied use of sources; 273 it was not pre-determined that elite sources become the 
primary definers of issues, and they `have to engage in goal-orientated action to 
achieve access, even though their recognition as "legitimate authorities" is already 
usually inscribed in the rules of the game. '274 Manning agreed with Schlesinger and 
Tumber's critique of Hall's primary definers theory, but believes Hall's work was 
vital in setting out a research agenda for both empirical and theoretical work on the 
media's use of sources. 
275 
273 P. Schlesinger., and H. Tumber., Reporting Crime: The Media Politics of Criminal Justice, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), in H. Tumber., News: A Reader, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 257-66, p. 260-4. Schlesinger also makes the same arguments in P. Schlesinger., Rethinking 
the Sociology of Journalism: Source Strategies and the Limits of Media-Centrism, in M. M. Ferguson., 
Public Communication: The New Imperatives: Future Directions for Media Research, (London, 
Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage, 1990), pp. 61-83, p. 64-9. 
274 P. Schlesinger., Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism, Ibid., p. 76-7. 
275 P. Manning., op. cit, p. 17. 
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Writing about the relationship between the British media, military and politicians, Ian 
Stewart indirectly agreed with the premises of hegemony and indexing when he 
stressed the importance of the government having a political consensus in support of 
the military campaign if they wanted to achieve and maintain the media's support: 
`The key, then, to a successful media war from the perspective of the goverment is to 
ensure that there is a firm consensus across the political elite .... In conclusion, the key 
component in ensuring that a successful media war is waged alongside the 
conventional war is the existence of widespread support for the validity of the 
political goal the military action seeks. If the legacy of Vietnam reminds United 
States administrations of this fact, the Suez Crisis of 1956 does similarly in the British 
context. ' Stewart considers that some of the British press went against Britain's Suez 
campaign because they had access to a `section of the political elite able to express 
those views publicly. In short, this was another example of a divided political elite 
finding expression in divided press coverage. ' Stewart considers the media did not 
offer as much criticism of the military during the Falklands and Gulf wars because 
there was no significant opposition from the mainstream political parties, and when 
there are only a few mavericks criticising the government policy they are framed in 
general as irrelevant to the main issues: `Journalism is only as good as its sources and 
can only reflect those sources. In time of a national crisis such as a war those sources 
are, in the main, the political elite whose views inform parliamentary debate. The 
opposition character of formal political debate in Britain defines the first balance. 
What then is a journalist to do when there is no opposition from the opposition.... The 
Opposition system even isolates members of its own party who oppose the war. Such 
mavericks, though they might get some media exposure, are framed in general as 
irrelevant to the main issues. ' However, Stewart argued that a united political elite 
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should not be seen as the ultimate goal of the military's media relations in wartime, 
and that it should be more important for the military to have an informed and 
responsible public, and a popular consensus. '276 
In line with Hallin's opinion on journalists being limited by their professional 
restrictions, McNair considers that although objectivity was designed to win audience 
credibility through removing signs of journalistic bias, it can lead to bias in favour of 
the powerful because the `organisational demand for "source credibility" combines 
with the time pressures imposed by the news production process to favour 
establishment sources, ' as journalists base their choice of sources on cultural 
assumptions that reflect mainly elite-establishment views. 277 McNair suggested the 
use of official sources by journalists is so widespread in the UK because journalists 
value authoritative sources' views on issues as one of the three main characteristics of 
the `objective journalism' model. 278 In a later book, McNair referred to the 
hegemonic role the British and American medias can play in modem society, and in 
line with indexing how they can be a battleground between competing interests who 
try and influence the way issues are framed: `They [the media] may become a site of 
dissent, contributing to the breakdown of a previously hegemonic worldview and its 
replacement by another. When the British establishment lacks unity and coherence 
the British media, like those of the US in the case of the Vietnam War... reflect that 
disunity, and become more open. This openness can be further stretched and widened 
by effective source strategies. ' 279 
276 I. Stewart., Reporting Conflict: Who Calls the Shots?, in S. Badsey., op. cit, pp. 64-76, p. 71. 
277 Ibid., p. 75-6. 
278 B. McNair., Sociology of Journalism, op. cit, p. 68. 
279 B. McNair., News and Journalism in the UK: a Textbook, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 78. 
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Two books were published in 2004 with methodologies and results relevant for this 
section. Firstly, Tumber and Palmer analysed the UK television and newspaper 
coverage of the Iraq War, and cited some of the American hegemonic and indexing 
studies that provide the theoretical framework for this study in their conclusion. Their 
quantitative analysis found that coalition official spokespeople and representatives of 
government and the armed forces dominated the dialogue by a large margin in all the 
media sources analysed (Sun, Telegraph, Mirror, Guardian, BBC and ITN). 280 Their 
results also supported the theories that the media would be more critical of the 
coalition's campaign when there was a breakdown in elite consensus; and that the 
media would criticise the strategy of the campaign rather than the objectives. 281 
Secondly, Greg Philo and Mike Berry of the GUMG undertook a content analysis of 
British television news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian war, and combined it with a 
survey of how the coverage related to the understanding, beliefs and attitudes of the 
television audience. They found the news coverage used more Israeli sources than 
Palestinian, and also often used American sources who offered pro-Israeli 
perspectives. They also found that although there were more Palestinian casualties 
during the time of their analysis, the news coverage made it seem like there were 
more Israeli. They also argued that a lack of time spent on each report meant there 
was a lack of context in the news coverage, and that this impacted negatively on the 
audience's interest in the conflict. 282 
280 H. Tumber., and J. Palmer., Media at War: The Iraq Crisis, (London, Thousand Oaks and Delhi: 
Sage, 2004), p. 103. 
281 Ibid., p. 162-5. 
282 G. Philo., and M. Berry., Bad News From Israel, (London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto, 2004), p. 
245-59. 
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2.11. Conclusion 
As shown in this section, framing and hegemony have been used in a large body of 
research over the last three decades, in times of both peace and war. In this study, 
indexing will be included within the hegemonic media model, as they both refer to a 
contest for media coverage weighted in favour of national government and military 
leaders; with the media relying on those official sources for leadership in issue 
framing. The hegemonic model will provide an alternative view of the media to the 
plural model, so that judgements on the independence of the media during the Nato 
campaign can be made. The propaganda model, which like the manipulative model, 
is more critical of the media than the hegemonic model, is also referenced 
occasionally; as is the cascade model, which was proposed as an alternative model to 
hegemony and indexing during the later stages of this study. The cascade model is 
generally in line with the old plural model, and sometimes they are referred to 
together, as alternatives to the models that consider the politics-media relationship is 
heavily weighted in favour of politicians during wars involving their country's 
military. 
As this study focuses on an international conflict involving the military of the media's 
nation, with a general consensus between political parties and the media on the 
legitimacy of the campaign, there should be more evidence of hegemony than would 
be expected in a conflict where there were mainstream political divisions about the 
justification for the campaign. The fact that it was spun as a `new' kind of war often 
made it difficult to draw conclusions on whether the media offered opinions outside 
the hegemonic boundaries, because the war itself was spun as being a war fought 
outside the old hegemonic boundaries; for humanitarian reasons rather than economic 
or territorial. In this way, some of the right-wing media could be seen as more 
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hegemonic when they criticised the motivation of the Nato campaign, because they 
did not believe in the `hegemonic shift' in the country's military being used for 
humanitarian interventions. However, it was decided to analyse the hegemony of the 
media with regard to its support for the New Labour and Nato campaign, and how 
much it followed the Nato framing of their campaign, as that would show how much 
the media had adapted their coverage to the `hegemonic shift' in government and 
foreign policy. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
This study has used a content analysis combining quantitative and qualitative methods, 
followed by interviews with journalists involved in the reporting of the Kosovo 
Conflict in the UK. By combining these three aspects of research, this thesis is in line 
with the `multiple research strategies, ' or `method triangulation' methodology often 
cited by researchers as a means of adding authority to research findings; defining this, 
and with relevance to this study, Grannen wrote that `Method triangulation may be 
between-methods or within-method.... between-methods means using different 
methods in relation to the same object of study... ' 283 Arksey and Knight also wrote 
there were different types of methodological triangulation, and explained the one used 
in this study, between-method triangulation, as: `where two or more distinct 
methods ... are employed to measure the same phenomenon, 
but from different angles. 
The rationale is that cumulatively the weaknesses of one research method are offset 
by the strengths of the others. ' 284 Bryman corroborated the above definitions when he 
wrote that the logic of `triangulation' is that the `findings from one type of study can 
be checked against the findings deriving from the other type. For example, the results 
of a qualitative investigation might be checked against a quantitative study. The aim 
is generally to enhance the validity of findings. '285 
By first using qualitative research to set up the variables, categories and hypotheses 
used in the quantitative analysis, and then using the results from the quantitative 
283 J. Brannen., Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an overview, in J. Brannen (ed)., 
Mixing Methods: qualitative and quantitative research, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1992), pp. 3-37, p. 11. 
284 H. Arksey., and P. Knight., Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with 
Examples, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Sage, 1999), p. 23. 
285 A. Bryman., Quantitative and qualitative research: further reflections on their integration, in J. 
Brannen (ed)., op. cit, pp. 57-78, p. 59-60. 
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analysis to set up the qualitative content analysis and interviews, this study is in line 
with the rationale of triangulation as explained by the above writers. The combination 
of the three aspects of research should therefore bring results which will fulfil the 
objectives of this study: to identify the content and frames used by the British and 
American medias in their coverage of the Kosovo conflict; and to compare the media 
coverage between left and right wing UK media sources, and between the UK media 
and the NYT. 
3.2. Content Analysis 
Ole R. Holsti defined content analysis as `a multipurpose research method developed 
specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication 
serves as the basis of inference; '286 and `any technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. In 
somewhat more succinct form this definition incorporates the three criteria discussed 
earlier: content analysis must be objective and systematic, and... it must be undertaken 
for some theoretical reason. ' Holsti's definition did not specify quantification 
because he considered that `a rigid qualitative-quantitative distinction seems 
unwarranted for the purposes of defining the technique... '287 
A content analysis is therefore usually improved by a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative data; quantitative data can provide hard evidence to support or oppose 
theories made from qualitative analysis, 288 while additional qualitative analysis 
provides the researcher with examples of what the quantitative analysis has found, 
and further evidence to add weight to the quantitative findings. 
286 0. R. Holsti., Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, (Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1969), p. 2. 
28' Ibid., p. 14. 
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Denis McQuail has also written about the merits of mixing qualitative and 
quantitative research when analysing the media: `For some purposes, it may be 
permissible and necessary to depart from the pure form of either "Berelsonian" 
[quantitative] or "Barthian" [qualitative] analysis, and a number of studies have used 
combinations of both approaches, despite their divergent assumptions. An example of 
such a hybrid approach is the work on British television news of the Glasgow Media 
Group (1976,1980,1985), which combined rigorous and detailed quantitative 
analysis of industrial news with an attempt to "unpack" the deeper cultural meaning 
of specific news stories. '289 
3.2.1. Quantitative content analyses 
There are two major quantitative content analyses in this study, and one minor. 
Firstly, there is an analysis of the New Labour, MoD and Nato information, which it 
was thought would provide the foundation for the political and media debate on the 
Nato campaign in the UK. The media coding scheme is the most comprehensive, as 
the media coverage is the main focus of this study. The media coding scheme was 
changed slightly for some of the media sources, and the differences are explained 
below. A quantitative analysis of the House of Commons debates was also 
undertaken, but there was a front bench consensus for almost all the conflict, and as 
this meant indexing theory could not be tested, the analysis was kept to a minimum. 
3.2.1.1. The Nato Political and Military Information 
3.2.1.1.1. The sample 
The content analysis of the information provided to the media and public during the 
Kosovo Conflict draws on three sources in the month of April, 1999: firstly, the Nato 
288 J. Fiske., Introduction to Communication Studies (2"d edition), (London and New York: Routledge, 
1990), p. 190. 
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press conferences 290; secondly, the MoD press conferences; and thirdly, the personal 
speeches and interviews made by New Labour politicians during the conflict. The 
Nato conferences were also coded for their political presentations only, as it was 
thought this would give another angle to the comparisons with the MoD conferences, 
as the military presentations from the MoD conferences were not always available 
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) web-site. Out of the thirty days 
in April, there were nineteen days where information from all three sources were 
available, and these days are therefore the ones that have been analysed; they were 
April 1St, 2 "a 3rd, 4tß,, Stn, 6th, 7 tß', 10 tß', l Ith, 13th, 14 tß', 16th, 18 tß', 19th, 20th, 21St, 23rd, 
25 t" and 27th. A description of the contents and rationale follows below. 
There were no Nato conferences available for the 12th, 22nd, and 26th, and so that 
meant those days could not be included in the analysis. On the days that were 
available, and were also available for the other sources, on the 1St, Javier Solana gave 
the political speech, while General Wesley Clark gave the military speech. On the 2nd, 
Air Commodore David Wilby presented on his own, after a short introduction by Nato 
spokesperson, Jamie Shea. From the 3rd to the 7th Shea gave the political speech, 
while Wilby gave the military presentation. On the 10th and 1 lth Shea gave the 
political speech, while Colonel Konrad Freytag gave the military presentation. On the 
13`h Shea gave the political speech and Clark gave the military presentation. From the 
14th to the 201h, Shea was joined by General Giuseppe Marani, who gave the military 
presentation. On the 21st, Shea and Marani were joined by Commander Fabrizio 
Maltinti, who briefed the conference on the humanitarian situation. On the 23ýd and 
25Th Shea and Freytag gave the presentations from the Washington summit, while on 
the 27tß' Shea and Clark presented at a conference back in Brussels. 
289 D. McQuail., Mass Communications Theory, op. cit, p. 328. 
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Unfortunately, only the political presentations were available from many of the MoD 
conferences on the FCO web-site, 291 so only they could be coded and analysed on 
some of the dates below. There were no MoD conferences available on the web-site 
on April 8th , 24th 28th and 3 0th, so those days were left out of the analysis. On April 
I" the military presentation was not available, and Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, 
gave the political presentation. On the 2 °d, Dr. Edgar Buckley (MoD Under-Secretary, 
responsible for operations) gave the political presentation, while Air Marshall Sir 
John Day (Director of operations in the MoD working under General Charles Guthrie, 
the Chief of Defence Staff) presented the military up-date. On the 3rd and 4th Doug 
Henderson (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) presented the political up-date, 
while Day again presented the military conference (on the 3rd, Major Julian Moir also 
gave a presentation, but this was not available). On the 5th, Cook gave the political, 
and Guthrie gave the military presentation, while on the 6th these roles were filled by 
Robertson and Colonel Moody. On the 7th and 11th, only Cook's presentation was 
available, while on the 10th it was only Henderson's that was available. On the 13th, 
only Cook's was available. On the 14th, the presentations by Defence Secretary, 
George Robertson, and International Development Secretary, Clare Short, were 
available. On the 16th, Tony Lloyd's (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of 
State) presentation was available, while on the 17th and 18th, Henderson's was. On the 
19th it was Robertson again, and Cook on the 20tß. On the 21st, Robertson and Day's 
presentations were available, along with Paddy Ashdown (leader of the Liberal 
Democrats political party in the UK at the time)'s via satellite from Skopje. On the 
23 `d and 25th it was Cook and Robertson from the Washington press conference, while 
on the 27th Cook's presentation from back at the MoD was available. 
290 Nato's Kosovo press conferences were coded from: www. nato. int/docu/speech/sp99. htm 
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For the government's personal speeches and interviews, there were none available on 
the FCO web-site for the 9th 15th, 17 th 29th and 3 0th, and so those days were left out 
of the analysis. There were sometimes more than one available, and in those cases 
there were certain criteria followed for choosing which ones to use. The first was that 
those chosen were the ones with content aimed most directly at the Kosovo Conflict. 
The next reason for choosing which would be used was the governmental position of 
the source, and its relevance to the Kosovo Conflict. In this regard, and out of the 
politicians used, the Prime Minister Tony Blair took precedence, and he was followed 
in order by Robin Cook, George Robertson and Clare Short. 
On the 1st of April, only Robin Cook's internet message to the Serb people was 
available. On the 2"d, only an interview by Cook on BBC Radio was available. On 
the 3rd, Blair's interview with Sky News was used, while Cook's response to the 
refugee crisis was not. On the 4th, a Blair interview for the Sunday Telegraph 
newspaper was used, but a Cook interview on Radio 5 Live announcing Macedonia 
have agreed to give sanctuary to the refugees was not. On the 5th, a Blair interview 
for the Sun newspaper was used, but a Blair interview showing his respect to 
President Djukanovic on Montenegrin television was not. On the 6th, Short reporting 
to the MoD on her visit to Albania and Macedonia was used, even though it was at the 
MoD conference, while a Foreign Office reaction to a Belgrade peace proposal was 
not. On the 7th, only a press conference by Cook and a delegation of Kosovar 
Albanians was available. On the 10th, only a doorstep speech by Blair, alongside the 
Spanish President, Jose Maria Aznar, was available. On the 1 lth, an article by Blair 
for the Sunday Mirror was used, while George Robertson writing in the Sunday 
291 The MoD's Kosovo press briefings, and New Labour politicians' speeches, interviews and articles 
were coded from: www. fco. gov. uk/search. asp 
125 
Business was not. On the 13t", only Blair addressing the House of Commons was 
available. On the 14th, an interview given by Blair with Kofi Annan was used, while a 
Cook speech at the Lord Mayor of the City of London 's Easter Banquet on Kosovo 
and the Modern Europe was not. On the 16th, only Cook announcing the appointment 
of David Gowan as Britain's Kosovo War Crimes Coordinator was available. On the 
18th, only an interview by Blair for the American television station, CBS, at Chequers 
was available. On the 19t", Cook opening a debate on Kosovo in the House of 
Commons was used, while Blair speaking at the annual meeting of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development in London about their help after the fall of 
Communism was not. On the 20t", only Blair giving a press conference at Nato 
headquarters after meeting with Nato's military and political leaders on the air 
campaign was available. On the 21St, flair's interview for the Russian television 
station, NTV, was used, while Blair and FCO ministers answering questions on 
Kosovo in the House of Commons was not. On the 23 `d, a Blair interview for the PBS 
television show The Newshour with Jim Lehrer in America was used, while a Blair 
interview with another television station, NBC, rejecting Milosevic's latest offer, was 
not. On the 25th, only a television interview given by Robin Cook and Madelaine 
Albright on BBC television's Breakfast with Frost from Washington D. C. was 
available. Finally, on the 27th, a second Internet message to the Serb people from 
Robin Cook was used, while an announcement that FCO Minister of State, Joyce 
Quinn, would deliver the Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture in Luxembourg that 
night, entitled Britain in Europe, was not. 
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3.2.1.1.2. The coding of the elite information 
Coding units 
The coding unit was as much of the conference presentations, speeches, articles or 
interviews available from each Nato military spokesperson or British politician and 
military spokesperson. The dialogue of others, such as other politicians or diplomats, 
interviewers and journalists were not included. Although some interviews were led 
by the interviewers, and they might go against the New Labour politicians' agenda, it 
was thought that what the politician said, and how much time he spent on each 
question, would suggest how much emphasis he wanted to put on each issue. 
Coding procedure 
The objectives of the content analysis for the Nato and MoD conferences, and the 
New Labour rhetoric, were primarily to identify how they framed the conflict, to see 
how similar the content of their presentations were to each other, and to later compare 
them to the media frames to see how closely they related to each other. The coding 
system is the same as the media coding system at the start, with codes for the case, 
date and source. After this it changes, as its objectives differ to that of the media 
system, and there is no need for the paragraphs/time, format, position and main source 
variables. Unfortunately, no images were available from the web-sites either, so that 
variable could not be included, but the images in the conferences usually reflected the 
topics anyway. Eight variables were therefore included in the coding system. 
There were seventy-six units coded and analysed, with nineteen each from the four 
sources. Each different topic's lines were counted in each unit to get a quantitative 
impression of what the sources concentrated on in each conference, speech, interview 
or article. Due to the inevitable restrictions involved in analysing quantitative data, a 
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comprehensive list of categories was formulated, so that as much evidence as possible 
would be identifiable. 
As only one category was recorded for each variable in the unit of analysis, a lot of 
the topics that appeared regularly, but did not take up a long time, did not feature 
prominently in the final results. These included themes like the Serbs expanding the 
war into neighbouring countries, the KLA being undefeated in the ground war, 
collateral damage, and how Milosevic's policies had affected the Serbian economy. 
Although this means the analysis of the conferences is not comprehensive, it was 
thought that the main features of the Nato and New Labour framing of the conflict 
would still become apparent from the results. 
Also, when more than one category appeared in an article, it was sometimes difficult 
to choose which should be included, and this was particularly true for the historical 
references variable. It was decided that the first one mentioned should be included, 
unless another became much more salient later. Furthermore, some historical 
references were left out if their allusion was too vague, or if they were references to 
places where wars had taken place, but there was no reference to the wars that took 
place; Bosnia was the most common example of this. 
3.2.1.2. The House of Commons information 
Having analysed the information from the Nato politicians and military, a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the Kosovo debates in the House of Commons was then 
undertaken. Transcripts from the oral questions and debates on Kosovo were 
available on Hansard from fourteen dates: March 23rd, 24 th, 25th1,29th and 31St; April 
13th, 19th and 20th; May 10th, 12 `h, 18th and 26th; and June 8th and 9t". On March 23rd 
there were twenty-two speakers coded; on March 24th there were twenty-five; on 
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March 25th there were twenty-five; on March 29th there were twenty-one; on March 
3 1St there were nineteen; on April 13th there were twenty-four; on April 19th there 
were forty-eight; on April 20th there were seven; on May 10th there were five; on May 
12tH there were six; on May 18th there were eight; on May 26th there were twenty-three; 
on June 8th there were twenty-one, and on June 9th there were twenty. This meant a 
total of 274 political speakers were coded. The speakers were coded into five 
categories for the quantitative analysis: Positive for the Nato campaign; Positive- 
Questioning for the Nato campaign; Questioning; Negative-Questioning for the Nato 
campaign; and Negative for the Nato campaign. 
3.2.1.3. The quantitative media analysis 
3.2.1.3.1. The sample 
Guardian 
The Guardian started life as the Manchester Guardian. The paper was developed by 
the editorship of C. P. Scott, which started in 1872. Scott also became the principal 
proprietor in 1907, and remained editor for over fifty-seven years, until 1929. Scott 
believed that whatever interpretation was made of a story, the facts were sacred, and 
should be stated as plainly as possible. After Scott's death, the family put the whole 
of the ordinary shareholding into the Scott Trust in 1936, and the Trust remains the 
holder of all ordinary shares. Increased national standing led to the newspaper being 
renamed The Guardian in 1959, and in 1976 the newspaper relocated its headquarters 
to London. In 1993 the Group reconstituted itself as Guardian Media Group plc and 
also purchased the Observer. 292 In line with the wishes of C. P. Scott, all profits are 
ploughed back into the company, and Simon Jenkins considers that no other paper has 
gone to such lengths to ensure that its editorial columns remain loyal to the wishes of 
292 Guardian media Group history., http: //www. gmRplc. co. uk/gnu/history/ February, 2002. 
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its original proprietor, and does not think anyone with right-wing views would be 
appointed to the Trust. 293 Hetherington believes the Scott Trust is worth attention in 
terms of its journalistic philosophy, because it `provides a greater guarantee of 
editorial freedom than any other and because it aims to maintain journalism with a 
high standard of accuracy and impartiality, as well as an open-minded approach. '294 
The Times 
In the early to mid 1800s, The Times was the principal paper in terms of circulation 
and influence, and changed its policy on substantial issues from year to year as its 
editors sought to identify the needs of their readers. Anthony Smith considers The 
Times `wanted to lead and instruct its readers but never stand too far ahead of them or 
too far behind them... ' 295 Ken Ward wrote that The Times sold four times as many 
copies as its main rivals together in 1850, as a result of an astute commercial policy 
and editorial flair, and this gave the paper the confidence to challenge statesmen; for 
example, it crusaded over the terrible conditions the British military had to suffer in 
the Crimean War, and this led to improved treatment for the soldiers. However, The 
Times' reputation and popularity fell later in the century, until it was bought and had 
its fortunes revived by Lord Northcliffe in 1908.296 
Although The Times remained popular through the twentieth century, Hetherington 
considers it has also made some important mistakes, such as supporting the 
appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s, 297 and keeping silent about Eden's Suez 
293 S. Jenkins, The Market for Glory, (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 212-13. 
294 A. Hetherington., News, Newspapers and Television, (London: MacMillan, 1985), p. 24-6. 
295A. Smith., The Politics of Information: Problems of Policy in Modern Media, (London and 
Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1978), p. 147-8. 
296 K. Ward., Mass Communications and the Modern World, (Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, 
1989), p. 41-2. 
297 A. Hetherington., op. cit, p. 24. 
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preparations despite knowing more than any other news channel. 298 However, the 
BBC still considered The Times the most reliable newspaper for attaining relevant 
news when Schlesinger conducted an ethnographic study there in the 1970s, 299 and 
Tunstall wrote that with political columnists such as Lord (William) Rees-Mogg, 
Simon Jenkins, Peter Riddell and Matthew Parris The Times have the best of the 
British papers. 300 
Rupert Murdoch, an Australian with American citizenship, bought The Times in 1981, 
and changed its content and style, although he said he would not interfere with the 
editor on news and opinion. 301 Jeremy Paxman believes Murdoch's influence has 
meant The Times has dropped its elitist outlook and adopted the techniques of other 
papers, and this has meant it is not seen as the establishment paper in Britain 
anymore. '302 McNair also believes The Times has changed, and Murdoch has 
included a wide range of viewpoints in the (Sunday) Times because he knows his 
youngish, affluent, educated readership would not respond to being patronised from 
the right alone. 303 
Financial Times 
The Financial Times Group is one of the world's leading business information 
companies, and they describe their objective as providing a broad range of business 
information, analysis and services to an audience of internationally minded business 
people. It is now printed in twenty-three countries, and Colin Sparks wrote that out of 
298 Ibid., p. 41. 
299 P Schlesinger., Putting `reality' together: BBC news, (London and New York: Routledge, 1987), p. 
91. 
300 J Tunstall., Newspaper Power, op. cit, p. 282-5. 
301 J Street., op. cit, p. 137. 
302 J Paxman., Friends in High Places, (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 324-327. 
303 B. McNair., Sociology of journalism, op. cit, p. 110. 
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the FT's 312,723 circulation in the first half of 1997, only 200,000 were sold in the 
UK. 304 
The FT was founded in 1888, and was printed on its trademark pink paper for the first 
time in 1893. In 1957 it was taken over by Pearson, a company specialising in 
education; in 1979 its European edition was launched from Frankfurt, and in 1997 the 
US edition was launched from New York. Richard Lambert was editor during the 
Kosovo Conflict, but Andrew Gowers took over in 2001.305 
Anthony Sampson considers the FT, Economist and International Herald Tribune to 
be exceptions to the decline in serious foreign news in international broadsheets, 
although they are primarily business papers; while Tunstall argues the FT took over 
from The Times as Britain's leading prestige newspaper in the mid 1970s. 306 In the 
1992 and 1997 general elections the FT supported the Labour party. 
The Independent and Independent on Sunday 
On their web-site, the Independent described themselves thus: `Independent 
Newspapers is a division of Independent News and Media UK., part of a successful 
global media and communications group with a turnover of 1,341m Euros, which 
publishes more than 160 newspapers and magazines in five countries - the UK, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. The Independent was launched on 
7 October, 1986, the first UK national quality newspaper for 131 years. The 
Independent on Sunday followed just over three years later in 1990. Our readership is 
an advertiser's dream: young, professional and educated adults with high incomes and 
a propensity to spend money. ' Simon Keiner, Editor-in-Chief, The 
304 C. Sparks., The Press, in J. Stokes., and A. Reading (eds)., The Media in Britain: Current Debates 
and Developments, (Basingstoke and London: MacMillan, 1999), pp. 41-60, p. 44. 
305 http: //www. pearson. com/about/ft/business. htm, 22/07/04. 
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Independent/Independent on Sunday, wrote: `Our values remain identical to those of 
the paper when it launched in 1986: beholden to no one political party, economically 
and socially liberal.... We are now firmly persuaded, however, that our values unite 
naturally with the overall goal of at last making Britain, in the fullest sense, a key 
force in contemporary Europe. '307 
When the Independent was launched in 1986, Tunstall thought their owners were 
aiming for a niche between The Times and Daily Telegraph on the political right and 
the Guardian on the left, 308 although he described its political outlook as vaguely 
Conservative, but not supportive of Thatcher. 309 Several journalists left The Times to 
go to the Independent at its launch, as they did not approve of Murdoch's ownership, 
and hoped the Independent could take The Times' place as Britain's politically 
unattached newspaper-of-record .3 
10 At first, the paper was completely independent, 
but increasingly poor sales after a good start resulted in Mirror Group Newspapers 
and Ireland's main press baron Tony O'Reilly acquiring forty-four per cent apiece of 
the paper; this was against determined opposition from its journalists. 311 In 1998 0' 
Reilly took complete control, but Editor in Chief Simon Kelner insists they are still 
free from proprietoral control, and 0' Reilly is proud the paper is not his political 
mouthpiece. During the Kosovo Conflict, Kim Fletcher was the editor of the IoS, or 
Sindy as it is often called; and as previously mentioned, was the only UK editor to 
306 J Tunstall., Newspaper Power, op. cit, p. 340. 
307 Independent News and Media UK., 15 October, 2003, at: 
http: //www. independent. co. uk/advertise/media_pack/story. jsp? story=116349 
308 J Tunstall., op. cit, p. 53. 
309 Ibid., p. 250. 
310 Ibid., p. 53. 
311 P. J. Humphreys., Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996), p. 109-10. 
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take an anti-war stance. The IoS also took a similarly anti-war view for the Iraq war 
in 2003.312 
Telegraph 
The Daily Telegraph was launched in 1855, and has been the upmarket leader since 
1930. It was bought by Conrad Black, a Canadian, in the 1980s, and he was still the 
owner during the Kosovo Conflict in 1999. Tunstall explained that being the market 
leader allows the paper to charge premium advertising rates, and that is why the paper 
was very profitable in the early 1990s. 313 Michael Leapman explained its sales 
strategy thus: `The Telegraph maintains its position as Britain's largest-selling 
broadsheet newspaper by aiming down-market of The Times, the Guardian and the 
Independent. It sells more than twice as many copies as any of them. No other paper 
competes in its precise market segment. That is true of only two other national papers, 
the Financial Times and Today; 314 Today later went out of business. However, The 
Times has since been eroding the Telegraph's circulation lead, through price cutting 
and aiming for a more populist market. 
The Telegraph web-site was known as the Electronic Telegraph during the Kosovo 
Conflict, before it later changed its name to telegraph. co. uk. The Electronic 
Telegraph was launched in 1994, and was the first major newspaper web-site. It won 
three consecutive 'Best newspaper on the world wide web' awards (1997,1998 and 
1999). Hollinger Telegraph New Media Limited was created in 1999, and is now the 
312 Media Lens., No Mea Culpa from the British Media, part 2: The Independent on Sunday - Guardian 
of Power, 70' September, 2004, at 
http: //www. medialens. org/alerts/2004/040907 - 
No_Mea_Cu lpa_2. HTM 
313 J. Tunstall., Newspaper Power, op. cit, p. 16-17. 
314 M. Leapman., op. cit, p. 176. 
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holding company for Telegraph Group Limited's online and digital activity in the UK 
and Europe. 315 
New York Times and Sunday New York Times 
The NYT was first published in 1851, and the New York Times Company now owns 
nineteen papers besides the main paper. 316 It is now owned by the Sulzberger family, 
rather than by a big organisation, 317 and Benjamin Page believes this will make it 
more likely the paper's contents will follow a narrow debate influenced by the views 
of its owners. Page considers the NYT is such a prestigious and authoritative 
publication that its opinions not only influence its readers, which include foreign- 
policy decision makers, experts and other media editors, but also trickles down 
through other sources to an even bigger mass audience than its sales show. 318 Lance 
Bennett also considers the NYT `continues to set the tone and provide much of the 
content cues for the nation's other mass media outlets. '319 Bennett explained the NYT 
and the Washington Post have reputations as critical, liberal papers that are not afraid 
of exposing government deception, but both heavily rely on official sources. 320 
Entman and Page wrote they used the NYT and Washington Post in their study of the 
first Gulf War because the papers have `large foreign news staffs, high prestige and 
sophistication, and a proven record of willingness to take on the government. ' 
Moreover, they were also the most likely `to be particularly scrupulous in reporting 
the many criticisms of administration policy that were voiced during the periods 
315 www. teleý,, raph. co. uk, 21/01/04. 
316 M. Schudson., op. cit, p. 121. 
317 B. I. Page., Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 110-11. 
318 Ibid., p. 19. 
319 W. L. Bennett., The News About Foreign Policy, in W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz., Taken by Storm, 
op. cit, pp. 12-40, p. 18. Jonathan Mermin also wrote of the NY's influence in Debating War and 
Peace, op. cit, p. 12-13. 
320 W. Lance Bennett., News: The Politics of Illusion (5th edition), op. cit, p. 124-5. 
135 
analysed. '321 The NYT was often at the centre of controversy during the Kennedy 
period, when tensions over Vietnam reporting first began to flare, 322 and in 1971 it led 
the way in publishing the classified history of the Vietnam War in what were known 
as the Pentagon Papers, which led to a `major constitutional confrontation. '323 
Although Hallin was critical of the NYT coverage of the Vietnam War, he thought it 
was the best of American journalism, 324 and that coverage of Vietnam in a `liberal 
prestige paper' like the NYT was very different from coverage in a conservative paper 
like the Chicago Tribune or the San Diego Union. 325 The NYT therefore seems like a 
good source for comparison with the British media. 
3.2.1.3.2. The Media Coding Scheme 
The media coding scheme was designed to provide a detailed account of how the 
British media covered the Kosovo Conflict; with comparisons to be made between 
different British media sources, and with the NYT. The coding scheme was 
influenced by several others that have used content analysis in their studies, such as 
the GUMG's hegemonic analysis of the British media's reporting of the Falklands 
War in War and Peace News, Gadi Wolfsfeld's frame analysis of the media coverage 
of the Gulf War and Intifada in The Media and Political Conflict, and Eilders and 
Luter's frame analysis of German newspapers' coverage of the Kosovo Conflict. The 
coding scheme for this study consisted of the variables previously discussed in the 
theory section, after the case number and date. Lines and articles were also counted 
for their total and monthly amounts, and sources were counted in separate categoires 
of domestic or international, and positive, neutral or negative. As in the official 
321 R. M. Entman., and B. I. Page., The News Before the Storm, in W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz, 
op. cit, pp. 82-101, p. 84. 
322 Ibid., p. 25. 
323 D. Hallin., Uncensored War, op. cit, p. 6. 
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sources analysis, there could only be one category chosen for each variable from each 
unit of analysis, and so the first category was included unless another became much 
more salient in the article. There now follows a brief description of the variables. and 
some of the difficulties encountered in the coding. 
Main People and evaluation 
The main people and evaluation variables should show us who the media focused 
their coverage on, and what their opinions of them were. At times, a reference was 
kept out of its most obvious category, as it would have gone against the reasons for 
the categories inclusion if it was included, and would then have meant the results and 
interpretations misrepresented the actual media coverage. For example, when ethnic- 
Albanians from outside Kosovo were featured, they were included in the ethnic- 
Albanians category if they sympathised with the KLA, and Nato campaign, but were 
put as others if they distanced themselves from the KLA and Nato campaign. 
Similarly, the Serb civilians category was meant to be for Serbs who were seen 
positively, as a comparison with the ethnic-Albanian civilians who were almost 
always framed positively, but some articles went against that. Examples included 
when Slobodan Milosevic's son Marko was featured, or when a Serb journalist who 
was a victim of the Serb authorities rather than Nato bombs was the main person 
featured. In these cases, judgements on whether to count them as Serb civilians was 
made on whether they were at all relevant to the Serbs being victims of Nato. 
Moreover, the arrest of a humanitarian worker, and the use of other humanitarian 
workers as sources concerning this case, showed that events like this can also 
influence the data in a manner that was not foreseen when setting up the coding 
system. It was thought that humanitarian workers would be the sources in stories on 
325 ibid., p. 11. 
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refugees, as they were most of the time, but sometimes they were also featured in 
other stories. Again, decisions were made on whether to count them as humanitarian 
workers, or others, in line with their relevance to the reason why the humanitarian 
workers category was included in the analysis. There were also several cases when 
official sources' quotes were recalled by journalists in articles, but they were only 
cited to be criticised, and so were not included as references, as it might have made it 
look as if there were more positive sources than there were. The decision on the 
article's evaluation of the people or organisation featured was interpretative, and 
based primarily on the general content of the article, rather than an interpretation of 
the writers' opinion; if there was no clear evaluation the article was coded as neutral. 
Main Source 
The main source variable was included because this will answer one of the most 
important questions of this study: where did the media attain their news information; 
did they get most of their information from Nato elite sources, or from a variety of 
sources? When politicians or personalities wrote articles they were categorised under 
their usual position descriptions, rather than as journalists or writers. If information 
for the article was taken from another media source, the media source was included as 
the main source, unless there was a lot of coverage given to another source. Nato 
employees, such as Michael Jackson and Wesley Clark, were counted as Nato sources 
rather than British military or American military, and as international rather than 
domestic. When the location of journalists was not given, they were included as in 
the UK, unless it was obvious from the text that they were somewhere else. 
Diagnosis and Prognosis 
The diagnosis and prognosis variables will allow us to see how the media 
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professionals framed and discussed the Nato campaign as it started and progressed, 
and what they or their sources thought were the best solutions to Nato's difficulties. It 
was thought that most previous studies had limited the diagnosis variable too much to 
the causes of the conflict, and this had led them to find there were more prognoses in 
the media, in line with the hegemonic model. It was thought that having diagnoses 
that were relevant throughout the conflict would bring a more balanced view, as the 
media was not likely to discuss the causes of the conflict or Nato campaign much 
after the first few days. The variables will also show whether the media were positive 
or negative towards the Nato campaign in their events coverage and opinions. 
Sometimes it was difficult to choose whether to go with what the source was saying 
or what the journalists' views seemed to be. The issue of ground troops was the best 
example of this, with the papers often seeming to push for ground troops, but with 
their articles featuring sources that denied ground troops would be used; as with other 
categories, each article was interpreted individually on the dominant impression it 
gave. In the last few days of the Nato campaign, the media sources started to talk 
about the ground troops that were going in to oversee the peace. Although this was a 
different context to ground troops going to war, which was what the Send in ground 
troops prognosis category was supposed to identify, they were coded as this category 
because there was still a possibility that the soldiers would face hostility when they 
entered Kosovo. However, this factor was taken into consideration when the 
prognoses data was being analysed. 
Although it was usually to be presumed that the newspapers held Milosevic and the 
Serbs responsible for the refugee situation, if the article did not name them, it was not 
coded as a diagnosis of Refugees are Serbs' fault or Refugees are Milosevic's fault. If 
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the articles were blaming the Serbs for the refugee situation, and Milosevic was 
mentioned, it was coded as the latter of the two categories above, while if he was not 
named it was coded as the former. 
The Diplomacy prognosis category was included as a negative for Nato in the results 
chapter comparative analyses, as for most of the campaign it would have meant Nato 
compromising beyond their five key demands, which was not acceptable to Blair and 
New Labour. However, ideally the category should have been divided into positive, 
neutral and negative for Nato at the start of the analysis, to avoid relying on a 
generality. 
Format 
The operational definition of the episodic format was the latest news, or the latest 
episode of a recurring issue, while the article was coded as thematic when there was 
historical context, discussion of an issue, preview of an event, or opinion on the future 
of the war. There were often difficulties in deciding whether an article was episodic 
or thematic, and an example of why episodic and thematic can be difficult to define is 
how articles on the ethnic-Albanian refugees seemed episodic, as they were featured 
regularly, but similar articles with Serb civilians seemed more thematic, because they 
did not feature as regularly. Moreover, as some media analysts have previously 
observed, there are often elements of both categories in an article. An example of this 
is an article that featured a latest development, but then featured more in-depth 
analysis of the conflict, and what it meant for the future. The choice was usually 
made by deciding which category was featured more. 
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Historical references 
It was thought important to include an historical reference variable, because the 
media's use of historical references can show us how the media professionals 
envisaged the conflict, and then tried to explain it to the audience; as well as how 
much they followed the Nato leaders' presentations, and how biased they were in their 
use. With news content almost definitely influenced by ideology to some extent, the 
historical setting the journalists invoked for the conflict should provide us with 
evidence about their ideological thinking. 
The coding of historical references was often complicated, but the splitting of the 
categories into positive, neutral and negative hopefully provided a thorough coding 
that prevented generalisation as much as possible. For example, after the Serb 
atrocities in Bosnia, and the Nato countries' peacekeeping role there, in a simple 
content analysis where there was only the category Bosnia, any reference to Bosnia 
might be presumed to be positive for Nato and negative for the Serbs. However, this 
was not always the case, and the thorough content analysis allows distinctions to be 
made between the different ways Bosnia was referenced. For example, the article 
might be negative for Nato because the journalist believed the Western countries had 
not intervened early enough in the Bosnian conflict, or the Bosnian reference might be 
positive towards the Serbs because the article was warning that Kosovo meant more 
to Milosevic and the Serbs than Bosnia did. Similarly, the Gulf War was a success for 
the Nato countries, but it could still be a negative historical reference for Nato, such 
as when journalists criticised depleted uranium being used in bombs in the Gulf War 
and Kosovo, or wrote that the Kosovo campaign was not working as efficiently as the 
Gulf operation had. 
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Some references were easily coded; for example, the conflict being described as the 
biggest in Europe since World War Two would be coded as World War Two neutral. 
However, other references were more vague, and decisions had to be made as to the 
relevance of the reference to the audience; for example, references to Churchill in an 
article about Nato would be coded as Nato World War Two positive, while references 
to Hitler in an article about Nato would be coded as Nato World War Two negative; 
this was because although Churchill and Hitler do not have any particular relevance to 
Nato today, their references invoke thoughts of the past which are positive and 
negative for most British and American people thinking about the Nato countries at 
war. 
Images 
Images were included with the article they were closest to, either in topic or position. 
The topic took precedence, but if there were two articles reporting news on the same 
topic as an image, the image was included in the coding sheet with the article it was 
positioned closest to. Although most photos reflected the articles they were with, 
some photographs that accompanied articles had little to do with them, or even 
opposed the message in the article; an example of this was a Nato meeting held to 
show resolve, accompanied by a photo of an anti-war demonstration. 
It was thought the Serb civilians category would be included as a contrast to the 
ethnic-Albanian civilians category; as Serb images would be of them as victims of 
collateral damage, as ethnic-Albanian images would be of them suffering from the 
Serb ethnic cleansing. Although these generalities usually held true, there were some 
images that showed the people in other roles, such as when Serb civilians were 
demonstrating against their government. Judgements were made in these cases 
142 
whether to code the article in the Serb civilians category, or whether to code it as 
others. Like some other categories, these two categories could have been divided into 
positive and negative. It was for a similar reason that the General Nato military 
armoury category became the General Nato military armoury in a positive picture, as 
this factor was noticed in that category early enough; this was because early pictures 
of the Apache helicopter crash meant the original category would have had more 
cases than it should have done in respect to its reasons for inclusion: to see how 
patriotic and supportive of the Nato campaign the different newspapers were, through 
their use of positive Nato images. 
Days coded and total units 
For the daily newspapers and Telegraph web-site, the days for analysis were picked at 
random, at two or three day intervals, starting the day after that Nato campaign started, 
and ending the day after the campaign ended. The weekends were avoided. The 
coding unit was all relevant articles on Kosovo. The days coded were 25/03,27/03, 
30/03,31/03,03/04,05/04,07/04,10/04,12/04,14/04,16/04,19/04,21/04,23/04, 
26/04,28/04,30/04,03/05,05/05,07/05,10/05,12/05,14/05,17/05,19/05,21/05, 
24/05,26/05,28/05,31/05,03/06,05/06,08/06 and 11/06. From the above dates, the 
following amount of articles were coded: 442 in the NYT; 424 in The Times; 411 in 
the Guardian; 387 in the Independent; 221 in the FT and 219 in the Telegraph. That 
meant a total of 2104 daily media articles were coded. In the Sunday papers, 
beginning the Sunday before the Nato campaign started, and ending the Sunday after, 
143 articles were coded in the IoS and 121 in the SNYT, making 264 in total. That 
meant that a total of 2368 articles were coded altogether. 
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Changes to the coding sheet for the NYT analysis 
Having coded the British newspapers, it was apparent that some categories should be 
adjusted for the American media, as their focus would be on American politics and 
history. Also, having counted official British sources in the British newspapers, just 
on a positive and negative basis, it was thought that it would be a good idea to also 
count official domestic and international sources separately, and also include a neutral 
category with the positive and negative. This was done for the NYT, and then the UK 
sources were re-coded using this system. 
Changes to the coding sheet for the Telegraph analysis 
The Telegraph coding scheme was the same as for the British newspapers, except that 
two variables were left out because the Telegraph data being taken from the Internet 
meant they were not relevant. The first variable was images, because there were no 
images on the web-site when the analysis was undertaken; the second was position, as 
the articles did not seem to have any particular positional order, as was obviously the 
case with the newspapers. 
Changes to the coding sheet for the Independent on Sunday and Sunday New 
York Times analyses 
Having coded the previous media sources, some categories were added for the 
analyses of the IoS and SNYT, but the only one that really seemed to register in the 
final results, and alter the final interpretations, was splitting the Damage from Nato 
image category into positive and negative for Nato. 
Omissions 
Some material that included information on the Kosovo Conflict was left out of the 
analysis, as it was considered too insignificant to the objectives of the study. This 
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was material like letters, updates, timetables, single quotes outside articles and news 
in brief. Also, articles that focused almost exclusively on other subjects, but 
mentioned the conflict, were also left out. 
Statistical analyses 
Having coded the media sources, the data was then entered into SPSS, and frequency 
and cross-tabulation analyses were undertaken for each variable. For some analyses, 
SPSS was not needed, and the data was counted. From the resulting data, analytical 
tables were set up in Microsoft Word to compare the results of the different media 
sources, and those are featured in the results section. 
3.3. Media content hypotheses and elite influence research question 
Following the qualitative reading and data collecting, it was thought that the 
hegemonic model was the most relevant of the critical theories for this analysis, and 
hypotheses were therefore formulated in line with hegemonic theory; if the 
hypotheses are found to be confirmed by the results then it will suggest the media's 
coverage of the Kosovo Conflict was hegemonic. However, if the results are not in 
line with the hypotheses it will suggest the media coverage was more in line with the 
plural model than the hegemonic, and also the cascade model, with reference to recent 
developments in American theory. Another analysis was also undertaken to evaluate 
whether Alistair Campbell's re-organisation of the Nato media operation brought a 
more positive media coverage for Nato, and negative for the Serbs, in the second half 
of the Nato campaign. As this was not thought relevant to identifying hegemonic 
content in the British media coverage, it is featured as a separate research question 
after the nine hypotheses have been tested. The hypotheses and research question are 
listed below. 
145 
Hypothesis 1. Main People variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will follow the elite lead and focus 
the vast amount of their coverage on the Nato and Serb leadership and militaries, and 
the ethnic-Albanian refugees. 
Hypothesis 2. Evaluation variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will give the Nato alliance members 
and allies a positive coverage the vast majority of the time, while depicting the Serb 
leadership and military negatively. 
Hypothesis 3. Source variable. 
In line with the hegemonic model, the media will use the British government and 
Nato military leaders as their sources the vast majority of the time, and there will be 
little use of sources that are critical of the Nato campaign. 
Hypothesis 4. Positioning variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, the front pages will include good coverage for Nato 
and bad for the Serbs the vast majority of the time, while the vast majority of bad 
coverage for Nato will be in the inside pages. 
Hypothesis 5. Diagnosis variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of the diagnoses will be supportive of 
the Nato campaign, and critical of the Serbs. 
Hypothesis 6. Prognosis variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, the vast amount of prognoses will follow the Nato lead, 
and will not propose radical changes to the Nato strategy unless there is dissension 
among British politicians or the Nato countries' political and military elites. 
Hypothesis 7. Format variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, the vast majority of media coverage of the Nato 
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campaign will be episodic rather than thematic. 
Hypothesis 8. Historical references variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, the vast majority of historical references will be more 
positive for Nato than the Serbs. 
Hypothesis 9. Images variable. 
In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of images will be positive towards 
Nato and negative towards the Serbs. 
Research question. Did the re-organisation of the Nato media operation near the end 
of the first half of the Nato campaign improve their media coverage in the second half 
of their campaign? 
3.4. Qualitative Analysis 
3.4.1. Discussion 
Following conclusions being drawn on the quantitative content analysis results, a 
qualitative analysis was then undertaken for the discussion section. The main reason 
for this qualitative analysis was to identify whether the results from the quantitative 
analysis could be backed up with examples from the media coverage, in line with the 
principles of triangulation. This entailed looking back through notes taken during the 
coding of the media content for the quantitative analysis, and then going back to the 
media sources again to follow up initial observations. If sufficient evidence was 
available to identify a pattern in the coverage, and formulate an argument for 
discussion, then the relevant information was collected for possible inclusion. The 
various data collected was then edited for the final version of the discussion section. 
3.4.2. Interviews 
Following the quantitative and qualitative content analyses, twenty letters requesting 
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interviews were sent out to journalists involved in the reporting of the Kosovo 
Conflict for the UK media sources analysed in this study. Eight agreed to be 
interviewed, and they were then interviewed by telephone, with the interviews lasting 
from twenty to forty-five minutes. The interviews followed the semi-structured 
format, as described by Arksey and Knight: `Semi-structured interviews are perhaps 
the commonest and most diverse of the three [interview] formats. They fall between 
the structured and unstructured format, but are more similar to the latter in the sense 
that they too generate qualitative data. The approach adopted is far less formal than 
that employed in a structured interview. Having said that, the interviewer does have a 
specific agenda to follow and will have selected beforehand the relevant topic areas 
and themes to pursue. '326 
The journalists interviewed held different positions during the Kosovo Conflict; two 
were present at the Nato conferences; two were in the House of Commons; two were 
defence and diplomatic editors; one was a columnist, and one was a news reporter. 
Therefore, questions that were relevant to some journalists were not as relevant to 
others, and so the questions were adapted to each journalist's main interests, 
depending on their role during the Kosovo conflict. The interviews were recorded by 
hand, so the longer quotes are paraphrased, while the shorter sound-bites are verbatim. 
Following the transcription of the interviews, they were shown to the interviewees, 
who were asked if they had an objection to any of the material being used. The 
approved information was then manually cut and pasted into the different categories 
evident in chapter six; the material narrowed down for inclusion, and typed into the 
final draft contained in this thesis. 
326 H. Arksey., and P. Knight., Intervici ving for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource 'i'ith 
Examples, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1999), p. 7. 
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4. Results 
4.1. The Nato and MoD conferences, and Government information results. 
4.1.1. Diagnosis 
Including all the sources analysed together, most of the diagnoses focused on the Nato 
campaign being Milosevic's fault, although the refugees being Milosevic's fault had 
only one less reference. The former was the main diagnosis in twenty-five, or 32.9%, 
of the units analysed, while the latter was the main focus of twenty four, or 31.6%. 
The Nato campaign is working, and the refugees are the Serbs' fault, were other 
diagnoses that featured quite frequently, and the only other diagnosis that featured 
was Nato campaign is Serbs' fault. The results are presented in the table below. 
Diagnosis Frequency Percentage 
Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault 25 32.9 
Refugees are Milosevic's fault 24 31.6 
Nato campaign is working 13 17.1 
Refugees are Serbs' fault 12 15.8 
Nato campaign is Serbs' fault 2 2.6 
Total 76 100 
Table 4.1. Diagnoses used by official sources. 
From these results, it seems clear the conflict was framed as a Nato campaign 
undertaken because Milosevic's offensive had caused a humanitarian crisis, and his 
failure to negotiate a peace deal had left them with no choice. At times, Milosevic 
was not blamed directly, and the fault for the refugee crisis and Nato campaign were 
apportioned to the Serbs collectively. Stressing the air campaign was working took 
precedence sometimes, and this seemed to be used both as a form of self- 
congratulation in times of success, and a rallying call in times of frustration. 
Collateral damage and the ground war did not feature enough to register in the final 
results, although having looked at the sources qualitatively, blame was usually 
apportioned to Milosevic and the Serbs, as they were blamed for all the problems in 
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the Balkans, and not negotiating a peace deal in the months before the Nato campaign. 
Nato also explained collateral damage through accusing the Serbs of using ethnic- 
Albanians as human shields a few times. 
When the data was split up into the different official sources, and a cross-tabulation 
analysis undertaken, the results showed about twice as many Government politicians 
outside the MoD conferences used their platforms to blame Milosevic for making 
Nato launch its air campaign as the Nato conferences did. The Nato conferences did 
not spend much time apportioning blame for the Nato campaign in their diagnoses, 
although when they did, they did blame it on Milosevic. The MoD conferences 
focused even less than the Nato conferences on blaming Milosevic for the Nato 
campaign in their diagnoses, and the MoD was the only one to put blame on the Serbs 
collectively. At their conferences, the MoD presentations spent more time blaming 
Milosevic for the refugee situation, with about twice as many of their conferences 
offering this diagnosis than the Nato conferences. Government spokespeople outside 
the conferences were also much more likely to spend time apportioning blame for the 
refugees on Milosevic than the Nato conferences' political presentations, although it 
had only one more reference than the full Nato conferences. The Nato conferences 
were split between blaming the refugees more on Milosevic individually, and the 
Serbs collectively. The MoD conferences spent more time detailing the achievements 
of the Nato campaign than the other sources, and stressing that it was working. 
Government politicians outside the conferences spent much less time proclaiming the 
campaign to be working, while the Nato conferences had an average amount of 
references for this category. These results are presented in the table below. 
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Source Refugees Refugees Nato Nato Nato 
are are campaign campaign is campaign 
Serbs' Milosevic's is Serbs' Milosevic's is 
fault fault fault fault working 
Full Nato 5 5 5 4 
conference 
MoD political 9 2 3 5 
presentations 
New Labour 6 11 2 
politicians 
Nato 7 4 6 2 
conference 
political only 
Table 4.2. Individual official sources' use of diagnoses 
4.1.2. Prognosis 
The prognosis analysis shows clearly how the conferences consistently kept to the 
same objectives, stressing that Milosevic would have to give in to their demands, that 
they would continue the air campaign until he did, and that they were doing their best 
to provide as much humanitarian aid to the refugees as possible. As only one of these 
themes could be included from each unit they are spread out in the results, but they 
were usually included together, and were pivotal to the presentations. Continuation of 
the air campaign was the most stressed feature of half the prognoses, and the three 
categories together account for over ninety per cent of the prognoses. Bringing war 
criminals to justice was the only other prognosis that became the main focus more 
than once. These results are presented in the table below. 
Prognosis Frequency Percentage 
Continue the air campaign 38 50 
More humanitarian aid 21 27.6 
Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands 10 13.2 
War criminals must be brought to justice 3 3.9 
Others 4 5.2 
Total 76 100 
Table 4.3. Prognoses used by otticial sources. 
151 
Government politicians were again more likely to focus on Milosevic in their 
prognoses, with more than twice as many stressing that Milosevic must give in to 
their demands as either the Nato or MoD conferences did. The MoD and Government 
politicians also focused more on bringing Serb war criminals to justice, while the 
Nato conferences concentrated more on their humanitarian aid operations, and the 
needs of the refugees. This aspect of the MoD conferences may have been contained 
more in their military information though, which was not always available. This data 
is shown in the table below. 
Source Continue 
the air 
campaign 
More 
aid 
Milosevic must 
give in to Nato's 
demands 
War Criminals 
must be brought 
to justice 
Others 
Full Nato 12 6 1 
MoD political 10 4 2 2 1 
New Labour 10 1 5 1 2 
Nato political 6 10 2 1 
Table 4.4. Individual official sources' use of prognoses. 
4.1.3. Historical references 
The historical references analysis shows there were historical references in just under 
half of the units analysed, with twenty-six historical references in the fifty-seven units; 
the Nato conferences were counted as one source in this regard. The conflict was 
mostly framed as a return to the dark days of World War Two, with fourteen 
references. Most references to World War Two were quite vague, and seemed to refer 
to a cross between the policies of Hitler and Stalin, with forced deportations the main 
parallel between the past and the present. The second most cited conflict was the 
Bosnian war, with eight references, while the Serb-Croat war had one. The Bosnian 
war was also usually blamed on Milosevic, and was often used together with a World 
War Two reference. Milosevic was also compared to Pol Pot, who was formerly the 
genocidal leader of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, while there were a couple of 
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references to the darkest events of the twentieth century in general. These results are 
shown in the table below. 
Historical references Frequency 
World War Two 14 
Bosnian War 8 
Serb-Croat War 1 
Cambodia 1 
Others 2 
Total historical references 26 
Total units analysed 57 
Table 4.5. Historical references used by official sources. 
Examination of the sources and historical references breakdown shows that it was the 
Government politicians outside the MoD conferences that made the World War Two 
reference the most prominent, with ten of the fourteen citations. The MoD also used 
it most prominently three times, while Nato only used it once. Nato preferred to draw 
parallels with the earlier wars in the Balkans, referring to the Serbs' wars in Bosnia 
most saliently five times, while the MoD and New Labour used it twice and once 
respectively. These results are shown below. 
Source World War 
Two 
Serb- 
Croat War 
Bosnian 
War 
Cambodia Others 
Full Nato 1 5 
MoD political 3 1 2 1 1 
New Labour 10 1 1 
Table 4.6. Individual official sources' use of historical references. 
4.1.4. Most featured people 
The collective Nato military were the most featured people, with the ethnic-Albanian 
civilians second. Between them they had almost sixty per cent of the main coverage, 
and this reflects how they dominated the Nato agenda, through the spokespeoples' up- 
dates on the Nato air campaign, humanitarian aid, and the refugee situation. They 
were often combined with criticisms of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serb military, 
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who were easily the third most referenced main people if counted together. When 
diplomacy or arrangements for humanitarian aid were prominent, politicians and 
diplomats often became the main people featured. The media featured as the main 
people in all the sources apart from the full Nato conferences. This was because the 
Serb media was criticised as propagandistic, and the sources spoke of their efforts to 
get `free' information to the people in Yugoslavia. There were a couple of minor 
references to reports in the Western media, but they were not long enough to register 
in the quantitative analysis. These results are shown in the table below. 
Main People Frequency Percentage 
Collective Nato military 29 38.2 
Ethnic-Albanian civilians 16 21.1 
Serb military 9 11.8 
Other politicians and diplomats 5 6.6 
Slobodan Milosevic 4 5.3 
British military 3 3.9 
Nato hierarchy 3 3.9 
The media 3 3.9 
British government 2 2.6 
Russians negative 1 1.3 
Other Serb politicians 1 1.3 
Total 76 100 
Table 4.7. Main People cited by official sources. 
There were not many surprises in the individual analyses, with the Nato conferences 
concentrating most of their presentations on the collective Nato military. This was 
also true of the MoD, but they also focused on the British contribution most a couple 
of times. Government sources from outside the conferences spent a little less time on 
military matters, and were the only ones to spend the most time focusing on the 
British government. Nato concentrated much more on the ethnic-Albanian civilians 
than the Serb military, while the MoD did the opposite, concentrating much more on 
the Serb military than the ethnic-Albanians. Government sources from outside the 
conferences were the only ones to concentrate more on Slobodan Milosevic than the 
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Serb military or ethnic-Albanians, focusing twice as much on Milosevic as the ethnic- 
Albanians, and four times as much on Milosevic as the Serb military. However, this 
is not to say that they were unconcerned with the refugee situation, as the usual reason 
for referring to Milosevic was to warn about the refugee situation and its 
consequences. The main categories mentioned above are shown below, with other 
categories left out due to limited space. 
Source Brit Brit Nato Nato Milosevic Serb Ethnic- 
ovt military hierarchy military military Albanians 
Full 12 1 5 
Nato 
MoD 2 2 6 4 2 
political 
New 2 1 1 5 4 1 2 
Labour 
Nato 6 3 7 
political 
Table 4.8. Individual official sources' main people references. 
4.1.5. Main topics 
There was quite a wide range of main topics cited, but the Nato military attacks and 
Nato helping the humanitarian situation were the most prominent, with fifty per cent 
of the time spent on them. War crimes by the Serbs had the third highest amount of 
coverage, followed by diplomacy, the refugee situation and the media. The refugee 
figures are perhaps lower than they should be because they were usually featured 
alongside the Nato humanitarian operation, which usually took up a longer time, as 
details of their past, present and future operations were released to the media. As 
previously mentioned, the talk about the media was mainly about the Serb media and 
the battle to get Nato information into the conflict area. The results are shown in the 
table below. 
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Topic Frequency Percentage 
Nato military attacks 22 28.9 
Nato helping the humanitarian situation 16 21.1 
War crimes by Serbs 13 17.1 
Diplomacy 7 9.2 
The media 5 6.6 
Amount of refugees 3 3.9 
British soldiers' humanitarian work 2 2.6 
Personal stories of the refugees 2 2.6 
Unity of Nato 2 2.6 
Others 4 5.2 
Total 76 100 
Table 4.9. Main topics presented by official sources. 
When separated into individual sources, the results show Nato concentrated much 
more on the humanitarian situation than the Government and MoD, while the 
Government and MoD focused more on diplomacy than Nato. The main results are 
featured in the table below. 
Source Nato helping the Nato military War Diplomacy Others 
humanitarian attacks in crimes by 
situation general Serbs 
Full Nato 7 8 1 1 2 
MoD 1 5 4 3 6 
New 1 5 4 3 6 
Labour 
Nato 7 4 4 0 4 
political 
only 
Table 4.10. Individual sources' main topics. 
4.1.6. Conclusion 
The results show the biggest difference in the framing of the conflict by the Nato 
official sources was between the Government politicians and the Nato spokespeople, 
with the MoD somewhere in between. The Government seemed to personalise the 
conflict around Milosevic, who had to be defeated and seen to be defeated, while the 
Nato conferences were more inclined to emphasise the Serb military collectively. 
New Labour politicians also set the conflict in a World War Two frame more than the 
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other sources, and combined references to World War Two with making Milosevic 
the most prominent person of the speech, article or interview. In contrast, Nato used 
the Bosnian war as a historical reference more, and unlike the references used by the 
Government, qualitative analysis shows they were used more for discussing practical 
issues involving Nato forces than for drawing historical parallels. The Government 
also combined references to Serb war crimes with Milosevic, while the Nato 
conference was more inclined to refer to the Serb military when talking about war 
crimes. 
4.2. House of Commons debates and summary of media coverage 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The results in this section have been formulated from a quantitative analysis of the 
speakers in the House of Commons oral questions and debates on Kosovo, beginning 
just before the start of the Nato campaign, and ending just before its conclusion. 327 
The debates were usually started and led by a member of government, and these 
government representatives therefore had much more opportunity to speak than any of 
the other contributors; on 23/03 this was Tony Blair; on 24/03 John Prescott; on 25/03 
Robin Cook; on 29/03 Tony Blair; on 31/03 Clare Short; on 13/04 Blair; on 19/04 
Cook; on 20/04 Cook; on 10/05 George Robertson; on 12/05 Short; on 18/05 Cook; 
on 26/05 Robertson; on 08/06 Blair, and on 09/06 Robertson. 
The fact that the debates were led by a Labour representative meant that although the 
number of speakers might have been more negative towards the Nato campaign than 
positive on some occasions, the amount of spoken time was almost always likely to be 
more positive towards the Nato campaign than negative. This is shown in the first 
32' House of Commons' Kosovo debates taken from: http: //www. parIiament. t'he-stationery- 
office co uk/pa/cni/cniliansrd. htm 
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debate of 23/03, which was led by Blair: Although there were four negative speakers 
to three positive for the Nato campaign, the amount of time they were speaking for, 
measured in lines of dialogue on the Hansard web-site, were 192 positive (of which 
182 were Blair) to 31 negative; so this is over six times the amount of time for 
positive dialogue for the Nato campaign to negative. There was also a front-bench 
consensus in support of the Nato campaign for almost all the conflict, with most of the 
negative speakers on the back-benches. 
4.2.2. Results of the quantitative analysis of the House of Commons debates 
The results of the quantitative counting of whether each speaker was positive or 
negative, which included the above leader of the debate as one speaker, show that the 
majority of the debates were more positive towards the Nato campaign than negative. 
There were seventy-four positive to fifty-seven negative speakers, and one-hundred 
and nineteen positive and positive questioning to eighty-two negative and negative 
questioning. The anomalies in having more negative than positive speakers were the 
debates on 23/03,25/03,13/04 and 19/04. The days that had more negative and 
negative questioning than positive and positive questioning were 25/03,19/04 and 
18/05. There were also several days when there was the same amount of positivity 
and negativity towards the Nato campaign. The data from the debates is presented in 
the table below, and a summary of the media coverage follows. 
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Date Positive Positive- 
Questioning 
Questioning Negative- 
Questioning 
Negative 
23/03 3 6 7 2 4 
24/03 13 5 2 0 5 
25/03 6 3 3 3 10 
29/03 10 3 1 4 3 
31/03 6 8 1 0 4 
13/04 6 8 2 0 8 
19/04 9 5 15 2 17 
20/04 1 0 5 1 0 
10/05 1 0 3 0 1 
12/05 1 0 4 0 1 
18/05 1 0 2 4 1 
26/05 6 1 9 5 2 
08/06 5 2 10 3 1 
09/06 6 4 9 1 0 
Total 74 45 73 25 57 
Table 4.11. Quantitative results of the House of Commons debates. 
4.2.3. The media coverage of the House of Commons debates, and the debates' 
influence on the media coverage 
Headlines, articles and editorials were checked in the daily media sources analysed in 
this study, to see if they corresponded to the amount of positive and negative House of 
Commons speakers in the debates, but no pattern was found. The only time when the 
debates looked like they would significantly influence the media coverage was when 
Conservative foreign affairs spokesperson, Michael Howard, questioned the 
competence of Nato, and the logic of their strategy, thus threatening to undo the front- 
bench consensus, after Nato bombed the Chinese embassy in early May. This caused 
a flurry of interest in some of the papers, and especially The Times, but when unity 
was restored again a day later the media interest waned. The media increasing their 
interest in the House of Commons when there was front-bench criticism could be 
interpreted as being supportive of indexing, but the time period was too short to 
provide a conclusive analysis. 
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As there was little front-bench criticism of the Nato campaign, or evidence of the 
political debates influencing the media coverage, indexing theory was not found to be 
relevant for examining or explaining the British political-media relationship during 
the Kosovo conflict. However, the lack of prominent political support for ground 
troops did seem to quieten the media's calls for that policy; until Blair and New 
Labour started to hint at the possibility they would be introduced after all, in the 
middle of the campaign. However, Entman does account for that in his cascade 
critique of indexing, and as it was the politicians changing their policy, the only real 
u-turn on an issue the government and media disagreed on at the start of the conflict 
was made by the government. 
In contrast to expectations under the propaganda model, the Commons debates were 
featured most prominently in the media when there was a rift in the Commons, rather 
than when the debates were largely supportive, and this suggests the reporting was 
focused on the news values of getting a story rather than acting as a cheerleader for 
the government. This was especially true when The Times and Telegraph sensed the 
opposition were about to end the front-bench consensus in the aforementioned early 
May rebellion. 
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4.3. Results of the media analysis 
This section contains the results from the quantitative analysis of the media coverage. 
Where categories are written in the same way as they were in the analysis, they are 
put in italics, but if they are changed in any way they are left in the normal font. 
Although the NYT is included in the analysis, its main relevance is as a comparison to 
the British media sources, and the hypotheses refer only to the British sources. Points 
are given for some of the tables in the analysis, with the media source that seems the 
most hegemonic getting the highest amount of points, and the least hegemonic the 
lowest amount of points. The points are counted together at the end of each 
hypothesis evaluation, and evaluation points are given. The evaluation points are 
counted up at the end of the daily media section, and they should provide a quick 
reference for the evaluation of which media sources were found to be the most 
hegemonic in their coverage of the Nato campaign. 
4.3.1. Hypothesis I. In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will follow 
the elite lead and focus the vast amount of their coverage on the Nato and Serb 
leadership and militaries, and the ethnic-Albanian refugees. 
This first section of the media analysis addresses the issue of who the media focused 
their coverage on. According to hegemonic theory, the media will follow Nato's 
framing of their campaign, and this revolved around Nato conducting a humanitarian 
intervention to save the ethnic-Albanian civilians from the Serb military and 
leadership. Therefore, for the hypothesis to be confirmed, the media coverage should 
be concentrated on the Nato leadership and military, the Serb leadership and military, 
and the ethnic-Albanian civilians. 
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The section starts by looking at the results from the individual categories as they 
appeared in three frequency and cross-tabulation analyses: Main People; Source and 
Main People, and Position and Main People. Then the individual categories are 
joined together into groups of similar categories for a further two analyses: the first 
looks at whether the Nato countries' political and military leaders dominated the 
media coverage; and the second compares the coverage of the ethnic-Albanians and 
the Serbs. A conclusion on whether the hypothesis was supported by the results then 
follows. 
4.3.1.1. Individual categories 
4.3.1.1.1. The Main People analysis results 
The most referenced category in the Main People variable was Nato military at war in 
all the media sources except the FT, which had Nato hierarchy as its highest reference. 
The FT had Nato military at war as its second most referenced category, while the 
other five media sources had ethnic-Albanian civilians. The FT had ethnic-Albanian 
civilians as its third most referenced category; the Guardian, Independent and 
Telegraph had Collective Nato hierarchy; The Times had Serb civilians and the NYT 
had Clinton and his administration. The FT having Nato hierarchy as its most 
referenced category seems to highlight its different outlook from the other media 
sources, and this focus on the hierarchical aspects of the conflict was also evident in 
other results. The Times was the only paper to have Serb civilians in their top three 
references, and they were also the only paper to have more references for Serb 
civilians than a combination of Milosevic and the Serb military. The NYT was the 
only media source to have their government's leader in the top three most referenced 
categories. 
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In fourth and fifth positions, the FT had European politicians and other Russian 
politicians, and this seems to emphasise how the FT focused on international 
diplomacy. Highlighting the Guardian's concentration on the war in Kosovo, they 
had Serb civilians and Milosevic as their fourth and fifth highest references. The 
Times had Blair and Nato hierarchy as their fourth and fifth highest; this was the 
highest position for Blair in any of the media sources, and this seems to set the tone 
for The Times' other results, with the paper having a higher than average focus on the 
British contribution to the Nato campaign, and Blair's in particular. The Independent 
had other Balkans countries and Serb military as their fourth and fifth highest 
references, while the Telegraph had other Balkans countries and Blair. The NYT had 
American military at war and Serb civilians joint fourth. The NYT therefore had 
American military at war in a higher position than any of the British sources had 
British military, although it should be taken into consideration that there was a lot 
more American military than British military involved in the Nato campaign. The 
highest position the British military category appeared in any of the British media 
sources was seventh in The Times. 
In the writers themselves (without sources) category of the Source and Main people 
cross-tabulation analysis, the same pattern emerged in the top position: while the FT 
writers focused on Nato hierarchy, all the other media sources' writers had Nato 
military at war as their top reference. The FT writers did have Nato military at war as 
their second highest reference, while the The Times, Guardian and Independent 
writers had Nato hierarchy as their second highest. The Telegraph writers had Nato 
hierarchy and Milosevic with the same amount of references as their second highest 
references; the high position for Milosevic suggests the Telegraph writers 
personalised the Serb campaign around Milosevic more than the other papers. The 
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NYT writers had Clinton as the second highest reference; Milosevic was third, and 
Nato hierarchy and American military at war had the same amount of references in 
fourth. The NYT writers' focus on their head of government, with Clinton having 
double the references of Nato hierarchy, again suggests the NYT focused on the 
domestic decision makers in the Nato campaign. This is in contrast to the UK writers' 
focus on the Nato hierarchy, and suggests a cultural difference in the two countries' 
media coverage of the leaders in the Nato campaign, although Clinton did have much 
more power over the Nato campaign than Blair. The writers did not feature ethnic- 
Albanian civilians as highly as the articles with sources did, and they seemed to write 
more about the military aspects of the Nato campaign. On the Serb coverage, the 
Independent, FT, Telegraph and NYT writers had more references for Milosevic than 
all the other Serbs counted together, while the Guardian writers had the same amount 
of references for Milosevic as all the other Serbs together. As with the overall 
analysis, only The Times writers had more references for the other Serbs than for 
Milosevic. 
4.3.1.1.2. The Position and Main People analysis results 
The Position and Main people analysis found The Times, Independent and NYT had 
Collective Nato military at war with the most top position references. Collective Nato 
hierarchy had the second highest amount of top position references in The Times and 
NYT, while ethnic-Albanian civilians had the second highest amount in the 
Independent. In the NYT, Nato military at war also had the highest amount of 
position two references, and was followed by ethnic-Albanians civilians; Blair had the 
highest amount of position two references in The Times, while ethnic-Albanian 
civilians and Collective Nato hierarchy had the most position two references in the 
Independent. 
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The Guardian and FT both featured Nato hierarchy in the top position the most. The 
Guardian had the category with about a third more top position references than 
Collective Nato military at war, which had the second highest amount of references; 
while the FT had it with over four times as many references as several categories that 
had the second highest amount of references. The Guardian and FT also both had 
Collective Nato military at war with the most position two references. 
4.3.1.2. Collective categories 
4.3.1.2.1. Elite representation 
When all the British and American Government and Nato categories were included 
together, The Times was found to have featured them 49.9% of the time; the NYT 
45.3%; the Telegraph 43.4%; the Independent 42.8%; the Guardian 42.7%, while the 
FT used them the least at 40.7%. British and American Government and Nato 
personnel therefore had between forty and fifty per cent of the media coverage in all 
the sources, which is quite a high percentage. Although there may have been some 
criticism of the above parties within that coverage, the focus on those responsible for 
the Nato campaign is likely to have given the campaign more legitimacy than if there 
was more focus on those not involved in the campaign; such as the UN, neutral 
politicians and anti-war demonstrators. Most of the other main people featured were 
also supportive of the Nato campaign, such as the ethnic-Albanian civilians. 
The large amount of coverage given to the Nato war campaign is perhaps best 
emphasised when comparing it with another group of politicians and diplomats, as in 
the table below. The grouping of people compared to the Nato leadership is not a 
proper group in any way or form, but some members of each separate category did 
help conduct the main diplomatic effort that brought the final negotiated peace deal. 
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They therefore represent an important body of people that sought the negotiation of a 
satisfactory peace deal to end the conflict. 
Newspaper Coverage of British and Coverage of UN, Ratio Points 
American Government European 
and Nato personnel politicians and 
(including British and Russian politicians 
American armies) in in percentage of 
percentage of total total references 
references 
Times 49.9 7.3 6.8: 1 6 
Independent 42.8 6.6 6.5: 1 5 
Guardian 43.1 6.8 6.3: 1 4 
NYT 41.2 8.1 5: 1 3 
Telegraph 43.4 8.8 4.9: 1 2 
FT 40.7 16.8 2.4: 1 1 
UK sources 44 9.3 4.7: 1 
average 
Table 4.12. Comparison of coverage between Nato and other politicians and 
diplomats. 
The above table shows The Times had the highest ratio of coverage in the comparison 
of Nato leaders with UN, European politicians and Russian politicians, while the FT 
had the lowest ratio. The FT seemed to have a particularly small ratio at 2.4: 1, and 
this seems to highlight its much higher interest in diplomacy than the other papers; the 
FTs ratio also brought the overall UK sources' average down below the NYTs ratio. 
The NYT and Telegraph both had quite a high coverage of UN, European politicians 
and Russian politicians, and this helped give them a medium final ratio. 
4.3.1.2.2. Ethnic-Albanians and Serbs 
While ethnic-Albanian civilians were featured much higher than the ethnic-Albanian 
politicians and KLA in all papers, only The Times had more coverage of Serb 
civilians than Serb politicians and military. The Telegraph had the highest ratio of 
politicians and military to civilians for both the Serbs and ethnic-Albanians. The NYT 
had the biggest ratio for ethnic-Albanian civilians in comparison to their politicians 
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and military. The FT had quite a high percentage of civilian coverage in both 
analyses, and this was quite surprising considering their focus on international politics 
and diplomacy. Overall, if the media's coverage of politicians and military are 
counted together, and compared to the civilian coverage, the evidence suggests the 
conflict on the ground in Kosovo was depicted mostly as Serb politicians and military 
against ethnic-Albanian civilians. This is shown in the tables below. 
Newspaper Coverage of Serb 
politicians and 
military in 
percentage of total 
references 
Coverage of Serb 
civilians in 
percentage of 
total references 
Ratio Points 
Telegraph 12.7 2.7 4.7: 1 6 
Independent 9.6 3.1 3: 1 5 
Financial Times 7.8 2.7 2.9: 1 4 
NYT 10.4 6.1 1.7: 1 3 
Guardian 9.3 6.6 1.4: 1 2 
Times 5.9 6.1 1: 1 1 
Table 4.13. Coverage of the Serbs. 
Newspaper Coverage of 
ethnic-Albanian 
civilians 
Coverage of ethnic- 
Albanian politicians 
and military 
Ratio Points 
NYT 13.6 1.8 7.5: 1 6 
Times 11.1 1.7 6.5: 1 5 
Independent 16.8 2.9 5.8: 1 4 
Financial Times 9.0 2.3 3.9: 1 3 
Guardian 13.6 3.7 3.7: 1 2 
Telegraph 12.8 4.6 2.8: 1 1 
Table 4.14. Coverage of the ethnic-Albanians. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 1. 
Taking the amount of coverage as the judgemental factor, the results confirm the first 
hypothesis, as the papers did largely follow the elite lead, and focus on the Nato 
leadership, ethnic-Albanian civilians, and the Serb leadership and military. All the 
papers focused on the UK and US governments and Nato personnel for nearly half 
their coverage, and the majority of the rest of the coverage was also positive for Nato, 
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with ethnic-Albanian victims of Serb repression accounting for a large percentage of 
it. All the papers also focused a high percentage of their ethnic-Albanian coverage on 
the civilian population, and largely ignored their political leadership and KLA. In 
contrast, only The Times gave the Serb civilians more coverage than the Serb 
politicians and military, and this was only by one reference. Those involved with the 
peace initiatives got little coverage in comparison with the Nato leaders, with only the 
FT giving them quite a large percentage of its news space. The Position and Main 
People cross-tabulation also provided some further evidence to support the hypothesis, 
with the Nato hierarchy and military receiving much more top position coverage than 
the other participants in the conflict. 
Looking at the individual media sources, and counting the three tables' points 
together, the Independent had the most points, and so their coverage of the main 
people was the most hegemonic according to the results; the Independent was the 
most hegemonic because it gave the least coverage to the UN, European politicians 
and Russian politicians, had the highest coverage of ethnic-Albanian civilians, and 
had an above average coverage of Serb politicians and military, combined with a 
below average coverage of Serb civilians. The NYT was as hegemonic as its UK 
namesake The Times, and they were more hegemonic than the majority of the other 
UK media. They were followed by the Telegraph; and it being below average in the 
final table was a rarity, as will be shown by the later analyses. Then the least 
hegemonic media sources in this analysis were the Guardian and FT; the Guardian 
was the joint least hegemonic because it had the highest percentage of Serb civilian 
coverage, and the second highest amount of coverage of ethnic-Albanian politicians 
and military, while the FT was joint least mainly because it had the lowest ratio for 
coverage of British and American governments and Nato when compared to UN, 
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European politicians and Russian politicians. The results are summarised in the 
following table. 
Media 
source 
Table 4.12. Table 4.13. Table 4.14. Total Evaluation 
points 
Independent 5 5 4 14 6 
Times 6 1 5 12 4.5 
NYT 3 3 6 12 4.5 
Telegraph 2 6 1 9 3 
FT 1 4 3 8 1.5 
Guardian 4 2 2 8 1.5 
Table 4.15. Evaluation points for analysis 1. 
4.3.2. Hypothesis 2. In line with hegemonic theory, the media sources will give 
the Nato alliance members and allies a positive coverage the vast majority of the 
time, while depicting the Serb leadership and military negatively. 
Having addressed the question of how much emphasis the media sources gave the 
people involved in the Kosovo conflict in the last section, this section takes the 
analysis a step further by evaluating whether that coverage was positive or negative 
for the main people featured in the articles. This section works in the opposite way to 
the last section, because it starts with the collective categories analysis, and then goes 
on to the individual categories analysis. The collective categories analysis first looks 
at how the Nato politicians and military were evaluated, before going on to focus 
solely on the Nato personnel. The individual categories analysis then compares the 
media's evaluation of Blair and Clinton, and Milosevic and the KLA, before there is a 
conclusion on whether the hypothesis was supported by the evidence. 
4.3.2.1. Collective categories 
4.3.2.1.1. The media's evaluations of the Nato politicians and military 
Although most of the evidence seemed to fulfil the criteria of the hypothesis, because 
the media sources did largely focus their coverage on the Nato and Serb leaderships 
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and the ethnic-Albanian civilians, an analysis of the media sources' evaluation of the 
British and American governments and Nato personnel brings a different view of the 
media coverage; as the combined UK media's evaluation of them only had a positive 
to negative ratio of 1.3: 1. The NY7 s positive to negative ratio was a little higher at 
2: 1. In the UK, only the Telegraph had a higher ratio than the NYT. The Times, FT 
and Independent had a more positive evaluation than negative, but the Guardian's 
was more negative than positive. These details are shown in the following table. 
Media source Coverage of British and American governments and Points 
Nato personnel (including British and American 
armies) 
Telegraph Positive-negative Ratio: 2.2: 1 6 
38-17 
NYT Positive-negative Ratio: 2: 1 5 
56-28 
Times Positive-negative Ratio: 1.7: 1 4 
82-47 
Financial Positive-negative Ratio: 1.4: 1 3 
Times 27-19 
Independent Positive-negative Ratio: 1.3: 1 2 
54-41 
Guardian Positive-negative Ratio: 1: 1.4 1 
38-55 
Combined UK Positive-negative Ratio: 1.3: 1 
sources 239-179 
Table 4.16. Evaluation of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel coverage. 
4.3.2.1.2. The media's evaluations of the Nato military 
Continuing the above theme, when the evaluations are confined to the Nato military 
personnel, The Times surprisingly joins the Guardian in being more negative than 
positive, while the FT has an equal ratio. The Independent is a little more positive 
than in the previous analysis, while the NYT and Telegraph again have relatively high 
positive to negative ratios. When all the media sources are combined together, the 
overall ratio was slightly more negative than positive, and the negative ratio is slightly 
higher for the UK media sources on their own. The Guardian's high amount of 
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negative references for Nato is the main reason for the overall ratios being more 
negative than positive. This is shown in the following table. 
Newspaper Positive-negative coverage of Nato Points 
hierarchy, military and media 
operation in amount of references. 
Telegraph Positive-negative ratio: 2.1: 1 6 
25-12 
NYT Positive-negative ratio: 1.8: 1 5 
20-11 
Independent Positive-negative ratio: 1.01: 1 4 
35-34 
FT Equal ratio: 1: 1 3 
16-16 
Times Positive-negative ratio: 1: 1.1 2 
33-36 
Guardian Positive-negative ratio: 1: 1.9 1 
24-45 
Combined UK Positive-negative ratio: 1: 1.1 
sources 133-143 
Table 4.17. Coverage of the Nato hierarchy, military and media. 
4.3.2.2. Individual categories 
4.3.2.2.1. The media's evaluation of the UK and US militaries and leadership 
The individual category results also give mixed results. For example, only two media 
sources, the Guardian and The Times, were more negative than positive about the 
Nato hierarchy, but only two sources, the Telegraph and the NYT, were more positive 
than negative about the Nato military at war. The Guardian had over twice as many 
negative references for the Nato military at war as they did positive, and this was 
probably because they did not approve of Nato's reliance on bombing from high 
altitude. The American military also had mixed evaluations in the British media, with 
The Times more positive about them, the Independent neutral, and the Guardian 
negative; the Telegraph and FT did not feature them. The British military did not 
feature in the NYT results, but the NYT had a positive coverage of the American 
military. All the media sources were therefore more positive than negative about their 
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own military, and this leads nicely on to the next analysis; of the media coverage of 
the UK and US political leaders. In the media coverage of the two leaders, Blair was 
viewed as more positive than negative by all the media sources. The Times was the 
most supportive, with sixteen positive references to two negative. The FT and 
Guardian also had clear positive to negative ratios in favour of Blair. In contrast, 
although Clinton was a little more positive than negative in the Independent and NYT, 
his coverage was more negative in the other media sources. Although all the papers' 
results for Clinton only had a difference of one reference, as leader of the dominant 
country in the Nato alliance he should have been in a good position to receive a 
positive coverage. The above results are shown in the following table. 
Newspaper Blair Clinton Total Points 
Times Positive 16-2 Negative 3-4 19-6 6 
Financial Times Positive 8-1 Negative 0-1 8-2 5 
Independent Positive 5-3 Positive 4-3 9-6 4 
Guardian Positive 4-1 Negative 0-1 4-2 2.5 
NYT Positive 1-0 Positive 11-10 12-10 2.5 
Telegraph Positive 4-2 Negative 0-1 4-3 1 
Table 4.18. Coverage of Blair and Clinton. 
4.3.2.2.2. The media's evaluation of Milosevic and the KLA 
While Milosevic received an overwhelmingly negative coverage from all the media 
sources; the KLA, who seemed to become the unofficial leaders of the ethnic- 
Albanians during the Nato campaign, enjoyed a positive coverage in all the sources 
apart from the NYT, which had an equal amount of positive and negative articles. The 
above results are shown in the following table. 
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Newspaper Milosevic KLA Total Points 
Guardian Negative-positive 19-0 Positive-negative 7-0 26-0 6 
Independent Neg-pos 12-0 Pos-neg 5-1 17-1 4.5 
NYT Neg-pos 17-1 Pos-neg 2-2 19-3 4.5 
Telegraph Neg-pos 9-0 Pos-neg 6-2 15-2 3 
Times Neg-pos 8-0 Pos-neg 3-1 11-1 2 
FT Neg-pos 7-0 Pos-neg 1-0 8-0 1 
Table 4.19. Comparison of the coverage of Milosevic and the KLA. 
Although Milosevic received an overwhelmingly negative coverage, the other Serb 
politicians were not featured very negatively, and the Serb civilians were featured 
positively; this suggests the media personalised the blame for the conflict around 
Milosevic. The NYT and Guardian had especially positive coverage of the Serb 
civilians, with the NYT having eighteen positive references to one negative, while the 
Guardian had sixteen positive to no negative. All the media sources were also very 
positive about the ethnic-Albanian civilians. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 2. 
Most of the results supported hypothesis 2, but overall there is probably enough 
conflicting evidence to bring the hypothesis into question; and the lack of consistency 
among the papers means their coverage cannot really be considered hegemonic when 
taken as a whole. In support of the hypothesis, the British media seemed hegemonic 
in their coverage of the Serb military and Milosevic as compared to the KLA, most 
were positive towards Nato, and all were positive towards the British military. 
However, two of the British media sources also had more negative than positive 
references for Nato, and Nato had slightly more negative references than positive 
overall; this was mainly due to the Guardian's particularly negative coverage of 
Nato. 
Clinton also had a more negative than positive coverage in four of the British media 
sources. There was also little evidence of the media positioning stories to either 
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highlight or hide information in support of the Nato campaign, and all the papers gave 
both the ethnic-Albanian civilians and the Serb civilians a good coverage. 
Looking at the individual media sources, and counting the points from the four tables, 
the NYT had the most points, and according to the rationale behind these tables they 
therefore had a more hegemonic evaluation of the main people in the conflict than the 
UK media. The Telegraph was the most hegemonic in the UK, followed by the 
Independent, and then The Times. The FT and Guardian were again the two least 
hegemonic, but this time the Guardian was the least hegemonic outright. 
Media 
source 
Table 
4.16 
Table 
4.17 
Table 
4.18 
Table 
4.19 
Total Evaluation 
points 
NYT 5 5 2.5 4.5 17 6 
Telegraph 6 6 1 3 16 5 
Independent 2 4 4 4.5 14.5 4 
Times 4 2 6 2 14 3 
FT 3 3 5 1 12 2 
Guardian 1 1 2.5 6 10.5 1 
Table 4.20. Evaluation points for analysis 2. 
4.3.3. Hypothesis 3. In line with the hegemonic model, the media will use the 
British government and Nato military leaders as their sources the vast majority 
of the time, and there will be little use of sources that are critical of the Nato 
campaign. 
This question is one of the most important for evaluating how hegemonic the media 
coverage of the Kosovo conflict was, as previous research into media hegemony has 
often focused on whether the media use a variety of sources to provide the audience 
with an informed and balanced view of the news topic. Therefore, this section 
includes a large amount of data and analyses, and it is hoped it will bring together a 
comprehensive view of what sources were used, and what elite criticism of the Nato 
campaign the media featured. Due to the limitations of space, an analysis of whether 
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the media showed any direct evidence of influence from their most used source was 
left out. The results were mixed, and there was little evidence supporting direct 
influence on the media content from their main sources' information, and it was 
therefore thought that the analysis did not provide relevant enough information for 
inclusion in the study. 
As there is a lot of content in this section it is split up into two parts. To begin with, 
the first sub-section looks at the amount of sources used, and focuses on how many 
domestic and international sources were used, and whether they were positive, neutral 
or negative for Nato; ratios are given for each media source, and then they are 
compared. The second sub-section takes a closer look at the sources, and compares 
the use of official Western sources by the different media sources, and also compares 
the use of official Western sources with the use of Serb sources, and then the use of 
Serb sources with ethnic-Albanian sources. 
4.3.3.1. Amounts and ratios of domestic and international source use 
4.3.3.1.1. Domestic and international official sources 
The two tables below contain data showing the media sources' use of official sources 
during Nato's Kosovo campaign. The first table below shows the amount of 
international and domestic sources used, while the second shows the international to 
domestic ratios through the months, and at the end. Under hegemonic theory, the 
media will usually use more domestic official sources, and points are given in the 
second table to later evaluate each media source's hegemony with regard to this. 
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Newspaper International 
sources 
Domestic 
sources 
Total 
NYT 280 250 530 
Telegraph 171 102 273 
Times 198 126 324 
Guardian 258 147 405 
Independent 211 102 313 
FT 186 64 250 
Table 4.21. Amount of international and domestic sources. 
Newspaper March 
int-dom 
ratio 
April 
int-dom 
ratio 
May 
int-dom 
ratio 
June 
int-dom 
ratio 
Total 
int-dom 
ratio 
Points 
NYT 1.3: 1 1: 1.4 1.3: 1 1.1: 1 1.1: 1 6 
Telegraph 1.3: 1 1.9: 1 1.6: 1 1.7: 1 1.7: 1 5 
Times 1.7: 1 1.9: 1 1.6: 1 2.1: 1 1.8: 1 4 
Guardian 1.2: 1 2.1: 1 2.7: 1 3.3: 1 2.2: 1 3 
Independent 2.8: 1 1.9: 1 2.5: 1 3.9: 1 2.4: 1 2 
FT 1.9: 1 3: 1 4.9: 1 9.7: 1 3.3: 1 1 
Table 4.22. Ratios of international to domestic use of sources. 
The NYT was shown to use the most domestic sources compared to international, and 
only just used more international; this suggests they routinely index their reporting to 
the US government, and this finding is in line with some previous studies on the NYT 
coverage of US international conflicts, which have found it to be hegemonic in its 
source use. The Telegraph and The Times had the lowest ratio of international to 
domestic sources use among the British media sources, while the FT had the highest. 
4.3.3.1.2. The use of domestic positive, neutral and negative sources by the 
media. 
For this section, a quantitative analysis of the positive, neutral and negative opinions 
of the elite domestic and international sources was undertaken. This involved 
counting each use of an elite source in an article, and interpreting whether the views 
were positive, neutral or negative for the Nato campaign. The section starts with an 
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analysis of the use of domestic sources, then goes on to international, and then ends 
with an analysis of the domestic and international source use combined. 
Media source March April May June Total 
Times P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
27-0-2 42-4-6 34-1-2 13-0-0 116-10 
Total: 29 Total: 52 Total: 37 Total: 13 Ratio p-neg: 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 11.6: 1 
13.5: 1 7: 1 17: 1 N/A 
Telegraph P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: Total: 
19-2-1 36-1-5 19-5-2 12-0-0 86-8-8 
Total: 22 Total: 42 Total: 26 Total: 12 Total: 102 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
19-1 7.2-1 9.5-1 N/A 10.8-1 
Independent P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
24-0-1 33-2-7 27-0-3 7-0-0 91-11 
Total: 25 Total: 42 Total: 30 Total: 7 Ratio p-neg: 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 8.3: 1 
24: 1 4.7: 1 9: 1 N/A 
Guardian P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
26-1-9 49-4-6 34-0-7 16-0-0 125-22 
Total: 36 Total: 59 Total: 41 Total: 16 Ratio p-neg: 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 5.7: 1 
2.9: 1 8.2: 1 4.9: 1 N/A 
NYT P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
40-4-6 106-19-23 56-6-8 29-4-12 231-49 
Total: 50 Total: 148 Total: 70 Total: 45 Ratio p-neg: 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 4.7: 1 
6.7: 1 4.6: 1 7: 1 2.4: 1 
FT P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 50-14 
11-0-7 23-9-7 13-0-0 3-0-0 Ratio p-neg: 
Total: 18 Total: 39 Total: 13 Total: 3 3.6: 1 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
1.6: 1 3.3: 1 N/A N/A 
Table 4.23. Domestic positive, neutral and negative source amounts, and ratio of 
positive to negative. P-Neu-Neg stands for Positive-Neutral-Negative. p-neg stands 
for positive-negative. N/A stands for not available. 
The above table shows The Times had the highest positive to negative ratio at 11.6: 1, 
and was followed closely by the Telegraph. The other media sources also had ratios 
that were quite high. The NYT had the second lowest ratio, after the FT. As this is 
one of the key areas where evidence of a hegemonic media is tested, the evidence 
suggests most of the British media were more hegemonic than the NYT in this regard, 
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as the NYT ratio was much lower than the average for the British media sources. The 
findings are summarised in the table below. 
Media source Ratio 
Times 11.6: 1 
Telegraph 10.8: 1 
Independent 8.3: 1 
Guardian 5.7: 1 
NYT 4.7: 1 
FT 3.6: 1 
Average of British media sources 8: 1 
Table 4.24. Table of domestic positive-negative ratio in highest to lowest order. 
4.3.3.1.3. The use of international positive, neutral and negative sources. 
Tables 4.25 and 4.26 below show the Independent had the highest ratio of 
international sources' positive to negative references; it was closely followed by the 
other media sources, and they generally had much lower positive-negative ratios than 
for their use of domestic sources. The NYT again had the second lowest ratio, but this 
time it was not much lower than the average for the British media sources. The Times 
had the lowest ratio, after having the highest for the domestic source use. The ratios 
for each media source's total positive and negative source references from tables 4.23 
and 4.25 are then combined in table 4.27. 
Source March April May June Total 
Indy P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
38-13-19 64-12-5 51-14-11 18-4-5 171-40 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
2: 1 12.8: 1 4.6: 1 3.6: 1 4.3: 1 
FT P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: 70-30- P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
20-6-8 17 34-16-13 19-5-5 143-43 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 4.1: 1 Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
2.5: 1 2.6: 1 3.8: 1 3.3: 1 
Guardian P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: 73-31- P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
26-3-15 22 61-28-21 27-12-13 187-71 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 3.3: 1 Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
1.7: 1 2.9: 1 2.1: 1 2.6: 1 
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Telegraph P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg 
20-1-8 53-12-16 20-10-11 11-4-5 104-40 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-ne,,: 
2.5: 1 3.3: 1 1.8: 1 2.2: 1 2.6: 1 
NYT P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: 61-17- P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
39-7-21 29 45-31-17 29-10-9 174-76 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 2.1: 1 Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
1.9: 1 2.7: 1 3.2: 1 2.3: 1 
Times P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: 63-9- P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg: 
30-7-11 26 31-13-16 13-6-8 137-61 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 2.4: 1 Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: 
2.7: 1 1.9: 1 1.6: 1 2.3: 1 
I able 4. Z-'). international positive, neutral and negative sources amounts, and ratio of 
positive to negative. 
Newspaper Ratio 
Independent 4.3: 1 
FT 3.3: 1 
Guardian 2.63: 1 
Telegraph 2.6: 1 
NYT 2.29: 1 
Times 2.25: 1 
Average of British media sources 3: 1 
Table 4.26. Table of international positive-negative ratios in highest to lowest order. 
Newspaper Ratio Points 
Independent 5.1: 1 6 
Telegraph 4: 1 5 
Times 3.6: 1 4 
FT 3.38: 1 3 
Guardian 3.35: 1 2 
NYT 3.2: 1 1 
Average of British media 3.9: 1 
Table 4.27. Table of total positive-negative ratios in highest to lowest order. 
4.3.3.2. The use of Nato, Serb and ethnic-Albanian sources 
4.3.3.2.1. Source frequency results 
In the Main Source frequency analysis, all the media sources had Writers themselves 
as the highest category. After the writers, the Guardian, Times and Independent used 
other British Government the most, while the FT and NYT had other American 
Government, and the Telegraph had Nato spokesperson no conference cited. The FT 
would have had Nato spokespeople as their second highest reference, behind the 
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writers, if all Nato sources were counted together, rather than conferences cited or not 
cited counted separately. 
The Guardian had ethnic-Albanian civilians as their third most referenced source, and 
then Humanitarian workers level with the Nato hierarchy after that; this seems to 
again highlight its concern for the civilian population. The FT had European 
politicians after American Government, followed by Nato hierarchy, and this again 
seems to highlight their focus on international aspects of the conflict, and the 
diplomacy that was taking place. The Times had Humanitarian workers as their third 
highest reference, and then ethnic-Albanian civilians, which was similar to the 
Guardian. Considering their reputation as an elite newspaper, it seems quite 
surprising that The Times used more humanitarian workers as sources than official 
sources like Nato spokespeople. The Independent had Humanitarian workers as their 
third highest source, and they were followed by Nato spokespeople without 
conferences cited. The Nato spokespeople would have been the third highest if they 
were included together, instead of separate as conferences cited and not cited. The 
Telegraph had other British Government as their third highest referenced source, and 
then ethnic-Albanian civilians; while the NYT had other Nato spokesperson no 
conference cited, followed by ethnic-Albanian civilians. 
Looking at the access gained by the UK and US leaders in their home media, Blair 
was sixth in The Times and Telegraph; seventh in the Independent; eighth in the FT 
and ninth in the Guardian, while Clinton was fifth in the NYT. Clinton being used 
more in the NYT than Blair in any of the British media sources suggests the NYT 
indexes to the leader of government more than the UK papers; although it must also 
be remembered that the vast majority of military forces used in the Nato campaign 
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were American, and Clinton therefore had more power and responsibility during the 
conflict than Blair. 
4.3.3.2.2. The use of Government sources 
When combining similar categories together into groups, the British newspaper 
coverage of all the British Government sources together, and the NYT's coverage of 
all the American Government sources together, showed the NYT used a higher 
percentage of government sources than the British media. This again suggests the 
NYT indexed more to their government than the British papers did to theirs. The 
Telegraph used the most Government sources out of the British media, and this was a 
little surprising considering the Telegraph traditionally supports the Conservative 
party; from that evidence it seems as if they put their traditional support of the British 
military at war above their traditional support of political parties. The FT was the 
lowest percentage user of their government, and this seems to fit in with their general 
focus on international affairs. These results are shown in the table below; there are 
five tables in this section that go towards the final evaluation points. 
Media source The use of Government sources Points 
NYT 19% 6 
Telegraph 17.3% 5 
Times 15.8% 4 
Guardian 14.6% 3 
Independent 12.9% 2 
FT 10% 1 
Table 4.28. UK papers' use of New Labour sources, and the NY7 s use of Democrat 
sources. 
4.3.3.2.3. The media sources' use of Government and Nato sources 
When Government and Nato sources were included together, the Telegraph was the 
highest percentage user of the Nato elite, with the NYT in second place. The FT 
jumped from being the lowest user of British Government sources to being the third 
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highest user of the combined sources. The Guardian and Independent stayed in the 
same position, but The Times swapped position with the FT, and went from being the 
third highest percentage user of British Government sources to the lowest user of the 
combined sources; this swap in places seems to again highlight their different 
outlooks on the conflict, with The Times more focused on the domestic situation, and 
the FT more on the international. 
Media source The media sources' use of Government and Nato 
sources 
Points 
Telegraph 37% 6 
NYT 34.2% 5 
FT 31.7% 4 
Guardian 29.4% 3 
Independent 28.7% 2 
Times 25.7% 1 
Table 4.29. Media sources' use of New Labour, Democrat and Nato sources. 
4.3.3.2.4. Nato and Serb source use comparison 
The above table is now adapted to compare the media sources' use of the three main 
groups in the Nato campaign; the British and American governments and Nato, with 
the media's use of official Serb sources. 
Newspaper British and American 
Government, and Nato 
sources 
Official Serb 
sources 
Ratio Points 
Times 109 6 18.2: 1 6 
Guardian 121 8 15.1: 1 5 
NYT 151 17 8.9: 1 4 
Independent 111 14 7.9: 1 3 
Telegraph 81 11 7.4: 1 2 
FT 70 10 7: 1 1 
Total for UK 
sources 
492 66 7.5: 1 
Table 4.30. The media sources' use of Nato and Serb sources. 
The above table shows that although The Times had the lowest percentage of 
government and Nato sources it still had the highest ratio of the Nato sources' use in 
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comparison to the use of official Serb sources. The main reason for the low 
percentages of both sets of sources seems to be mainly due to The Times having the 
highest percentage of articles without any sources. So although The Times might 
seem to be hegemonic with their high ratio of Nato to Serb official sources, in another 
way they are going against the hegemonic model, as they are relying on their own 
writers rather than official sources. The high ratio therefore seems to be down to the 
newspaper's style more than its ideology, although it did have the lowest percentage 
of official Serb source use; however, remembering the Main People analysis, it was 
the only media source to have more references for Serb civilians than government and 
military, and this was viewed as a positive feature of their coverage for that analysis. 
The fact that the Guardian, which is traditionally independent of the establishment, 
has the second highest ratio, and a much higher ratio than the other four sources, also 
brings up the question of hegemony, and whether the government and Nato 
humanitarianism had influenced the Guardian; however, it seems more likely that it 
was because of a reluctance to use official Serb sources because of the brutality of 
their military campaign, rather than a hegemonic over-use of Nato official sources, as 
it had the second lowest percentage of official Serb source use, and only the fourth 
highest percentage of Nato source use. The NYT had the third highest ratio, but they 
and the other three sources all have quite similar ratios. 
Although the above results make the coverage seem largely hegemonic, it must be 
remembered that the ethnic-Albanians received a similar coverage to the Serbs, with 
their official sources receiving a little less access than the Serbs, but their civilians 
getting much more. This can be clarified in the following tables, which are used to 
test the hegemony of each media source in their coverage of the ethnic-Albanian 
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`allies' and the Serb `enemies'. In the first table, the Serb sources are therefore 
structured with the paper with the lowest percentage of sources in first position, and 
then descending down to the paper with the most use of Serb sources. In the second 
table, the ethnic-Albanian source usage is presented in the opposite order, with the 
media source with the highest percentage of ethnic-Albanian source usage at the top, 
descending down to the media source with the lowest percentage of use at the bottom. 
Newspaper Official Serb 
sources 
Civilian Serb 
sources 
All Serb 
sources 
Points 
Guardian 2.0 4.4 6.4 5.5 
FT 4.6 1.8 6.4 5.5 
Independent 3.7 3.1 6.8 4 
Times 1.5 5.7 7.2 3 
Telegraph 5.0 2.3 7.3 2 
NYT 3.9 5.2 9.1 1 
Table 4.31. The media's use of Serb sources. 
Newspaper Civilian ethnic- 
Albanian 
sources 
Official ethnic- 
Albanian 
sources 
All-ethnic- 
Albanian 
sources 
Points 
Telegraph 9.1 3.7 12.8 6 
NYT 8.6 1.3 9.9 5 
Independent 7.2 2.4 9.6 4 
Guardian 7.1 1.7 8.8 3 
Times 5.9 0.9 6.8 2 
FT 2.7 0.9 3.6 1 
Table 4.32. The media's use of ethnic-Albanian sources. 
Having compared ethnic-Albanian and Serb sources in the above tables, there does 
not seem to be any paper that used a particularly low amount of Serb sources together 
with a disproportionately high amount of ethnic-Albanian sources. However, if we 
compare the points from the two tables, the Guardian had the most difference in their 
use of the two sides' sources, after using the joint least percentage of Serb sources, 
and the fourth highest percentage of ethnic-Albanian sources. That left them with 
eight and a half points from the two tables. This concurs with the paper having a high 
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ratio of Nato to Serb official sources, and seems to emphasise their reluctance to use 
official Serb sources. 
The Independent and the Telegraph were the media sources with the next highest use 
of ethnic-Albanian sources compared to the Serbs, as they had eight points each from 
the two tables. The Independent used the third lowest percentage of Serb sources, and 
the third highest percentage of ethnic-Albanians, which meant it was above average in 
both tables. The Telegraph had the highest percentage of ethnic-Albanian source use, 
but also had the second highest percentage of Serb use, and so was above average in 
the use of both sets of sources. 
The FT was the next highest with six and a half points, and so was a little below 
average in its use of ethnic-Albanian sources compared to Serbs. The FT had the joint 
least percentage of Serb source usage, and also the lowest percentage of ethnic- 
Albanian source usage, which again seems to emphasise that the paper did not cover 
the actual conflict in Kosovo as much as the other media sources, and instead focused 
on international diplomacy. The NYT was the next highest, and was only half a point 
behind the FT. In contrast to the FT, it had the highest percentage of Serb source use, 
and was also the second highest percentage user of ethnic-Albanian sources, making it 
a big user of both sources. The Times had the lowest amount of points from the two 
tables, with five. It therefore had the most balanced use of the two opposing sets of 
sources. They were similar to the FT in their coverage, as they were low users of both 
sets of sources; they were the fourth highest percentage user of Serb sources, and the 
fifth highest of ethnic-Albanian sources. The combined points from this analysis are 
shown in the table below, but the points used in the individual analyses are used for 
the final evaluation. 
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Newspaper Serb table points Ethnic-Albanian table points Total 
Guardian 5.5 3 8.5 
Independent 4 4 8 
Telegraph 2 6 8 
Financial Times 5 1 6.5 
NYT 1 5 6 
Times 3 2 5 
Table 4.33. Combined points for Serb and ethnic-Albanian source use. 
When all five of the tables where points were given in this sub-section are combined 
together they reach the following findings. 
Newspaper Table 
4.28 
Table 
4.29 
Table 
4.30 
Table 
4.31 
Table 
4.32. 
Total Points 
NYT 6 5 4 1 5 21 5.5 
Telegraph 5 6 2 2 6 21 5.5 
Guardian 3 3 5 5.5 3 19.5 4 
Times 4 1 6 3 2 16 3 
Indy 2 2 3 4 4 15 2 
FT 1 4 1 5.5 1 12.5 1 
Table 4.34. Points for 4.3.3.2. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 3. 
The results from the final two tables from the sub-sections; 4.27 and 4.34, are brought 
together in the following table, and evaluation points given for each media source. 
The Telegraph was the most hegemonic overall, followed by the Independent and The 
Times. The NYT was just below average, and just above the Guardian, while the FT 
was comfortably the least hegemonic. 
Media 
Source 
Points for 
4.3.3.1. 
Points for 
4.3.3.2. 
Total points Evaluation 
points 
Telegraph 5 5.5 10.5 6 
Independent 6 2 8 5 
Times 4 3 7 4 
NYT 1 5.5 6.5 3 
Guardian 2 4 6 2 
FT 3 1 4 1 
Table 4.35. Evaluation points for the sources variable. 
The overall results support the hypothesis, as the media sources used Nato sources a 
vast majority of the time, and the official sources used were much more positive 
186 
towards the Nato campaign than negative. For example, the first sub-section showed 
the ratio of positive to negative official source use by the British media for the Nato 
campaign was 3.9: 1, while the second section showed the ratio of Nato source use to 
Serb source use was 7.5: 1. Other non-Nato sources were also neglected, including 
ethnic-Albanian official sources, and so it seems as if the media were acting more 
hegemonically than propagandistically. Some aspects of the results did not support 
the hypothesis, but they only made up a small amount of the evidence in comparison. 
4.3.4. Hypothesis 4. In line with hegemonic theory, the front pages will include 
good coverage for Nato and bad for the Serbs the vast majority of the time, while 
the vast majority of bad coverage for Nato will be in the inside pages. 
There were usually between one and four Kosovo articles on each page, and one or 
two on the front page; there were usually between ten and twenty articles in each 
newspaper. Therefore, the framework for this analysis considers the prominent 
stories as those going down to position five. This study does not differentiate 
between news and opinion articles, and accepts that an opinion article in position 
fifteen might be more influential than a news article in position one or two. The 
Position and Main people, and Position and Format analyses are featured in the Main 
People and Format sections, as they seem more important for those hypotheses than 
this one. The Telegraph is not included in this section, as the articles were not in any 
particular positional order on the Internet. 
4.3.4.1. Position and Source 
The Position and Source cross-tabulation analysis showed Nato leaders and 
spokespeople took the majority of prominent positions in all the media sources, so this 
was supportive of the hypothesis. The Guardian and FT used American Democrats 
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and Pentagon sources as their most referenced top position source. The FT had Nato 
spokespeople next, and so did the Guardian if Nato spokespersons from the 
conference and conference not cited categories were included together; otherwise 
Nato spokespeople conferences not cited was level with other Russian politicians. 
The FT had European politicians as their third most referenced source. 
In the Independent, Nato spokespeople conferences not cited had the most top 
positions with nine references, followed by ethnic-Albanian civilians with six, and 
Writers themselves with five. American Democrats and Pentagon spokespeople had 
the highest amount of position two references, followed by Nato spokespeople and 
ethnic-Albanian civilians. Nato spokespeople featured in the higher positions more 
than the lower, while American Democrats and Pentagon spokespeople got a more 
prominent coverage than Blair. The ethnic-Albanian refugees also featured highly. 
Milosevic was the only Serb to appear in the top position, and he appeared only once. 
The Times was the only British media source to have domestic sources as their top 
source, as they had Other Labour in the most top positions; moreover, Blair had the 
second highest amount of references. Other Labour also had the most second 
positions, and was again followed by Blair. Blair featured in the highest two 
positions much more than the lower ones, while other Labour were spread out over 
the top eight positions. Perhaps surprisingly for The Times, European politicians had 
the third highest amount of top position references. The NYT had a similar result to 
The Times from an American perspective, as they had other American Democrats as 
the source with the highest amount of top position references, and Clinton had the 
second highest amount of references in the top position. The other sources with the 
most top position references were other Nato spokespeople conferences not cited, 
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Wesley Clark and other Serb politicians. Apart from Serb politicians, the top 
positions were dominated by Nato spokespeople and American Democrat politicians. 
Points are given below based on the above evidence, and they will be used for later 
evaluation at the end. There was not much to choose between the sources, as Nato 
dominated the top positions, but other Serb politicians were in the top three most 
referenced top sources in the NYT, and so the paper was considered the least 
hegemonic in this analysis. The Guardian had other Russian politicians in their top 
three and so they were considered the second least hegemonic. The FT and Times had 
European politicians in their top three, while the Independent had writers themselves, 
so they were considered to be at about the same level of hegemony, and were given 
the same points. 
Newspaper Points 
Independent 4 
FT 4 
Times 4 
Guardian 2 
NYT 1 
Table 4.36. Position and Source points. 
4.3.4.2. Position and Diagnosis 
The Position and Diagnosis results were also mostly supportive of the hypothesis, 
with three of the five newspapers having positive diagnoses more in the top positions, 
and negative diagnoses more in the lower positions. For example, in the Guardian, 
the Nato campaign is working diagnosis had more than twice as many articles in the 
first position as any other category, and had eighteen of its twenty-five references in 
the top three positions. In comparison, the Nato campaign is not working category 
only had five of its eighteen references in the top three positions, and only one in the 
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first position. In the lower positions there were three Nato campaign is working 
references to twenty Nato campaign is not working. 
Also in line with the hypothesis, and with a similar coverage to the Guardian, the FT 
also seemed to have a much higher proportion of Nato campaign is working to Nato 
campaign is not working in the higher positions. Despite Nato campaign is not 
working having three more references overall, there were nine Nato campaign is 
working references in the top position compared with one Nato campaign is not 
working. The more positive positioning of the Nato campaign is working to Nato 
campaign is not working references is emphasised further by the top three positions 
having eighteen Nato campaign is working to five Nato campaign is not working, 
while in the lower seven positions it was seven Nato campaign is working to thirteen 
Nato campaign is not working. However, there was also some evidence that went 
against the hypothesis, with Collateral damage is Nato 's fault more in the top 
positions than the lower ones: it had more references in the first position than in any 
other position, and also had its second highest amount of references in position two. 
The Independent had similar findings to the Guardian and the FT on the question of 
whether the Nato campaign was working, with Nato campaign is working having a 
much higher percentage of references in the top six positions than Nato campaign is 
not working: out of twenty-six Nato campaign is working references, twenty were in 
the first six positions, while out of seventeen Nato campaign is not working references, 
only five were in the top six positions. Also supporting the hypothesis, Refugees are 
the Serbs 'fault had the most references in the top two positions. Nato campaign is 
working was tied as the second highest top position reference with Collateral damage 
is Nato 's fault, so they balanced each other out as a positive and negative for the 
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hypothesis. Collateral damage is Nato's fault was also the second most referenced 
category in position two. 
The Times and NYT results showed balance in their positioning of articles, and so their 
results did not support the hypothesis. Individually, there was not much difference 
between the media sources that supported the hypothesis, or between the media 
sources that did not support the hypothesis, and so the points for later evaluation 
featured in the table below were divided evenly between the individual media sources 
in each group. 
Newspaper Points 
Guardian 4 
FT 4 
Independent 4 
Times 1.5 
NYT 1.5 
Table 4.37. Position and Diagnosis points. 
4.3.4.3. Position and Prognosis 
The results were more balanced in the Position and Prognosis cross-tabulation 
analysis than in the previous analyses, and there was therefore not much support for 
the hypothesis. However, most of the evidence seemed to support the hypothesis in 
the Guardian. For example, Continue the bombing had the most top position 
references, and also had sixteen of its thirty-three references in the top four positions. 
Also, Stop the bombing seemed to be more in the lower positions, with only two of its 
eighteen references in the top six positions. However, there was also some evidence 
that went against the hypothesis, as the most prominent category in the top positions 
was Diplomacy, with twenty of its thirty-five references in the top five positions. 
Most of the evidence seemed to go against the hypothesis in the FT and Independent, 
with Diplomacy prominent in the former, and Send in ground troops in the latter. The 
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results in The Times were quite mixed for the hypothesis; in support of the hypothesis, 
Continue the bombing was the most referenced in the top position, but going against 
the hypothesis, Change the bombing strategy and Diplomacy had the second highest 
amount of top position references. There were also mixed results in the NYT, as 
Continue the bombing and Diplomacy had the most top position references, with six 
each. Points were given in accordance with the above conclusions, with the Guardian 
seen as the most positive for Nato; The Times and NYT with their mixed results next, 
and the Independent and FT the joint least hegemonic with their negative results for 
the hypothesis. 
Newspaper Points 
Guardian 5 
Times 3.5 
NYT 3.5 
Independent 1.5 
Financial Times 1.5 
Table 4.38. Position and Prognosis points. 
4.3.4.4. Position and historical reference 
There were also mixed results for the hypothesis in the Position and Historical 
References cross-tabulation. The Independent seemed to be the most in line with the 
hypothesis, with World War Two Serbs negative having the most references in 
position one; followed by Bosnian War Serbs negative and Gulf Nato positive. 
However, there were also several references for those categories in the lower 
positions as well, so they did not seem to be prominently placed for hegemonic 
reasons. There was little negative for Nato, or positive for the Serbs, in the top 
positions. 
There were mixed results in The Times. In line with the hypothesis, Bosnian War 
Serbs negative was the most referenced top position category with four references, 
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and World War Two Serbs negative was quite prominently placed, with eight 
references in the top four positions, but both categories also had quite a lot of 
references in the lower positions as well. Going against the hypothesis, World War 
Two Nato negative was also quite prominently placed, although it also had references 
in lower positions as well. Of those categories that seemed to be in disproportionately 
lower positions, one was positive for the Serbs, World War Two Serbs positive, and 
the other negative, Serbo-Croat war Serbs negative. 
In the Guardian, nothing really stood out as particularly prominently placed, but 
World War Two Serbs negative had the joint highest amount of references in the top 
position, along with Gulf war neutral. World War Two Nato negative and Vietnam 
Nato negative being quite lowly placed was also in line with the hypothesis. Going 
against the hypothesis, Bosnian War Serbs negative, Bosnian War Nato positive, and 
Gulf Nato positive had most of their references in quite low positions. In the FT, there 
were no significant patterns of coverage, although Gulf Nato positive was the only 
category to get a top position reference. 
The NYT results were also largely inconclusive. World War Two Nato negative, 
World War Two neutral, Gulf Nato positive, and Bosnian War neutral had the most 
top position references, and this mixture of negative and positive for the Nato 
campaign did not support the hypothesis. World War Two Serbs negative, World War 
Two Nato negative, Gulf War Nato negative, Bosnian War Serbs negative and World 
War Two Nato positive were all quite prominent in the top positions, but also quite 
spread out as well, so the mixed message again did not really support the hypothesis. 
Probably the most supportive evidence for the hypothesis was that all eight Vietnam 
Nato negative references were at position nine and below. Taking the above findings 
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into consideration, the Independent was judged to be the most hegemonic in this 
analysis, and The Times second. The other three newspapers were considered equally 
hegemonic. 
Newspaper Points 
Independent 5 
Times 4 
Financial Times 2 
Guardian 2 
New York Times 2 
Table 4.39. Position and Historical reference points. 
4.3.4.5. Position and image 
In the Position and Image cross-tabulation analysis, all the British newspaper sources 
had ethnic-Albanians as their most referenced image in position one, while the NYT 
had Damage from Nato. This suggests there might have been a cultural difference in 
the UK and US framing of the Nato campaign in this regard, with the British papers 
more hegemonic in their coverage, as their top image was more in line with the Nato 
framing of the conflict. 
In the Independent, ethnic-Albanian civilians easily had the most position one 
references with fourteen. Damage from Nato and other American Democrats had the 
next highest amounts with two each. No category really seemed to be in a 
disproportionately high or low position, although British soldiers in a positive picture 
had all eight of its references in the top seven positions. The Guardian, FT and The 
Times had mixed results; in the Guardian, although ethnic-Albanian civilians, a 
positive image for Nato, was the most referenced position one category, it only had 
one more reference than Damage from Nato. Similarly, in line with the hypothesis, 
only two of the ten Serb civilians references were in the top three positions, but 
against the hypothesis, Damage from Serbs only had one reference, and this was in a 
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low position. The only disproportionate positioning that supported the hypothesis was 
that the Serb military was disproportionately high, with four of their five references in 
the top three positions, while the KLA was disproportionately low, with none of their 
five references in the top three positions; these could be interpreted as supporting the 
hypothesis, because Nato wanted to focus on the Serb military and ethnic-Albanian 
civilians most of the time. The FT also had ethnic-Albanian civilians the most in the 
top position, with five references, and then Damage from Nato and other American 
Democrat politicians were tied with the next highest amount of position one 
references with two each. Similarly, in The Times, ethnic-Albanian civilians was 
again the most referenced in the top position, with seven references, and Damage 
from Nato was joint second on three references, this time with Maps. None of the 
categories seemed to have more references in a disproportionately high or low 
position in the latter two media sources. 
In the NYT, Damage from Nato was the most prominent image the highest amount of 
times, with five references, followed by ethnic-Albanian civilians with four; this was 
despite ethnic-Albanian civilians having over four times as many references overall. 
However, in line with the hypothesis, two positive categories for Nato, American 
soldiers in a positive picture and Milosevic, were tied with the third highest amount of 
top position references with just one less than ethnic-Albanian civilians, and two less 
than Damage from Nato. No categories were in a disproportionately high or low 
position. 
With regard to which media source looked the most hegemonic, the NYT clearly 
seemed to have the least hegemonic coverage, as they had Damage from Nato as their 
most referenced image, and all the British papers had that category behind ethnic- 
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Albanian civilians as their most referenced category. As there were no other negative 
images for Nato in the top three references, the other points were given out on the 
basis of how much difference there was between their use of Damage from Nato and 
ethnic-Albanian civilians. The Independent had a difference of twelve references, so 
they were considered the most hegemonic. The Times had a difference of four, so 
they were considered the next most hegemonic, followed by the FT on three. The 
Guardian only had a difference of one, and so they were considered the least 
hegemonic after the NYT. 
Newspaper Points 
Independent 5 
Times 4 
Financial Times 3 
Guardian 2 
NYT 1 
Table 4.40. Position and Image. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 4. 
The majority of evidence in the British media does seem to show enough positivity 
towards Nato in the prominent positions to confirm the hypothesis, and this seems to 
have been because the newspapers often had the latest news from a Nato perspective 
on the front page. The Position and Main People, and Position and Source analyses 
produced evidence that seemed clearly supportive of the hypothesis, with the top 
positions dominated by Nato leaders and allies. The Source positioning seemed to 
make sure the Diagnosis positioning would also be positive for Nato, and in the 
Position and Diagnosis analysis only Collateral damage is Nato 's fault offered any 
regular interruption to the positive diagnoses for Nato in three of the four British 
papers and the NYT. 
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The Position and Historical References evidence was mixed, although most of it 
supported the hypothesis, with three of the British papers offering largely supportive 
evidence, while the FT and NYT were balanced. The Position and Image analysis also 
had mixed results, as although ethnic-Albanian civilians was the top reference in all 
the British papers, Damage from Nato also had a lot of references in the top position, 
and there was little sign of any disproportion in the placement of any of the categories. 
It was only in the Position and Prognosis analysis that there were some negative 
findings for the hypothesis, with only one of the sources' prognoses supporting the 
hypothesis. However, this is partly expected under hegemonic theory, as previous 
studies have found that the media often criticise its country's military strategy rather 
than its rationale for war, as this allows them to appear independent of their 
government and military. Therefore, despite some evidence that was critical of the 
Nato campaign in the top positions, and which therefore called the hypothesis into 
question, there does seem to be enough evidence that the front pages were largely 
supportive of Nato, and this seems to validate the hypothesis. Evaluation points are 
given in the table below; the NYT having easily the lowest amount of points seems to 
be the most significant finding. 
Newspaper 4.36 4.37 4.38 4.39 4.40 Total Evaluation points 
Independent 4 4 1.5 5 5 19.5 5 
Times 4 1.5 3.5 4 4 17 4 
Guardian 2 4 5 2 2 15 3 
FT 4 4 1.5 2 3 14.5 2 
NYT 1 1.5 3.5 2 1 9 1 
Table 4.41. Evaluation points for hypothesis 4. 
4.3.5. Hypothesis 5. In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of the 
diagnoses will be supportive of the Nato campaign, and critical of the Serbs. 
The diagnosis analysis starts with the individual categories frequency analysis, and 
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this includes a focus on the diagnoses contained in the articles without sources 
(Writers themselves category); it is hoped that this analysis will offer an insight into 
how the writers were thinking when their articles were not being directly influenced 
by sources, and whether their diagnoses differed much from the articles that did use 
sources. The section then continues with collective diagnoses analyses. 
4.3.5.1. Individual Diagnosis references 
The Telegraph had the most positive results for Nato, with their three most referenced 
diagnoses positive for Nato: Refugees are Serbs' fault was the highest, and it was 
followed in amount of references by Ground war is Serb aggression and Nato 
campaign is working. The highest negative references for Nato, Nato campaign is 
Nato's fault and Nato campaign is not working, were in joint fifth position along with 
two positive diagnoses. Collateral damage is Nato 's fault was only the ninth highest 
reference. In the Writers themselves category, the highest referenced diagnosis was a 
tie between Ground war is Milosevic's fault, Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault, Nato 
campaign is working and Nato campaign is not working; the first three were therefore 
positive for Nato, and there seemed to be more of a personalisation of the Serb blame 
around Milosevic than where sources were used; this pattern is also evident in the 
other media sources' analyses. 
The Times had mixed results for Nato, but was mainly positive. The two highest 
referenced categories were positive for the Nato campaign; Refugees are Serbs' fault 
and Refugees are Milosevic 's fault. However, the third highest was negative, as it 
was Collateral damage is Nato's fault; moreover, Nato campaign is not working had 
more references than Nato campaign is working. In the Writers themselves category 
there was a tie on nine references for the most referenced diagnosis between two 
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diagnoses that were positive for the Nato campaign: Ground war is Milosevic's fault 
and Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault, and one that was negative: Nato campaign is 
not working. Nato campaign is working only had three references. 
The Independent again had mixed results for Nato, but was mainly positive. Refugees 
are Serbs' fault was the highest reference by a high majority, and was followed by 
Collateral damage is Nato's fault and Refugees are Milosevic's fault. Nato campaign 
is working was fourth highest, while Nato campaign is not working was seventh. In 
the Writers themselves category, the two highest diagnoses were very negative for 
Nato, with Nato campaign is not working the highest category, followed by Collateral 
damage is Nato's fault; this was probably because of Robert Fisk's reporting, as he 
was usually very negative towards Nato. However, the three categories with the next 
highest amount of references were positive for Nato: Ground war is Milosevic's fault; 
Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault, and Refugees are Serbs' fault. Nato campaign is 
working had just under half as many references as Nato campaign is not working. 
The Guardian's diagnoses also had mixed results for the Nato campaign, and 
although the highest reference was positive for Nato, the next two were negative: the 
highest was Refugees are Serbs' fault, but it was followed by Collateral damage is 
Nato 's fault and Nato campaign is not working. The latter had three references more 
than Nato campaign is working, which was the fourth most referenced category. The 
Writers themselves category also had mixed results, as Nato campaign is Milosevic's 
fault was the highest reference, followed by Nato campaign is because of bad 
diplomacy and Nato campaign is not working joint second. They only had one 
reference for Nato campaign is working. 
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The FT had similar results to the Guardian, with two of the three highest references 
negative for Nato, although the highest was positive: Nato campaign is working was 
the highest reference, but this was closely followed by Nato campaign is not working 
and Collateral damage is Nato 's fault. These were followed by Refugees are Serbs' 
fault, which was positive. In the Writers themselves category, the Nato campaign is 
not working was the highest reference, but was followed closely by the Nato 
campaign is working. Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault was the third highest 
reference. 
The NYT results were also mixed, with the first two references positive for Nato, but 
the third negative: Refugees are Serbs' fault was the most referenced, followed by 
Refugees are Milosevic's fault; Collateral damage is Nato's fault was third. Nato 
campaign is not working was the sixth highest reference, while the Nato campaign is 
working was the ninth. In the Writers themselves category, Refugees are Milosevic's 
fault was the highest reference, and was followed by Ground war is Milosevic's fault. 
The Refugees are Serbs' fault and Nato campaign is not working categories were tied 
as the third highest reference. There were no references for Nato campaign is 
working. The above results therefore show that most papers had quite a mixed 
highest diagnosis results. 
4.3.5.2. Combined categories results 
Most of the media sources' individual category results produced mixed results for 
Nato and the hypothesis, so the separate categories were combined in a collective 
analysis. Negative references for the opposing groups, Milosevic and the Serbs 
against Nato and the KLA, were compared in each media source, with some of the 
categories that had distinguished between Milosevic and the Serbs combined: the 
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negative categories for the Serbs were Ground war is Serb aggression/Milosevic's 
fault, Collateral damage is Serbs' fault/Milosevic's fault, Refugees are Serbs' 
fault/Milosevic's fault, Nato campaign is Serbs' fault/Milosevic's fault, Nato 
campaign is working. The negative references for Nato and the KLA were: Ground 
war is KLA 's fault, Collateral damage is Nato 's fault, Nato campaign is KLA 's fault, 
Nato campaign is Nato 's fault and Nato campaign is not working. There were 
therefore five diagnoses for each opposing side. Diagnoses counted as neutral and left 
out of the analysis were Ground war is unavoidable civil war and Nato campaign is 
because of bad diplomacy. Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy would 
probably be critical of the Nato leaders, but it was thought to be too ambiguous to 
include as a negative reference for Nato. The results of the analysis are presented in 
the table below. 
Newspaper Negative Serbs- 
Negative Nato 
Ratio Evaluation 
points 
Telegraph 104-27 3.9: 1 6 
Independent 174-59 3.1: 1 5 
NYT 188-68 2.8: 1 4 
Times 138-56 2.5: 1 3 
Guardian 127-74 1.7: 1 2 
Financial Times 63-39 1.6: 1 1 
Average of UK media 606-255 2.4: 1 
Table 4.42. Negative Serbs to negative Nato ratios and diagnosis evaluation points. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 5. 
The overall results suggest the coverage was not positive enough for Nato to confirm 
the hypothesis, with the Telegraph being the only exception, as it was the most 
positive towards Nato by quite a margin. As the UK average for negative Serbs 
coverage to negative Nato coverage was 2.4: 1, the combined British media can be 
seen as providing a plurality of diagnoses that did not depend on the Nato framing for 
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its view of the causes of the Nato campaign, its continuation and the bombing of 
civilian targets. The UK media's ratio was also below the NYT ratio. 
4.3.6. Hypothesis 6. In line with hegemonic theory, the prognoses will follow the 
elite lead, and will not propose radical changes to the Nato strategy unless there 
is dissension among British politicians or the Nato countries' political and 
military elites. 
Like the diagnosis section, this begins by looking at the most referenced prognoses of 
each media source and their writers without sources, before independent prognosis 
categories are then combined into opposed groups of positive and negative for Nato, 
and conclusions drawn on the hegemony of the media as a whole, and each individual 
media source. 
4.3.6.1. Individual Prognosis Categories 
The Guardian's most referenced prognosis seemed to show their concern with the 
humanitarian situation, as it was More humanitarian aid. It was followed by 
Diplomacy and Continue the bombing. The next three were all quite negative towards 
the Nato strategy: Send in ground troops, Change the bombing strategy and Stop the 
bombing. The FT, Telegraph and NYT also had the same three highest prognoses as 
the Guardian, but had Diplomacy first, followed by Continue the bombing and More 
humanitarian aid. With regard to the negative references for Nato's strategy, the FT 
had Send in ground troops as its fourth highest category, Change the bombing 
strategy was the seventh highest, while Stop the bombing only had two references. 
The NYT had Change the bombing strategy at fourth, Stop the bombing at joint fifth, 
and Send in ground troops at eighth. Continue the bombing had over double the 
references of Stop the bombing. The Telegraph had Continue the bombing first, More 
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humanitarian aid second and Diplomacy third. The Telegraph's highest critical 
category for Nato was Stop the bombing at fourth; Send in ground troops was fifth, 
and Change the bombing strategy was sixth. 
Like the Guardian, The Times had More humanitarian aid first, and then had 
Continue the bombing second. Change the bombing strategy was the third most 
referenced category, and this seems to show The Times writers' doubts about the Nato 
campaign. With regard to the other negative prognoses for the Nato strategy, Send in 
ground troops was fifth, and Stop the bombing was eighth. The Independent also had 
More humanitarian aid first, and the writers then showed their impatience with the 
Nato campaign by having Send in ground troops second. Diplomacy was the third 
most referenced category, and the other negative references for the Nato strategy, 
Change the bombing strategy and Stop the bombing, were the fourth and eighth most 
referenced. 
In the Writers themselves category, the Independent, FT, Guardian, and Telegraph 
writers had Send in ground troops as their most referenced category; as the writers 
seemed to blame Milosevic more on their own in the diagnosis analysis, Send in 
ground troops being the most referenced seems to suggest the writers were more 
escalationist on their own than when they used sources. The Independent writers only 
had a couple of references for Stop the bombing, and the Telegraph writers only had 
one. In the Guardian, Continue the bombing and Stop the bombing were joint third, 
after Diplomacy. The FT writers did not have any references for Stop the bombing. 
The Times and NYT writers both mostly focused on Diplomacy; The Times then had 
Humanitarian aid, Send in ground troops and Continue the bombing. There were two 
references for Stop the bombing. The NYT had Change the bombing strategy with the 
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next highest amount of references, and then Continue the bombing. Stop the bombing 
did not have any references. 
4.3.6.2. Combined prognosis categories 
As the diagnoses were combined into groups of positive and negative for Nato, a 
similar study was undertaken for the prognoses. The prognosis categories grouped 
together as positive for Nato were Milosevic must give in to Nato 's demands, No 
ground troops, Continue the bombing, Divide the Serbs, and War Criminals must be 
brought to justice. Negative prognoses for Nato were Nato should negotiate with 
Milosevic now, Send in ground troops, Change the bombing strategy, Stop the 
bombing and Diplomacy. That meant there were five negative prognoses for each 
side. Prognoses that were counted as neutral, and therefore left out of the analysis, 
were Arm the KLA, Beware of the KLA, Nato must remain united, Sanctions, More 
humanitarian aid and Partition. The findings are summarised in the table below, and 
evaluation points are allocated to each of the media sources. As the results all brought 
negative ratios for Nato, the media sources with the lowest ratios are placed at the top, 
as they had the most positive collective prognosis results for Nato. As most of the 
results are close together, none of them were rounded up to the hundredth. 
Media Source Negative-Positive 
totals for Nato 
Negative-Positive 
Ratio for Nato 
Evaluation 
points 
Telegraph 53-52 1.01: 1 6 
FT 49-44 1.11: 1 5 
Times 105-91 1.16: 1 4 
Independent 96-78 1.23: 1 3 
NYT 117-94 1.24: 1 2 
Guardian 103-69 1.49: 1 1 
UK media sources' 
average 
523-428 1.2: 1 
Table 4.43. Negative-Positive prognosis ratios for Nato. 
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Conclusion for hypothesis 6. 
Looking at the results from the prognosis analyses, there are mixed messages for the 
hypothesis, with diplomacy being counted as a negative category meaning there were 
more negative prognoses for the Nato campaign than positive when the combined 
prognoses were counted together. However, Continue the bombing had more 
references in all the media sources than Stop the bombing, and out of the negative 
references for the Nato campaign there were much more references for an escalation 
than a cessation. However, escalationist references were still against the Nato 
`message', and therefore are not considered hegemonic in this study, and this means 
the hypothesis cannot be considered confirmed. Individually, the Telegraph was 
again the most hegemonic, while the NYT was the second least hegemonic after the 
Guardian; however, there was little difference in any of the media sources' ratios, 
although the Guardian was noticeably less hegemonic than the others. 
4.3.7. Hypothesis 7. In line with hegemonic theory, most of the media coverage 
of the Nato campaign will be episodic rather than thematic. 
This section sets out to determine how the different media sources reported the Nato 
campaign, and also where they focused their coverage. It is only a short section, as 
there are just two analyses, and then a table provides a summary of some of the 
information, before it is judged whether the hypothesis was confirmed. The 
Telegraph is not included in the Position and Format cross-tabulation analysis. 
4.3.7.1. Position and Format results 
The Position and Format cross-tabulation results showed that all the papers had 
episodic formats for the majority of their first two stories, and then had thematic 
stories later. The Guardian, FT and The Times had more thematic stories than 
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episodic from position three; the Independent from position four, while the NYT did 
not have them until position nine. In this regard, the NYT seemed more hegemonic 
than the British papers, as under the hegemonic model episodic news is more 
favourable for the establishment. 
4.3.7.2. The format and location of the reporting 
The five newspapers had Thematic in Yugoslavia as their top format and location, 
while the Telegraph web-site had Episodic in Yugoslavia as their highest reference. 
The Times, NYT and Independent all had Episodic in Yugoslavia second, and the fact 
that their top two references were in Yugoslavia seems to suggest they were focused 
on the war in Yugoslavia. Both The Times and Independent had Episodic in the UK 
third, while the NYT had Episodic elsewhere third. 
The Guardian had Thematic in the UK as their second most referenced category, and 
it was the only media source to have their top two references thematic. Episodic in 
Yugoslavia was third, and having two of the top three references in Yugoslavia seems 
to show their focus on the conflict in Kosovo, although having Thematic in the UK 
second suggests they also provided a lot of analysis and interviews from home. The 
FT had Episodic elsewhere second, and Thematic elsewhere third; the prominence of 
the elsewhere locations fits in with their emphasis on international coverage. The 
Telegraph had Episodic in the UK as their second highest reference, and having two 
episodic formats as their highest references suggests their coverage concentrated more 
on daily news rather than interpretation and analysis. However, Thematic in 
Yugoslavia was their third highest reference. The FT and the NYT were the only 
media sources not to have any home news categories in their three most referenced, 
and this suggests they did not focus on home news as much as the other media sources. 
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This is surprising for the NYT, as from the results of previous studies it was expected 
to focus more on domestic issues than international. 
For the evaluation points, it was decided to give them on the basis of their episodic 
and thematic coverage, as these were the most relevant categories for the hegemonic 
model. The Times and FT ratios were so close in the episodic-thematic analysis that 
their ratios are left to the hundredth, as it was relevant for their evaluation points, 
while the other results were rounded up to the nearest tenth. 
Media 
source 
UK 
or 
us 
Yugo 
-slav 
Else- 
where 
Episodic Thematic Ratio Evaluation 
points 
Telegraph 30 49 21 65 35 1.9: 1 6 
NYT 24 50 26 60 40 1.5: 1 5 
Times 19 60 21 45.1 54.9 1: 1.22 4 
FT 20 37 43 44.3 54.7 1: 1.23 3 
Indy 24 58 18 44 56 1: 1.3 2 
Guardian 22 56 22 33 67 1: 2 1 
Table 4.44. The formats and locations for the reporting of the Nato campaign. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 7. 
The hypothesis was not confirmed, as most of the media sources had a more thematic 
and international coverage than episodic and national. Overall, as the above table 
shows, the Telegraph had the most episodic coverage, and the NYT was the only other 
media source to be more episodic than thematic. The Guardian was the most 
thematic overall. Also going against the hypothesis, none of the British sources had 
the majority of their coverage from the UK; the NYT also did not have the majority of 
their coverage from the US. Apart from the FT, all the other media sources had the 
majority of their coverage from Yugoslavia. The Times had the lowest percentage of 
articles from domestic writers out of all the media sources, while the Telegraph had 
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the highest. The Times 'results were surprising, as they had the most coverage of 
Blair and New Labour in the Main People analysis. 
4.3.8. Hypothesis 8. In line with hegemonic theory, the vast majority of 
historical references will be more positive for Nato than the Serbs. 
This section starts by detailing the most referenced previous conflicts by each media 
source. Then, the results of the frequency analysis are discussed in terms of the 
positivity for Nato of the most referenced historical references; firstly in terms of 
which ones each media source used most, and then which ones the writers without 
sources used the most. The historical references categories are then divided into 
positive and negative combinations for Nato and the Serbs, and comparisons made to 
analyse if Nato had a more positive historical references coverage than the Serbs. 
Ratios of the findings are then set out, and evaluation points given, before a 
conclusion is reached on the hypothesis. 
4.3.8.1. Most referenced conflicts 
When the historical references are separated into the different conflicts, World War 
Two and the Balkans wars were the most referenced in all the media sources. The 
Times had more World War Two references than any other category, and also had the 
highest ratio of World War Two references compared to Balkans wars references in 
the six media sources analysed. It had fifty-eight World War Two references, while 
there were twenty-seven Bosnian War references and eleven Serbo-Croat war 
references, meaning the Balkans wars combined had thirty-eight references. The 
Guardian also had World War Two as the highest individual reference, and also had it 
with more references than the Balkans wars counted together; while World War Two 
had fifty-five references, the Bosnian War had thirty-eight, and the Serbo-Croat war 
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had thirteen, meaning the Balkans wars included together totalled fifty-one. World 
War Two also had the most individual category references in the FT, with sixteen. 
The Bosnian war had the second highest amount with thirteen, and as the Serbo-Croat 
war had three references, that meant the Balkans wars together also had sixteen 
references. Therefore, unlike The Times and the Guardian, the Balkans wars included 
together had the same amount of references as World War Two in the FT. 
The other three media sources also had World War Two with the most references for 
a single category, but had the Balkans wars counted together with more references. 
The NYT had fifty-four World War Two references, but Bosnia had fifty and the 
Serbo-Croat war had eleven, so together the Balkans wars had sixty-one references. 
In the Telegraph, World War Two had twelve references, followed by Bosnia with 
eleven, and the Serbo-Croat war and Gulf War with ten; the Balkans wars included 
together therefore had twenty-one references. The Independent had World War Two 
with forty-eight references, followed by the Bosnian war with forty-two. The Serbo- 
Croat war had thirteen references, and so the Balkans wars counted together had fifty- 
five references. 
For clarification of the above, the World War Two and Balkans wars references by 
each media source are set out in a table below, and ratios given for comparison. The 
table is set out in ratio order, with those having the highest World War Two to 
Balkans wars ratio at the top, and then descending down in amount of World War 
Two references compared to Balkans wars references. As the NYT and Independent 
would both be on the same ratio if shortened to the tenth, their ratios are left to the 
hundredth. The NYT was about in the middle, and had more of a focus on the Balkans 
209 
wars than World War Two, while the UK sources as a whole had a slight majority of 
World War Two references to Balkans wars. 
Media source World War 
Two 
Balkans 
wars 
WW2-Balkans ratio 
Times 58 38 1.5: 1 
Guardian 55 51 1.1: 1 
FT 16 16 1: 1 
NYT 54 61 1: 1.13 
Independent 48 55 1: 1.15 
Telegraph 12 21 1: 1.8 
UK totals and ratio 189 181 1.04: 1 
Table 4.45. References and ratios of World War Two compared to Balkans. 
4.3.8.2. The individual media sources' use of historical references 
When analysing the most referenced historical references of each media source, the 
NYT had the most positive coverage for Nato, as it was the only media source to have 
two positive historical references in the three most referenced without having a 
negative as well. It had most references for Bosnian War Serbs negative, followed by 
World War Two Serbs negative as the second most referenced, and Bosnian War 
neutral the third; their first two references were therefore positive for Nato, and the 
third neutral. 
Apart from the FT, which did not have any positive for Nato in their three most 
referenced, the British media sources all had a similar coverage to each other in their 
most referenced historical references, with some having more positives but also a 
negative, while others had more neutrals. The Guardian featured Bosnian War Serbs 
negative the most, followed by World War Two Nato negative and Serbs World War 
Two negative third. The Telegraph had Serbo-Croat war Serbs negative as their 
highest reference, with Gulf neutral second and Bosnian War neutral third. The 
Times had World War Two Serbs negative as their highest reference, followed by 
World War Two neutral and Bosnian War Serbs negative. The Independent had 
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World War Two Serbs negative the highest, followed by Bosnian War Serbs negative 
and Gulf Nato positive. In the FT, Bosnian War neutral and World War Two Nato 
negative were the joint most referenced categories, and were followed by Gulf neutral. 
4.3.8.3. Writers without sources' use of historical references 
The NYT writers' top references were the same as the overall paper, but with the first 
two in a different order: World War Two Serbs negative had the most, then Bosnian 
War Serbs negative, before Bosnian war neutral was again the third most referenced. 
The Telegraph and Independent writers also gave Nato a very positive coverage, and 
did not have any negative historical references in their three most referenced 
categories. The Telegraph writers did not have many references, but Cold War Nato 
positive, Serbo-Croat war Serbs negative, Gulf neutral and Bosnia neutral were the 
most referenced with two references each. The Independent writers had World War 
Two Serbs negative the most, with eight references, and then had the following 
categories with five references: Gulf Nato positive, World War Two neutral and 
Bosnian war neutral. 
Both The Times and Guardian writers' results were mixed in their positivity for Nato. 
The Times' writers had four references each for World War Two neutral and Cold 
War neutral, and three each for World War Two Nato positive, Vietnam Nato negative, 
Falklands neutral, and Bosnian war Serbs negative. The Guardian writers had 
Bosnian war Serbs negative as their most referenced category, with five references. 
Gulf Nato positive and Vietnam Nato negative were the next two highest categories, 
with three references each. The Guardian and The Times' Vietnam Nato negative 
references were the only negative references in the top three references for any of the 
media sources' writers. The FT writers only had two categories with more than one 
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reference, and these were Gulf neutral with three references, and Bosnian war neutral 
with two, so no conclusions could really be drawn from these results. 
The frequency analysis was therefore supportive of the hypothesis, as when the three 
most referenced categories from all the sources were counted together, there were ten 
positive for Nato, seven neutral and two negative. The writers themselves analysis 
was similarly supportive of the hypothesis, as there were ten positive for Nato, ten 
neutral and two negative. 
4.3.8.4. Combined historical references categories 
Although most of the above results seem to support the hypothesis, counting the 
categories together into separate groups of Nato positive and negative, and Serbs 
positive and negative, and then comparing their negative to positive ratios provides a 
clearer overall picture of the media sources' use of historical references. The results 
of the comparison are presented in the first table below, and then the results are drawn 
together to compare each media source, and allocate evaluation points. 
Newspaper Nato 
ne ative 
Nato 
positive 
Ratio 
ne - os 
Serb 
negative 
Serb 
ositive 
Ratio neg- 
os 
Guardian 48 24 2: 1 48 4 12: 1 
Telegraph 11 6 1.8: 1 20 2 10: 1 
Times 35 19 1.8: 1 51 6 8.5: 1 
NYT 41 23 1.8: 1 56 9 6.2: 1 
FT 17 8 2.1: 1 7 1 7: 1 
Independent 34 23 1.5: 1 60 13 4.6: 1 
Table 4.46. Nato and Serb negative and positive historical references. 
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Newspaper Ratio comparing the Serb negative- 
positive ratio to the equivalent Nato 
ratio in Table 4.46. 
Evaluation 
points 
Guardian 6: 1 6 
Telegraph 5.5: 1 5 
Times 4.7: 1 4 
NYT 3.4: 1 3 
FT 3.3: 1 2 
Independent 3.1: 1 1 
UK media average 3.8: 1 
Table 4.47. Negative Serbs to negative Nato historical reference ratios. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 8. 
Table 4.47 shows that all the media sources did have a lot more positive historical 
references for Nato than they did for the Serbs, although as the previous table shows, 
all the media sources also had a more negative than positive coverage for Nato as well. 
This was surprising, and suggests the media are more likely to use historical 
references for negative aspects of conflicts than positive. While both Nato and the 
Serbs' ratios were more negative than positive, the Serbs' negative to positive ratio 
was much higher than Nato in every media source, and the lowest negative to positive 
Serb ratio was much higher than the highest negative to positive Nato ratio: Nato 
negative to positive ratios were between the Independent's 1.5: 1 and the FT's 2.1: 1, 
while the Serb ratios were between the Independent's 4.6: 1 and the Guardian's 12: 1. 
Table 4.47 also shows the average of overall negativity for the Serbs in comparison to 
Nato was 3.8: 1 in the British sources, and the ratios of Serb to Nato negativity are 
therefore considered high enough to confirm the hypothesis. 
4.3.9. Hypothesis 9. In line with hegemonic theory, a vast majority of images 
will be positive towards Nato and negative towards the Serbs. 
This final section of results starts by looking at the most referenced categories in the 
Image frequency results for each media source. Then, some image categories are 
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grouped together into positive for Nato and positive for the Serbs, and a ratio made 
for comparison; the results of those two analyses are then evaluated to decide if there 
was enough evidence to support the hypothesis. The Telegraph is not included in this 
section, as there were no images available when the data was collected. 
4.3.9.1. Individual image categories 
All five papers had ethnic-Albanian civilians as their most referenced image, and this 
was supportive for the hypothesis because Nato wanted to focus the media's attention 
on the ethnic-Albanian refugee crisis. The FT and NYT had Maps as their second 
highest, while the Guardian, Independent and The Times had its own writers. All the 
papers then had Damage from Nato as their third most referenced category, and this 
went against the hypothesis. Further evidence against the hypothesis was that the 
Guardian had Serb civilians as their joint fourth most used image category, along 
with Nato military armoury in a positive picture. The NYT also had Serb civilians as 
their fourth highest reference. The other papers were more in line with the Nato 
message, as The Times and FT had Nato military armoury in a positive picture as their 
fourth highest reference, while the Independent had Milosevic. 
4.3.9.2. Combined image categories 
The above findings are quite ambiguous, so the categories were included together into 
positive and negative groupings for Nato. As there were no positive categories for the 
Serbs that could be compared to the Nato soldiers and armoury in positive pictures, 
the collective analysis was confined to just two categories each: ethnic-Albanian 
civilians and Damage from Serbs were counted as positive for Nato, while Serb 
civilians and Damage from Nato were counted as negative for Nato. The results are 
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set out in table 4.4$, and ratios and evaluation points allocated for each media source; 
a conclusion on the findings then follows, and ends the daily media results section. 
Newspaper Positive for Nato Positive for Serbs Ratio Evaluation 
Dints 
Independent 69 22 3.1: 1 5 
NYT 67 27 2.5: 1 4 
FT 16 7 2.3: 1 3 
Guardian 44 32 1.4: 1 2 
Times 43 32 1.3: 1 1 
UK sources' 
totals and ratio 
172 93 1.8: 1 
Table 4.48. The amounts and ratio for positive Nato and Serb historical references. 
Conclusion for hypothesis 9. 
The image results in the above analyses have produced findings that can be 
interpreted to support or contradict the hypothesis, although overall the results do not 
seem positive enough to confirm the hypothesis. In support of the hypothesis, all the 
British papers had ethnic-Albanian civilians as their most referenced image, and as 
this was what the Nato leaders wanted the media to focus on, it was in line with the 
hypothesis. However, going against the hypothesis, the next most referenced image 
category that was relevant to either side was Damage from Nato in all the papers. 
Moreover, the ratios of Nato positive to Serb positive images in the combined 
categories analysis were not high enough to confirm the hypothesis either, and an 
average ratio of 1.8: 1 for the British newspapers seems compatible with the 
requirements of a plural media under the circumstances. There is therefore probably 
enough conflicting evidence to leave the hypothesis unconfirmed. 
4.3.10. Results Conclusion 
This conclusion starts with two tables containing the totals for the evaluation points 
from the nine analyses. There are two tables because the Telegraph was not included 
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in analyses 4 and 9, as it did not have any positioning or images on its web-site when 
the research was undertaken. The first table is the main evaluation for the five 
newspapers, while the second table provides a comparison with the Telegraph. After 
the tables, there is then a two dimensional concluding analysis on the UK and US 
media coverage of the Kosovo conflict. The first part looks at each individual media 
source's coverage, by looking through the different analyses undertaken; while the 
second part looks at how much evidence there was to support the hegemonic model. 
4.3.10.1. Individual media sources 
Media source 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 Total Average 
Telegraph 3 5 6 6 6 6 5 37 5.3 
NYT 4.5 6 3 4 2 5 3 27.5 3.9 
Times 4.5 3 4 3 4 4 4 26.5 3.8 
Independent 6 4 5 5 3 2 1 26 3.7 
FT 1.5 2 1 1 5 3 2 15.5 2.2 
Guardian 1.5 1 2 2 1 1 6 14.5 2.1 
Table 4.49. Evaluation points not including tables 4 and 9. 
Media source 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Average 
Independent 5 4 5 5 5 3 2 1 5 35 3.9 
NYT 3.5 5 3 1 4 2 5 3 4 30.5 3.4 
Times 3.5 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 1 30.5 3.4 
FT 1.5 2 1 2 1 5 3 2 3 20.5 2.5 
Guardian 1.5 1 2 3 2 1 1 5 2 18.5 1.9 
Table 4.50. Evaluation points including tables 4 and 9. 
The Telegraph had easily the highest average in the table it was included in, table 
4.50, and this suggests it was the most hegemonic in its support for the Nato 
campaign out of the media sources analysed. This result was what might have been 
expected for the reporting of a traditional war involving Britain, but it is quite 
surprising for the circumstances of the Kosovo conflict, with a Labour government in 
power, and the conflict portrayed as the first fought for purely humanitarian reasons. 
216 
The next three media sources had a similar coverage, and switched positions in the 
two tables. The Independent was the most positive media source towards Nato in 
table 4.50; although it was lower than the NYT and The Times in table 4.49. The 
Independent was varied in its scoring, being high in some categories, average in 
others, and low in a couple. The NYT was below the Independent in table 4.50, but 
above it in table 4.49, and so was the second most hegemonic in both tables; it shared 
the second place with The Times in table 4.50. As well as being behind the 
Independent and level with the NYT in table 4.50, The Times was the third highest in 
table 4.49, and so was a little above average in both tables. 
After the Telegraph was clearly the most hegemonic, and the next three media sources 
were moderately hegemonic in a similar way, the Guardian and FT were clearly the 
least hegemonic. The Guardian looked the least hegemonic despite its stout support 
for Nato, and calls for an escalation in the Nato campaign for most of the conflict; this 
was because it was often very critical of the Nato campaign as well, and had a varied 
coverage. The FT did not appear hegemonic because it focused a lot of its coverage 
on diplomacy, and this was often undertaken by non-Nato politicians and diplomats. 
Conclusion 
The fact that the evaluation points show the Telegraph was the most supportive of the 
Nato campaign, and the Guardian the most negative, suggests the portrayal of the 
Nato campaign as one fought for purely humanitarian reasons did not alter the 
traditional reporting positions of the left and right wing media sources to any great 
degree; the right-wing press were still the most supportive, while the left-wing press 
was still the most critical. There were signs of changes, such as the Guardian being 
the most escalationist, but over the many different features of the media coverage, and 
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over the whole campaign, the Telegraph was still the most hegemonic and the 
Guardian the least. 
4.3.10.2. The collective British Media: hegemonic or plural 
Having looked at the individual media sources above, the results are brought together 
here to evaluate whether the different analyses show the British media sources to have 
been more in line with the hegemonic or plural models. 
The hegemonic evidence 
There were four analyses that brought results more in line with the hegemonic model, 
and these were main people, use of sources, positioning of news, and historical 
references. In the main people analysis, the media sources focused most of their 
coverage on the Nato and Serb leaderships and ethnic-Albanian civilians, and this was 
in line with the Nato media strategy. The KLA and Serb civilians were not given the 
same kind of prominent coverage, and only The Times gave the Serb civilians more 
coverage than the Serb politicians and military. Only the FT gave a coverage that 
concentrated on the wider issues of the conflict, and the diplomacy that was taking 
place. In the use of sources, the results showed Nato sources and ethnic-Albanian 
civilians were used the vast majority of the time, and this was positive for the Nato 
campaign. In the position analysis, the results showed the front pages contained Nato 
leaders and allies as the main people and sources, along with positive news for Nato, 
in the majority of the media sources. In the historical references analysis, the results 
showed that although the media had more negative historical references for Nato than 
positive, there were much more negative references for the Serbs, and the ratio of 
negative historical references for the Serbs to negative for Nato was large enough to 
consider the hypothesis confirmed. 
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The plural evidence 
There were four analyses with results more in line with the plural model, and these 
were diagnoses, prognoses, format, and images. In the diagnoses analysis, apart from 
the Telegraph, the other media sources all had a negative diagnosis in the highest 
three diagnoses, and the FT and Guardian had two, which seems quite plural; this was 
mainly because there was quite a lot of coverage of Nato collateral damage, along 
with articles with the view that the Nato campaign was not working. The Guardian 
and The Times had more references for the Nato campaign not working than working. 
In the prognoses analysis, the results showed there were quite a lot of negative 
prognoses for Nato, although many were for diplomacy, or preferred an escalation of 
the Nato campaign to a cessation. In the format analysis, the results showed there was 
more thematic coverage than episodic, with more inquiry, analysis and opinion 
articles than the reporting of daily news events. The Telegraph was the most 
hegemonic in format and location, and the Guardian the least, so this was in line with 
other hegemonic and plural results, and suggests the theory is relevant. In the images 
analysis, although they were more positive images than negative for Nato, there were 
prominent Nato collateral damage images shown on a regular basis, and this meant 
there was not a high enough positive-negative ratio to consider the hypothesis 
confirmed. 
The mixed evidence 
There was one analysis that had results too mixed to consider them either more 
hegemonic or plural, and this was the evaluation of the main people. Although the 
Nato leaders and Nato military were evaluated more positively than negatively in 
most of the media sources, Nato's ratio was more negative than positive overall, and 
the Guardian coverage was particularly negative. Clinton also received a more 
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negative than positive evaluation in four of the UK media sources. In support of the 
hegemonic model, the evaluations of the Serb military and Milosevic compared to the 
KLA seemed hegemonic, as the KLA received a much more positive coverage than 
Milosevic and the Serb military. 
Conclusion 
The above results seem to suggest the Kosovo media coverage was in the middle of 
the hegemonic and plural models. This is in line with the theory that both critical and 
plural media analysts are correct in different ways, or depending on the analysis, and 
the UK and US medias often show elements from both models in their coverage. The 
main way the media looked hegemonic was in giving the Nato leaders the most 
prominent coverage, and using them more as the main sources; this led to the Nato 
campaign being reported from a largely Nato perspective. These are two of the main 
aspects of the hegemonic model, which argues that the UK and US media give too 
much preference to official sources, such as government and military leaders. This 
could be said to be a part of their `natural' way of thinking and working, in that they 
consider the people who have power in their country to be the most authoritative 
sources to fulfil their professional values, and interest the audience. 
However, although the above evidence suggests the people in authority have the 
advantage, that does not mean they control the news, or will always be given positive 
coverage. As the negative hypothesis analyses showed, if the media do not consider 
the political and military leaders are doing a good job, they will feature news and 
opinion that is negative for them. The diagnosis and image analyses showed that 
most of the media sources analysed did not try and ignore Nato's collateral damage 
incidents; the diagnosis Collateral damage is Nato 's fault was one of the most 
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referenced categories, and Damage by Nato was also one of the most used images. 
Two of the UK sources also had more articles that gave the impression the Nato 
campaign was not working than it was working in the diagnosis analysis. The 
prognosis results also showed that the media sources were not willing to support the 
Nato strategy without offering criticisms and alternative opinions, and there were 
regular articles calling for diplomacy, the bombing to be stopped, or for changes in 
the campaign strategy. 
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4.4. Research question. Did the re-organisation of the Nato media operation 
near the end of the first half of their campaign improve their media coverage in 
the second half of their campaign? 
Introduction 
After the Nato media operation was criticised for reacting slowly and incoherently to 
the Djakovica convoy attack in the middle of April, Alistair Campbell and some other 
British and American public relations experts went out to Brussels to reorganise the 
Nato media operation. This investigation into whether there were any significant 
signs of Nato political and military influence on the British media coverage of 
Kosovo, divides the Nato campaign in half and looks for differences in the media 
coverage in the two halves. This is because the MOC began their work in late April, 
and although it cannot be known exactly when their work started to take effect, it is 
presumed their influence would have been evident by the beginning of May, which 
was roughly half way through the Nato campaign. This section therefore compares 
the media coverage of the Nato campaign in the two halves, with seventeen days in 
each half; the first half runs from March 24th to April 3 0th and the second half from 
May 1St to the June 10th 
To begin with, the difference in the amount of coverage in each half are set out, as the 
second half of the Nato campaign generally had much less coverage than the first, and 
this meant there was likely to be much less evidence of some of the categories in the 
second half than the first. The lines and articles were counted at first, but then the 
article amounts seemed to be the best guide, as they were the unit of analysis, and 
there was one variable category included for each article, so the lines were left out. 
The NYT is also included in this analysis, even though the main interest is in 
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evaluating whether the Nato political and military leaders influenced the British 
media coverage. After the differences in first and second half content are detailed, 
evidence from the Date and Source, Date and Diagnosis, Date and Historical 
Reference, Date and Image, and Date and Prognosis cross-tabulation results are then 
analysed to see if there were any disproportionate differences in the two halves' 
coverage. 
4.4.1. The difference in the media sources' first and second half coverage of the 
Kosovo Conflict 
For clarity, the amount of first and second half articles, and the percentage of second 
half articles in comparison to the first are set out in the following table. The 
percentages and ratios are shortened to the tenth unless the media sources have similar 
coverage to each other, and then they are kept to the hundredth to differentiate 
between media sources. A short summary of the findings then follows the tables. 
Newspaper First half-second half 
amount of articles. 
Second half's 
percentage of first 
half's coverage 
Telegraph 138-81 58.6% 
Times 267-157 58.8% 
NYT 258-184 71% 
Independent 224-162 72% 
Guardian 237-173 73% 
FT 123-98 80% 
Total and average for UK 
media sources 
989-671 68% 
Table 4.51. The percentages of second half coverage compared to the first, and the 
ratios of first half to second half coverage. 
Summary of the tables' findings 
The tables show The Times and Telegraph had almost identical drops in article 
amounts in the second half coverage as compared to the first, with only between fifty- 
eight and fifty-nine per cent of articles in the second half as compared to the first. 
This nearly halving of content in the second half of the Nato campaign means they 
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can therefore be expected to show the biggest fall in category amounts from the first 
half to the second in the later analyses in this section. The Independent, Guardian 
and NYT had the next biggest falls in coverage, and the decline was very similar in the 
three media sources, at about thirteen per cent less decline than The Times and 
Telegraph. The FT had the lowest fall in second half coverage, at about eight per cent 
less decline than the Independent, Guardian and NYT, and twenty-one per cent less 
than The Times and Telegraph. The NYT s decline in second half coverage was a 
little less than the UK average. 
4.4.2. Date and Source 
To analyse the date and source data, each of the media sources' Date and Source 
results were split into a first and second half of the Nato campaign, and the references 
for the following categories or groups of categories were counted together in each 
separate half of seventeen days: all the British Government; all the Nato categories; 
American Government; UK and US opposition parties; all Serbs, except the free 
media; all ethnic-Albanians, except the free media; and finally, Diplomats, Russian 
politicians, the UN and European politicians were included together in a last group. 
Identifying whether there was an increase or decrease in the above sources' use 
should offer an insight into the success of Campbell's reorganisation of the Nato 
media operation. The results for each media source, and then for each of the above 
groups of source categories are presented below. 
4.4.2.1. Each media source's Date and Source data 
The six media sources' first and second half main source use comparison are set out 
in the following six tables, with the percentage of increase or decrease in the second 
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half from the first given for each media source. The media source's decline in second 
half articles is also included at the top of the table. 
Independent Decline in second half articles: 28% 
Sources 
First half 
references 
Second half 
references 
Percentage increase 
or decrease in halves 
British government 34 16 -53% 
Nato 19 17 -11% 
American government 14 11 -21% 
Opposition parties 3 0 N/A 
Serbs 17 9 -47% 
Ethnic-Albanians 22 15 -32% 
Diplomats/Neutrals 8 7 -12% 
Table 4.52. Independent's use of sources in the two halves. 
The most notable difference between the two halves in the Independent, which had a 
28% drop in second half articles, was that British Government sources had the biggest 
drop in use: down 53% on the first half. The Serbs had the second biggest drop at 
47%. All the sources saw a drop in second half access, but Nato had the smallest 
decline, with 11% less than the first half; just less than the diplomats and neutral 
politicians at 12%. 
FT Decline in second half articles: 20% 
Sources 
First half 
references 
Second half 
references 
Percentage increase or 
decrease in halves 
British government 14 8 -43% 
Nato 15 10 -34% 
American government 14 9 -36% 
Opposition parties 2 0 N/A 
Serbs 13 1 -92% 
Ethnic-Albanians 3 5 +67% 
Diplomats/Neutrals 14 16 +12% 
Table 4.53. FT's use of sources in the two halves. 
In the FT, which had a 20% decline in second half coverage compared to the first, the 
Serbs had the biggest drop in source access from the first half to the second, at 92%. 
This was in contrast to the ethnic-Albanians, who had the biggest increase in coverage 
from the second half to the first, with a 67% increase. Although this seems a big 
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increase, it was only going up from three first half references to five in the second half. 
The diplomats and neutral politicians had a small increase in coverage in the second 
half, while the British and American governments, and the Democrats all saw big 
decreases. 
Guardian Decline in second half articles: 27% 
Sources 
First half 
references 
Second half 
references 
Percentage increase 
or decrease in 
halves 
British government 38 22 -42% 
Nato 19 18 -5% 
American government 13 11 -15% 
Opposition parties 2 3 +33% 
Serbs 15 11 -27% 
Ethnic-Albanians 21 15 -29% 
Diplomats/Neutrals 21 15 -29% 
Table 4.54. Guardian's use of sources in the two halves. 
In the Guardian, which had a 27% fall in second half coverage as compared to the 
first, the opposition parties were the only ones to have more second half source access 
than the first, with a 33% increase in their second half use; although this was only up 
from two references to three. Nato had the smallest decrease in coverage, with just a 
5% fall. The British government had the biggest decrease: down 42%. The Serbs and 
ethnic-Albanians were both down 29%. 
Times Decline in second half articles: 41.2% 
Sources 
First half 
references 
Second half 
references 
Percentage increase 
or decrease in halves 
British government 43 24 -44% 
Nato 16 7 -56% 
American government 10 9 -10% 
Opposition parties 2 4 +100% 
Serbs 24 7 -71% 
Ethnic-Albanians 22 7 -68% 
Diplomats/Neutrals 12 11 -8% 
Table 4.55. Times' use of sources in the two halves. 
In The Times, which had a second half decline in coverage of 41.2% compared to the 
first, opposition parties were again the only category to show an increase in second 
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half access. Their references were up 100% in the second half, although this was only 
from two references to four. Apart from the diplomats and neutral politicians only 
being down 8%, and the American Government down 10%, all the others had quite 
big decreases, with the Serbs the biggest at 71%. 
Telegraph Decline in second half articles: 41.4% 
Sources 
First half 
references 
Second half 
references 
Percentage increase 
or decrease in halves 
British government 21 17 -19% 
Nato 19 10 -47% 
American government 11 3 -73% 
Opposition parties 3 1 -67% 
Serbs 10 8 -20% 
Ethnic-Albanians 20 8 -60% 
Diplomats/Neutrals 9 9 No change 
Table 4.56. Telegraph's use of sources in the two halves. 
In the Telegraph, which had a second half decline in coverage of 41.4% compared to 
the first, there were no second half increases in source usage, although the diplomats 
and neutrals had no change. The British Government saw the smallest decrease at 
19%, just ahead of the Serbs at 20%. The Democrats had the highest fall at 73%, and 
this might have been because the Telegraph did not agree with their strategy on 
ground troops, and chose to marginalise them; although evidence from the Date and 
Prognosis results suggests the Telegraph supported the introduction of ground troops 
more in the first half of the Nato campaign than the second. 
NYT Decline in second half art icles: 29% 
Sources 
First half 
references 
Second half 
references 
Percentage increase 
or decrease in halves 
British Government 6 3 -50% 
Nato 29 19 -34% 
American Government 54 35 -35% 
Opposition parties 8 5 -37% 
Serbs 24 20 -17% 
Ethnic-Albanians 25 19 -24% 
Diplomats/Neutrals 13 14 +7% 
Table 4.57. NYT's use of sources in the two halves. 
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In the NYT, which had a 29% fall in second half coverage, only the diplomats and 
neutrals saw an increase in second half source access, as they were up 7%. The Serbs 
had the lowest decrease at 17%, just less than the ethnic-Albanians at 19%. The 
British Government had the highest decrease at 50%, and this might have been for a 
similar reason as the Democrats having the biggest fall in the Telegraph; the media 
sources supporting their government's strategy, and marginalising that of the other 
government. 
Altogether, there was a 31.1 % drop in coverage in the second half to the first in all the 
media sources. However, there were some very different changes in source access for 
the different groups between the different media sources. For example, the British 
Government only fell 19% in the Telegraph, but they declined by over 40% in all the 
other media sources, and by 53% in the Independent. Nato's second half decline 
ranged from just 5% in the Guardian, and 11% in the Independent, to 56% in The 
Times, and 47% in the Telegraph; those divisions seem to indicate continued support 
from the left-wing media, and disillusionment from the right-wing media, in the 
second half of the Nato campaign. The American Governments' lowest second half 
decline was 10% in The Times, while their highest was 73% in the Telegraph. 
Opposition parties' access grew 33% during the second half in the Guardian, but did 
not have any second half references in the FT or Independent. The Serbs' lowest 
decline was 17% in the NYT, while their highest was 92% in the FT. The ethnic- 
Albanians' biggest decline was 68% in The Times, while they had a 67% increase in 
the FT. Finally, Diplomats and Neutral politicians ranged from a 29% decline in the 
Guardian to a 7% increase in the NYT. 
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4.4.2.2. The difference in the sources' use in each half of the Nato campaign 
The results for each group of sources are summarised in a table below, with the results 
given for all the media sources in the first two columns, and a percentage of their 
decrease in the third column; while the next three columns do the same in an analysis 
of the UK media. 
Source All All Percentage UK UK Percentage 
media media decrease media media decrease 
1St half 2°d half 1St half 2nd half 
British 156 90 -42% 122 74 -39% 
government 
Nato 117 81 -31% 88 62 -30% 
American 116 78 -33% 62 43 -31% 
government 
Opposition 20 13 -35% 12 8 -33% 
Serbs 103 56 -46% 79 36 -55% 
Ethnic-Albanians 113 69 -39% 88 50 -43% 
Diplomats/Neutral 77 72 -6% 64 58 -9% 
politicians 
Total and overall 702 459 -33% 515 331 -34% 
percentage 
Table 4.58. Sources' first and second half access to the media. 
The above table shows the Serbs had the highest decrease in source access in the 
second half of the Nato campaign, dropping 46% in all the media sources, and 55% in 
the UK media; this was compared to the drop in the overall source use of about 33- 
34%. This can be seen as something of a success for the MOC, although the ethnic- 
Albanians saw the second biggest decrease, so that might suggest the decline in Serb 
sources was more to do with the media moving the focus of their coverage away from 
the ground war than it was to do with the work of the MOC. This view is also 
supported by the fact that the group of categories including Russian and European 
politicians, Diplomats and the UN saw the smallest decrease in second half access, 
with the second half seeing their use as sources drop only 6% in all media, and 9% in 
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the UK media. When it is taken into consideration there was an overall decrease in 
second half articles of over 30% compared to the first, those decreases look like 
comparative increases. Nato had the second lowest decline in source use in the 
second half of the campaign with about 30-31 %, which was a little below the average; 
this suggests the MOC was a partial success in this analysis, and especially when the 
Serbs' decline is taken into consideration. 
4.4.3. Date and Historical Reference 
The amount of historical references fell in the second half of the conflict, and this 
section focuses on the most significant changes for the Nato campaign in the two 
halves; after an account of the individual frequency results, the historical references 
categories are therefore combined into positive and negative for Nato, and positive 
and negative for the Serbs, to see if the ratios changed much in the two halves of the 
conflict, and whether the second half was more or less positive for Nato than the first. 
4.4.3.1. Significant historical reference frequency changes during the Nato 
campaign 
In the Independent, in line with the hypothesis, the second half of the campaign saw 
Vietnam Nato negative and Cold War Nato negative references largely drop out of the 
framing, after there were a few of each in the first half of the campaign. Also positive 
for the MOC in the second half of the campaign, Serb-Croat war Serbs positive and 
Bosnian war Serbs positive had their only references in the first half of the campaign, 
while Serb-Croat war Serbs negative had more references in the second half of the 
campaign to the first. The only disproportionate evidence in the Guardian also 
seemed to be in line with the hypothesis, as eight of the nine Vietnam Nato negative 
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references, and four out of the five Cold War Nato negative references were in the 
first half of the Nato campaign. 
In contrast to the Independent and Guardian, the most notable evidence went against 
the hypothesis in the FT, as Bosnian war Nato negative only had references in the last 
few days of the campaign, while Bosnian war Serbs negative only had references in 
the first half of the Nato campaign. The Times, Telegraph and NYT had a mostly 
balanced coverage over the two halves, with little of significance for the hypothesis, 
although a lack of improvement goes against the MOC improving the Nato media 
operation. 
4.4.3.2. Combined historical references categories 
For a clearer idea of the overall historical references coverage in the two halves of the 
Nato campaign, all the positive and negative historical references for Nato and the 
Serbs were combined together and separated into the two halves. The data is set out 
in the following two tables. 
Media 
source 
Nato 
positive 
Ist half 
Nato 
negative 
1" half 
Pos- 
Neg 
ratio 
Nato 
positive 
2'd half 
Nato 
negative 
2nd half 
Pos-Neg 
ratio 
Independent 18 24 1: 1.3 5 10 1: 2 
NYT 16 27 1: 1.7 7 14 1: 2 
Times 14 25 1: 1.8 5 10 1: 2 
Guardian 16 36 1: 2.3 8 15 1: 1.8 
FT 6 14 1: 2.3 2 3 1: 1.5 
Telegraph 3 8 1: 2.7 3 3 1: 1 
Total 73 134 1: 1.8 30 55 1: 1.8 
UK sources 56 107 1: 1.9 23 41 1: 1.8 
Table 4.59. The first and second half historical references for Nato. 
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Newspaper Serbs 
positive 
Ist half 
Serbs 
negative 
1St half 
Pos- 
Neg 
ratio 
Serbs 
positive 
2nd half 
Serbs 
negative 
2nd half 
Pos- 
Neg 
ratio 
Independent 10 32 1: 3.2 3 28 1: 9.3 
Telegraph 0 10 N/A 2 10 1: 5 
Times 6 37 1: 6.2 0 14 N/A 
Guardian 3 32 1: 10.7 1 16 1: 16 
FT 1 5 1: 5 0 2 N/A 
NYT 8 40 1: 5 1 16 1: 16 
Total 28 156 1: 5.6 7 86 1: 12.3 
UK sources 20 116 1: 5.8 6 70 1: 11.7 
Table 4.60. The first and second half historical references for the Serbs. 
The overall results show all media sources' historical references were negative for 
both sides in both halves, apart from the Telegraph's second half ratio for Nato, which 
was even. Combining the results for all the papers, they show the two halves of the 
Nato campaign had very similar results for Nato's positive-negative ratio, as it 
remained at a negative to positive 1.8: 1. The Serbs' ratio became more negative in 
the second half: rising from a negative to positive 5.6: 1 in the first half to 12.3: 1 in the 
second half. The UK media sources had similar findings, with the Nato references 
improving a little in the second half, from a negative-positive ratio of 1.9: 1 to 1.8: 1; 
while the Serbs' references declined from 5.8: 1 to 11.7: 1. 
Looking at the individual media sources' coverage of Nato, they were split down the 
middle in their coverage of the two halves, with the Telegraph, Guardian and FT 
having an improved ratio for Nato in the second half of the conflict, while the 
Independent, Times and NYT had a worse second half coverage for Nato. All the 
media sources had similar ratios for Nato in both halves, and only the Telegraph, 
Guardian and FT had a negative to positive ratio of over 2: 1 against Nato in either 
half; in support of the MOC, this was during the first half of the conflict. The largest 
swing between the two halves for Nato was in the Telegraph, which changed from a 
first half negative to positive ratio of 2.7: 1 to an even ratio in the second. 
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The Guardian was the most negative towards the Serbs, and their 10.7: 1 negative to 
positive ratio in the first half rose to 16: 1 in the second. There were no ratios 
available for the analysis of the Serb coverage in the Telegraph in the first half, and 
The Times and FT in the second, as there were no positive references for the Serbs. 
All the ratios that were available for analysis deteriorated for the Serbs in the second 
half of the conflict, and where there were no ratios available the second half looked at 
least as bad as the first for the Serbs. So, although the Nato ratios remained stable 
over the two halves of the conflict, the Serb ratios can be interpreted as possible 
evidence that the MOC improved the media coverage for Nato in the second half of 
the conflict by increasing the media's negativity towards the Serbs. 
4.4.4. A comparison of the Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanian civilians image 
references in the two halves of the Nato campaign 
This analysis evaluates how the images used by the newspapers changed over the 
course of the Nato campaign. It was thought that the best way to evaluate the impact 
of the MOC would be to compare a positive image for Nato with a negative one, and 
as the MOC was trying to focus the media's attention on ethnic-Albanian civilians, it 
was used as a positive reference for Nato, and as Nato was trying to avoid media 
coverage of their collateral damage incidents, Damage from Nato was chosen as the 
negative image. 
4.4.4.1. The results 
The following table compares the above categories, and their use in the two halves is 
compared to the general difference in coverage between the two halves in amount of 
articles and overall images. 
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Media 2" half 2" half per 2" half per 2" half per Ratio of per 
Source per cent cent of first cent of first cent of first cent decline: 
of first half images half ethnic- half Damage Nato damage 
half Albanian by Nato to E-A civilian 
articles civilian images images in 2nd 
images half 
Times 58 49 53 10 5.3: 1 
Indy 72 56 54 27 2: 1 
Guardian 72 56 59 37 1.6: 1 
NYT 71 70 80 50 1.6: 1 
FT 79 86 23 6-0 N/A 
Table 4.61. Differences in positive and negative images for Nato in the two halves. 
The above table shows how the media's use of Damage by Nato images declined 
disproportionately in the second half of the campaign in all the media sources, and 
especially The Times and FT. As the media would probably explain the decrease as 
being because the Nato collateral damage was not the news it had been at the start of 
the campaign, it was also compared to the coverage of the ethnic-Albanian civilians, 
as Blair complained the media were showing `refugee fatigue' in the second half of 
the conflict because they were not giving them enough coverage. While The Times 
maintained over fifty per-cent of its ethnic-Albanian civilian pictures in the second 
half as compared to the first, it cut its Damage by Nato images down to ten per cent of 
their first half amount. However, a qualitative analysis later found that The Times 
featured several images of Chinese protestors after the embassy bombing, rather than 
the damage to the embassy, so this might have influenced the results to look more 
positive for the MOC than they really were. The Independent and Guardian also kept 
their ethnic-Albanian civilian images up above fifty per cent of their first half 
amounts, but the Independent cut their Damage by Nato images to twenty-seven per 
cent of the first half amount, while the Guardian's Damage by Nato images decreased 
to thirty-seven per cent of their first half amount. The NYT kept a higher percentage 
of both types of images, and ended with the same ratio as the Guardian. The FT 
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cannot be compared through percentages or ratios as it did not have any Nato 
collateral damage images in the second half of the analysis, but that meant it was in 
line with the other media sources analysed, in that it cut its Damage by Nato second 
half images. It also cut its ethnic-Albanian civilians images by seventy-seven per cent 
as well though. Nevertheless, the above results seem to provide good evidence to 
support the view that the MOC brought an improved media coverage for Nato in the 
second half of the campaign. 
4.4.5. Date and Diagnosis 
This analysis will concentrate on four diagnosis categories that seem to offer the best 
way to judge if the media coverage improved for Nato in the second half of the 
conflict. It will start by looking at the Collateral Damage is Nato 's fault and ethnic- 
Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault categories, and then go on to look at the 
Nato campaign is working and Nato campaign is not working categories. 
4.4.5.1. A comparison of the decrease in second half Collateral damage is Nato's 
fault to ethnic-Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault diagnosis references. 
The Analysis 
Although the Date and Image analysis provided good evidence to support an 
improved media coverage of collateral damage for Nato in the second half of the 
campaign, qualitative analysis suggested media coverage of Nato collateral damage 
did not decrease as much as the above comparison between the Damage from Nato 
and ethnic-Albanian refugees images suggested, and it was thought that the decrease 
in second half Damage by Nato images was partly because there was more coverage 
of the Nato bombing campaign in the first few days after it started, and some of those 
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images were positive for the Nato campaign. Therefore, a quantitative comparison 
was made between the two halves for the amount of Collateral damage is Nato's fault 
and refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault diagnosis references, and the results are 
shown in the table below, and analysed afterwards. 
Media 2" half 2" half 2" half Ratio of percentage 
Source percent percentage percentage of first decline in 2"d half: 
age of of first half half ethnic- E-A refugees are 
first collateral Albanian refugees Serbs/Milosevic's 
half damage is are fault to collateral 
articles Nato's fault Serbs/Milosevic's damage is Nato's 
diagnoses fault diagnoses fault 
Telegraph 59 50 65 1: 1.3 
Indy 72 113 70 1.6: 1 
FT 79 114 65 1.8: 1 
Times 58 85 43 1.98: 1 
Guardian 72 88 44 2: 1 
NYT 71 270 54 5: 1 
Table 4.62. Comparison between Nato collateral damage and Serbs causing refugees 
diagnoses in the two halves. 
4.4.5.1.2. The results 
The above table suggests only the Telegraph diagnoses fitted in with the theory that 
the Nato media operation improved in the second half of the conflict, as its ratio of 
ethnic-Albanian refugees are Serbs/Milosevic's fault increased in comparison to Nato 
collateral damage is Nato's fault in the second half of the conflict, while the other 
media sources' coverage declined, and therefore went against the theory. After an 
additional analysis of the material, it was found that a reason for the disparity between 
the image and diagnosis results was probably that they reported the Chinese Embassy 
bombing in the second half of the conflict negatively, but showed images of the 
protests, rather than the actual damage from the Nato bombs; as there were quite a 
few articles and images about that event, it influenced the results in the above manner. 
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The British papers had a much lower increase in Collateral damage is Nato's fault 
diagnoses references than the NYT, which saw a massive 270% increase in the second 
half; this was in line with it also having less of a decrease in Damage by Nato images 
in the second half compared to the British media. It could therefore be argued that the 
NYT's coverage was more representative of the conflict situation, as six out of the 
nine biggest Nato collateral damage incidents detailed by Amnesty International were 
in the second half of the campaign. Therefore, Campbell and Shea's belief in an 
improved media coverage for Nato collateral damage incidents in the second half of 
the campaign could be correct in terms of the British media if the amount of Nato 
collateral damage is taken into consideration, as the coverage of Nato collateral 
damage in the British media did not increase in line with its occurrence. 
4.4.5.2. Nato campaign is working or Nato campaign is not working? 
In five of the media sources there was an improved coverage for Nato in the second 
half when compared with the first. For example, in the FT, there were seven 
references for Nato campaign is working in the first half, and eighteen in the second 
half; moreover, in the first half there were thirteen references for Nato campaign is 
not working, but only five in the second half. The second half coverage had therefore 
improved for Nato in both categories, and there was a similar transformation in four 
of the other media sources. 
In the first of these, the Guardian, there were seven references for Nato campaign is 
working in the first half of the conflict and fifteen in the second half, and there were 
seventeen references for Nato campaign is not working in the first half and only eight 
in the second half. This was mirrored in the Independent, where Nato campaign is 
working had ten references in the first half and sixteen in the second half, while Nato 
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campaign is not working had eleven references in the first half and only six in the 
second. In the Telegraph there was an even bigger difference in the first and second 
halves: for Nato campaign is working there were two references in the first half and 
fifteen in the second half, while the Nato campaign is not working category had seven 
references in the first half and only three in the second half. The NYT also had similar 
results to the British media sources: the first half had four Nato campaign is working 
references, while there were seven in the second half, while the Nato campaign is not 
working had fourteen in the first half and only one in the second. 
The only media source where the Nato campaign is or is not working diagnoses did 
not improve in the second half was The Times, where it stayed roughly the same: there 
were five references for Nato campaign is working in the first half and six in the 
second, and nine references for Nato campaign is not working in the first half, and ten 
in the second. 
4.4.6. The Date and Prognosis analysis 
This analysis focuses on trying to identify whether the prognoses improved for Nato 
in the second half of the conflict, with prognoses like Continue the bombing, 
Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands, War criminals must be brought to justice 
and No ground troops considered positive for Nato, and prognoses like Stop the 
bombing, Change the bombing strategy, Send in ground troops and Diplomacy 
considered negative for Nato. The analysis starts with the British media sources, and 
then the NYT analysis follows at the end. 
4.4.6.1. Results 
In line with the hypothesis, the evidence from the Date and Prognosis analysis 
suggests the Guardian dug its heels in for victory in the second half of the conflict, 
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and became more supportive of the Nato campaign. For example, fifteen of its 
eighteen Stop the bombing articles were in the first half of the conflict, and the 
disproportionate fall in second half references suggests their resolve for the Nato 
bombing increased in the second half of the conflict. Although the Continue the 
bombing references also decreased in the second half of the conflict, the drop was 
more in line with the general decrease in coverage, and was not at the same rate as 
Stop the bombing. Also supporting the hypothesis, and going against the second half 
decrease in coverage, all six of the Nato must remain united references were in the 
second half. 
The main evidence from the Telegraph also seems to be in line with the hypothesis, as 
it seemed to change from calling for Nato ground troops to be introduced in the first 
half of the conflict to opposing their use in the second. However, possibly going 
against the hypothesis, the only other category to show a significant increase in 
second half references was Diplomacy, which doubled from seven references in the 
first half to fourteen in the second. There was a mixture of positive and negative 
findings for the hypothesis in the Independent analysis, and the most noticeable 
feature was that the paper seemed to become more hawkish in the second half of the 
conflict. The FT results showed the two most significant differences in the first and 
second half coverage were negative for the hypothesis, with more diplomacy and 
ground troops references in the second half of the campaign. 
The Times also had more evidence that went against the hypothesis than supported it 
in the analysis. For example, they seemed to increase their use of the prognosis Send 
in ground troops in the second half of the conflict, with eighteen of the twenty-six 
references in May and June; although No ground troops also rose a little as well, from 
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two in the first half to four in the second. There were also mixed results in the 'YT, 
although most were positive for the theory that the MOC improved the coverage for 
Nato in the second half For example, in support of the hypothesis, Stop the bombing 
fell from fifteen first half references to five in the second; there were eleven 
references for Send in ground troops in the first half of the conflict, but only one in 
the second half until the final day, when troops were ready to go in to oversee the 
peace deal, and there were then three references; there were twenty-four references in 
the first half of the conflict for Change the bombing strategy and only four in the 
second, and War criminals must be brought to justice and Milosevic must give in to 
Nato's demands went against the downward trend in second half articles and had 
more references. Going against the hypothesis in the NYT, Continue the bombing 
references fell from thirty-two in the first half to seventeen in the second, and 
Diplomacy references increased markedly in the second half of the campaign, from 
nineteen to thirty-three. 
4.4.7. Conclusion 
Most of the above results did therefore show signs of improvement for the media 
coverage of the Nato campaign in the second half, although whether it was down to 
the MOC or an improving Nato campaign cannot be decided from this analysis. The 
Date and Source analysis suggested the MOC had been successful to a certain extent, 
and especially in comparison to the Serbs, with Nato's second half source access 
decline below average, while the Serbs' was much higher than average. The 
historical references comparison also showed an improvement for Nato in the second 
half of their campaign, as Nato's positive-negative ratio stayed virtually the same, 
while the Serbs' declined markedly. The prognoses results were mixed, but the 
images analysis also showed an improvement for Nato, although maybe it is not as 
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much as the comparison suggests, due to the Damage by Nato category not being 
separated into positive and negative, and the Chinese embassy coverage focusing 
more on the resulting protests against the Nato bombing than the damage by Nato. In 
the Date and Diagnosis analysis, the Nato campaign was considered to be working 
much more by the media in the second half to the first, although Nato was blamed for 
collateral damage more, so those results look to be down to events more than the 
MOC's work. However, the British sources focused much less on collateral damage 
than the NYT in the second half, and this might be evidence that the British character 
of the MOC meant it had more of an influence on the British media than the American. 
Although the MoD included new forms of systematic assessment, including the 
evaluation of the UK print media, in their analysis of their media operation in the Iraq 
war, they still concluded that `Measurement of the success of an effects-based 
operation such as an information campaign is important, but difficult to achieve... ' 
328 
It is likewise difficult for this study to draw a conclusion on the effects of the Nato 
media operation on the British media, with presumably much more limited resources; 
but if the media operation was meant to save rather than win Nato's Kosovo campaign, 
in the face of mounting collateral damage incidents, then there does seem enough 
evidence to suggest the MOC re-organisation was a success. 
328 MoD., Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, at 
http: //wNNw inod uk/publications/irag futurelessons/chapI0. htm, last updated 
November, 2003. 
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4.5. Sunday papers 
Having analysed six media sources that were all editorially pro-war, it was thought 
that a comparison between the Sunday New York Times (SNYT), which was also 
editorially pro-war, and the only editorially anti-war British newspaper, the 
Independent on Sunday (IoS), would offer evidence of whether a paper being 
editorially anti-war would be reflected in the quantitative data; this should offer clues 
as to how much influence a paper's editorial support for a war involving their military 
has on the paper's content. Analyses were also undertaken to see if there was any 
positioning of news articles and images that favoured Nato, and if the MOC had 
affected the second half coverage, but little evidence was found for either, and they 
were then left out because of word limit restrictions. 
4.5.1. Main People 
4.5.1.1. Individual Categories 
The loS had most references for Nato military at war, then Nato hierarchy, and then 
ethnic-Albanian civilians third. The SNYT also had Nato military at war with the 
most references, then ethnic-Albanian civilians were second, and Serb civilians were 
third. The IoS seemed to focus more on their national leader, as Blair was its fourth 
highest category with 9.1% of the references, while Clinton was only joint sixth in the 
SNYT with 4.9%. However, the SNYT focused more on their military, as American 
military was their fourth most referenced with 8.1%, while the British military only 
had 1.4% of the references in the IoS. 
4.5.1.2. Collective Categories 
4.5.1.2.1. Politicians and the military 
The table below shows the IoS had a much higher percentage coverage of British and 
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American government and Nato personnel than the SNYT, and also a lower percentage 
of UN, European politicians and Russian politicians. Therefore, the IoS's ratio of the 
former to the latter was over four times that of the SNYT; this was unexpected 
considering the IoS was editorially anti-war and the SNYT pro-war, and goes against 
the hegemonic theory belief that the media only use official sources because they 
support them. 
Newspaper Coverage of New Labour, Coverage of UN, Ratio Points 
Democrats and Nato European 
personnel (including politicians and 
British and American Russian 
armies) in percentage of politicians in 
total references percentage of 
total references 
IoS 53.2 4.9 10.9: 1 2 
SNYT 22.7 9.0 2.5: 1 1 
Table 4.63. Coverage of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel. 
4.5.1.2.2. Serbs and ethnic-Albanians 
The tables below show the two papers had a similar coverage of the ethnic-Albanians, 
but there was a different coverage of the Serbs, with the IoS having more coverage of 
Serb politicians and military than Serb civilians, while the SNYT had more coverage 
of Serb civilians than Serb politicians and military; this again went against the 
expectations of the IoS having a less positive coverage for Nato than the SNYT 
because of it being editorially anti-war. 
Newspaper Coverage of Serb Coverage of Serb Ratio Points 
politicians and military in civilians in 
percentage of total percentage of 
references total references 
IoS 8.4 5.6 1.5: 1 2 
SNYT 8.1 8.9 1: 1.1 1 
Table 4.64. Coverage of Serb politicians, military and civilians. 
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Newspaper Coverage of Coverage of ethnic- Ratio Points 
ethnic-Albanian Albanian politicians 
civilians and military 
SNYT 12.2 3.2 3.8: 1 2 
IoS 10.5 2.8 3.75: 1 1 
Table 4.65. Coverage of ethnic-Albanian civilians, politicians and the military. 
4.5.2. Main People Evaluations 
The Main People Evaluation analysis gives a different picture to the media coverage 
of Nato leaders and personnel than that in the Main People analysis above. Although 
the SNYT had Clinton and the Nato hierarchy as more negative than positive, there 
was little difference in the amount of positive and negative references. In contrast, the 
IoS had Blair with seven negative references to one positive, while Nato military at 
war had nineteen negative references to two positive. The overall results for the 
evaluations of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel are presented in the table 
below. 
Newspaper Coverage of New Labour, Democrats and 
Nato personnel (including British and 
American armies) 
SNYT Positive-negative: Ratio: 1.2: 1 
13-11 
IoS Positive-negative: Ratio: 1: 4.3 
9-39 
Table 4.66. Evaluations of New Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel. 
4.5.3. Sources 
4.5.3.1. Use of positive and negative sources 
The SNYT used a lot more sources in its content than the IoS, and also had a slightly 
higher ratio of international to domestic sources, as shown in the table below. 
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Newspaper International sources Domestic sources Total Int-dom ratio 
SNYT 92 37 129 2.5: 1 
IoS 32 19 51 1.7: 1 
lame 4. b /. Use of international and domestic sources. 
In the tables below are firstly, the domestic positive, neutral and negative use of 
sources for the Nato campaign; secondly, the international positive, neutral and 
negative use of sources; and thirdly, the combined domestic and international use of 
sources, split into positive and negative, with a ratio. 
Newspaper March April ratio May ratio June ratio Total ratio 
SNYT P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg 
7-0-0 12-2-1 6-2-0 7-0-0 32-1 
Total: 7 Total: 15 Total: 8 Total: 7 Total: 37 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p- Ratio p- Ratio p-neg: 
N/A 12-1 neg: neg: 32: 1 
N/A N/A 
IoS P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg 
3-0-0 7-0-0 6-0-0 3-0-0 19: 0 
Total: 3 Total: 7 Total: 6 Total: 3 Total: 19 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p- Ratio p- Ratio p-neg: 
N/A N/A neg: N/A neg: N/A N/A 
Table 4.68. Domestic positive, neutral and negative source amounts, and ratio of 
positive to negative. 
Newspaper March April ratio May ratio June ratio Total ratio 
SNYT P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg 
7-3-1 21-4-10 18-7-9 9-1-3 55-23 
Total: 11 Total: 35 Total: 34 Total: 13 Total: 78 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p- Ratio p- Ratio p-neg: 
7-1 2.1-1 neg: 2: 1 neg: 3: 1 2.4: 1 
IoS P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neu-Neg: P-Neg 
1-0-0 10-1-2 8-1-3 4-1-1 23-6 
Total: 1 Total: 13 Total: 12 Total: 6 Total: 19 
Ratio p-neg: Ratio p-neg: Ratio p- Ratio p- Ratio p-neg: 
N/A 5: 1 neg: 2.7: 1 neg: 4: 1 3.8: 1 
Table 4.69. International positive, neutral and negative source amounts, and ratio of 
positive to negative. 
Newspaper Positive Negative Ratio 
IoS 42 6 7: 1 
SNYT 87 24 3.6: 1 
Table 4.70. Combined domestic and international source use. 
The above table shows the IoS had almost double the positive to negative ratio of 
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source use when compared to the SNYT. The IoS did not use any negative domestic 
sources, and also had a higher international positive to negative ratio than the SNYT. 
4.5.3.2. Frequencies of official sources use 
The IoS only used Blair as a main source once, while the SNYT used Clinton four 
times. The IoS had four references for other British Government politicians, making 
all British Goverrunent sources 3.5% of the total source use. The SNYT had eighteen 
references for other American Government politicians, making all Democrats 17.1 % 
of the total. The SNYT also used more Nato sources: 15.4% of the total; while the IoS 
used Nato sources for only 7% of the total. Although those differences might be 
down to the papers being pro and anti war, it also seems as if it is influenced by the 
IoS only using sources in 52% of their articles, while the SNYT used sources in 82% 
of their articles. The use of Serb and ethnic-Albanian sources was similar to that 
found in the main analysis, and there were no real differences between the Sunday 
papers. 
4.5.4. Diagnosis 
The IoS showed its disillusionment with the Nato campaign by having Nato campaign 
is not working as its most referenced diagnosis, and Collateral damage is Nato 's fault 
as its second highest reference. Refugees are the Serbs' fault was third, and Refugees 
are Milosevic's fault was fourth. This contrasted with the SNYT, which had Refugees 
are Serbs' fault as the most referenced, and Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault third. 
Collateral damage is Nato 's fault was the second most referenced. 
The above results were largely reflected in the Writers themselves category; the IoS 
had Nato campaign is not working as the clear top reference with eighteen, and then 
Collateral Damage is Nato 's fault was the second most referenced category with 
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seven. Third was Refugees are Milosevic 's fault with four references. In contrast. the 
SNYT writers without sources were very positive for the Nato campaign. as Nato 
campaign is Milosevic's fault was the most referenced category; Ground war is 
Milosevic's fault was the second most referenced, and Refugees are Serbs' fault was 
the third. Nato campaign is not working and Collateral damage is Nato 's fault only 
had one reference between them. 
4.5.5. Prognosis 
The IoS had More humanitarian aid as its most referenced prognosis, and this was 
followed by Diplomacy; this seems to reflect its perspective on the conflict, as it 
thought war was the wrong way to deal with the humanitarian crisis. Surprisingly, 
Send in ground troops was the next highest category, before Continue the bombing 
and Change the bombing strategy. Stop the bombing was next, along with War 
criminals must be brought to justice. In contrast, the SNYT was more critical in its 
prognoses, with Stop the bombing and Continue the bombing the joint most 
referenced categories. Stop the bombing's high position was probably because there 
were more articles with the Serbs as sources in the SNYT (8.1 %) than in the IoS 
(4.2%). Change the bombing strategy was the third most referenced category, then 
Diplomacy was the fourth, and More humanitarian aid the fifth. There were similar 
findings in the Writers themselves analysis; the IoS had Diplomacy as the most 
referenced category, Ground troops second, and More humanitarian aid third. Stop 
the bombing and Continue the bombing were next with two references each. In the 
SNYT, Continue the bombing and Change the bombing strategy had the most 
references, and were followed by Diplomacy. 
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4.5.6. Format 
The IoS's vast majority of articles were in line with the Thematic in the UK category, 
as 45.5% of articles had this result. Thematic elsewhere and Episodic in Yugoslavia 
were the next highest, with 12.6% each. The SNYT had a similar result, with 
Thematic in the US the most referenced category, although with only 30.1 % of the 
articles. Episodic in Yugoslavia was second with 25.2% of articles, and Episodic in 
the US was third with 14.6%. 
4.5.7. Historical References 
The loS had World War Two Nato Negative and World War Two Neutral as its joint 
most referenced historical references, with World War Two Serbs Negative third. 
Altogether, there were four positive references for the Serbs and ten negative (1: 2.5), 
and eight positive for Nato and eighteen negative (1: 2.25), so they were roughly 
similar, with Nato a little more positive. In the SNYT, Bosnia Serbs Negative was the 
most referenced category with eight references, and this was followed by Gulf Neutral 
and World War Two Nato Negative with six references each. Altogether, there was 
one positive for the Serbs and twelve negative (1: 12) and five positive for Nato and 
sixteen negative (1: 3.2), so that meant the SNYTs historical references were much 
more positive for Nato than the Serbs overall, and also much more positive for Nato 
than the IoS.. 
In the IoS, World War Two had the most references, with twenty, followed by the 
Bosnian and Gulf wars with eight references each. The Serb-Croat war had six 
references, so that meant the Balkans wars together had fourteen references; six less 
than World War Two. In the SNYT, Bosnia had the most references with thirteen, and 
including the Serbo-Croat references, the Balkans wars had sixteen. World War Two 
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had twelve, and the Gulf nine. This means the SNYT focused more on the Balkans 
wars, as the NYT did, while the IoS focused on World War Two, which was in line 
with the UK average, but in contrast to the Independent. 
4.5.8. Images 
In the IoS, ethnic-Albanian civilians had the most images with sixteen, followed by 
Writers in the UK. British soldiers in positive images, Serb civilians and Damage 
from Nato Negative were the next categories with the most images, with six each. 
Ethnic-Albanian civilians also had the most images in the SNYT, with seventeen. 
Maps were the second most referenced, and were followed by seven categories with 
four references: US soldiers positive, US armoury positive, Nato hierarchy, Nato 
soldiers in a positive picture, Milosevic, Anti-war demos and Damage from Nato 
negative. The two papers therefore had similar results, with ethnic-Albanian civilians 
the most referenced, and Damage from Nato negative the joint third most referenced. 
Replicating the analysis in hypothesis 9 (see pages 192-3), by including Ethnic- 
Albanian civilians and Damage from Serbs together, and contrasting them with Serb 
civilians and Damage from Nato, the IoS had eighteen for the latter and twelve for the 
former (1.5: 1), while the SNYT had seventeen for the latter and seven for the former 
(2.4: 1). The SNYT therefore had a more positive coverage for Nato in the analysis 
than the IoS, whereas the Independent had a more positive coverage for Nato than the 
NYT in the same analysis. 
Conclusion 
The Sunday papers differed to the daily papers in that they were much more thematic; 
relying more on opinion and less on recent news than the daily papers; this also seems 
to have meant that the Sunday papers' coverage did not decline in the second half of 
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the conflict as significantly as in the daily papers, as they were less reliant on new 
events to update their Kosovo coverage. The reading of a combination of editorially 
pro and anti war papers, with much more context than news, did seem to provide a 
much more balanced and in-depth view of the Kosovo Conflict. 
The results showed that in several of the analyses the IoS's anti-war stance seemed to 
be apparent in the data results. The first real evidence was in the evaluations of New 
Labour, Democrats and Nato personnel, where the SNYT was more positive than 
negative towards them, but the IoS was more negative towards them by a ratio of 
4.3: 1. This difference in evaluation was most evident in the coverage of the US and 
UK leaders, with Clinton receiving a balanced coverage in the SNYT, while Blair had 
a negative to positive ratio of 7: 1 in the IoS. There was also evidence in other 
analyses that seemed to show the IoS's anti-war stance; for example, the two highest 
IoS diagnoses were both negative for Nato, while the SNY7 s top reference was 
positive for Nato; and the SNYT's historical references and images were more 
positive for Nato than those of the IoS. 
However, in some analyses the IoS's anti-war stance did not materialise into a more 
negative coverage for Nato. For example, both papers still used a majority of Nato 
sources as their main article source, although that did not mean it was always positive 
news for Nato. As the IoS was anti-war and still often gave Nato sources priority of 
position, this seems to suggest it was out of practicality rather than bias. Moreover, 
the IoS's official sources positive to negative ratio for the Nato campaign was almost 
double that of the SNYT. The other results that went against expectations under the 
hegemonic model were that the SNYT had nearly double the percentage of coverage 
for `neutral' main people than the IoS, featured half as many Nato personnel as main 
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people, and unlike the IoS, featured more Serb civilians than politicians and military. 
The SNYT also had Stop the bombing as their joint most referenced prognosis, a much 
higher position than the IoS did. 
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5. Discussion 
Robert Entman has previously written that if 'limited solely to quantitative 
information... social science can miss some of the reality of. .. 
j ournalism. In studying 
the news media, genuine empirical accuracy demands going beyond the numbers to 
qualitative data and informed speculation. ' 329 As recommended in the above 
quotation, some examples of what was found in the quantitative analysis are provided 
in this discussion, along with some theories about why the media chose to frame the 
Kosovo Conflict the way they did. This will hopefully provide readers with some 
examples to supplement the quantitative analysis results, and go beyond numbers and 
basic variables and categories. The section begins with some of the historical 
references used by the media, and some theories on why certain historical references 
were more prevalent than others, before going on to assess which media theories the 
Kosovo media coverage most supported. 
5.1 Historical References 
5.1.1. World War Two 
As the quantitative data suggests, both Nato and the Serbs tried to use World War 
Two to frame the conflict, and the justification for each case was compared by Fisk in 
the IoS on April 4th; Fisk wrote the Serbs compare the Nato bombing to the Nazis, but 
the scenes on the borders have greater similarity to the atrocities of Nazi Germany. 
Deciding whether to use Nato or Serb historical references was not the only decision 
facing the media editors, as they also had to decide whether to include references 
straight from official sources, or independently from journalists. Examples of all the 
above variables; positive or negative for Nato or the Serbs, and official sources or 
329 R. M. Entman., Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics, (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. viii. 
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independent journalistic references; appeared in the Independent on March 25th, with 
John Prescott being cited comparing the Serb behaviour in Kosovo to that of the Nazis 
before World War Two, while a later article had a journalist reporting the Luftwaffe 
were back at war after fifty-four years. The references were also used by the media 
sources to describe different aspects of the conflict over time, and actions by the Serbs 
and Nato; an example is how the Telegraph accused the Serbs of bringing a `Return to 
terror of concentration camps' on April 1St, while describing how Yugoslavia had 
been `bombed back to 1945' on June 7 t1 
5.1.2. Balkans Wars 
As with the above World War Two frames, the Balkans Wars were also used to recall 
both positive and negative aspects for Nato and the Serbs, although most references 
were used to draw analogies with the Serb ethnic-cleansing in those wars during the 
early 1990s. An example of this was the Independent on March 27th, as it compared 
the Serb behaviour in Kosovo to that of the Serbs in the Bosnian war on the front page, 
and had a profile inside of the notorious Serb commander during that conflict, Arkan. 
There were also similar examples in the Independent on March 3 0th and 3 1St, and 
April 3 `d, and other papers also featured the story; for example, on March 29th The 
Times had an article under the headline `Bosnia terror chief directs Kosovo killers', 
and the Telegraph had an article under the headline `Ethnic cleanser Arkan is spotted 
near Pristina. ' However, in response to the original story, and in an example of how 
Bosnia could be negative for Nato, in the Independent on March 30th, Fisk criticised 
George Robertson for claiming Arkan was in Kosovo when there was no evidence. 
The previous Balkans wars were still being referred to near the end of the conflict, but 
then it was more Milosevic's character and guilt for the Balkans wars that was being 
discussed, rather than the refugee situation. For example, the Telegraph profiled 
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Milosevic as a liar from his behaviour in the previous Balkans wars in articles under 
the headlines `Record of lies may mean the crisis is not over yet' (June 4th), and 'Rise 
to power littered with broken promises' (June 8th); while the Independent editorial on 
June 8th had the headline `History shows that Milosevic will only respond to force. ' 
5.1.3. Cold War 
On April 10th, there was the biggest opportunity for the Cold War frame to emerge, 
after Yeltsin was reported to have turned Russian guns back towards the West the 
previous day; however, even then the Cold War frame did not really appear. The 
Independent had a small story on page one about the above development, under the 
headline `Nato dismisses Yeltsin's threats, ' with the article reporting the US had said 
it expected Russia to honour its pledge not to become involved in the war. Although 
a bigger story on page three warned of the possibility of World War Three, an 
accompanying article by Rupert Cornwell discounted the threat posed by Russia 
under the headline `the Bear roars but it will not bite'. Similarly, the Guardian front 
page had the headline `Yeltsin's threat raises stakes in war', and said Russia 
threatened intervention if Nato launched a ground war, but Martin Woollacott agreed 
with Cornwell that `Russia may be bluffing'. 
As well as Russia's relative weakness at the time of the Nato campaign, it seems 
another reason for there being little evidence of Cold War framing was that Russia 
was considered neutral or an ally for most of the conflict. This was probably due to 
Yeltsin being in power in Russia, as he was steering Russia in a Western democratic 
direction. This generally positive framing of Yeltsin and Russia was more apparent in 
the NYT than the UK media, and an early example of the NYTs positive image of 
Russia was when the editorial on April 13 t" argued that Moscow was the best hope for 
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diplomacy, as they had grown impatient with Mr. Milosevic's truculence in recent 
years, and recognised that Russian and Serb interests do not always coincide. This 
positive NYT framing of Yeltsin was confirmed in an editorial near the end of the 
Nato campaign, on June 4th, which stated there had been constructive peacemaking 
by Russia, and Yeltsin was courageous to align with the West despite opposition at 
home. 
5.2. Evidence supporting previous media theories 
This discussion of the evidence presented in this thesis now continues with a look at 
which of the media models described in the theory section best describes the British 
media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict from the quantitative results, and the 
qualitative analysis that followed it. The old debate about biases in the media 
surfaced again during the Kosovo Conflict, with the British Government taking the 
view previously espoused by the Conservatives in the Falklands War, and the New 
Right in the US; criticising the media for paying too much attention to enemy 
propaganda, and being too critical of Nato `news management'; while on the other 
hand, critical theorists in line with the propaganda model claimed the media were 
mere propagandists for Nato. The results from the quantitative analysis suggested the 
media was more in the centre of the above two extremes, and showed a mixture of 
hegemony and pluralism; this section largely confirms that view. 
5.2.1. Evidence of Plurality; the Propaganda model countered 
This section includes evidence from journalistic reviews of the Nato media operation, 
and the media's coverage of Nato collateral damage and Serb atrocity stories. The 
evidence suggests the media sources were not generally acting in coercion with Nato, 
or acting under their influence. In contrast, they were aware of Nato attempts to 
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influence their coverage of the conflict, and tried to provide a balanced coverage in 
line with their views on the Nato campaign. 
5.2.1.1. The Media Relationship with Politicians and the Military 
Referring to the American media, Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model 
suggested the media are willing accomplices to elites during foreign conflicts 
involving their country's military, but McNair has argued that broadsheet newspapers 
are likely to be sceptical of attempts to manipulate the news agenda. 330 This section 
features evidence from throughout Nato's Kosovo campaign that supports McNair's 
view, and suggests broadsheet journalists were generally aware of Nato attempts to 
influence them through spin and propaganda, and could thus resist most media 
management techniques used by the Nato politicians and military. Although they still 
often agreed with Nato policy, it seems to have been mostly through judgement rather 
than elite manipulation, and the biggest change in direction during the Nato campaign 
was by politicians rather than the media, as many politicians changed from opposing 
the sending of Nato ground troops into combat to supporting the policy. 
Early examples of journalistic resistance to propaganda were provided by Fisk, who 
accused Nato and the Western media of lying on March 27th, and the Serbs on March 
31 S`; before criticising the Nato press conferences as more and more propagandistic on 
April 7th. Also in the Independent, on April 7th, Anne McElvoy wrote that the Nato 
conferences have always been very boring. On April 16th, The Times showed its 
awareness of propaganda when it featured an article about how the Serbs had 
conducted a good propaganda campaign, but Nato had also done well to now, by 
retorting Serb propaganda, demonising Milosevic, and owning up to errors while 
relating their apologies and regrets to a wider context in which the Yugoslavian leader 
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is ultimately to blame for every death and injury; as most people would not believe 
Milosevic when he said Nato targeted civilians. 
On April 28th, the Independent showed its awareness of the new Nato media strategy 
when it accredited Campbell with having introduced a `tougher, more aggressive 
media strategy against Serbian propaganda from the Nato headquarters. ' On May 3 ra, 
after the Luzane bus bombing, the Independent again cited an improvement in the 
Nato media operation, when an article observed that after the furore over muddled 
Nato explanations for Djakovica `the alliance has changed its media strategy and 
admitted responsibility quickly. ' 
On May 15th, in a Guardian article under the headline `The spin doctors hit back', 
Martin Walker also emphasised the improvements in the Nato media operation since 
Djakovica: `Nato's reinforced team of spin doctors reacted quickly yesterday to 
reports of yet another disastrous attack on civilians in Kosovo. . 
Some of the 
photographs had been screened by Nato before .... 
its timing was classic counter- 
propaganda. . 
Nato's once amateurish media operation was reinforced with experts 
after last month's mistaken strike on the refugee convoy.. . . 
The results have been 
striking... ' However, in the Telegraph on June 6th, John Keegan showed he had not 
been impressed by the Nato media operation, when he wrote that it should have 
showed `much less indulgence of media disbelief, a much stronger display of 
confidence, a much fuller presentation of the facts. Full and frank disclosure of 
damage done does not compromise intelligence when the enemy cannot strike back 
and when one's own side is winning. ' 
330 B. McNair., Sociology of Journalism, op. cit, p. 156. 
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5.2.1.2. Examples of plural media coverage 
Having ascertained in the section above that the broadsheet media were not 
unquestioning puppets of the Nato political and military elite, this section provides 
examples of some of the media content that was more negative than positive for Nato. 
This was most apparent in the media's focus on Nato collateral damage, with articles 
on it usually more prominently placed than positive articles for Nato, such as their 
reports of Serb atrocities. There were also more images of damage from Nato bombs 
than images of damage done by the Serb military, and the vast majority of Nato 
damage images were negative. Although this is probably because the newspapers had 
more access to images of damage done by Nato than damage done by the Serbs, it still 
goes against the propaganda model, because the newspapers would ignore most 
images of Nato collateral damage under the propaganda model. This suggests the 
propaganda model is not relevant to the British media's coverage of Nato's Kosovo 
campaign, and evidence to support this conclusion is provided below; the analysis 
starts on April 7th, the day after the first big Nato collateral damage incident, and 
continues until June 2°d; just after the last large Nato collateral damage incident. 
5.2.1.2.1. Aleksinac-Djakovica, April 7th - 22nd. 
On April 6th, Nato had their first big collateral damage incident when they hit 
residential homes in Aleksinac, killing several people. The FT had Aleksinac as their 
second story on page one, under the headline `Homes hit as bombs miss targets', 
while The Times had the story on page six under the ironic headline "`Surgical Strike" 
kills 12 civilians'; it had a photo of an injured Serb woman and son in bed. The 
Independent reported that Nato bombs had killed five civilians and wounded thirty in 
an article on page five, under the headline `Nato "sorry" for the damage'. It also 
featured a photo of a Serb in Aleksinac, in front of a bombed car and house. The NYT 
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had Aleksinac as a front page story, under the title `Small Serbian town is Stricken by 
a Deadly "Accident of War"'; the two front-page photos were both of the damage. 
There was further coverage inside on page ten, with a photo of a boy in hospital. 
The Independent also featured quite a critical coverage of Nato the next day on pages 
one and two, with Robert Fisk reporting that eleven bombs had been targeted at the 
centre of Pristina. On the front page, Fisk questioned whether it was a deliberate 
attack on a civilian Serb area in revenge for the Serb persecution of the ethnic- 
Albanians, while on page two there was a photo of a man searching the rubble of a 
house in the centre of Pristina. This prominent and polemical coverage of the Nato 
collateral damage was also placed higher than articles on Nato investigating fresh 
reports of forty-nine alleged Serb atrocities and three mass graves, which only made it 
on to page three, and Blair setting out Nato's terms for ending the campaign, which 
only made it on to page four. On April loth, the Independent again showed their 
plurality with a big Fisk story on page one, under the headline: `In Serbia, too, the 
ordinary people feel the suffering and agony of war'; the article was accompanied by 
a photo of a Serb woman in front of ruined houses. On page two, another article 
featured Nato apologising for getting their facts wrong yesterday about the bombing, 
and admitting one of three bombs aimed at the main telephone exchange hit a 
residential area, after they'd previously denied it. 
On April 13th, the Independent, Guardian and The Times had the Nato bombing of the 
civilian train on the Grdelica railroad bridge on the front page, with big photos. On 
April 14th, The Times had Nato's explanation for Grdelica on page five with four 
photos, and also had Tom Walker in Belgrade reporting on Serb casualties of Nato 
collateral damage; in contrast, a good propaganda story for Nato, Cook's claim of the 
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Serbs running a rape camp, only made it on to page six. The Guardian's front page 
that day contained a big picture of a refugee mother and child dominating the front 
page with the headline `Day 21: more bombs, more death, more despair'. The NiT's 
only photo on the front page that day was of the Grdelica train wreck; the article on 
Grdelica was also on the front page, under the headline `At sites of two Nato attacks, 
Scent of Death, Sound of Fury'. It featured a Serb source before Shea. 
On April 15th, the day after the Djakovica convoy attack, The Times had a large 
gruesome picture of an old woman who looked charred and dead on the front page, 
but was said to be still alive, and then had a variety of accounts about what happened. 
The other UK papers also had Djakovica as the main story on the front page; the FT 
had the headline `Serbs claim Nato killed seventy refugees', while the Independent 
asked who takes the blame. The Independent article was accompanied by a photo of a 
refugee boy in the midst of rubble, while on page two a Fisk article had the headline 
`Nato stained with blood of civilians'. 
On April 16th, the Guardian front page stated the blame for Djakovica seemed to lie 
increasingly with Nato, and it had another image of the bomb's aftermath. On page 
three, it tried to piece together what had happened, with a map and another image. On 
the same day, The Times had a big photo of an injured child on the front page under 
the headline `Nato admits bombing convoy'; on pages four and five they criticised 
Nato's strategy of not flying below 15,000 feet, arguing that `laser systems were no 
substitute for low flying. ' It also had a big photo of the Grdelica train bombing on 
page twenty-one, along with the diary of a British woman who is married to a Serb. 
The Independent also had Djakovica on the front page again, with a Fisk article 
having the headline `This is a horror story. There is no other way to describe it. ' The 
260 
article was accompanied by a photo, and inside Fisk described Djakovica as a -series 
of massacres.... Nato appears to be responsible for an atrocity. ' There was more on 
Djakovica on page three, while a story on war crimes investigators in the Hague 
having been given evidence of at least fifteen mass graves inside Kosovo only made it 
to page four. The FT also had Djakovica on the front page again, with Nato 
apologising, but declaring the bombing would go on. The NYT had a Nato admission 
of the mistaken bombing of citizens as the front page main story, and there was more 
on it inside, including a Steve Erlanger article under the title `Blackened Bodies and a 
Half-Eaten Meal'. 
In the Independent on April 17th, a massive Fisk article criticising Nato over 
Djakovica took over the front page under the headline `This atrocity is still a mystery 
to Nato. Perhaps I can help... ' The criticism of Nato continued on page two, with an 
article under the headline `Military suppress massacre video'. News that a Serbian air 
base and bridge had been hit in successful Nato attacks, with a photo and map, only 
made it to page five. On April 19th, on page two, the Guardian reported that Nato had 
changed its story on Djakovica again as rifts emerge among its members. On April 
20th, the Guardian front page had Nato admitting unintentional harm on the Djakovica 
convoy, with a photo, and on page three it had the Nato explanation with two photos. 
The Independent also had the Nato explanation on the front page, under the headline 
`The Convoy Massacre: Nato offers its evidence'; it also had a transcript of the Nato 
briefing on page two. The NYT had the Nato explanation on the front page and page 
twelve, but reckoned the Nato account still left a good number of questions 
unanswered. An article about ethnic-Albanian refugees' tales of rape and killings by 
the Serbs only made it to page thirteen. 
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5.2.1.2.2. Serb TV Station-Chinese embassy, April 23rd - May 14th. 
On April 23rd, the Guardian had Nato's bombing of the Serb television station on the 
front page and page two; the NYT also had it on the front page. It was also on page 
three the next day in the Guardian, and the editorial said it was wrong to target 
television and power stations. Also on the 24th, Fisk criticised Nato for targeting the 
Serb television station on pages one and three in the Independent; both pages also 
featured a photo of the damage. On April 29t", the Independent had a big Fisk article 
on page three about two homes hit by Nato bombs in Surdilica under the headline 
`Families blasted in "just another mistake"'; it was accompanied by a photo of a 
damaged house and rescue operation. 
On May 1st, the Guardian had a critical article of Nato increasing their use of `dumb' 
unguided bombs above what was a good propaganda story for Nato; Medecins sans 
Frontieres' evidence of how the Serbs had planned ethnic cleansing and atrocities. 
On the same day, the Independent had a close-up photo of a bloodied dead body under 
a mangled bridge, with the caption saying `This is what happens when a Nato missile 
hits a bus in Kosovo'. On page two of the FT on May lst/2"d, a photo of a Belgrade 
resident in front of a bombed house accompanied an article on Nato vowing to 
intensify the air strikes as weather improves; there was also a small article on three 
civilians killed in a Nato attack on the same page. On May 3rd, the FT had an article 
titled `Nato regrets bus bombing' on page two; inside, it reported that `Nato's 
admission came as it stepped up its attacks... ' On the same day, in their first two 
articles of the paper, the Independent reported that Nato had admitted the Luzane 
bombing; the first article described it as the `darkest blot' on the day, while in the 
second, Fisk argued that `Even the word Nato is becoming a lie. ' 
262 
On May 4 t" in The Times, what looked like a good propaganda story for Nato, the 
video admission of Serb massacres by Private Shefko Terkovic, a Serb captured by 
the KLA, only made fourth story on page twelve, and was below one on ethnic- 
Albanian prostitution rape gangs in refugee camps. In the Independent, an article on 
Nato killing twenty in a second bus bombing was the third story on page one, and it 
was accompanied by a photo of the damage on page two; while the Terkovic story 
was only on page two, and did not have a photo. Also on the same day, Steve 
Erlanger in the NYT had an article under the balanced headline of `Fleeing Kosovars 
Dread Dangers of Nato Above and Serb Below' as a front page story; it was 
continued on page eighteen, with a photo of a mother and baby standing near vehicles 
the Serbs claimed were destroyed by Nato. 
On May 5th in The Times, Nato denials about the previous day's collateral damage 
claims were only featured within a bigger article that was negative for them on page 
fourteen; General Naumann's criticisms of the Nato politicians for restricting the 
effectiveness of the Nato campaign through their caution over targeting; the headline 
of the article was `Nato faults have prolonged war, says top general'. In the FT, 
Naumann's views on Nato's `strategy shortcomings' was the main Kosovo story, 
while Blair's vow to defeat `hideous genocide' was a much smaller one. In the 
Independent, Naumann's criticisms were on pages one and four, while ethnic- 
Albanian reports of 100 men executed by the Serbs, and Nato denying the bus 
bombing, were only on page five. 
On May 8t", the Guardian had Nato's bombing of the Chinese embassy as its main 
story on the front page, and on page two the main story with a big photo was `Nato 
cluster bombs "kill 15" in hospital and crowded market'; the article explained that 
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Nato had accepted it was highly probable one of their bombs went astray, and 
described Nato reports of rape hotels in Pee and other atrocities as Nato attempts to 
`deflect criticism'. The Times and FT also had the Chinese embassy bombing as the 
main story on the front page, and the FT also had the Nis collateral damage on page 
four, under the headline `Nato admits cluster bomb went astray'. The Independent 
had the Nis market bombing as the second story on the front page, under the headline 
`Nato strike "killed 13 near hospital"'; on page two there was a bigger story on it, and 
a photo of a crying man outside his wrecked house. 
On May loth, the Guardian had the Chinese embassy bombing as their main story, 
including a Nato admission of error; on page two, another article on the bombing 
began: `It was a mistake which even Nato's spokesman Jamie Shea found difficult to 
explain. ' On May 11th, contradicting propaganda theorists who claim the media 
include hidden cultural messages that are supportive of their military's campaign, The 
Times featured an article on the American air-force that was accompanied by an 
image with negative connotations for Nato: an airbrush artist painting a Nato plane 
with a grim reaper releasing bombs, with the word Apocalypse written on it. On May 
12th, Jonathan Freedland claimed the Nato campaign was now indefensible in the 
Guardian; while on May 13th, Fisk argued the Nato campaign should be wound up 
due to the `folly' of the `catastrophe' in the Independent. The same day, the 
Telegraph looked back on `The first 50 days of lost opportunities', with the article 
ending: `However the conflict in Kosovo ends, few people will argue that the first 50 
days went as well as Nato had hoped. ' Similarly, the Independent gave all of page 
three over to opinions on the Nato campaign, under the headline: `Fifty days of 
bombing in Europe, and the voices of doubt grow even louder'. 
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5.2.1.2.3. Korisa-Surdulica, May 15tß' - June 2 °'. 
On May 15th, the Guardian had a big front page story and photo on Korisa, reporting 
that Nato was accused of killing more than eighty civilians and injuring sixty. Nato 
sources were said to be reviewing the incident, and the article also had Russian and 
Tanjug (official Yugoslav media) sources. On page two, it had an article on how the 
Chinese embassy `Blunder' was jeopardising Nato unity, while on page three there 
were two more collateral damage photos, along with a chronology of Nato collateral 
damage. The FT also had Korisa on the front page, under the headline Yugoslavia 
says Nato raid killed 100 ethnic-Albanians'. It reported that Nato was still pressing 
ahead undeterred by Yugoslav allegations, after what could be their worst blunder; 
although it did also feature the KLA claiming the Serbs were using ethnic-Albanians 
as human shields, and Nato saying Korisa could have been shelled by the Serbs. The 
Independent had a big Korisa article on the front page, with a photo of a crying boy 
and `charred tractors'; it had local witnesses as sources and then Shea. A Fisk article 
underneath had the ironic headline: `It all went very well .... 
Another effective Day' 
Within the article, Fisk called Shea and Jertz's explanation for the bombing `theatre of 
the obscene', and described Shea as launching `into his usual denunciations of Serb 
atrocities, exhuming some old pictures of mass graves and some (slightly) newer ones 
of burnt villages. ' On page two, another article on Korisa had the headlines `Waking 
to a nightmare of slaughter' and `Massacre'; next to it was a list of six previous Nato 
collateral damage incidents with three photos. The Times' main story on the front 
page was `Nato jets dump bombs off Venice', and this was also negative towards the 
Nato campaign. Korisa only appeared on page nineteen, under the headline `Nato air 
raid "kills 100 Albanians"'. The article only had Serbs and ethnic-Albanians as 
sources, and it also had a map of `Nato bombing blunders' with dates. In the NYT on 
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the same day, Korisa was the main story with a photo, with the Serbs blaming Nato in 
what was described as being possibly the `Worst Misdirected Hit' yet, as sixty 
civilians were reported dead. There was another photo and map on page eight, along 
with the continuation of the article. By May 17th, the media seemed to have accepted 
the Nato explanation that the Serbs were to blame for the civilian casualties at Korisa 
because they had used human shields. 33' 
On May 19th, The Times' William Rees Mogg wrote that the Nato policy of dropping 
cluster bombs from 15,000 feet on parachutes, which can be carried by the wind, can 
be expected to kill civilians, and Nato's claim that Milosevic intends to kill civilians 
but they don't is not so convincing now that the `accidents' are happening so quickly. 
On May 2 1St, The Times featured the MoD admitting: `Serb army in Kosovo as strong 
as ever' as the main story on the front page. On the same day, the FT had an article 
on Nato killing three people in a Belgrade hospital, and hitting the Swedish embassy 
during the heaviest bombing of Belgrade since the Chinese embassy attack; it added 
there had now been nine significant errors by Nato. On May 22 °d, the Independent 
had a big story on page fifteen about fresh concerns over the accuracy of the Nato 
bombing, after Nato bombs had killed nineteen in a Serb prison and hit the Swiss 
ambassadors' residence. The NYT featured the same news, with a photo and a map. 
331 Although the media seemed confused about what happened at Korisa, this is not surprising really, as 
Amnesty International was still struggling to find the truth about the incident a year later, as recorded in 
a report on Nato collateral damage incidents during their campaign: `It also remains unclear on the 
basis of current information whether or not civilians were being used as human shields in Kori§a. If 
they were, this would constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law by FRY forces, 
but would not relieve NATO of the responsibility of ensuring their protection. NATO has said that it 
had no knowledge of the presence of ethnic Albanian civilians at Koriga .' 
Amnesty International., 
NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA. "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL 
KILLINGS? Violations of the Laws of War by NA TO during Operation Allied Force, at: 
http: //www. amnesty. org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/nato all. pdf (June 2000). If the fact that Amnesty 
International cannot ascertain the truth about the incident with the benefit of a year of investigation, 
then it suggests the media did as good a job as possible under the circumstances, as they were caught 
between a Nato media operation spinning the conflict on the one hand, and a Serbian government that 
closely controlled access to the conflict environment on the other. 
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In contrast, a good propaganda story for Nato on May 26th only had a small amount of 
coverage: the story of how the 'UN says it has evidence of "massive" war crimes' 
only made it to page eighteen in the Independent, and was only a small story with no 
photo or other sources in the Guardian. 
Nato collateral damage continued to make news even at the end of May, and into June. 
On May 3 1St, the Guardian reported that eleven civilians had been killed by Nato 
missiles on the front page; the main victims were said to be families going to market 
across the Varvarin bridge. The article reported that Nato had acknowledged four of 
their aircraft attacked it, but had claimed it was a legitimate target, and they didn't 
intentionally attack civilians. The front page also featured the news that Western 
journalists had been injured by Nato bombs. On page five it had another article on 
Varvarin under the headline `Planes buzzed overhead -and then death came'; it only 
featured Serb sources. The Independent also had Varvarin as the main story on the 
front page, under the headline: `Nato kills civilians on bridge in another deadly 
blunder'; Fisk wrote: `Nato was accused of committing another deadly 
blunder... refused initially to be drawn on whether the attack at Varvarin was another 
disasterous error... ' The story was continued on page nine, with a big photo of the 
destroyed bridge, and a caption explaining nine had been killed and forty wounded. 
The Times had a front page story on how their reporter, Eve-Ann Prentice, had been 
injured in the aforementioned Nato attack; it also reported that eleven people had died 
in a Nato attack near Krusevac. 
On June 1St, the Guardian had an article on the second Nato collateral damage 
incident in Surdulica on page five, under the headline `Nato bombs kill 17 in 
sanatorium'; it also reported that the Yugoslav media had said another ten civilians 
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had died in Novi Pazar, and that meant Nato's collateral damage death toll was over 
fifty in two days, but Shea had justified them as legitimate targets. The FT had the 
same story and statistics under the headline: `Civilian death toll rising'. The 
Independent had Fisk in a big front page story stating `Nato calls the bombing of a 
hospital collateral damage. I call it a tragedy. ' Accompanying the article was a photo 
of undertakers loading the corpses of civilians killed when the sanatorium and 
retirement home were hit in Surdulica. In comparison, the Serbs' offer to settle on G8 
terms only made it to page twelve, and a refugee's story on Serb `Troops "butcher 
entire families"' only made it to page thirteen. The NYT had a similar coverage to the 
UK media on page twelve, under the headline `Dozens of civilians are Killed as Nato 
Air Strikes Go Awry'; the article was accompanied by a photo of damage from Nato 
bombs. 
On June 2nd, the Guardian had the Nato admission of the limited effects their 
bombing had had on the Serb military on page four, and on page five had the story: 
`Albanians condemn Nato's bombing blunders', after Nato bombed four defensive 
bunkers in Albania. The Independent also had the Nato bombing of Albanians as a 
prominent story, and started with the sentence: `Given the long list of Nato's errors 
during the Kosovo air campaign perhaps we should not have been surprised. ' 
5.2.2. Hegemonie evidence; the Government and New-Right criticisms countered 
Although, the above evidence makes it seem as if Blair and Campbell were right to 
criticise the media coverage of the Nato campaign, the quantitative data showed that 
the vast majority of the media coverage was much more positive towards Nato than 
the Serbs. This is more difficult to show qualitatively than the plural evidence, as it is 
more to do with quantity over time, than specific cases; however, this section will try 
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and provide some examples of hegemonic content to show how the media was usualk- 
supportive of the Nato campaign, despite occasional criticisms. 
5.2.2.1. Front pages 
The Position variable analyses showed the front pages were often dominated by news 
from a Nato perspective, with Nato politicians and military spokespeople therefore 
having an advantage in controlling the framing of the Nato campaign. The articles 
would often be reports of the previous night's attacks, but could also be news of 
Nato's rejection of Serb peace proposals, Nato evidence of Serb atrocities, Nato's 
humanitarian role, Nato's apologies for collateral damage, or Nato's plans for their 
campaign. This was evident from the start of the Nato campaign, and this section 
focuses on that period, although the practise continued throughout the Nato campaign. 
A good early example of this reporting was apparent in the IoS on March 21 St, a few 
days before the Nato campaign started. The IoS was editorially anti-war, but seemed 
to have a more negative attitude to the Serbs than the daily newspapers in their last 
edition before the Nato campaign, with their main front page story having the 
headline: `SERBS MOVE IN FOR THE KILL IN KOSOVO AS THREAT OF 
NATO AIR STRIKES GROWS'; the article was also accompanied by an image of a 
balaclava wearing Serb in a tank, which reflected and emphasised the headline's 
ominous message. The article described how `The Serbs mounted spectacular acts of 
violent defiance yesterday', and talked of a `ferocious attack... forcing thousands of 
civilians to flee'. Cook was the first source, and then an ethnic-Albanian civilian. On 
page two, Blair was given space to make an impassioned defence of air strikes, under 
the headline "`Barbaric" Milosevic must take the blame'; it was alongside an article 
under the headline `Clinton acts to avert a "catastrophe, "' which gave sympathetic 
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coverage to the American arm of the Nato political leadership, as Nato prepared to 
launch its campaign. 
There was more evidence of the media reporting the war from a Nato perspective on 
March 25th, the day after the Nato campaign began. The Independent had Blair 
declaring We must end vile oppression' in their first article, and also featured Clinton, 
Robertson and Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, as prominent sources; 
the article also talked of Nato's `forensic accuracy' in its bombing. The Times had 
several stories on the Nato bombing from a British perspective on the first day, such 
as `RAF and Navy in onslaught on Serbs', `RAF Harrier missions "ran on rails"', and 
`Allies on full alert for retaliation'; there were also a couple on the American military: 
`Stealth bomber's chance to prove its worth' and `American airmen proud of their 
role'. The Guardian's main article featured William Cohen, Blair and Clinton as the 
first three sources. There were similar articles throughout the Nato campaign, 
including The Times having one with the headline `Cluster-bombing ends frustration 
of Harrier pilots' on April 7th, the day after Aleksinac, and one on the front page of 
The Times on May 10th containing a warm discussion with American B2 pilots 
alongside an article on the bombing of the Chinese embassy. 
Although the Telegraph did not have a front page on the web-site, it often had 
prominent articles with similarly hegemonic headlines for the Nato campaign. On the 
first day, the Telegraph had several headlines that suggested they were viewing the 
war from the Nato perspective, such as: `Nato bombers pound Serb targets', `Leaders 
fear war engulfing Balkans' and `British soldiers ready to deal with revenge attacks'. 
The reporting of Nato's collateral damage in the bombing of Aleksinac seems to be a 
further example, as it was within an article under the title `Harriers go in with cluster 
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bombs', and had MoD and Nato spokespeople as the main sources. It was one of 
several in the Telegraph that framed the previous night as a successful night's 
bombing, with other articles having headlines like `Pilots relieved to have 
accomplished their mission' and `Nato replies to Milosevic peace ploy with new wave 
of air raids'. 
5.2.2.2. Editorials 
Apart from the IoS, the other papers' editorials kept supporting the Nato campaign 
even when they seemed unsure of its strategy or outcome; and setbacks to the 
campaign usually brought calls for an escalation in the campaign rather than a 
cessation. For example, the day after the Nato campaign started, on March 25th, the 
Independent editorial declared it was a deadly gamble, but we are right to strike at 
Milosevic. ' The editorial did not believe it would be a quick and bloodless victory, as 
it thought there are never any simple solutions in the Balkans. This mixture of 
uncertainty and support was apparent in the Independent again on April 11th, when the 
editorial declared: `Foolish as Nato's actions have hitherto been, however, it is in no 
one's interests that Nato should be defeated. ' The editorial offered the argument that 
although Nato had started without clear aims, they could not lose to a semi-dictator. 
On April 17th, The Times editorial showed its continued support for the Nato 
campaign after the Djakovica convoy attack, and deflected its blame onto the Serbs 
when it stated: `That tragic accident, one waiting to happen in the mayhem that the 
Serbs have unleashed, should not deflect Nato from intensifying the air war. ' 
Similarly, on May 10t", the day after the Chinese embassy bombing, The Times 
editorial argued the peace deal Clinton had proposed that week came close to 
undermining the very rationale for Nato's actions, and that Nato should intensify the 
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bombing so that Belgrade needs peace more than anyone. The Independent editorial 
on May 12th was equally resilient to Chinese protests, and declared Nato should stand 
firm in the face of Chinese pressure. 
On May 15th, after Korisa, the Guardian editorial's first heading was 'Nato errs again', 
but the second was `But its cause remains valid'; the content called on Clinton to act 
decisively and escalate the Nato campaign. On May 17th, the Independent editorial 
criticised those members of Nato that wanted a campaign of `immaculate coercion', 
and expected no mistakes and civilian casualties, and argued: `... better to fight a just 
war with both hands tied behind the back than not at all. ' On May 18th, the Guardian 
editorial again focused on trying to guide Nato policy, when it called on Europe to 
unite in supporting the introduction of ground troops, as it would convince American 
politicians and the public about the merits of the policy, and make it easier for Clinton 
to commit US ground troops. 
The NYT had a similar outlook on the Nato campaign in its editorials: on April 7th, the 
editorial considered the Aleksinac casualties unfortunate, but argued that Nato have 
used precision munitions to keep casualties to a minimum, while the Serb forces have 
deliberately targeted civilians in their brutal march across Kosovo. On April 16th, 
after Djakovica, the editorial headline called it a `Grisly Accident in Kosovo', and 
said it should not stop the Nato campaign. On April 29th, the editorial seemed very 
hegemonic when it stated that Clinton was right to tell Congress he should seek 
consent to send ground troops, as that would avoid the divisions and political unrest 
that developed in Vietnam; in other words, the NYT wanted national unity rather than 
a disunity that would probably bring it more sales and revenue. On May 10th, after 
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the Chinese embassy bombing, the NYT editorial argued it was not reason enough to 
suspend the air war, which Washington `has correctly decided to continue. ' 
Even the IoS editorials, which were anti-war throughout the Nato campaign, did not 
want Nato to settle for anything less than a victory. This was evident on April 11th 
when the editorial declared that Nato should not capitulate, and needed something 
they could call victory. Moreover, on April 18th, after the Djakovica convoy attack, 
the editorial headline was `Accidents happen in the fog and fury of war', and it 
opened with the sentence: `The bombing of the refugees was appalling but it was not 
deliberately evil; pilot error is not. ' So even the IoS showed signs of hegemony, and 
wanted a Nato `victory', despite being opposed to the use of military force. 
5.2.2.3. National leaders 
As well as supporting the Nato campaign, most of the British media sources also 
seemed to focus on Blair out of the Nato political leaders, with The Times giving him 
a particularly comprehensive and positive coverage. This seemed to be particularly 
true at the end of April, when Blair was encouraging Clinton to consider sending 
ground troops into Kosovo, and seemed to be taking the lead in trying to escalate the 
Nato campaign. For example, on April 19th, The Times editorial seemed to take a 
similar line to that of the NYT on Clinton and Congress, when it suggested Labour 
will face a tougher challenge in the House of Commons today, and decisive leadership 
is essential. Then, on the front page of April 21 St, The Times' main headline was 
`Blair says defeat of Milosevic is moral imperative for Nato'; on April 22°d, the main 
story on the front page was Blair on the possibility of a ground invasion; on April 23 81, 
the headline on the front page was `Hawk Blair stiffens US resolve', while `Blair 
convinced Milosevic will fall in wake of Apache assault' was a headline on page 16; 
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the editorial headline on April 24th was `Blair in America', while `Blair defends 
strategy as 10 die in TV centre attack' was a headline on page fifteen. However, on 
April 27t", the article `No 10 denies Clinton clipped Blair's wings' seemed to signal 
the end of Blair's attempt to pressure Clinton into sending in ground troops, and the 
Times' coverage of Blair then went back to normal. 
5.2.2.4. The conflict on the ground 
The Main People variable analysis found the Telegraph gave the ethnic-Albanians the 
most positive coverage in comparison to the Serbs, while The Times gave the most 
balanced coverage; this suggests it was not down to right and left differences, as they 
were the two most right-wing media sources in the study. Examples of the seemingly 
different outlooks of the papers can be seen at the start of the campaign: whereas on 
The Times' March 25th front page it stated the campaign was the first military 
offensive against a sovereign state in Nato's history, the next day the Telegraph's 
Patrick Bishop wrote: `All over the former Yugoslavia yesterday, as the drone of 
bomber engines faded, hundreds of thousands of Muslims, Croats and Albanians were 
thinking the same, warming thought. At long last, they were saying to each other, 
Slobodan Milosevic has had a taste of his own bitter medicine. '332 
The KLA usually had a much more positive coverage than the Serb military in the 
media sources analysed, and a good comparison to show how there seemed to be 
some selective reporting was in the coverage of Arkan and Mladic, Serbians who had 
been involved in `ethnic cleansing' in the Balkans wars, but who probably weren't in 
Kosovo, and Agim Ceku, a KLA leader who had been involved in `ethnic cleansing' 
Serbs from the Krajina during the Serbo-Croat war, and who was definitely in Kosovo. 
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On March 29th, a Telegraph article under the headline `Ethnic cleanser Arkan is 
spotted near Pristina' began with the paragraph 'A NOTORIOUS Serbian 
paramilitary commander accused of massacres in Croatia and Bosnia has been spotted 
in Kosovo, George Robertson, the Defence Secretary, said yesterday. ' A couple of 
weeks later, on April 15th, another Telegraph article titled `Bosnian killer "back in 
action"', featured George Robertson's claims that Mladic was also in Kosovo. In 
contrast, on May 13th, the Guardian reported that Agim Ceku was the new KLA chief 
of staff, and mentioned he commanded Croatian forces in the Kraj ina; but instead of 
describing him as having been involved in ethnic cleansing during `Operation Storm', 
it was termed driving out: `... Operation Storm in which the Croats drove the Serbs 
out of Krajina... ' So there is a bit of a difference between the terms ethnic cleansing 
and driving out, although it was a similar process. The FT also had a small story on 
Ceku on May 4th, with no ethnic cleansing mentioned. However, on June 5th, near the 
end of the Nato campaign, and after Milosevic had agreed to withdraw the Serb 
military from Kosovo, the Independent's Fisk was predicting the infamous Agim 
Ceku, who cleansed 170,000 Serbs in the Krajina, will cleanse the remaining Serbs 
from Kosovo. 
The `revelation' of Ceku's past in the last week of the Nato campaign is one example 
of how negative aspects of the KLA seemed to be largely left off the media agenda 
until the last week of the Nato campaign, when several columnists predicted they 
would take revenge on the Serb population left in Kosovo. The dominant image of 
the KLA during most of the Nato campaign was one of heroic freedom fighters, with 
article headlines such as `KLA mountain men take fight back to Serbs', `Song in the 
332 Patrick Bishop., Milosevic has a taste of his own medicine, at 
http: //www. tele(, rapli. co. uk/htmlContent. ihtinl? html=/archive/1999/03/26/wkose26. html, Friday, 
March 26 `h, 1999. 
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mists that drove the enemy away' (both Telegraph, April 19th), and `Amateur army 
learns on the job' (Guardian, May 12th) typifying their coverage. This seemed to 
change in the last week of the Nato campaign, when the conflict was nearing the end, 
and there were warnings of a new wave of killing by the KLA, and the purging of the 
Serb population from Kosovo; examples of this were the Telegraph articles `KLA 
threatens new wave of killing' (June 4th) and `The Serbs will blame us - and they'll 
have a point' (June 9th). However, media professionals would probably argue that the 
KLA threat to Serb civilians was not relevant news until near the end of the Nato 
campaign, when it became apparent the KLA would be able to return to a Kosovo 
emptied of the Serb military and police. 
5.2.2.5. Falling Domino 
Although Steve Crawshaw, writing in the IoS on May 2°d, was proved correct when 
he wrote `Mr. Milosevic does not like to fight on two fronts at the same time, ' the 
`falling domino' frame was regularly used by Nato and the media whenever there was 
any conflict between the Serbs and their neighbours. This may be an example of the 
media following the Nato line too much, although sometimes it was the Serbs' 
Balkans neighbours who were expressing their concerns, rather than the Nato 
spokespeople. The media's use of this frame may also have been a reaction to events 
rather than hegemonic reporting, or simply to offer their audience a new angle on the 
conflict when the other news was becoming too repetitive. Some of the examples of 
the falling domino frame in the UK media were: The Times on the Serb threat to 
Albania and Macedonia (March 27th); the Guardian on Montenegrin fears (April 3rd); 
the Guardian and Independent on a Serb incursion into Albania (April 14th), and the 
FT on a Serb incursion into Montenegro (April 21S). The falling domino frame was 
also evident in the NYT, with the editorial on May 5th an example of this; as it accused 
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Milosevic of using the war to sabotage his `most formidable political rival, ' Milo 
Djukanovic, the Montenegrin president. In the event, the only significant widening of 
conflict in the Balkans resulting from the Kosovo Conflict was the remnants of the 
KLA taking their struggle for ethnic-Albanian civil rights into Macedonia. 
Conclusion 
The concepts of the hegemonic and plural media have therefore been helpful in 
providing guiding principles for this analysis, and the results suggest the two models 
can exist together. This is because on a higher, or unconscious level, hegemonic 
ideology seemed to influence the media to frame the Nato campaign in line with the 
Nato perspective; while on a lower, or conscious level, the media professionals tried 
to supply news in line with the plural model, as they included bad news for Nato, such 
as collateral damage, and tried to provide as balanced a coverage as their ideology and 
culture would allow them. Therefore, the media did not seem to be trying to be 
propagandists for Nato as alleged by propaganda theorists, or to be unnecessarily 
critical of the Nato military operations as alleged by the British Government; they 
were just trying to provide a plural coverage within hegemonic constraints. While 
their professionalism urged them to provide a balanced account of the Kosovo 
Conflict, their ideology and culture limited how objective the news coverage appeared 
in the published copy. 
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6. Interviews 
Having analysed the quantitative results, it was thought useful to put some of the main 
points brought up by the analysis to the journalists that had been involved in the 
reporting of Nato's Kosovo campaign, to see whether the journalists thought the 
results accurately reflected how they experienced and observed the Nato campaign, 
and the media's relationship with Nato and those involved. Interviews were therefore 
conducted with eight British journalists involved in the Kosovo campaign; with the 
questions focusing on issues brought up by the theory and results previously discussed 
in this study. This chapter is split into three main sections, and several sub-sections; 
the three main sections focus on the reporting of the Kosovo Conflict, the media's 
reporting of conflicts involving their country's military, and news culture. There were 
four journalists interviewed from The Times (Michael Binyon, Charles Bremner, 
Simon Jenkins and Matthew Parris), two from the Guardian (Stephen Bates and 
Richard Norton-Taylor), one from the Independent (Thomas Sutcliffe), and one from 
the IoS (Rachel Sylvester). Hereafter, the journalists are referred to by their surnames. 
Bremner and Bates were at the Nato conferences in Brussels; Parris and Sutcliffe were 
in the House of Commons; Binyon was a diplomatic editor; Norton-Taylor was a 
defence editor; Jenkins was a columnist, while Sylvester was a news reporter. 
6.1. Reporting the Kosovo Conflict 
6.1.1. Nato conferences and spin 
Those journalists who had been in contact with Nato leaders and spokespeople during 
the Nato campaign were asked about their experiences, to try and identify how their 
relationship had developed, and whether they felt empathy with them because of their 
nationality, or if they maintained an unattached independence; this has relevance for 
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the question of how significant hegemonic influence is on source use by journalists 
reporting conflicts involving their own military. 
There was a general feeling amongst the journalists interviewed that Nato and New 
Labour had been spinning the war; but it was to be expected, and the journalists were 
prepared for it. Bates and Bremner, who were at the Nato conferences in Brussels for 
the Guardian and The Times, seemed to have a good opinion of the Nato 
spokespeople, and Bates' working for the Guardian did not seem to have heightened 
his cynicism of the Nato media operation. Bates, who acknowledged he is not a 
defence or international affairs correspondent, seemed to reminisce fondly of `a 
surreal experience, going to a big hangar each day for the briefings; ' and seemed to 
excuse Nato's spin when saying they had been `as open and honest as they could have 
been under the circumstances, ' and that `they had a difficult job keeping to the 
media's deadlines. ' Bremner, who said he had covered several wars in the past, 
considered the Nato conferences to have `become a very British affair after Campbell 
went out to Brussels, ' and seemed to show pride in the fact that `the British have a 
reputation for being the best communicators in Europe. ' Bremner acknowledged 
Nato had been very hospitable to the journalists, and there was a certain amount of 
socialising with the Nato spokespeople. Bremner considered that `Nato had wildly 
exaggerated the accuracy of their bombing, ' but defended The Times' reporting of it 
by emphasising they `had not reported it as fact; only as Nato reports. ' Recollecting 
Braestrup's view that most journalists attending the allied conferences in the Gulf 
War were inexperienced, Bremner had the same opinion on the journalists at Nato's 
Kosovo conferences, as he said Nato `had a captive audience. Most of the journalists 
there were not war journalists; they were just covering a beat. ' 
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The journalists covering the Nato campaign in the UK were also aware of spin and 
propaganda in the New Labour and Nato information, but defended their use of it by 
saying they had to use the information, as the public want to hear the government and 
Nato leaders' opinions. For example, Sylvester said that `Campbell used to feed 
journalists regular stories of Serb atrocities in Kosovo, and the tabloids completely 
took the Nato line, reporting it on the front pages, but the quality press were more 
cautious, and reported it as uncorroborated if there was no proof. ' Norton-Taylor was 
more critical of the Nato media operation, and especially of Campbell's spinning of 
intelligence information, which he saw as a precursor to Campbell's use of the 
weapons of mass destruction dossier that led the UK into the Iraq War in 2003; 
Norton-Taylor considered the Nato spin-doctors had `grossly exaggerated how much 
Serb armour they'd hit, ' `milked the refugee situation, ' and `focused on how bad 
Milosevic was, while keeping cluster bombs and civilian casualties quiet. ' Jenkins, 
who as a columnist did not attend New Labour and Nato conferences, but had his own 
`expert' sources, said he `was aware the government had a particular agenda; hyping 
the situation on the ground to get the Americans to send ground troops in; ' this 
suggests Jenkins considered that Blair and New Labour wanted ground troops from 
early in the Nato campaign, and this would mean the media calling for ground troops 
was not necessarily against the New Labour strategy, and therefore could have been 
hegemonic rather than unhegemonic. When Parris was asked if he thought Kosovo 
would be remembered as the war of spin, as the New Labour spin doctors were at the 
peak of their powers at the time of their takeover of the Nato media operation, Parris 
said `no, because governments always spin; spin is like a virus, always developing 
new strains, as resistance to it in one form grows. Therefore, spin doctors like 
Campbell have a limited shelf-life. ' 
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6.1.2. Influences on the media's view of the Kosovo conflict 
When asked what historic conflict they thought influenced the media's reporting of 
the Nato campaign, and remembering that World War Two had more references than 
the Balkans wars in the historical references quantitative analysis, which was 
conducted to identify cultural influences on the journalists' reporting, Parris and 
Bremner did not seem to think World War Two had been a relevant parallel, as the 
Serbs had been Britain's allies during that war. Parris did not think the media were 
influenced in their coverage by World War Two, because Britain was allied with the 
Serbs during that war. ' Parris thought `the media saw the Kosovo conflict as a clear 
story of good and evil, and Milosevic was so out of order the Albanians had to be the 
heroes, as there cannot be any ambivalence in the media. ' Similarly, Bremner said: 
`the reason Nato had a positive media coverage in the UK was because there was a 
general consensus that the Albanians were being beaten up by the Serbs. ' 
Parris, Bremner, Bates and Binyon all had the view that the West had not intervened 
early enough in the previous Balkans wars, and this had influenced the way they 
viewed the Kosovo conflict. Parris said `those journalists who had not criticised the 
Serbs early enough in the previous Balkans wars felt they had lost a little authority 
after the truth came out from Bosnia; ' Bates said `journalists felt something should 
have been done earlier in the previous Balkans wars; ' Bremner said `Kosovo was a bit 
of a relief, because journalists had felt impotent in the earlier wars, ' and Binyon said 
`journalists thought all sorts were going on in Kosovo because of the earlier Balkans 
wars. ' Binyon also added that `the emotional hangover felt by journalists from the 
previous Balkans wars left them more open to influence by anti-Serb propaganda, and 
this meant there was some bad reporting in assuming from a couple of massacres that 
thousands were being killed. The Serbs were therefore demonised for much more 
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than what was going on in Kosovo, and after the end of the Kosovo Conflict the 
Macedonian ethnic-Albanians took advantage by rising up and demanding more civil 
rights. ' 
Some of the journalists were then questioned about whether (1) historical reasons, (2) 
the way the Kosovo Conflict had been spun inaccurately, or (3) the circumstances of 
the conflicts, were the biggest influence on there being more UK media criticism of 
the Iraq war in 2003 than the Kosovo conflict. There was a general consensus across 
the political spectrum that it was the circumstances of the conflicts, and this suggests 
that the inaccuracies of the Nato information during the Kosovo campaign had not had 
a lasting effect on the journalists' opinion. Jenkins, who opposed both wars, said he 
thought `Kosovo was a sub-set of Bosnia, and the difference in coverage with the Iraq 
war was because of the refugee situation in Kosovo; ' Sylvester also thought `it was 
more that the context for going to war was completely different; ' while Bates said `the 
influences on the media coverage were a mixture of journalistic, cultural and political. 
Kosovo was more clear-cut than Iraq; morally and politically, and there was no doubts 
about whether Nato had provoked it. ' Bates added that `the general view of Nato's 
Kosovo campaign was that Milosevic and his cronies were a nasty opportunistic 
bunch, and they were set on oppressing large numbers of people. ' Sutcliffe also 
thought `it was the difference in the conflict situations that influenced the media 
coverage, ' but also stressed outside influences on the media `as public and political 
support for Nato's Kosovo campaign was more unanimous than for the Iraq war. ' 
Despite the results and discussion showing The Times was the most supportive of 
Blair in his efforts to influence the Americans on ground troops, their writers seemed 
to accept the US was the alliance's leader, and therefore did not over-estimate the 
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UK's power and influence; Bremner said the `British are usually more willing to back 
the US in military campaigns than other European countries for all kinds of historical 
reasons; ' while Parris emphasised the American influence on the Times' world-view 
when he said that `because of their instinctual pro-Americanism, The Times' views of 
state and sovereignty have changed since Kosovo, and they are more accepting of a 
disregard for national sovereignty, and even the UN, if they think intervention is 
justified. ' Jenkins considered `the British government and military were keen to play 
a leading role in Nato's campaign because it was a natural British instinct from our 
imperialist past; when we see a bad man we think we should help, while most other 
countries do not have that urge. ' 
Sylvester also thought Blair's attitude was `modern imperialism, ' and thought the 
Kosovo media coverage was driven by 'Blair's belief in using the military to solve 
international crises, as seen in the parallels with the New Labour rhetoric on the Iraq 
war; Blair saw both as moral wars between good and evil. ' Sylvester also considered 
the British media's focus on refugees was influenced by Blair and the New Labour 
media operation, as Nato used images of the refugees to `emphasise the effects of evil; 
showing the refugees made it a clear moral issue. ' 
6.1.3. Was the Nato campaign a success? 
When asked if they thought the Nato military campaign had been a success, there was 
mixed opinions, and the journalists did not seem to have changed their views since the 
Nato campaign. Bates, Sylvester and Bremner thought the Nato campaign was 
generally a success, but were quite elusive about it, as they said they had not really 
followed it since the Nato campaign, and this seems evidence of how journalists who 
do not have a continuing interest in a conflict soon lose track of the situation. 
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Bremner, who is now the Paris correspondent for The Times, acknowledged that 
4 some people have said the Serbs had a hard time afterwards, and were ethnically- 
cleansed, ' but he still considered the Nato campaign to have been a success because of 
its immediate impact in 1999: `it seemed to have achieved what it set out to do. ' 
Bates, who is now a religious affairs correspondent for the Guardian, limited his 
opinion to the objectives of the Nato campaign, as he considered it a success in that it 
`stopped the persecution and ethnic-cleansing of the ethnic-Albanians. ' In contrast, 
Sylvester, who is now a columnist for the Telegraph, took into consideration the long- 
term effect of the Nato campaign, and said she had heard `Kosovo is a better place 
now, from people who had been there. ' Sutcliffe also considered the long-term 
effects of the Nato campaign, and admitted he does `not really know if Nato's 
campaign was a success, as it was not on the media agenda now; ' agreeing with 
Iyengar et al on the limitations of episodic reporting, he added that `the attention span 
of the news media, and how ambiguous conflicts are not covered, are issues needing 
investigation. ' 
Parris and Jenkins had not changed their opinions since Nato's campaign, which they 
opposed, and did not think the Nato intervention had been a success; Parris thought 
`the Nato campaign was the start of a long and expensive peace-keeping mission that 
is going to end in partition; a solution that would have been possible without 
completely humiliating the Serbs. ' Jenkins thought that as well as the Nato campaign 
being the start of an expensive peace-keeping mission, `it legitimised a disparate 
separatist movement, split up what was left of Yugoslavia, and stopped one 
population movement but started another. ' 
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6.2. Journalistic reporting of conflicts involving their nation's military 
6.2.1. The media's use of sources 
When asking journalists about the media's relationship with politicians during 
conflicts involving their own military, and putting to them the findings from previous 
hegemonic studies; that the media rely too much on elite government and military 
sources, most of the journalists acknowledged there were deficiencies in the media's 
source use, but cited practical limitations on their work as the reason, rather than it 
being a part of a conspiracy, or influenced by national biases. 
After Hallin's Vietnam War findings were cited in the interview with Bremner, as an 
example of how hegemonic theorists believe the media have relied too much on 
government sources in past conflicts, Bremner disagreed with Hallin's version of 
events; while evoking memories of watching the Australian media coverage of the 
Vietnam War. Bremner said he `remembered journalists criticising US policy before 
the breakdown in the political consensus. ' On the UK media, he said `papers do take 
crusading lines against the government and military, as the Guardian, Independent 
and Mirror have done over the Iraq war, although he acknowledged there had also 
been a lot of public and political opinion against the Iraq war, and so it was unclear 
whether the above media sources had acted independently. ' Binyon also defended the 
journalistic use of official sources when he said `it was difficult to balance sources in 
any war, and access to Serbia was the main problem in balancing sources during the 
Kosovo conflict, as the costs and dangers involved were too much for most media 
organisations. ' 
Sutcliffe also pointed out that `the British media did not only report from the Nato 
perspective in Kosovo, and in Iraq there has been even more criticism of the 
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government. ' Sutcliffe defended the journalistic reliance on official sources as being 
because of `the difficulties journalists have in finding credible sources; ' he thought 
the GUMG lose sight of the realities and hardships journalists face when reporting 
conflicts; journalists have to judge issues while being fed propaganda, that they have 
deadlines they often struggle to meet, and that it is usually dangerous and time 
consuming to check facts during war-time. ' Sutcliffe added that it `therefore should 
not be a surprise that journalists go to sources that are credible and available during 
conflicts; during the Kosovo conflict the war-zone had been cleared of independent 
journalists by the Serbs, and Nato sources were considered more reliable than the 
Serbs. ' Norton-Taylor was quite opposed to the use of independent sources in 
military situations, as he said `experts' had got him `into trouble during the 
Afghanistan war in 2001, with inaccurate predictions. ' He believes `it is very difficult 
to get knowledgeable sources in military conflicts, and that independent "experts" can 
only give an overview, as they don't know any more than journalists. ' When asked 
about using members of the public as sources, he seemed shocked at the thought, and 
said `that wouldn't be very professional would it? ' 
However, some journalists offered hope for a wider use of sources, with Parris 
acknowledging `it is easier to get alternative sources now than in the past. ' Parris 
agreed there `is always an uncomfortable dependence on official government and 
military sources during conflicts, and the modem media are aware of this, and they do 
try and let the audience know they are subjected to censorship and uncorroborated 
information. ' Sylvester said there was a `feeling in the media that more independent 
sources are needed, ' although like Norton-Taylor, she said `you have to be careful, as 
they might not be accurate; ' she believes `the BBC recommended using more 
independent sources in their reporting after a recent review. ' Bates also agreed that 
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`journalists should use as wide a variety of sources as possible, as long as the 
audience is told who has said what, and in what context, so they can then make an 
informed judgement on what to believe. ' 
On the use of domestic anti-war political sources, there was a general consensus that 
the media used sources to reflect the political and public view on the war. Although 
hegemony and indexing studies have criticised the media for relying too much on 
prominent politicians, and not featuring enough alternative opinions, the journalists 
clearly did not think they were obliged to report all back-bench criticism, and did not 
consider the expected anti-war politicians to be particularly newsworthy. In this 
regard, they reflect Ian Stewart's view that back-bench anti-war politicians are treated 
as mavericks even by their own parties, and are therefore also marginalised by the 
media. For example, Norton-Taylor emphasised `a lack of emphasis on anti-war 
sources is not a conspiracy, it was just that the usual anti-war politicians are not 
considered news. ' This was supported by Sutcliffe and Parris; Sutcliffe said `it was 
news when Michael Howard broke cross-party front bench unity, and it would be 
news if Benn had supported Blair, but Benn being anti-war is expected, and therefore 
not news. ' Parris thinks `political opinion is only headline news if the Commons is 
split, and it is inappropriate if it becomes the story otherwise. ' Parris thought `the 
anti-war left stopped some of the more mainstream politicians being more critical of 
the Nato campaign, as it was a case of whether you were on the loony left or not. ' 
Parris also considered `the media overdid the collateral damage coverage in Kosovo, 
and that might have distracted attention from the issue of the failure of the original 
war aims; ' this supports the theory that the media concentrate their criticisms too 
much on aspects of the continuing military campaign, while neglecting to reflect on 
-X 
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the question of the justification and success of the campaign in relation to its original 
rationale and objectives. 
6.2.2. Patriotism 
The general view was that editorials and opinion were often influenced by patriotism, 
but news reporting should be objective, and therefore not show signs of patriotism. 
However, there were differences of opinion within those broad generalisations. For 
example, Parris thought hegemonic influence should be expected at The Times, 
because `it sees itself as the national voice, and the presumption of the editor is 
therefore to support the country at war, unless there is an overwhelming reason not 
to. ' Bates, who is with the left-wing Guardian, also seemed to think some hegemonic 
influence could be expected in journalistic reporting of your nation's military, as he 
acknowledged that `journalists are members of a society, and you want your side to 
win to a certain extent, but that does not mean you accept everything your side tells 
you, and negative news should be reported as accurately as possible. ' Binyon also 
acknowledged that `patriotism influences opinion and comment, because views are 
being expressed, and the views of the journalists are influenced by their background 
and culture; ' however, he considered that `reporting should be objective', and `there is 
no room for patriotism in it, the media cannot do a government propaganda job during 
conflicts involving their military. ' Jenkins also emphasised that `journalists have an 
obligation to tell the truth. ' 
On the particular difficulties involved in reporting from the war-zone, Bremner, who 
has reported from Central American and Middle Eastern war-zones, admitted 
he felt 
he `could report more objectively when not reporting on the British military; ' 
although he also said journalists were `completely obliged to report negative news 
for 
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their military, as long as it did not endanger lives and operations, so there is a thin line 
between what journalists should and should not report, and journalists do what their 
instinct tells them. ' Against the notion of a particular hegemonic influence on 
journalistic reporting from war-zones, Sutcliffe considered that journalists are `likely 
to develop empathy with whoever they are with in a war-zone, whether they are 
embedded with their country's troops or with the enemy. ' 
There was also a feeling that the media could be too critical of the British government 
and military because they are the most noticeable and easily attacked, and this concurs 
with the results and discussion sections of this study; although Nato were the focus of 
most articles, that did not mean they always had a positive coverage, as their 
evaluations were often negative. This goes against the Propaganda model view of the 
media, which considers the media to be subservient lap-dogs of the government- 
military elites. For example, Sylvester thought the IoS's anti-war stance during 
Nato's Kosovo campaign was legitimate because `that was how the editors genuinely 
felt at the time, but the BBC went too far on Iraq, in distorting information to 
undermine the government. ' Norton-Taylor also thought `there is a danger we put our 
own troops under more of a microscope, and this can mean the news is sometimes 
slanted against the British military. ' Bremner also cited `regular friction between the 
military and the media in the UK as a sign that the military-media relationship is not 
always a comfortable one, and that the media are often too independent for the 
military's liking. ' 
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6.2.3. Historical references 
A couple of the interviewees also offered insights into why historical references were 
used by journalists when they report military conflicts, and these concurred with those 
featured in the theory section, such as Wolfsfeld's view that `having established the 
mode of reporting, journalists then attempt to find historical examples to fit the story, 
and questions of which historical example offers the most appropriate frame often 
becomes a matter for public debate. '333 For example, Binyon said it is important for 
`journalists to be aware of the public's collective memories and consciousness when 
they are writing, ' and this often leads to them `drawing parallels with the past; ' while 
Sutcliffe explained that: `journalists are usually working under pressure, and look for 
narrative short-cuts to give shape to their reports; if they are in a trench they think of 
World War One. ' These views emphasise the fact that journalists are just like other 
members of the public, and they have to draw on their cultural and historical 
knowledge to make sense of new information; they then have to re-produce the new 
information in a coherent form which will interest their audience, and this often 
means drawing historical parallels with previous conflicts they think their readers will 
connect with, as an explanatory short-cut. 
6.3. News culture 
6.3.1. The journalists' views on management, politicial and public influence 
When I asked Michael Binyon about criticisms that the British media's coverage of 
the Nato campaign was either too propagandistic, according to left-wing critical 
theorists, or too open to Serb sources according to New Labour, he said `Well, that 
makes me think we got it about right. ' This view was mirrored by his Times 
333 G. Wolfsfeld., op. cit, p. 50-51. 
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colleague Charles Bremner, who was shocked to hear evidence had been found of the 
media relying too much on government and Nato sources, and responded in an e-mail 
follow-up to his telephone interview: `the British media do a fairly good job at 
distancing themselves from the Government and official line, though all sorts of 
influences make this an imperfect process. The ideal reporter positions him/herself as 
a reasonable witness who applies common sense to the events they observe. 
Inevitably, to make it into the paper or onto the air the story has to be told with an 
angle that attracts attention. This usually conforms to the culture prevailing over the 
viewers, listeners and readers. So it's difficult to say how much the media lead and 
shape opinion and how much they reflect the establishment outlook. ' 
This view of a relatively independent media environment, with the journalists 
interacting with politicians and public opinion in a circle of influence, was supported 
by most of the other journalists, and their views of the media environment are more in 
line with cascade theory than hegemony or indexing. They also stressed that the 
amount of independence from editorial control, and freedom of opinion, depended on 
the position of the journalist. For example, Sylvester said `there are no controls on 
columnists, and my opinions often disagree with the editorials. ' Jenkins and Binyon 
also emphasised that news reporters are expected to write objectively, while 
columnists are free to give their independent opinions. Jenkins thought those who 
have criticised the media about this `have grossly over-emphasised management 
controls; I have occasionally seen extreme pressure used, but not regularly; ' he 
thought `the editorial team conforms to editorial opinion, and there is usually an angle 
to news, but columnists are independent. ' Binyon generally agreed with Jenkins, and 
also acknowledged news usually has an angle, which seems to be the journalistic term 
for a frame: `columnists have latitude; newspaper analysts are supposed to provide a 
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fair representation of the facts, while news stories are supposed to be objective and 
balanced, but often have an angle. ' Binyon also pointed out that `newspapers are first 
of all businesses, and journalists collectively hunt around in packs, looking for 
different angles on the same story. ' In contrast to the hegemonic and indexing 
theories, which stress a top-down influence on journalistic output, and in line with 
cascade theory, Binyon said journalists wrote with more awareness of public opinion 
than political opinion; newspapers lead and follow public opinion. Parris' views were 
also in line with cascade theory, as he stressed `journalists often think their own 
opinions are those of their audience, and politicians mistake newspapers' opinions for 
public opinion. ' Binyon and Jenkins' views also reflect Anthony Smith's view that 
The Times does not want to stand too far ahead or behind its readers. 
Although Sutcliffe also thought public opinion was an important influence on the 
media, he said politicians could sometimes be more influential because you are going 
to have them phoning you, so they have a more direct influence than public opinion. ' 
Therefore, Sutcliffe considers `it's true that politicians can usually set the agenda, but 
its hard to see how journalists can go against the big picture; as newsrooms are in the 
grip of a `tidal news flow', and other news organisations are going to be reporting the 
same story. ' Sutcliffe's views are therefore more in line with hegemony and indexing 
theories than cascade theory. 
6.3.2. Changes in the politics-media relationship 
In opposition to the theory that politicians and the media enjoy a static, unified 
relationship, several journalists talked of the break-down in trust and sympathy 
between politicians and the media in modern Britain, and how the relationship now 
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seems to be one of competition and distrust, rather than cooperation and trust. This is 
in line with the right-wing view of the media, which considers the media have 
become too powerful; it is also more in line with cascade theory than hegemony 
theory, as hegemony theory considers the media subservient to the government. An 
example of this view was espoused by Sutcliffe, who explained `there is now distrust 
between politicians and the media, because politicians think the media will 
misinterpret them, and so they spin their information, and then the spin makes the 
media more suspicious and negative towards politicians, which makes the politicians 
more wary of the journalists. ' 
Parris also thought there had been a turn-around in the media-political relationship, 
with the media `now more self- confident, and with most politicians not seeming to 
have a clear direction. ' Sylvester considers `the media-political relationship changes 
with the standing of the politicians and government; New Labour was followed by 
most of the media when it was elected, because it was seen as positive and strong, but 
then spin became the story, and the balance has now shifted to a stronger media; 
which is more independent and sceptical of the New Labour government. ' Binyon 
agreed with John Lloyd's view that `the media have become too powerful in 
comparison to politicians, ' but did not think the media influenced Blair on ground 
troops during the Kosovo conflict; instead, he thought `Blair knew what he wanted 
from the start, and was using the media to create a "climate of opinion". ' Sylvester, 
who said the move from the IoS to the Telegraph had not changed her left-wing 
political opinion, still considers `there can be too much media cynicism, and that it 
can become unnecessarily destructive if taken to extremes. ' 
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As well as a change in the power relationship between the media and politics, Jenkins 
has also noticed `a change in both politics and the media towards the political centre, ' 
and Parris considers this has meant `there is a certain amount of confusion about who 
to support at The Times, rather than any real deep change in political beliefs. ' Binyon 
explained that The Times is traditionally centre-right, and usually supports the Tories, 
but there had been a great shift in politics, and they were now supporting Labour at 
the moment because they think Blair gets his policies right most of the time. 
However, Binyon believed the biggest change in the media is that the press have been 
marginalised, and influence and authority in the media has moved to television. 
6.3.3. UK and US journalism 
Asked whether they thought UK journalism had a similar watchdog ethic to the US, 
there was a difference of opinion on UK journalism, but an almost unanimously 
critical view of the American journalistic tradition in respect to their watchdog ideal. 
With reference to the UK media, Sylvester thought `the best UK journalists do have a 
similar watchdog ethic, such as in the broadsheets, ' and said she had a similar ethic, 
as she had `entered journalism with the aim of reporting the truth. ' Sutcliffe also 
thought that serious journalists in the UK `believe they have a constitutional function; 
a questioning role to play in society, and there is more of a tradition for healthy 
dissent to the government in the UK media than the US. ' Both Jenkins and Bates 
thought the UK media gets its plurality from the broad spectrum of titles and political 
views, while Binyon thought `The Times was more flexible, quicker to the story, 
braver and livelier than the NYT. ' Bremner and Parris both thought the UK 
broadsheets have become more like watchdogs recently; Parris thought the UK has 
followed the US, ' while Bremner thought `the UK media had been more gossipy and 
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informal before, with more of a `rock n' roll ethic than watchdog. ' Similarly, Jenkins 
thought `the UK media tradition is more ratfink than watchdog. ' 
Concerning the US media's image of being watchdogs for the public, Parris thought 
`the NYT do have the ideal, but not the rest of the US media. ' Sylvester thought the 
US media are much more patriotic in their reporting than the UK, ' while Sutcliffe 
thought `it is harder to distinguish patriotism and slavish following of government 
information in the US media than the UK, ' and cited Fox news' reporting as an 
example. Jenkins thought `the US media could be very pompous in the way they 
view themselves, ' and this was evident in their post-Iraq war apology for not 
strenuously analysing and criticising the US government information prior to the war. 
Norton-Taylor also thought `the NYT should have reported Iraq better, as they have 
the resources, ' and in line with hegemonic theory's view that the American media 
react to events rather than criticise them before, he also thought the NYT criticisms of 
the government were `all mea culpa, ' and that they should have been more sceptical 
before, as the Guardian was. Binyon also thought the NYT is `very pompous, in 
thinking it is the voice of the US, when in reality it is predictable and slow. ' Binyon 
also criticised `their supposed objectivity, ' as he believed it `does not go beyond the 
framework of the American view. ' Bremner also thought `the US media takes itself 
too seriously, ' while Parris thought `the US media is very parochial. ' 
An American Perspective on the difference between UK and US journalism 
The less serious and self-important, but more opinionated, image British journalists 
seem to have of themselves, and their profession, in comparison to the American 
media, and particularly the NYT, seems to have been confirmed by Sarah Lyall, the 
London correspondent of the NYT, although she disagreed with those interviewees 
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who claimed news reporting was objective, and opinion was left to the columnists. 
Her view of the British press seems to support the interviewees' opinion of their 
plurality through the spectrum of opinion, and also suggests they are less hegemonic 
than the American media. 
Lyall observed that: `British newspapers have always taken a point of view; this 
makes them fun as well as infuriating. Because their readers are more fickle and 
demanding than in the past, the papers have to work doubly hard to distinguish 
themselves from one another, to sparkle at the newsstand, to take a point of view, to 
draw consumers in. This smorgasbord of coverage is one reason that I read as many 
papers as I can each day.... Unfortunately, all of this reading brings you no closer to 
any objective truth. With so many points of view, so much spinning, and so much 
news-page editorializing (British papers don't tend to make the same distinction 
between news and editorial pages that American papers do, considering everything 
part of the same agenda-pursuing whole), it can seem impossible to answer the 
simplest of questions: What happened yesterday? For a newspaper-loving person, 
living in a country with so many perspectives to choose from can be a real liberation. 
And while the levity and sometime immaturity of the British press can be maddening, 
it can also, at times, be a welcome change. When American journalists-with their 
high-minded principles, their snooty self-regard, their First Amendment-confront 
Britons about the lack of seriousness in their papers, Britons generally counter with 
complaints about the paint-drying tedium of the American press. Most British 
journalists would rather be locked in a broom closet with no food than convey the 
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appearance of taking their profession seriously-even when they do take it seriously. 
And sometimes you start to see their point. '334 
Lyall also described her attendance at the British newspaper awards, and seemed to be 
surprised at the competition and animosity between the different journalists and 
organisations: `The British Press Awards have been called "the Academy Awards of 
British journalism, " Britain's answer to the Pulitzers. But last night's ceremony.. . was 
not a mutually respectful celebration of the British newspaper industry fuelled by 
camaraderie and bonhomie. It was more like a soccer match attended by a club of 
misanthropic inebriates. The losers were not happy for the winners .... 
The rule 
seemed to be that you were allowed to cheer only for awards won by a) someone at 
your own paper; or b) someone at a paper owned by your proprietor (e. g., Rupert 
Murdoch). Otherwise, the etiquette was either to mutter disapprovingly or to drown 
out the winner's acceptance speech by chattering as raucously as possible. '335 Lyall 
also explained why she believes there is more competition and sensationalism in the 
UK press than in the US the next day, and this again corroborated the interviewees' 
opinions: `British national newspapers, scrapping for readers in one of the toughest 
newspaper markets in the world, make much less money from advertising then their 
American counterparts and depend much more heavily on newsstand sales. With so 
many papers to choose from, readers can be fickle, selecting one paper over the other 
because of an enticing headline. '336 
6.4. Conclusion 
The interviews with the journalists suggested the majority felt empathy towards the 
government and Nato, and believed Nato were doing the right thing in going to war in 
334 Sarah Lyall., An American Perspective on the British Press, on the Slate e-magazine, at 
http: //slate. nisn. com/id,, '2114852,18/03/05. 
335 Ibid., 16/03/05. 
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defence of the ethnic-Albanian refugees. However, despite the interviews taking 
place five years after the Nato campaign ended, those journalists who had opposed the 
Nato campaign when it happened had not changed their opinions on whether it had 
been justified and successful. 
The journalists at the conferences knew the Nato spokespeople were spinning the war, 
and the journalists in the UK knew the politicians were distorting the reality of the 
campaign; but it was evident that they expected it, thought it was necessary for Nato 
to spin as they were involved in a propaganda battle, and that it was their job to report 
what they thought was relevant, while warning their readers when it was 
uncorroborated information. The journalists thought that as long as they warned the 
audience it was Nato information they were justified in using it, as there was often a 
lack of alternative sources because the Serbs had closed off Kosovo to independent 
journalists. At times, this attitude resigned the journalists to following the Nato media 
operation's version of events, as they did not consider there was much alternative, and 
this was in line with hegemonic theory and indexing. The journalists did stress 
frequent tensions in the military-media relationship though, and consider this to be 
evidence of their independence from state control. 
The journalists' general opinion of the relationship between politicians and journalists 
was more in line with cascade theory, as they said the media, politicians and public 
opinion all shape each other in a circle of influence similar to that proposed by plural 
theorists. 337 The interviewees' opinions on what was expected of them also differed 
to hegemonic/propaganda theorists' expectations, as they did not think they were 
under any obligation to balance source use equally during the conflict, domestically or 
336 Ibid., 17/03/05. 
337 See figure 2.1. 
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internationally, and were more concerned with reflecting the political and public 
climate in the UK. As Richard Norton-Taylor of the Guardian, who has previously 
undertaken investigatory journalism to expose elite corruption, seemed much more 
hostile to the idea of a wider use of sources than Matthew Parris of The Times, 
journalistic opinion on the use of sources does not seem to be divided between a 
libertarian left-wing and an establishment supporting right-wing. However, Michael 
Binyon does consider The Times thinks of itself as a national voice, and so the paper 
is likely to appear hegemonic. 
Most interviewees considered the relationship between politicians and the media 
changes with administrations and events, and they have plurality in the UK media 
through both independent opinions and the spectrum of political views. Several 
journalists admitted news was usually angled (framed) towards a particular view. 
Most of the journalists were also quite open about the limitations of the British media, 
and these often corresponded to criticisms previously advanced in communications 
studies, such as journalists at conferences lacking expert knowledge, the 
simplification of conflicts to bipolar contests between good and evil, the lack of depth 
in reporting, a focus on continuing events rather than the original objectives, and the 
short attention span of the media. Their criticisms of the American media's image of 
themselves as watchdogs also reflected criticisms espoused by the American media 
analysts featured in the theory section of this study, such as the limits of the American 
media's objectivity to the American world-view, slavish patriotism, and criticising 
government policy mea culpa; after the event rather than before. Sarah Lyall's views 
from an American perspective generally confirmed the British journalist interviewees' 
opinions on the differences between UK and US journalism. 
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7. Conclusion 
7.1. Models and Theories 
Nato's Kosovo campaign was a unique operation, and the findings of this study are 
particular to that war, although as the previous sections in this thesis have highlighted, 
most of the news reporting was similar to the reporting of previous British and 
American conflicts during the twentieth century. This is the first comprehensive 
study of the quality British press' coverage of Britain at war based largely on the 
American hegemony/indexing/cascade research tradition; with a comprehensive 
research scheme that incorporates quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
Past studies have shown that the journalistic tradition of objective reporting has 
opened it up to criticisms from the left and right, and the evidence from this study has 
shown why this is likely to be the case, with critics from either side of the political 
spectrum considering the media had not reported Nato's campaign properly. Before 
this first section of the conclusion focuses on evaluating how accurate the hegemonic, 
indexing and cascade models' expectations are in regard to the Kosovo media 
coverage, it will first explain why the more extreme theories on the right and left were 
thought to be inaccurate descriptions of the UK and US media coverage of Nato's 
Kosovo campaign, and thus were not included as a prominent part of the research 
framework. 
7.1.1. The Propaganda Model 
Although Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model was initiated before the end of 
the Cold War, they did recently defend its premises in a Political Communication 
debate with the Langs. 338 However, the results of this study are often at odds with 
Herman and Chomsky's expectations under the propaganda model, and their 
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predictions of what the news content would be were often found to be inaccurate. For 
example, Herman and Chomsky wrote: `Using a propaganda model... we would also 
expect the news stories about worthy and unworthy victims (or enemy and friendly 
states) to differ in quality. That is, we would expect official sources of the United 
States and its client states to be used heavily - and uncritically - in connection with 
one's own abuses and those of friendly governments, while refugees and other 
dissident sources will be used in dealing with enemies. ' The results showed that 
although the ethnic-Albanian civilians did get much more coverage than the Serb 
civilians; the Serb civilians did receive a qualitatively similar coverage, with regular 
articles emphasising their suffering under the Nato bombing campaign. The reporting 
of the Nato collateral damage also usually led with reports from sources at the scene, 
the local media or Yugoslav official sources. Moreover, while Nato official sources 
were used heavily to explain their collateral damage incidents, they were also 
criticised heavily most of the time. 
Herman and Chomsky also expected that the media would accept `one's own state' 
tells the truth; but the discussion section showed the media openly commented on the 
`propaganda' being released by Nato in a two-way propaganda battle, and warned it 
was often unverified. Herman and Chomsky also: `expect great investigatory zeal in 
the search for enemy villainy... but diminished enterprise in examining such matters 
in connection with one's own and friendly states; ' but the results and discussion 
section showed the media spent as much time investigating the Nato collateral 
damage incidents as the reports of Serb war crimes, and this was especially true of the 
NYT after the Chinese embassy bombing. Although reports of Serb war crimes 
338 See Political Communication, 21 (1), January-March, 2004. 
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initially seemed to be judged very newsworthy by most media sources, they soon 
faded off the front pages as the campaign wore on, and the reports became repetitive. 
Herman and Chomsky also expected the `quality of coverage should also be displayed 
more directly and crudely in placement, headlining, word usage, and other modes of 
mobilising interest and outrage. In the opinion columns, we would anticipate sharp 
restraints on the range of opinion allowed expression; ' 339 however, the results and 
discussion sections showed that loaded words critical of the Nato campaign were 
often used in headlines on the front pages, while the opinion columns were often more 
negative towards Nato than positive. Herman and Chomsky seem to have failed to 
observe the changes in the American media since Korea, as most other American 
media analysts have, and noticed there is enough criticism of the Administration, and 
questioning of their information, to make propaganda an inaccurate description of the 
news content. 
Philip Hammond also argued that the humanitarian dimension to Nato's Kosovo 
campaign meant the left-wing media in the UK had relinquished their role as 
watchdogs, and so the British media during the Kosovo conflict was basically a 
propaganda arm of Nato. Firstly, although the left-wing British media did support the 
Nato campaign, they also supported British military involvement in the Falklands and 
Gulf wars, so there is not as much of a historical change in the media coverage as 
Hammond tries to make out. Moreover, this study found there was quite a high level 
of criticism of the Nato campaign in the British media, and therefore it was not in line 
with the propaganda model. Although the humanitarian dimension to the war did 
make the left-wing media desperate for a Nato victory, it also made it highly critical 
of the Nato policy of only flying above 15,000 feet, as it felt it was doing little to ease 
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the humanitarian crisis for much of the campaign, and was also causing civilian 
casualties. Far from being propagandistic towards Nato, the media's coverage of 
Nato bombs going astray and causing civilian casualties was prominent and consistent, 
and this led to complaints about the media coverage by New Labour leaders. 
7.1.2. Right-wing theory 
Right-wing theorists who claim the media were not patriotic enough, or gave too 
much access to enemy sources, were also found to be unrealistic and inaccurate, and 
their `flak' came as a result of the media being too accurate and truthful in their 
reporting of a faltering Nato campaign in April and early May. All the media sources 
apart from the IoS supported the war, and reported the Kosovo conflict from the Nato 
perspective; even the IoS stated it still wanted a Nato victory, and all the papers tried 
to `guide' Nato towards a conclusion they could call victory. Nato sources gained the 
vast majority of access, and were largely able to frame their campaign in the media as 
a law and order operation to save the ethnic-Albanian refugees from Serb brutality. 
Serb government and military sources were given little access, although this was also 
true for the equivalent ethnic-Albanians. So wasn't the coverage propagandistic then? 
No, the reporting was in line with the values of objective news reporting, as it is for 
other non-conflict international news stories, and so was more cultural than 
propagandistic. If the media had reported the war in the way some British 
government politicians and supporters requested, it would have been in line with the 
`propaganda model, ' and would have risked both a loss of credibility, and the 
disillusionment of their readers. 
7.1.3. Hegemony, Indexing and Cascade theories: the NYT findings 
So, if the propaganda model and right-wing theory are thought to be too extreme in 
339 E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky., op. cit, p. 34-5. 
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their predictions and analyses for the media coverage of Nato's Kosovo campaign, 
how accurate were the more moderate theories that provided the framework for this 
study. As the section on the differences between the UK and US media explained in 
the introduction, the American media have often found it more difficult to accept 
restrictions on their freedom to report, as they consider press freedom a constitutional 
right, while the British press is generally considered more critical of government 
because of the competition they face from each newspaper being in close 
geographical proximity to each other. The NYT was primarily included in this study 
because it provides an international comparison for the UK media, and it is probably 
the media source that has had the most hegemonic/indexing analyses conducted on it. 
Most of those studies have found that although it is a liberal paper, it still relies 
heavily on American government and military sources, and those sources are 
therefore able to construct media frames that show their campaign positively; the 
journalists usually retain their `independence' from government through criticising 
the military tactics rather than the premises of the conflict. 
However, using the NYT to judge the British media's hegemony was difficult, because 
none of the studies that have found the NYT hegemonic conducted research on its 
Kosovo coverage; moreover, Entman considers the American media coverage of 
Nato's Kosovo campaign was an example of how they have become less hegemonic 
since the end of the Cold War, although he analysed magazines. Therefore, whether 
the NYT was as reliant on government sources during the Kosovo conflict as it was in 
the previous American conflicts analysed in hegemonic/indexing studies was unclear 
when this analysis took place. Consequently, this study had to judge the hegemony of 
the NYT s coverage along with the hegemony of the British media, rather than just 
comparing the British media to a definitely hegemonic NYT. 
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This study proposes that the NYT's Kosovo coverage was similar both to their 
coverage of the Vietnam War and Central American wars, as set out by Hallin and 
Bennett, and the more `plural' views of the media coverage set out in recent studies 
by Zaller and Chiu, Althaus and Entman, whose revisions of Hallin's hegemony and 
Bennett's indexing are arguably more about differences in samples, expectations, 
methodologies and interpretations than the actual media content. In line with 
hegemonic theory, the content analysis found the NYT was generally supportive of 
Clinton and the Nato campaign, predominantly used US government and Nato sources 
and few American anti-war sources, reported the conflict from the US government 
and Nato perspective in line with the moral humanitarian intervention frame, did not 
offer any sustained criticism of Nato which challenged their framing, and was more 
positive in its evaluations of Nato than any of the British media sources. When we 
look back at Hallin's Vietnam War study, there does not seem to be much difference 
in the conclusions he made, and the conclusions from the evidence of the Kosovo 
Conflict in this study. The premises of Nato's Kosovo campaign basically always 
stayed in the sphere of consensus, as the Vietnam War did for most of its duration, 
and it was only the tactics that were deemed to be within the sphere of legitimate 
controversy, and thus open to criticism. The law and order frame dominated again, 
and the KLA's part in fuelling the civil war prior to the Nato campaign was largely 
omitted from the narrative; civilian casualties caused by Nato were also ultimately 
accepted as necessary accidents, while the Serb politicians and military were framed 
as being intent on causing wanton death and destruction, and so were placed firmly in 
the sphere of deviance. 
The negative news for Nato in the NYT coverage did not seem to exceed that found 
by 
Hallin in the Vietnam War coverage; there was questioning of Nato information, but 
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no concerted effort to challenge the view that the system was working. There were 
criticisms of the Nato campaign, and regular images of the civilian casualties and 
destruction caused by Nato bombs, but as Hallin pointed out in the Vietnam coverage, 
the critical reporting was mostly about tactics, or individual issues, rather than of the 
government-military system, and the decision to use war instead of dialogue. These 
NYT criticisms could be interpreted as being supportive of the cascade model, in 
contrast to the Indexing hypothesis, although it was difficult to analyse how 
independent the media were of politicians in their criticisms, because there was also 
consistent political criticism of the Nato campaign from the start. The NYT criticisms 
certainly did not seem any more virulent than in the Vietnam War, or any more hostile 
to the administration than the political criticism; on the contrary, the editorials often 
offered the Nato leadership `guidance' on how to endure and win the campaign. 
7.1.4. The UK media findings 
So, with the NYT's Kosovo coverage found to be generally similar to that found in 
previous American studies on its reporting of the US at war, and with it being 
hegemonically high to medium in comparison to the British media sources, what does 
that mean for the British media in consideration to previous theory? The quantitative 
evaluation suggested the NYT coverage was most similar to The Times and 
Independent coverage in Kosovo. The Telegraph was more hegemonic than the NYT, 
while the Guardian and FT seemed to be much less hegemonic. The Independent has 
also taken up a much more critical stance since the Kosovo Conflict, and along with 
the Guardian editorially opposed the Iraq war; this suggests the UK media has more 
plurality than the US media, because at least two quality UK newspapers seem more 
likely to offer criticism of government than one of the most liberal US newspapers. 
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The media did report the conflict from all sides to a certain extent, and included 
prominent and regular criticisms of Nato when their campaign was faltering, or their 
bombs went astray. Where evidence of a disproportion in representation was found, 
such as in the focus on people and use of sources, it did not seem to be for propaganda 
reasons, as the evaluations of the Nato leaders were often negative, and this would not 
have been the case if the media were being propagandistic. As found in previous 
studies on journalists covering their military at war, it seemed to be more of a 
`natural' taking of sides for their country in a war the reporters considered justified; 
the use of we when talking about Nato forces; the relief when Nato military personnel 
returned unscathed from sorties, and the advice for victory and the fear of defeat. 
Rather than metaphorical watch-dogs, attack-dogs or lap-dogs, the media seemed to 
show most similarity to guide-dogs; 340 they knew they were not in control of the task, 
or if they would reach the goal, but they thought they could see the direction they 
should take better. 
Moreover, one of the main criticisms Hallin and Bennett had of the American media 
is that they did not publicise popular opposition in the face of unrepresentative or 
irresponsible institutions; in terms of their Kosovo coverage, the American and British 
media could argue they had not needed to do this, because as some of the journalists 
interviewed made clear, their coverage was quite reflective of public and political 
opinion, and in their view the government had not acted in an unrepresentative and 
irresponsible manner; so a more vigorous media criticism of the government and Nato 
campaign would have been unjustified. Although Bennett's democratic ideal expects 
340 In their analysis of the UK/US media coverage of the Iraq War, read during the final stages of this 
thesis, Nick Couldry and John Downey came to a similar conclusion about The Times' coverage of the 
coalition military campaign, as they wrote it often appeared `to see itself as coach of a somewhat 
disorganised team. ' N. Couldry., and J. Downey., War or peace?: legitimation, dissent, and rhetorical 
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the media to fill a vacuum when there is elite consensus, can the media really be 
expected to provide a balanced coverage when their military is at war, most of the 
political and public opinion supports the campaign, and most journalists and editors 
do too? 
Although reading an editorially pro and anti war paper during the Sunday papers 
analysis did seem to provide a more balanced and informed view of the Nato 
campaign, making sure this happens in the future would mean controlling the editorial 
and journalistic opinion of the free press, which goes against the liberal democratic 
tradition; as Althaus pointed out: `If the press is truly independent, it must logically 
have the option to agree as well as oppose. ' 341 Although there was prominent 
political opposition to the Iraq war in 2003, the fact that the Guardian and 
Independent editorially opposed the British involvement in the war suggests their 
support or opposition for wars is through choice rather than elite pressure or slavish 
patriotism. The question could be asked: Should editors and journalists be expected 
to support views they do not agree with, or use sources they do not believe? Although 
some critical theorists would argue they already do this, in serving their organisation 
or country. 
However, if hegemony is accepted as the media being unconsciously influenced by 
their ideology to use official sources supportive of the government policy, and to 
report the news in a way that benefits the government, then there is a good case for 
considering the British media coverage of Kosovo hegemonic, as the media mainly 
relied on government and Nato official sources for their news, with little use of 
independent sources, anti-war campaigners, or even opposition politicians. This 
closure in press coverage of the Iraq war build-up, in S. Allan., and B. Zelizer., op. cit, pp. 266-282, p. 
269. 
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meant they generally reported from the Nato perspective. Criticism was also 
generally kept to the tactics used by Nato, and not the fundamental justification for 
launching the bombing, which was a central theme of Hallin's criticisms of the 
American media in Vietnam. The UK media's Kosovo coverage therefore did not 
fundamentally differ to the NYT's Vietnam War coverage, and even the coverage of 
the IoS, which was editorially anti-war, only really seemed to differ from the other 
sources in its editorials and opinion columns. Tumber and Palmer also found a 
similar coverage in the Guardian during the Iraq War, with the paper being editorially 
anti-war not changing the generally positive framing of the war for the coalition in the 
papers, as UK and US sources dominated the contested discourse. In Gramscian 
terms, the UK and US were still controlling the media `commonsense, ' even if the 
outcome of their actions was often beyond the boundaries of what anybody would call 
sane in a civilised society. The results therefore concurred with other analyses on 
British conflict reporting which found the media relied heavily on official sources, 
and reported from their country's perspective, while occasionally criticising aspects of 
the military campaign, and offering the enemy's opinion. For example, in this regard 
the findings are not dissimilar to those of the GUMG in their Falklands War analysis, 
where Eldridge stated they had found journalists had `a set of professional [media] 
practices, which while valuing the principle of independence, relies heavily on official 
sources for its news.... it does result in tight limits on the amount of dissent that can 
take place outside those parameters especially in a time of crisis... '342 
In addition to the quantitative analysis results, the interviews seemed to confirm the 
accuracy of this description of the media's relationship with politicians and the 
military, as the interviewees were aware they relied on Nato sources, but did not think 
341 S. Althaus., op. cit, p. 402. 
309 
they had much option, as they did not consider reliable sources to be in abundance. 
Paradoxically, they were also aware that the Nato sources were trying to manipulate 
and deceive them. Within their ideological work values of objectivity, balance and 
accurateness, the journalists thought that as long as they attributed the information to 
their sources, and criticised Nato when relevant, there was nothing wrong with using a 
majority of government sources. Moreover, some journalists thought the usual anti- 
war `mavericks' were not really worthy of regular prominent access anyway, as their 
opinions were expected, and therefore not `news'. So the journalists' views are 
almost completely at odds with those of theorists like Hallin and Bennett, who think 
the media should be using a wide variety of sources in a conflict, and offering a 
balanced perspective for all sides. This therefore suggests the hegemonic and 
indexing findings are correct about the media's limited source use, but that the 
journalists do not agree with the basis of the criticisms, and consider their system of 
reporting what the main players in the conflict are saying is the best available. A 
couple of journalists did admit this was not ideal, but saw little alternative. 
Newspapers can create an interest in an issue and should provide a certain amount of 
balance and context, but they are not monthly magazines or documentary films, and 
therefore cannot be expected to provide complete backgrounds and context on new 
conflicts, and their participants, each issue; providing new and interesting information 
to their readers is a necessity for their survival in a competitive industry, and that 
means they often have to rely on using uncorroborated information and speculative 
analysis. While this leaves them open to manipulation by propagandists, as long as 
they inform the readers that the information is not necessarily true and factual, can we 
expect more from them? These factors should be taken into consideration for future 
34 J. Eldridge., News, Truth and Power, op. cit, p. 10. 
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analyses of the media covering their military at war, before the media are accused of 
being propagandists on the one hand, or unpatriotic on the other. However, that does 
not mean that any departure by the news media from a commitment to establishing a 
truthful account of conflicts should be accepted, or the research spotlight on media 
performance dimmed; if the media want to consider themselves working within the 
liberal democratic tradition, then they should make sure they provide the public with 
accurate information on why their military is sent to war, and informed opinion on 
whether the campaign is justified. 
7.2. Framing 
Remembering Goffman's original definition of framing; that reporters' understanding 
of the world precedes the stories they write about, `determining which ones reporters 
will select and how the ones that are selected will be told, '343 it was obvious that most 
British journalists had a particular framework of understanding for Nato's Kosovo 
campaign when it started; this basically revolved around symbolism from Britain's 
good history in World War Two and the Serbs' bad history from the earlier Balkans 
wars in the 1990s. Once the media accepted the `Moral War' frame, they almost 
seemed to have felt obliged to continue supporting the Nato campaign, even though 
many journalists and writers considered their campaign to have made the situation 
worse, and wondered if it would succeed. Milosevic and the Serb military had been 
evaluated as being the cause, and were thus ultimately responsible for the escalating 
humanitarian crisis and death toll. The fact that the Guardian and Independent later 
editorially opposed the Iraq War, which was a more traditional ground war, and had 
less of an immediate humanitarian rationale, suggests those papers could have been 
influenced by the `hegemonic shift' in the use of British military forces for 
311 
humanitarian reasons during Nato's Kosovo campaign, and that is why they 
editorially supported Nato's intervention. 
Recollecting Wolfsfeld's unequal wars meta-frames, the British media consistently 
framed the Nato campaign as a necessary humanitarian intervention in line with the 
law and order frame, in reaction to the ethnic-cleansing of a weaker people by a 
powerful aggressor with superior military capabilities. The opposite frame the Serbs 
tried to promote, including the injustice of the Nato campaign, and how they were 
victims as they had been in World War Two, did not receive much attention, and a 
competitive Serb counter-frame to Nato's did not become established in the UK 
media and NYT. Although there were regular articles sympathising with the Serb 
civilians, the blame for their plight was still usually attributed to Milosevic anyway, 
within the Nato framing of the conflict: Nato were fighting a humanitarian war for the 
majority in Kosovo; Milosevic had started the conflict, and had the opportunity to 
stop their campaign, and he was therefore responsible for Serb casualties. There was 
not much change in any of the media sources' perspectives as the Nato campaign 
continued, whether they were pro or anti war. Concerning the Nato media operation, 
and remembering Wolfsfeld's assertion that the `success of the law and order frame 
depends on the ability of the authorities to keep the moral spotlight squarely on the 
challenger. An alternative story line about the brutality of the powerful is always 
available from the news shelf... '; 344 it must be considered a success in the media 
sources analysed, because through the repeated juxtaposition of references and images 
of Milosevic, the Serb military and the ethnic-Albanian civilians, it limited the effects 
of increasing collateral damage on media and public opinion in the second half of the 
343 E. Goffman., op. cit, p. 14. 
344 G. Wolfsfeld., op. cit, p. 141-2, and 185. 
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conflict, and kept the `moral spotlight' for the humanitarian crisis on Milosevic and 
the Serb military. 
Those UK journalists and writers opposed to the Nato campaign, or worried about its 
effectiveness, invoked the Vietnam War more than Suez, perhaps suggesting that in 
this regard the length and intensity of Vietnam, together with it being a media war 
taking place in most journalists' lives, meant it had a higher cognitive significance for 
most journalists than the shorter Suez conflict, which had taken place before most 
journalists and the modern media were born, even though Suez was a national conflict 
and Vietnam was not. 345 However, it could also have been that the journalists thought 
their readers would recall Vietnam more than Suez, due to it being the subject of 
many Hollywood films, and therefore a more powerful cognitive tool. 
7.3. Contribution to methodology 
7.3.1. Introduction 
This thesis can be defended by stressing the main research was a comprehensive 
quantitative analysis containing several media sources, variables, categories, 
hypotheses and analyses; and it was backed up by a qualitative content analysis and 
interviews. This triangulation does not mean that the findings are irrefutable, but it 
does provide a solid basis for defence of the thesis and interpretations. The benefit of 
a multiple quantitative analysis investigation were confirmed when it prevented some 
conclusions being made that might have led to a different view of the media coverage 
than the one reached at the end of the study. By using a multiple investigation open to 
analysing all aspects of the media coverage that might bring a negative reaction from 
345 This would be in line with arguments made by Hallin and Gitlin, who believe that a conflict needs to 
be of a certain length and significance to become a part of the national psyche. See D. C. Hallin., and T. 
Gitlin., The Gulf War as Popular Culture and Television Drama, in W. L. Bennett., and D. L. Paletz., 
op. cit, pp. 149-166. 
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the audience, this study's methodology and interpretive framework is more in line 
with recent studies by Zaller and Chui, Entman, and Althaus, who have used a wider 
research perspective to identify media criticism of their government and military's 
decisions during conflicts involving their nations" military, than that used in previous 
studies by Hallin, Bennett and Mermin, who focused their methodology and 
interpretations on the media's use of sources, and whether there were criticisms of the 
whole military campaign. 
The coding scheme became more intricate as aspects of the media coverage that had 
not been evident at the start of the research affected theoretical views and assumptions. 
Some of these factors became apparent early in the research, and were included in the 
daily media analysis, while others did not become apparent until later, and were only 
included in the research on the Sunday papers, or the additional analysis that is 
included as appendix five. Below are some observations on the value of the different 
variables that should be of some benefit to future communications researchers. 
7.3.2. Variable contributions to the thesis 
Main People and Evaluation 
The Main People variable provided evidence of what people and organisations the 
media focused their attention on, and in line with hegemonic theory showed that most 
of the media sources focused the vast majority of their coverage on the Nato leaders 
and ethnic-Albanian civilians; this focus generally supported Nato's framing of the 
conflict as a humanitarian intervention. However, adding an Evaluation variable to 
the analysis showed the Main People analysis would have been misleading without 
looking at whether the people's coverage was positive or negative; because although 
the media sources frequently featured Nato elites and the military, their evaluations 
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were often negative. This suggests the coverage of the main people by the media was 
for professional and ideological reasons rather than propaganda. 
Main Source 
The source variable provided several good analyses that helped to provide a 
comprehensive account of the sources used by the media during the Nato campaign. 
This is one of the most important aspects of the hegemonic media model, and the 
findings supported previous research that has found the media rely too much on their 
government and military as sources during military conflicts involving their nation's 
military, and this often allowed the Nato sources to control the framing of the main 
articles on the front pages. The official sources used were also found to be 
overwhelmingly positive towards the Nato campaign. Out of all the aspects of the 
media analysed in this study, a wider variety of source use would probably be the 
most recommended improvement, as this would provide the audience with a more 
balanced view of the conflict, and the opportunity to evaluate the conflict from 
outside the national frame promoted by the government and military. 
Focus: Diagnoses and Prognoses 
Including diagnoses from throughout the Nato campaign seemed to make the variable 
more useful, and also balanced its results out against the prognosis variable in terms 
of its use; as after the early part of the conflict the media are more likely to look for 
solutions to the conflict than analyse its causes, and if an analysis investigates quite a 
long conflict, there is likely to be much more prognoses than diagnoses in the media 
coverage. Also, looking at the diagnoses and prognoses of the writers' articles that 
did not include sources allowed the analysis to identify the views of those writing 
without direct influence from sources. This showed there was little difference 
between articles with or without sources, and if anything the articles without sources 
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were less hegemonic in that they were more escalationist; this suggests the writers 
were not overly influenced by official sources in their support for the Nato campaign, 
and goes against the hegemonic model and indexing theory presumption that 
journalistic support for conflicts is heavily influenced by official sources. 
However, although both variables proved useful, their categories could also have been 
made more precise. For example, a differentiation could have been made between 
whether all diagnoses and prognoses were those of the writer, or the overall message 
contained in the article, as this was not always clear. The diplomacy category was 
also too vague, and should really have been split into positive and negative diplomacy 
articles and opinions for Nato, as this would have made the comparative analysis 
between positive and negative categories more accurate. 
Format: Episodic or Thematic 
The findings from this analysis were that most of the newspaper content was thematic 
rather than episodic, and the articles reported the news from a variety of locations, 
rather than focusing on the national agenda. Previous work on episodic and thematic 
reporting has argued that episodic coverage is more likely to result in hegemonic 
coverage, but this study found that whether it was episodic or thematic did not have 
much relevance, and it was the content of the articles that was important. Articles on 
Nato collateral damage were a good example of this, as they were usually episodic, 
but were also very negative for Nato; although a more thematic analysis of the causes 
might have had some relevance, it is difficult to see how they could have had more 
impact and influence than the episodic articles, with their graphic descriptions and 
images of the dead and injured. 
Historical References 
Splitting the historical references variable into positive, negative and neutral for 
Nato 
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and the Serbs helped to make the results more accurate for assessing the hypothesis, 
as the interpretations did not have to rely on generalisations about whether the 
previous conflict was positive or negative for the people referred to in the article. 
Including Nato and the Serbs in the analysis also meant the findings looked more 
balanced than they might have done if only the Serb references had been analysed, as 
although the Serbs' references were very negative, the Nato references were also more 
negative than positive; the latter was not expected, and prevented the historical 
references looking propagandistic. The cross-tabulation analysis with the Main 
Source variable also showed which references were the writers' own historical 
references, and this allowed an insight into their thought processes and ideology. 
However, a more precise analysis could have identified exactly which historical 
references were those of the writer, and which were from sources, as this was not 
clear in this analysis; because as long as there was a source in the article it meant the 
cross-tabulation analysis identified the historical reference with that source even if the 
main source had not used it. 
Images 
Although the images were generally more positive towards Nato than the Serbs, it did 
not seem to be done for propaganda reasons, as there were regular images of Nato 
collateral damage incidents on the front pages, and some of them were disturbingly 
graphic; this cast doubt on the arguments of those theorists who consider the images 
used by the media during war are mainly to depict heroism and promote patriotism. 
The Damage by Nato category was split up into positive and negative for Nato in the 
Sunday papers analysis, and it is unfortunate that this separation was not thought of 
until after the daily media analysis had been completed, as had been done for the Nato 
military personnel and Nato armoury categories, where only the positive references 
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were included. 346 Other image categories, such as ethnic-Albanian civilians and Serb 
civilians, could also have been divided into positive and negative, as their use did not 
always concur with their reason for inclusion in the coding system. 
Furthermore, the Damage by Nato category could also have been divided into six 
categories: Nato damage intended positive, neutral and negative, and Nato damage 
unintended positive, neutral and negative; to separate Nato hits and misses, and 
whether they were reported positively, neutrally or negatively for the Nato campaign. 
This is because some of their hits, such as the pharmaceutical factory, were sometimes 
reported negatively, because of the effect they had on the surrounding area; while 
some of their misses, such as Korisa, were sometimes reported positively, because the 
newspapers believed the Serbs had used human shields. Those images that were 
connected to the Nato bombing, such as the protests after the Chinese embassy 
bombing, could also be taken into consideration when assessing how the newspapers 
covered the damage caused by Nato bombs, because their omission might lead to the 
conclusion that the `story' did not run for as long as it did, even if the news reporting 
moved on to a related aspect. Moreover, without interviewing those who made the 
decisions on what photographs to include, we cannot determine conclusively why the 
photographs were included: whether they were just the best photographs to sell papers; 
or if they were included to call for an end to the war, or the introduction of ground 
troops. 
Position and Date 
The position and date variables made possible several analyses that brought additional 
insights into the main variables discussed above. The position variable crossed with 
346 An analysis in line with the above recommendations was made on the Guardian and Times ethnic- 
Albanian and Damage by Nato images from across the Nato campaign, and the results are included in 
appendix 5. 
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other variables helped identify if Nato were able to control the front page coverage, or 
if the media featured negative articles and images for Nato prominently. The date 
variable crossed with other variables showed how the media coverage changed over 
the two halves of the Nato campaign. The counting of lines and articles also provided 
accurate evidence about the depth of the reporting, and how it changed over the 
different halves of the campaign. 
7.3.3. The Sample: Media Sources 
The eight media sources analysed gave a good breadth of perspectives for analysis 
and comparison. The five daily media sources from the UK provided a combination 
of perspectives for analysis: some were more conservative, traditional and right-wing, 
while others were more liberal, critical and left wing; some had a more domestic focus, 
and others more international. It was rewarding to see how the different concerns of 
each media source became apparent in the content analysis, and their individual 
perspectives and distinctiveness were revealed. 
While all the daily media sources were editorially supportive of the Nato campaign, 
all also had elements of reporting that supported the plural model: the Independent 
and NYT had journalists like Fisk and Erlanger giving voice to the Serb perspective on 
the front pages, and exposing Nato collateral damage very critically; The Times had 
mostly anti-war columnists; the FT had an international outlook, and the coverage of 
the Guardian and Telegraph, which are the most diverse media sources in their 
traditional political support, often showed similarities in their criticism of the Nato 
strategy. The two Sunday papers provided an additional perspective, focusing on 
whether an editorially anti-war newspaper would be more in line with critical media 
theory's view of an ideal newspaper. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Nato, MoD and British Government information coding sheet 
Number 
I 
Variable 
Case number 
Categories 
1-76 
2 
3 
4 
Date 
Subject 
Historical 
reference 
01/04 - 27/04 
(1) Nato conference 
(2) Nato conference political only 
(3) MoD conference 
(4) Statement made outside conferences by a British politician 
(1) World War One 
(2) World War Two 
(3) Vietnam 
(4) Gulf War 
(5) Serb-Croat war 
(6) Bosnian War 
(7) Russian-Chechnyan war 
(8) Rwandan war 
(9) Israel-Palestinian war 
(10) Turkey-Kurds war 
(11) Cambodia 
(12) Others 
5 Diagnosis (1) Ground war is Serb aggression 
(2) Ground war is an unavoidable civil war 
(3) Ground war is Milosevic's fault 
(4) Ground war is the KLA's fault 
(5) Collateral damage is Serbs' fault 
(6) Collateral damage is Milosevic's fault 
(7) Collateral damage is Nato's fault 
(8) Refugees are Serbs' fault 
(9) Refugees are Nato's fault 
(10) Refugees are KLA's fault 
(11) Refugees are Milosevic's fault 
(12) Nato campaign is Serbs' fault 
(13) Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault 
(14) Nato campaign is KLA's fault 
(15) Nato campaign is Nato's fault 
(16) Nato campaign is unavoidable 
(17) Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy 
(18) Nato campaign is working 
(19) Nato campaign is not working 
(20) Others 
6 Prognosis (1) Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands 
(2) Nato should negotiate with Milosevic now 
(3) Send in ground troops 
(4) Continue the air campaign 
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(5) War criminals must be brought to justice 
(6) Arm the KLA 
(7) Nato must remain united 
(8) Divide the Serbs 
(9) Stop the bombing 
(10) More humanitarian aid 
(11) More diplomacy 
(12) No ground troops 
(13) Embargo 
(14) Others 
7 Main People 
featured 
(1) British government 
(2) British military 
(3) American government 
(4) American military 
(5) Nato hierarchy 
(6) Collective Nato military 
(7) Russians positive 
(8) Russians negative 
(9) Slobodan Milosevic 
(10) Other Serb politicians 
(11) Serb military 
(12) Serb civilians 
(13) Ibrahim Rugova 
(14) KLA 
(15) Kosovar Albanian civilians 
(16) The media 
(17) Other politicians and diplomats 
(18) Others 
8 Main topic (1) Nato helping the humanitarian situation 
(2) Relief agencies helping the humanitarian situation 
(3) Work of neighbouring countries helping the humanitarian situation 
(4) British soldiers involvement in helping the humanitarian situation 
(5) Personal stories of the refugees 
(6) Amount of refugees 
(7) Nato military attacks in general 
(8) British involvement in military attacks 
(9) Unity of Nato 
(10) War crimes by Serbs 
(11) Bringing the Serbs to justice 
(12) War crimes by the KLA 
(13) The economic ramifications 
(14) Diplomacy 
(15) The media 
(16) Public opinion 
(17) Political opinion 
(18) Collateral damage 
(19) The ground war 
321 
Appendix 2: The media coding sheet 
should be sent in 
These are the variables and categories included in the daily media analysis, which was 
greatly expanded from the official sources analysis. As explained in the methodology 
section, some small changes were made for the analysis of the NYT, Telegraph, and 
Sunday papers. 
Number Variable Categories 
1 Case number 1-2500 
2 Date 25/3 - 11 /6 
3 Media source (1) Financial Times 
(2) Guardian 
(3) Independent 
(4) The Times 
(5) Telegraph 
(6) New York Times 
(7) Independent on Sunday 
(8) Sunday New York Times 
4 Lines 1-1000 
5 Format of 
Presentation 
(1) Episodic: writer in UK 
(2) Episodic: writer in Yugoslavia and borders 
(3) Episodic: writer elsewhere 
(4) Thematic: writer in UK 
(5) Thematic: writer in Yugoslavia and borders 
(6) Thematic: writer elsewhere 
6 Position of story 1-40 
7 Image (1) Tony Blair 
(2) Other Government politician/MoD spokesperson/Foreign Office 
(3) Conservative politician 
(4) Other British politician 
(5) British soldiers in positive picture 
(6) British military armoury in positive picture 
(7) Jamie Shea 
(8) Other Nato spokesperson or hierarchy 
(9) General Nato soldiers in positive picture 
(10) General Nato military armoury in positive picture 
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(11) Bill Clinton 
(12) Other American Democrat politician 
(13) American Republican politician 
(14) Slobodan Milosevic 
(15) Other Serb politician 
(16) Serb military 
(17) Serb civilians 
(18) Russian military 
(19) Boris Yeltsin 
(20) Other Russian politician 
(21) Ibrahim Rugova 
(22) KLA 
(23) Kosovar Albanian civilians 
(24) Humanitarian workers 
(25) European politicians 
(26) Kofi Annan 
(27) Writers in UK 
(28) Writers in Yugoslavia 
(29) Writers elsewhere 
(30) Damage from Nato 
(31) Damage from Serbs 
(32) Damage from ethnic-Albanians 
(33) Damage from unnamed source 
(34) Map 
(35) Others 
8 Historical 
reference 
(1) World War One Serbs positive 
(2) World War One Serbs negative 
(3) World War One Nato positive 
(4) World War One Nato negative 
(5) World War One neutral 
(6) World War Two Serbs positive 
(7) World War Two Serbs negative 
(8) World War Two ethnic-Albanians positive 
(9) World War Two ethnic-Albanians negative 
(10) World War Two Nato positive 
(11) World War Two Nato negative 
(12) World War Two neutral 
(13) Suez Nato positive 
(14) Suez Nato negative 
(15) Suez Serbs positive 
(16) Suez Serbs negative 
(17) Suez neutral 
(18) Vietnam Nato positive 
(19) Vietnam Nato negative 
(20) Vietnam Serbs positive 
(21) Vietnam Serbs negative 
(22) Vietnam neutral 
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(23) Cold War Nato positive 
(24) Cold War Nato negative 
(25) Cold War Serbs positive 
(26) Cold War Serbs negative 
(27) Cold War neutral 
(28) Falklands War Nato positive 
(29) Falklands War Nato negative 
(30) Falklands War Serbs positive 
(31) Falklands War Serbs negative 
(32) Falklands neutral 
(33) Gulf War Nato positive 
(34) Gulf War Nato negative 
(35) Gulf War Serbs positive 
(36) Gulf War Serbs negative 
(37) Gulf War neutral 
(38) Desert Fox Nato positive 
(39) Desert Fox Nato negative 
(40) Desert Fox Serbs positive 
(41) Desert Fox Serbs negative 
(42) Desert Fox neutral 
(43) Serb-Croatia war Nato positive 
(44) Serb-Croatia war Nato negative 
(45) Serb-Croatia war Serbs positive 
(46) Serb-Croatia war Serbs negative 
(47) Serb-Croatia war neutral 
(48) Bosnian war Nato positive 
(49) Bosnian war Nato negative 
(50) Bosnian war Serbs positive 
(51) Bosnian war Serbs negative 
(52) Bosnian war Bosnian Serbs positive 
(53) Bosnian war Bosnian Serbs negative 
(54) Bosnian war ethnic-Albanians positive 
(55) Bosnian war ethnic-Albanians negative 
(56) Bosnian war neutral 
(57) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Nato positive 
(58) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Nato negative 
(59) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Serbs positive 
(60) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war Serbs negative 
(61) Israel-Palestine/Turkey-Kurds war neutral 
(62) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Nato positive 
(63) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Nato negative 
(64) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Serbs positive 
(65) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars Serbs negative 
(66) Russian-Afghanistan/Chechnyan wars neutral 
(67) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Nato positive 
(68) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Nato negative 
(69) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Serbs ositive 
(70) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions Serbs negative 
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(71) Cambodia/East Timor/Rwanda/non interventions neutral 
(72) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Nato positive 
(73) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Nato negative 
(74) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Serbs positive 
(75) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions Serbs negative 
(76) Grenada/Panama/Haiti/ successful interventions neutral 
(77) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Nato positive 
(78) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Nato negative 
(79) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Serbs positive 
(80) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions Serbs negative 
(81) Somalia/unsuccessful interventions neutral 
(82) Others 
9 Main source cited (1) Tony Blair 
(2) Other Government politician, Whitehall, Foreign Office or British 
spokesperson: conference cited 
(3) Other Government politician, Whitehall, Foreign Office or British 
spokesperson: conference not cited 
(4) British non-affiliated expert 
(5) Nato spokesperson or hierarchy from press conference 
(6) Nato spokesperson or hierarchy, press conference not cited 
(7) Conservative politician 
(8) American Democrat politician or Pentagon spokesperson 
(9) American Republican politician 
(10) American non-affiliated expert 
(11) Slobodan Milosevic 
(12) Other Serb politician 
(13) Serb military 
(14) Serb civilians 
(15) Russian military 
(16) Boris Yeltsin 
(17) Other Russian politician 
(18) Ibrahim Rugova 
(19) KLA 
(20) Kosovar Albanian civilians 
(21) Humanitarian workers 
(22) European politicians 
(23) Writer themselves 
(24) Other British media 
(25) American media 
(26) Other Nato countries' media 
(27) Tanjug/official Serb media 
(28) Free Yugoslav media 
(29) Neutral media 
(30) Humanitarian workers (put in as 21) 
(31) European politicians (put in as 22) 
(32) Other British politician 
(33) Opinion polls 
(34) Others 
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10 Diagnosis (1) Ground war is Serb aggression 
(2) Ground war is an unavoidable civil war 
Issues: (3) Ground war is Milosevic's fault 
1-4 Ground war (4) Ground war is the KLA's fault 
5-8 Collateral Damage (5) Collateral damage is Serbs' fault 
9-12 Refugees (6) Collateral damage is Milosevic's fault 
13-18 Nato campaign (7) Collateral damage is Nato's fault 
19-20 Working or not? (8) Collateral damage is KLA's fault 
(9) Refugees are Serbs' fault 
(10) Refugees are Nato's fault 
(11) Refugees are KLA's fault 
(12) Refugees are Milosevic's fault 
(13) Nato campaign is Serbs' fault 
(14) Nato campaign is Milosevic's fault 
(15) Nato campaign is KLA's fault 
(16) Nato campaign is Nato's fault 
(17) Nato campaign is unavoidable 
(18) Nato campaign is because of bad diplomacy 
(19) Nato campaign is working 
(20) Nato campaign is not working 
11 Prognosis (1) Milosevic must give in to Nato's demands 
(2) Nato should negotiate with Milosevic now 
(3) Send in ground troops 
(4) No ground troops 
(5) Continue the bombing 
(6) Change the bombing strategy 
(7) Stop the bombing 
(8) Divide the Serbs 
(9) Arm the KLA 
(10) Beware of the KLA 
(11) Diplomacy 
(12) Nato must remain united 
(13) Sanctions 
(14) War criminals must be brought to justice 
(15) More humanitarian aid 
12 Main people 
featured 
(1) Tony Blair 
(2) Other Government politicians 
(3) Conservative politicians 
(4) Other British opposition politicians 
(5) Collective British politicians 
(6) British military at war 
(7) British military doing humanitarian work 
(8) Bill Clinton 
(9) Other American democrat 
(10) American Republican 
(11) American military at war 
(12) American military doing humanitarian work 
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(13) Collective Nato hierarchy 
(14) Collective Nato military at war 
(15) Collective Nato military doing humanitarian work 
(16) Nato/MoD media operation 
(17) Slobodan Milosevic 
(18) Other Serb politicians 
(19) Serb military 
(20) Serb civilians 
(21) Boris Yeltsin 
(22) Other Russian politician 
(23) Russian military 
(24) Ibrahim Rugova 
(25) KLA 
(26) Kosovar Albanian civilians 
(27) Humanitarian workers 
(28) European politicians 
(29) Kofi Annan/United Nations 
(30) Environmental groups 
(31) Financial groups 
(32) Anti-war groups 
(33) Balkans countries 
(34) British civilians 
(35) American civilians 
(36) British media 
(37) American media 
(38) Other Nato countries' media 
(39) Serb media 
(40) Free Yugoslav media 
(41) Neutral media 
(42) Others 
Missing value (99) 
13 Evaluation of 
people or 
organisation 
(1) Positive 
(2) Neutral 
(3) Negative 
14 Number of positive British political, Whitehall, Foreign Office and MoD sources 1-20 
Number of negative British political, Whitehall, Foreign Office and MoD sources 1-20 
Number of neutral British political, Whitehall, Foreign Office and MoD sources 1-20 
Number of positive international official sources 1-20 
Number of negative international official sources 1-20 
Number of neutral international official sources 1-20 
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Appendix 3: Letter to request interviews with 'ournalists on the Kosovo Conflict 
media coverage 
Date 
Name and Address of recipient 
Dear Recipient 
I am a doctarate student at the University of Leeds, researching the British media 
coverage of Nato's Kosovo Conflict campaign. I have compared the coverage of the 
(in alphabetical order) Financial Times, Guardian, Independent, Telegraph and The 
Times; and have also included the New York Times to provide an additional 
comparison between the UK and US media. 
Having conducted my desk research on the media, I would now like to conduct 
interviews with prominent journalists involved in the Kosovo Conflict to receive their 
opinions on the Nato campaign, and media coverage. The information gained from 
these interviews will hopefully allow me to provide an informed overall 
representation of the British media coverage of Nato's campaign, and to take into 
account professional realities, and the difficulties media professionals face in 
reporting wars involving their country's military. 
I would therefore like to meet you for an interview, or conduct an interview by 
telephone if it is more convenient for you, in the next few weeks. I look forward to 
hearing from you. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Marc Latham 
Institute of Communications Studies 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
icsmll cr, leeds. ac. uk 
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Appendix 4: Interview questions 
These are some of the questions the journalists were asked; as they were semi- 
structured interviews the questions varied with each interviewee. 
Nato conferences and spin 
How did you view the information provided: did New Labour and the Democrats' 
reputation for spin make journalists more wary of accepting it? 
Did you become more sceptical or trusting during the campaign? 
Did you think Campbell's media operation improved the Nato presentations? 
What was the atmosphere like at the presentations; was there much hospitality? 
Shea said afterwards he thought they had tamed the media in the second half of the 
conflict, did you see the relationship as adversarial? 
Do you think Kosovo will be remembered as the war of spin? 
Do you think Kosovo increased media cynicism for recent wars? 
Influences on the media's view of the Kosovo Conflict 
Other countries saw the conflict differently; why do you think the UK saw it the way 
it did? 
How much did previous wars influence your view of the Kosovo Conflict? 
Did the humanitarian aspect make you view it differently? 
How do you view the Nato campaign now; was it a success? 
News Culture: The media relationship with management, politicians and the 
public 
How much pressure is there for you to conform to the management/political outlook 
of your paper? 
New Labour called for patriotism from the media during the Nato campaign; do you 
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think journalists can balance their nationality and professionalism in times when their 
military is at war? 
How much coverage of opposition information and negative news do you think the 
media are obliged to provide to the public? 
Do you feel you have any obligation to the public, to balance the power of 
government, like the watchdog role in America, and how do you think British 
broadsheets compare to the American, like the NYT? 
How important is front-bench opposition for the media to be critical of their military 
at war? 
How important is public opinion to your reporting? 
How much does ideology (history, culture and background) influence reporting? 
Why are historical references used by journalists? 
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Appendix 5: Results of the analysis of Guardian and Times images using an 
improved coding system. 
These are the results of a secondary analysis on the Guardian and Times images 
during the Nato campaign, including all the dates between March 25th and June 10 0, 
1999. Only ethnic-Albanians that looked positive for the Nato campaign were 
included (one photo that was omitted was of two ethnic-Albanians changing money 
on a city street), and only actual damage from Nato images were included (there were 
a few images of Chinese protests after the embassy bombing that were left out). 
For the research, firstly, the totals for ethnic Albanian civilians; and total, positive and 
negative Damage by Nato images were counted up, before two analyses were 
conducted; by first splitting the amounts up into the two halves, as in the main 
analysis, and then into before and after the reorganisation of the Nato media operation 
and end of the Djakovica convoy coverage, which was identified as April 20th. The 
percentages of each categories' second time section coverage in comparison to the 
first were then worked out, and a ratio calculated of the amount of coverage between 
ethnic-Albanian civilians and Damage by Nato images total, positive and negative, in 
the second time section as compared to the first. The results are featured in the tables 
below, starting with the two Guardian tables, and then the two Times tables. Those 
four tables are then followed by one comparing the two media sources' coverage. A 
short summary of the findings then follows. 
Guardian Ethnic Total Positive Negative Ratio Ratio 
Albanians damage EA- EA- 
Total neg 
Total 64 54 20 39 1.19: 1 1.64: 1 
First half 37 34 10 24 1.08: 1 1.54: 1 
Second 27 20 5 15 1.35: 1 1.8: 1 
half 
2° half 73% 59% 50% 63% 1.24: 1 1.15: 1 
Percentage 
of ist half 
Table A. 1. Amount of images for ethnic-Albanians as comparea to vamage oy i'aw 
in the second half of the conflict in comparison with the first 
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Guardian Ethnic Total Pos Neg Ratio EA- Ratio 
Albani- damage Total Nato EA- 
ans damage Nato 
damage 
Negative 
Total 64 54 15 35 1.19: 1 1.83: 1 
Pre-MOC 27 28 8 20 1: 1.03 1.35: 1 
reorganisation 
Post-MOC 37 26 7 19 1.68: 1 2.46: 1 
reorganisation 
Percentage and 137% 79% 88% 75% 1.73: 1 1.83: 1 
ratios after 
MOC 
reorganisation 
Table A. 2. Amount of images for Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanians after the 
Nato explanations for Djakovica had ended on April 20th 
Times Ethnic Total Positive Negative Ratio Ratio 
Albanians damage EA- EA- 
Total neg 
Total 88 38 18 20 2.32: 1 4.4: 1 
First half 68 33 16 17 2.06: 1 4: 1 
Second 20 5 2 3 4: 1 6.67: 1 
half 
2° half 29% 15% 13% 18% 1.93: 1 1.61: 1 
Percentage 
of 1st half 
Table A. 3. Amount of images for Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanians in the 
second half of the conflict in comparison with the first 
Times Ethnic Total Positive Negative Ratio Ratio 
Albanians damage EA- EA- 
Total neg 
Total 88 38 18 20 2.32: 1 4.4: 1 
Pre-MOC 53 27 12 15 1.96: 1 3.53: 1 
reorganisation 
Post-MOC 35 11 6 5 3.18: 1 7: 1 
reorganisation 
Percentage and 66% 41% 50% 33% 1.61: 1 2: 1 
ratios after MOC 
reorganisation 
Table A. 4. Amount of images for Damage by Nato and ethnic-Albanians after the 
Nato explanations for Djakovica had ended on April 20th 
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Media Nato damage Nato damage to Nato damage Nato damage 
Source to E-A drop E-A drop in negative to EA negative to E-A 
in 2nd half post- Djakovica drop in 2°d half drop in post- 
images eriod ima es D'akovica eriod 
Guardian 1.24: 1 1.73: 1 1.15: 1 1.83: 1 
Times 1.93: 1 1.61: 1 1.61: 1 2: 1 
i awe A. -ý). Ratios of second section coverage as compared to the first 
The results show there did seem to be an improvement for Nato in the second half as 
compared to the first, and in the post re-organisation of the Nato media operation 
period when compared to the pre re-organisation period. It had been hoped that 
splitting Damage by Nato into positive and negative would have solved the problem 
of ambiguity, and brought one-hundred per-cent clarity, but this was not found to be 
the case once the analysis was underway, as there were some images that were 
ambiguous in whether they were positive for Nato or not, and whether the targets had 
been intended to be hit by Nato or not; an example is the pharmaceutical factory that 
caused an environmental crisis; as it may have been an intended target, but was 
generally given a negative coverage. In contrast, unintended damage, such as the 
Korisa collateral damage incident, could receive a positive coverage when the media 
believed the Nato assertions that the Serbs had used human shields. 
In this analysis, images were simply included as positive if they had economic 
relevance, and negative if they did not, but if future analyses want to be more accurate, 
the category could be split up further, with the choice of categories expanded to: 
Damage by Nato intended positive; Damage by Nato intended negative; Damage by 
Nato intended neutral; Damage by Nato unintended positive; Damage by Nato 
unintended neutral and Damage by Nato unintended negative. This would not only 
allow the researcher to compare how the accurate and inaccurate bombing, and 
intended and unintended targets were reported, but also to get a more accurate idea 
about how often Nato collateral damage was critically reported in comparison to other 
categories. However, this would still leave images covering the consequences of Nato 
collateral damage, such as protests, outside the analysis, and they should also be taken 
into account in any analysis that is specifically analysing the coverage of collateral 
damage in comparison to another category. So, although this is a more precise coding 
system to that included in the main analysis, it could still have been made more 
specific for a more accurate analysis. 
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